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Summary of the Research 
 
 
The literature on strategy formation in the human services sector is relatively unex-
plored when examined against the backdrop of research on power from the industrial sector. 
The present research examines power strategy formation of employees in a mental health 
organization that went through a long separation from a psychiatric hospital. The central 
questions addressed were: What kinds of strategies emerge when there is turbulent organiza-
tional change? How do the employees deal with the turbulent events in terms of power 
strategies? How are their power strategies similar or different? What relational power pat-
terns emerge around the power strategies? 
To understand power strategy formation, a perspective using an interdisciplinary 
power games and relations perspective is advocated. Power strategy formation takes place at 
the surface level of organizations, where actors manipulate power sources to confront others 
in order to gain their compliance, to avoid resistance, and to prevent the emergence of con-
troversial issues that become dilemmas for them. Strategy formation also occurs on a deeper 
level, where actions of personnel are coded with cultural values, beliefs, and practices that 
often are an unperceived part of organizational functioning.  
This research relied on semi-structured interviews, historical documents, limited par-
ticipant observation, and the researcher’s personal experience working in the organization. 
Using a qualitative research approach, the analysis of the interviews compared staffs from 
different hierarchical levels as well as their veteran or newcomer status in the organization. 
Six hundred references to sources of power and nearly one thousand references to power 
strategies were compiled from transcripts of staff interviews. 
The present research provides evidence for including cultural identity as a source of 
power in organizations. Also, the analysis found that higher-ups do not always have more 
access to power sources, depending on the historical context and the values and beliefs of 
other participants. 
The research explored twelve surface and four deep level strategies. The uneven dis-
tribution of strategies across hierarchical groups is viewed as a reflection of differing access 
to power sources and of historical context. Senior managers placed more emphasis on deep 
level strategies than team leaders, therapists, and clerical staffs. Senior managers focused on 
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formal or structural sources of power and strategies and somewhat on cultural identity 
around issues of hiring. Middle managers, for their part, described themselves as sandwiched 
between levels and avoided the crossfire or tended to go to outside sources for support. 
Therapists, for their part, anchored themselves to the past to thwart change efforts and exer-
cised psychological distance. The fourth hierarchical group, clerical staffs, played a more pe-
ripheral role and showed little engagement in power games. There was very little reliance on 
strategies that exert high social pressure such as coercion and reprimands by any of the 
groups due to the already high levels of turbulence. 
Comparisons between newcomers and veteran staffs in the organization showed 
fewer differences than between hierarchical levels, although newcomers resorted more to 
deep level strategies. Veterans anchored themselves to the past while newcomers could not 
invoke the past in their strategies. Senior managers, who tried to break radically with the past 
engendered a feeling in veteran staffs that their skills and experience were not needed nor 
wanted.  
The data provided evidence that deep level strategies supplemented weakened power 
bases at all levels, although more evidently in the senior managers and therapists levels. Val-
ues and beliefs at the deep level acted as a catalyst to counteract surface level strategies, par-
ticularly when there were organizational history and cultural dynamics involved. The model 
of analysis helped understand the contrast between how senior managers focused on the fu-
ture and how therapists countered this by anchoring themselves to past history. 
The research provided empirical evidence that power strategy formation occurred at 
every level of the organization, regardless of position or rank. This challenges the traditional 
notion that strategy formation is for top management only. The study collected detailed in-
formation about strategy formation at the micro level in a human service organization, and it 
identified possible indications of problem spots. The literature from the industrial sector was 
found to be a valid starting point for study of power strategies in the human services sector. 
 The research affirms the importance of an interdisciplinary approach to the study of 
power strategy formation, where power is studied from many sources of information and 
from different angles. The power relations and games perspective that was used to study 
power strategies in this research epitomizes the interdisciplinary aspects of the field.  
Résumé de la recherche 
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La littérature sur la formation des stratégies de pouvoir dans le secteur des services 
humains est relativement inexplorée par rapport à celle qui traite du pouvoir dans le secteur 
industriel. C’est dans cette optique que la présente recherche examine la formation des stra-
tégies de pouvoir dans une organisation de santé mentale qui vient de vivre une scission 
mouvementée avec un hôpital psychiatrique.  
 En effet, l’organisation étudiée était un centre de santé mentale en voie de séparation 
administrative et organisationnelle complète d’un hôpital psychiatrique. Depuis plusieurs an-
nées, l’hôpital faisait face à des pressions de la communauté pour assurer une plus grande 
présence communautaire. Certains groupes culturels, pour leur part, réclamaient le contrôle 
des services par leur population. Suite à une proclamation du gouvernement ontarien, une 
nouvelle organisation a été formée, chacun des groupes culturels ayant son propre conseil 
consultatif dépendant d’un conseil administratif central. 
Les questions centrales de la recherche furent donc les suivantes : quels genres de 
stratégies émergent quand il y a un tel changement organisationnel? Comment les employés 
réagissent-ils à ces événements en termes de stratégies de pouvoir? En quoi leurs stratégies 
sont-elles semblables ou différentes? Quels modèles de relations de pouvoir émergent autour 
des stratégies? 
 Pour bien comprendre les stratégies de pouvoir, une analyse interdisciplinaire utili-
sant la perspective des relations et des enjeux de pouvoir est préconisée. La formation des 
stratégies a lieu à deux niveaux : à un premier niveau, plus évident, où les acteurs manipulent 
des sources de pouvoir dans leurs relations avec les autres et leurs actions par rapport aux 
autres, et, à un deuxième niveau, plus profond et subtil, où les stratégies des personnes sont 
nuancées par leurs valeurs culturelles, leurs croyances et leurs pratiques, qui passent souvent 
inaperçues dans le fonctionnement organisationnel. 
 La partie empirique de cette recherche exploratoire s’est basée sur une étude 
d’employés appartenant à quatre niveaux hiérarchiques de cette organisation. Les quatre 
groupes avaient en commun la séparation organisationnelle de l’hôpital psychiatrique, un en-
vironnement politique mouvementé, et tous travaillaient à l’amélioration des services répon-
dant aux besoins de santé mentale des enfants, des adolescents et des familles de la région. 
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Par contre, des contrastes existaient au niveau des responsabilités et des rôles des groupes, de 
leur autonomie professionnelle et de leur formation. Nous avons aussi comparé les groupes 
d’employés selon leur ancienneté (les nouveaux venus et les anciens) dans l’organisation. 
Pour la cueillette des données, nous avons utilisé des entrevues semi-structurées, des 
documents historiques, fait une observation participante limitée, et utilisé notre expérience 
personnelle dans l’organisation étudiée. Utilisant une approche qualitative, l’analyse des en-
trevues a comparé les stratégies de pouvoir selon leur appartenance hiérarchique et selon leur 
ancienneté. Les quatre groupes étaient constitués de trois personnes de la haute direction, de 
trois chefs d’équipe (cadres intermédiaires), de dix-huit thérapeutes et de trois secrétaires. Il y 
a eu en tout vingt-huit entrevues. Celles-ci ont révélé que les employés étaient très préoccu-
pés par les enjeux de pouvoir entre les membres de l’organisation. A cet effet, la littérature 
fait état de huit sources de pouvoir, ignorant la dimension de l’identité culturelle. C’est jus-
tement ce dernier point généralement ignoré que cette recherche met en lumière. De même, 
contrairement aux croyances générales, ceux qui sont au sommet de la hiérarchie n’ont pas 
toujours un accès plus facile aux sources de pouvoir. 
La recherche a exploré douze stratégies au premier niveau (surface level) et quatre stra-
tégies au deuxième niveau (deep level).  La répartition inégale des stratégies dans les groupes 
hiérarchiques relève de l’accès différencié aux sources de pouvoir, du contexte historique, et 
des valeurs et croyances des personnes impliquées. L’analyse révèle que les membres de la 
haute direction ont mis l’accent sur le pouvoir formel, notamment sur les politiques et pro-
cédures, les lignes de communication formelle, et l’identité culturelle pour justifier certaines 
pratiques d’embauche. Les chefs d’équipe, pour leur part, se sont décrits comme “coincés” 
entre les autres niveaux. Ils ont évité les tirs croisés et ont eu tendance à aller chercher des 
alliances à l’extérieur. Les thérapeutes, quant à eux, ont utilisé le passé pour contrecarrer les 
efforts de la direction, qui voulait faire croire que seulement ce qui était nouveau était sou-
haitable; ils ont aussi entretenu une certaine distance psychologique. Le quatrième groupe, 
celui des secrétaires, a joué un rôle plus périphérique et a fait preuve de peu d’engagement 
par rapport aux enjeux de pouvoir. Aucun groupe n’a mis l’accent sur les stratégies compor-
tant des contraintes et des réprimandes. Les résultats ont souligné que la haute direction avait 
davantage eu recours plus aux stratégies de deuxième niveau que les autres groupes.  
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Les anciens ont profité de leur connaissance approfondie de l’organisation et de son 
histoire pour imposer leurs stratégies, dimension que les nouveaux venus n’ont pu intégrer 
dans les leurs. Les directeurs ont essayé d’exercer un contre-pouvoir en promouvant l’idée 
que tout changement était désirable et qu’il fallait se départir des habitudes et des pratiques 
du passé. Les données ont démontré que les stratégies de deuxième niveau augmentaient ou 
renforçaient les sources de pouvoir au premier niveau lorsqu’elles étaient affaiblies, quel que 
soit la position dans l’hiérarchie. Les valeurs et les croyances à ce niveau ont agi comme cata-
lyseur pour contrecarrer les stratégies de premier niveau. Le modèle d’analyse utilisé a aidé à 
comprendre le contraste entre les stratégies de la direction, visant le “nouveau”, et celles des 
thérapeutes qui ont tiré profit de leur connaissance du passé de l’organisation. 
La recherche a mis en évidence que la formation des stratégies se produisait à tous 
les niveaux de l’organisation. Cela défie la croyance générale selon laquelle la formation des 
stratégies de pouvoir serait une fonction de la haute direction. L’étude a rassemblé et analysé 
des données au niveau micro-relationnel de l’organisation et a identifié des indicateurs possi-
bles de problèmes organisationnels. Le modèle d’analyse utilisé a révélé une scission entre le 
mandat de la haute direction, qui était de mettre sur pied une toute nouvelle organisation, et 
les efforts et stratégies des autres niveaux pour maintenir les pratiques passées. 
En terme de contributions théoriques et méthodologiques, nous reconnaissons qu’il 
y a une complémentarité entre les différentes approches théoriques des organisations, cha-
cune apportant un éclairage particulier. La littérature sur le changement dans les organisa-
tions industrielles cite souvent l’importance de dépasser les questions d’histoire organisa-
tionnelle pour amorcer le changement. La présente recherche révèle que des dynamiques 
semblables existent également dans le secteur des services humains. La littérature du secteur 
industriel peut être utile comme point de départ pour étudier une organisation tel un centre 
de santé mentale communautaire. 
En conclusion, cette recherche affirme l’importance d’une approche multi-
dimensionnelle et interdisciplinaire pour l’étude de la formation des stratégies de pouvoir. 
L’analyse a démontré que la structure organisationnelle, son contexte, son histoire et son dé-
veloppement, les composantes relationnelles entre les niveaux hiérarchiques, les relations 
entre les anciens et les nouveaux, et les valeurs et croyances des personnes impliquées intera-
gissent et jouent ainsi un rôle déterminant dans la formation des stratégies de pouvoir. 
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L’analyse des stratégies des premier et deuxième niveaux est essentielle pour comprendre les 
enjeux de pouvoir dans les organisations. 
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Glossary 
 
 
 
Actor. A person (or group of persons) who participate(s) in an action and that has interests 
in common with others to carry out that action. 
 
Alignment. A grouping of persons based on joint action against other groups. Similar to 
coalitions. 
 
Coalition. A temporary alliance of persons which involves the joint use of resources for 
promoting a common organizational interest. Similar to alignments. 
 
Influence. The capacity to pressure certain actors without necessarily having authority over 
them. Influence exists on a continuum with power. 
 
Game. A mechanism that actors use to structure and regulate their power relationships with 
others while preserving some freedom to act in their own best interest. Games imply inter-
dependence between actors. 
- 
Power.  The potential of an actor to influence behavior, to change the course of events, to 
overcome resistance, and to get people to do things that they would not otherwise do. 
 
Strategy. A pattern of actions over time; streams of actions through which power is organ-
ized, exercised, maintained and enhanced. 
 
Strategy formation. The activation of persons who are in interaction around the manipula-
tion of sources of power in different levels of an organization. 
 
Tactic. An action that is goal-oriented. Exists on a continuum with strategies. 
 
Uncertainty. A condition that exists when there is lack of information about future events, 
so that alternatives and their outcomes are unpredictable. 
 
Zone of uncertainty. An area of uncertainty for actors that are manipulated by others to 
gain benefit. 
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C h a p t e r  O n e 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
“Power is America's last dirty word. It is easier  
to talk about money — and much easier to talk  
about sex — than it is to talk about power.” 
Rosabeth Kanter (1979) 
 
 
This research pertains to the study of power and strategy-making by employees in a 
mental health organization. Research on power has often been difficult because it raises ap-
prehension in many persons (Kanter, 1979; Mintzberg, 1983; Summers, 1986; Friedberg, 
1993). Power also is difficult to analyze because it is an elusive and “messy” concept (Frost, 
1987). It is difficult to describe and analyze, in part because it is multifaceted by nature, hav-
ing visible characteristics and hidden ones “whose interrelations must be teased out if one is 
to fully grasp their meaning” (Frost, 1987, p. 505). Because power is not an easy subject to 
tackle, researchers often study organizations from the outside or from a distance. Mintzberg 
(1983, p. 3) points this out well when he says, “Until recently, power … was not quite a re-
spectable topic for research. Few researchers were inclined to knock on the organization’s 
door and announce ‘I’m here to find out who has the power in this place’.” Also, we still lack 
the knowledge on how to use power even if much has been written about it.  
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“Our ambivalence about power, and the fact that training in its use is far 
from widespread, mean that members of organizations are often unable to 
supplement their formal authority with the ‘unofficial’ processes of power 
and influence. As a result their organizations suffer, and promising projects 
fail to get off the ground. This is why learning how to manage with power is 
so important.” (Pfeffer, 1992b, p. 29) 
 
While this ambivalence about how to use power is widespread in private and multi-
national corporations, it also extends to human service organizations such as mental health 
centers. These organizations are not immune to power and political processes because they 
bring people together in relationships that involve power. 
 
1.1 WHY STUDY ORGANIZATIONS THROUGH POWER? 
In Images of Organization, Gareth Morgan (1986) suggests that theories about organiza-
tions arise from the images or metaphors people have about them. Some authors, for exam-
ple, portray organizations as machines and bureaucracies that are designed as interlocking 
parts, with each part playing a defined role. Other authors describe organizations as organ-
isms having a life cycle, as cultures defined by the values, norms and rituals, as instruments 
of domination, and as political entities, where the focus is on conflicts and power plays that 
shape activities in the organization. Each of these perspectives, to name only a few, helps us 
understand organizations from a different angle. 
The political or power perspective is useful for the study of organizations for several 
reasons. First is the recognition that power is an everyday part of organizations. As Mintz-
berg (1983) says, 
“although there are many other, more tangible forces that affect what organi-
zations do such as the buying habits of clients, the invention of a new ma-
chine, an upturn in the economy, power is a major factor, one that cannot be 
ignored by anyone interested in understanding how organizations work and 
end up doing what they do.” (p. 1) 
 
Mintzberg continues by saying that to improve our organizations and to ensure they 
act in our best interests, we must understand the power relationships that occur within them. 
This is echoed by Bacharach and Lawler (1980, p. 1) who state that “survival in an organiza-
tion is a political act… [O]rganizational life is dominated by political interactions”.  
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Also, Morgan (1986) and Friedberg (1993) say that all interactions between humans 
in organizations are, at least in part, related to power, and that power cannot be ignored be-
cause it permeates all organizations. According to Morgan, “an analysis of organizational 
politics in terms of the interplay among rival interests, conflicts, and sources of power can 
help us understand these forces of endogenous change” (p. 196).  
Other authors, such as Gargiulo (1993) support this.  
“Since March and Simon's (1958) influential book, the political image of the 
business firm has been a key component in organizational theory… . To un-
derstand [how decision makers overcome constraints on their ability to exer-
cise discretion], one must first understand how differences in power arise 
among organizational actors.” (p. 1)  
 
Friedberg (1993) provides further reason for the study of power:  
“Power is not an abnormal, pathological, or unhealthy phenomenon. To the 
contrary, it is a natural manifestation of human cooperation… Power is eve-
rywhere; it is part of our everyday actions. Instead of hiding ourselves from 
what is a normal dimension of human cooperation, we must accept its omni-
presence to be in a better position to control its consequences.” (p. 116, 
translation.) 
 
Because organizations are human constructs (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977; Fried-
berg, 1993), and because people exercise power through a relationship (Bacharach and 
Lawler, 1980; Friedberg, 1993), analysis using a power perspective allows us to examine the 
human side and functioning of organizations. This is not to say that all human interactions in 
organizations can be reduced to power and politics, or that those individuals constantly seek 
power. As Friedberg (1993) points out, however, to exclude the study of power would result 
in an incomplete picture of organizations. 
 
1.2 MOTIVATIONS FOR THE RESEARCH 
This research project grows out of the researcher’s personal interest for understand-
ing the daily life of organizations, especially those that have undergone long periods of 
change and that are still dealing with the effects of power and turbulent change. The organi-
zation studied (a Northern Ontario mental health center) is an organization that has con-
tinuously experienced turbulent change events that have been menacing to its employees 
over the past few years, particularly in the period 1990-1993. It is an organization that, after 
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several years of heated discussions and negotiations at the local and provincial levels, split 
from the local psychiatric hospital in 1990 to form an independent corporation. The new 
corporation was an organization of 48 staff, with the mandate of offering community-based 
children’s mental health services through four satellite clinics in the city. The satellite clinics 
were divided along English, French, Native, and multicultural lines and situated in areas of 
the city with high concentrations of their respective ethnic or cultural groups. For many of 
the new organization’s employees, the question of power remained intimately tied to the tur-
bulence before, during, and after the organizational separation because they were continually 
involved in power struggles since the mid 1980’s.  
“Turbulent change” is an expression that has been chosen over others such as “evo-
lutionary change” and “radical change” because it originates in the field or is grounded in the 
experiences of the participants, rather than originating purely in theory (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967). The employees interviewed in the present research used the term frequently, and both 
they and the researcher found it easy to understand and relate to. Briefly stated, change may 
range from predictable and non-threatening (little turbulence), as in situations where one 
knows about coming events and outcomes, to situations where coming events are com-
pletely unfamiliar and where results are unknown (high turbulence) (Ansoff, 1978). In terms 
of practical application, turbulent change is characterized by its menacing nature to employ-
ees (job security, role, working conditions, leeway in job, etc.) and their inability to formulate 
clear short-term and long-term goals and to define the means to attain these goals. In turbu-
lent settings, unplanned activities and behaviors often replace standard procedures and poli-
cies. Solutions and decisions often precede recognition of the problems to which they might 
be applied (Van de Ven, 1980). Thus, turbulence goes hand in hand with uncertainty and 
instability in an organization. This definition of turbulence is useful because it focuses not 
simply on the content or type of change individuals and groups in organizations are going 
through, but also on the behavior and interactions of the actors involved in change. 
The turbulence discussed in this research encompasses all levels of turbulence, from 
small predictable change (both positive and negative) to the completely unpredictable. The 
changes in the organization studied represent an important shift in the structure of the deliv-
ery of intervention services to children and their families in the community. More impor-
tantly, they also triggered a series of dynamics that made employees very apprehensive about 
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any further changes in their organization, even if these changes were promoted as positive. 
Any talk about change, for example, instantly raised anxiety and issues of power and mis-
trust. Several employees at different levels of the organization even described their agency as 
“sick” because of the accumulation of turbulent events that they continued to experience at 
the time of this study. One of the participants in the present research summed this up well 
when she said, “I wish I could figure out what’s going on in this organization so that I can 
get on with my work”. It also struck the researcher as meaningful that most staffs were pre-
occupied by old “skeletons” that they felt still lurking in the hallways of their new organiza-
tion. Thus, strategy formation not only related to the types of changes that occurred but also 
the perceptions of these changes by the involved actors. 
The availability of an organization that the researcher knew well and that had experi-
enced such changes thus presented an excellent opportunity to carry out this research. Ob-
servations concerning the constant focus on power issues, maneuvering, and complicated 
personal relations between the employees raised many questions about the effects of accu-
mulating turbulent events on them. They also led to questions about how they dealt with 
power struggles in terms of strategies when there is so much uncertainty surrounding them. 
It was ironic that the staffs did not understand why there were so many dysfunctional inter-
actions and conflicts in the agency over issues of power and control, despite their strong 
skills, training, and experience in analyzing such processes in the individuals and families they 
treat. The researcher was intrigued at how they would sometimes collaborate with each 
other, while at other times purposefully not cooperate, and how they would work both di-
rectly and in concealed ways against the formal structures of hierarchy and authority of the 
organization.  
Thus, employees of the mental health center were often caught up in power struggles 
within their organization. The strategies used by employees, or their strategic behaviors as 
Friedberg (1993) would put it, were not totally accounted for by existing theory. Strategies, 
as defined in this research and commonly in the literature, are a pattern of behaviors occur-
ring over time through which power is organized, exercised, maintained, and enhanced 
(Frost, 1987). There is a tremendous gap in current research and knowledge on power strat-
egy formation, despite much attention in the literature to the subject of power. Bacharach 
and Lawler (1980, p. 4) emphasize this when they say, “it is not power that has remained un-
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examined but rather the patterns of intraorganizational politics… No political perspective 
has been developed for analyzing the internal workings of organizations as political sys-
tems”. Also, formal models of strategy formation in organizational theory, social psychology, 
and political science provided little explanation of these processes, especially since few of 
them addressed the dynamics of staffs in human service organizations, let alone mental 
health centers. Their focus on management levels of organizations provided only a narrow 
perspective and little understanding of the strategic behavior of employees at other levels of 
the organization. They also did not explain the interaction of the strategies between the dif-
ferent levels. Hart (1992, p. 327) supports this in stating that “associated empirical work has 
covered such a wide range of considerations that little cumulative knowledge has resulted. A 
conceptualization that is capable of providing a framework for ongoing research is lacking”. 
Power strategy formation, as it is being studied in this research, addresses members 
at all levels of organizations, from clerical staffs to middle management to executive levels. 
The research is not specifically aimed at examining union-management relations, although 
many dynamics around this were observed. Rather, the focus is to examine the dynamics be-
hind the formation of power strategies when turbulent change occurs in human service or-
ganizations. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The present study aims to provide an exploratory empirical analysis of power strat-
egy formation in a human service organization, from the perspective of employees who have 
experienced cumulative turbulent change. The research will focus on the dynamic process of 
strategy-making through an interdisciplinary perspective, with particular emphasis on the 
interactional dynamics of power relationships — not just what the actions of people are, but 
how the actions fit with each other into the larger picture. The focus of power in this disserta-
tion is thus on dynamics and processes instead of content and structure. In this research, the 
actions of people will be explored to examine how they act in a given setting.  
The questions that will be addressed in this context-specific study are the following: 
What kinds of power strategies emerge when there is prolonged and accumulating turbulent 
change? How do employees at different levels of the organization (e.g., managers versus 
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front-line staffs) mobilize power in support of their strategies in a turbulent context? How 
are they similar/dissimilar in their use of strategies? What is the relationship of the strategies 
between the different levels? What relational patterns emerge in terms of power strategies?  
Using a hybrid approach based on inductive principles of analysis, the research was 
carried out starting with the experiences of employees having gone through turbulent events, 
rather than testing and measuring prior hypotheses. This approach is particularly fruitful in 
the study of micro-level processes in organizations. As Friedberg (1993) says,  
“without observation of the actions of [a system’s] members, knowledge 
about the system remains in inert form, a form where we cannot appreciate 
its full impact, nor its inertia… All hypotheses about the characteristics of the 
system … can only be shown by the demonstration of their effects in the 
empirical behavior of the actors.” (p. 19, translation) 
 
The examination of the field from a hybrid approach will lead to a better understand-
ing of the nature of the power relationships between the actors in the organization and of 
the process involved in strategy-making in turbulent contexts. This study highlights power 
strategy formation at the micro level, using an interdisciplinary model adapted from several 
other models of organizational analysis. The research methods used for this study relied on 
documentary evidence, semi-structured interviews, and participant observation to gather the 
data. 
Concerning the interdisciplinary nature of this research, studies on organizations are 
at the cross-roads of many disciplines, each of which, for different reasons, has made contri-
butions to our understanding of the structure, functioning, and reasons for the existence of 
organizations. The body of research is as abundant as it is wide and eclectic. In terms of lev-
els of analysis, for example, the microanalysis of individual organizations is paralleled by 
comparisons of processes between large systems or networks of organizations. Methodol-
ogically, approaches are varied, ranging from positivist and statistical to interpretative ap-
proaches.  
While this richness in the literature can be an advantage for research on organiza-
tions, the literature on power is nonetheless fragmented among several fields of knowledge 
that cut across several academic disciplines such as organizational theory, business manage-
ment, sociology, social psychology, political science, anthropology, and organizational com-
munication (Jablin, Putnam, Roberts, and Porter, 1987; Rahnema, 1992; Friedberg, 1993). 
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Findings from one discipline may be unfamiliar to researchers from other fields. They do 
provide a common interest to theorists, however, for analyzing and understanding the be-
havior of people in organizations. Thus, in keeping with the interdisciplinary nature of the 
doctoral program behind the present research, the literature review and the analysis will in-
troduce the reader to different approaches, assumptions, and issues associated with power in 
organizations. Convergences and divergences, and parallels and contrasts of these different 
bodies of research will be examined from a critical point of view.  
In terms of the applied nature of this research, this research is about power that indi-
viduals use and exert in organizations. Also, this research has practical value. Most of us 
work in one form of organization or other. Knowledge about how our individual activities 
fit into the total scheme of these organizations is helpful if we are to survive in them. The 
next chapter will review the theoretical writings related to power and power strategy forma-
tion. 
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C h a p t e r  T w o 
 
Theoretical Framework:  
Interdisciplinary Aspects 
 
 
 
“Power dynamics … are inevitable and needed to make organizations function well.” 
(Kotter, 1979) 
 
“You can’t go to the grocery store and buy ten pounds of power.” 
(Participant #8, Therapist) 
 
 
 
2.1 STRATEGY FORMATION IN INDUSTRY VERSUS STRATEGY FORMATION IN THE 
HUMAN SERVICES SECTOR  
Well-known authors such as Crozier and Friedberg (1977), Bacharach and Lawler 
(1980), Mintzberg (1983, 1989), Pettigrew (1985), Kanter, Stein & Jick (1992), and Friedberg 
(1993) have addressed power strategy formation. Strategy often is viewed as “a pattern in a 
stream of decisions” (Mintzberg, 1989) or as “the set of decisions and objectives regarding 
the range of businesses the firm chooses to operate and the competitive approaches used by 
these businesses” (Summer et al., 1990). Strategy formation, for its part, is the process that or-
ganizational actors use in engaging and manipulating power in and around organizations 
(Friedberg, 1993). 
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There are different types of strategies. Corporate strategies, for example, are con-
cerned with activities such as diversification, mergers and acquisitions. Business strategies, 
on the other hand, deal with issues such as competitive pricing, styling and image, and 
choices about timing and delivery of products. 
While the concept of strategy has widespread application and empirical foundation in 
the industrial and business literature, the literature is not quite so clear about its application 
to public sector organizations such as governments, universities, hospitals and community 
mental health centers. As Mintzberg (1989) states, comparisons between a pub-
lic/professional organization such as a mental health center and an industry like IBM or 
MacDonald’s should not be made without caution. Using Mintzberg’s categories of organiza-
tions, the mental health center in this research is a professional organization different from 
the industrial organizations, on which most of the literature focuses. Briefly stated, a profes-
sional organization relies on the skills and knowledge of its professionals to function. It is 
characterized by employees who have a high degree of education and years of training, who 
are specialists in their field, and whose loyalty and accountability belong to professional asso-
ciations and certification bodies outside the organization. The employees also exert much 
discretion in carrying out their functions, and they work relatively independently from their 
colleagues. This ensemble of characteristics is unique to professional organizations. 
Also, as Rahnema (1992) points out concerning the Canadian context, public sector 
organizations do not have to compete with each other as private organizations do. The in-
centive to become more “efficient” and “productive” than competitors may thus not be as 
strong. Professional organizations such as mental health centers and hospitals in Canada 
tend to be non-profit, and they are often heavily dependent on government funding for their 
existence. The survival of professional organizations does not directly depend on their per-
formance because the measurement of staffs and program performance in hospitals and 
mental health centers is abstract and difficult to measure at best when compared to private 
industries. 
Comparing mandates reveals other differences between the industrial sector and the 
public sector. Profit is the chief motive of corporations such as IBM and MacDonald’s, and 
market forces lead their strategies. This is not the case for human service organizations be-
cause legislation and social needs often define these organizations, and market forces are not 
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a factor. The types of services offered are also quite different. In industrial organizations, the 
final “product” is designed and manufactured by the company for the client. In professional 
organizations like mental health centers, the product is a co-construction between the pro-
fessional and his client. There are thus many differences between professional and industrial 
types of organizations. These differences are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PRIVATE SECTOR  
AND PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 
PRIVATE SECTOR / INDUSTRIAL  
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
PUBLIC SECTOR / PROFESSIONAL  
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 
Examples: IBM, General Motors, chartered 
banks, private enterprise. 
 
Examples: community mental health centers, most Cana-
dian hospitals, voluntary organizations. 
 
Objective: Principal objective is profit; goal of 
management is organizational survival. 
 
Objectives are often vague compared with profit-driven 
organizations; profit cannot be a primary goal; funding 
often guaranteed by government; organizational survival, 
while important, is secondary to fulfilling social mandate. 
 
Emphasis is on measurable output and effi-
ciency. 
 
Production and output are often difficult to measure and 
often shunned as objectives by professionals; efficiency 
recently has become an important concern because of 
financial constraint. 
 
Mandate: defined by profit motives; organiz-
ational strategies led by market forces. 
 
Mandate often defined by legislation and social needs; 
market forces are not a factor because there is little com-
petition. 
 
Risk-taking is an integral part of competitive 
strategy. 
 
Low tendency for risk-taking by executives because of 
nature of services. Professionals exercise much discretion 
in their judgments and actions. 
 
Final product: designed and constructed by the 
organization. 
 
The “product” is a co-construction by the professional 
and his or her client. 
 
Loyalty is to the organization. 
 
Loyalty often to a profession, not necessarily to an organi-
zation. 
 
Cost-benefit analysis used to guide production 
and expenditures. 
 
Cost-benefit analysis just starting to be an important factor 
in government funding of non-profit organizations. 
 
More specifically concerning health care organizations, including hospitals and men-
tal health centers, Fottler (1987) questioned the applicability of general management princi-
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ples to these types of organizations. Fottler found that defining and measuring output is dif-
ficult in such organizations, and that the work involved is highly complex, specialized, and 
requires a high degree of co-ordination among different professional groups. He also found 
that health care organizations use professionals whose primary loyalty belongs to a profes-
sion rather than to the organization, which entails different dynamics of control and author-
ity, and of accountability to the public. Other arguments Fottler brings are that the political, 
legal, and financial environments that confront health organizations require an understand-
ing of complex linkages between systems such as government and large institutions. Fottler 
concludes “the size and uniqueness of health care organizations make them worthy of study 
in their own right. Further, there is the possibility that research findings from other indus-
trial/service sectors may not generalize to the health care sector” (p. 306). Other authors 
such as Luke, Begun and Pointer (1989) who find that existing models of organizations do 
not adequately capture the essence of health care centers support these findings. Picard 
(1980) comes to similar conclusions for the Canadian context. 
According to Rahnema (1992), these difficulties are due in part to very limited litera-
ture on public sector management in general and to research and writings that tend to be 
business-oriented. The author concludes organizational studies for the public sector such as 
hospitals and other government-funded agencies need to find a strong emphasis. This is 
supported by Hasenfeld (1992) who found that “the organizational literature was helpful to a 
broad understanding of the dynamics of social and health agencies, but not too useful for 
illuminating the variant properties and processes of this class of organization” (p. vii). This 
dissertation is a step toward filling this gap in the literature. 
Even within the human services sector, there are differences between the types of or-
ganizations in terms of mandate, philosophy of intervention, structure, and functioning. 
Studies carried out in hospitals in the United States cannot easily be generalized to hospitals 
in Canada because of different social mandates and funding sources, for example. Hospitals 
in the United States are often profit-driven organizations, whereas in Canada, federal and 
provincial legislation prevents them from being run for profit. Also, hospitals and commu-
nity mental health centers, in Canada at least, are governed by two different sets of philoso-
phies. Hospitals function under the medical diagnostic model, while community mental 
health centres are generally less diagnostically oriented. Community mental health centers 
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also are much smaller than hospitals. Smaller size often means that employees potentially 
have easier access to the executive levels of the organization, compared to much larger insti-
tutions where all staffs cannot have access to these levels because of the sheer numbers of 
people and levels of bureaucracy. Other differences include status differences and power dy-
namics between staffs. Medical staffs, for example, generally hold the hierarchical power in 
hospitals, but in community mental centers they rarely have a leading hierarchical role. Medi-
cal staffs often act more as consultants or simply as clinicians in community mental health 
centers rather than holding hierarchical power. Also, the boundaries between professional 
groups are often blurred in community mental health centers because of the overlap of many 
of their functions (e.g., social workers and psychologists often both carry out psychotherapy 
with similar techniques) (Hasenfeld, 1992). 
Concerning the study of strategy formation, these differences imply caution in apply-
ing concepts from settings that are different. Although it is not the goal per se of this research 
to compare different types of organizations, it is possible that there are differences in the 
way that actors design and use power strategies. Crozier, for example, has shown that four 
hospital units had considerable differences in their ways of working and social relations, de-
spite the same structural conditions (in Hassard and Parker, 1993). It can be assumed there-
fore, that in comparing community mental health centers to larger institutions such as 
hospitals, it is possible that the strategies employed around professional expertise differ be-
tween the two types of organizations. These are just hypotheses that are not the object of 
this study, however. They would provide a rich ground for further study.  
Thus, there are limits in using business concepts to study human service organiza-
tions. Since no context-specific literature is available concerning power strategy formation in 
mental health centers, however, the business literature will be examined as a starting point. 
The following sections present the theoretical concepts used in this research. Power 
and strategy formation influence how struggles develop, are managed, and are resolved in 
organizations. The goal of this chapter is to elaborate on the nature of these concepts and on 
the linkages between power and strategy formation. We will first examine the nature of or-
ganizational power, and then discuss the way that power strategies are shaped. The chapter 
ends with a concluding summary of the literature. 
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2.2 WHAT IS "POWER"? 
The literature identifies many definitions of power as it relates to systems such as or-
ganizations. Ouimet (1990), for example, finds that depending on their base discipline (po-
litical science, sociology, psychology, or management sciences), writers do not all view the 
term “power” in the same way. This has led to difficulties when comparing results of differ-
ent studies on power because there is no common language. This lack of coherence reflects 
both the complexity of power and the divergent backgrounds of researchers on the subject. 
The approach in this chapter is to emphasize and integrate important insights from the gen-
eral organizational literature and to come to an understanding of how it can be applied to the 
human services sector.  
Before embarking on an overview of the concept of power, it is noteworthy that 
there are sometimes distinctions made between power and influence. As Frost (1987) states, 
confusion between the terms often leads to a “semantic jungle”. Kanter (1977), McCall 
(1979) and Mintzberg (1983), however, see little benefit in differentiating the terms because 
this provides little information in studying power. “It is an unrealistic separation of the phe-
nomenon to consider the power a person has separately from the power (s)he actually uses” 
(McCall, 1979, p. 188). Following the lead of these writers, power and influence are viewed 
in a continuum according to the amount of pressure one is able to bring to bear on the target 
of his or her influence, not in terms of two separate processes. For the purposes of this re-
search, there will be no further distinction between the two. 
We will now discuss a typology of the diverse theoretical approaches dealing with 
power, partly based on Ouimet (1990), that will give a better understanding of the evolution 
and the meaning of the concept. There are two broad clusters of definitions of power, which 
are the individual approach, concentrating on the characteristics of individuals, and the relational 
approach, which puts the focus on the dynamics between individuals. Ouimet identifies a third 
cluster, the systemic approach, where power is not an individual nor a relational attribute but an 
attribute of a system. This third cluster has not been retained for several reasons. First, many 
of the dimensions in the systemic approach overlap dimensions in the other two perspec-
tives, especially the relational approach. Second, power is not exercised by systems, as the 
systems approach would have us believe. Persons exercise it in a system. This approach also 
depersonalizes power by removing it from the human level. Individuals and groups are thus 
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ignored. Since the goal of this research is to examine the way individuals behave in organiza-
tions, it would not be appropriate to carry the discussion at a non-human level. 
Thus, we will retain two principal clusters of definitions, the individual and relational 
approaches. Because researchers often build upon the findings of other studies, the dimen-
sions of some of these approaches overlap one another. The categories are not mutually ex-
clusive. Table 2 summarizes these dimensions. 
 
Table 2 
CLASSIFICATION OF THE DIMENSIONS OF POWER 
INTO TWO CLUSTERS 
 
 
  PERSPECTIVES OF POWER  
  AND THEIR PRINCIPAL DIMENSIONS 
 
EXAMPLES OF  
LEADING RESEARCHERS 
 
 The Individual-Psychological Perspective
 
• power means the ability to affect the behavior of an-
other person 
• power can be formal or informal 
• power is a function of personality and situational factors 
• power compensates for feelings of inferiority  
• power exists in actual and potential forms 
• power resides in the hands of its possessor 
• power is used to satisfy needs 
 
 
 
 
• Dahl (1957) 
 
• Mechanic (1962) 
• Kaplan (1964) 
• Adler (1966) 
• Wrong (1968) 
• Berle (1969) 
• McClelland (1970) 
 
 The Relational Perspective
 
• power originates in interpersonal exchanges 
• there are five bases of power: rewards, coercion, au-
thority,  expertise, reference 
• an individual’s power rests on the possession, control, 
and tactical use of the five bases of power. 
• power derives from the contingencies facing an organi-
zation 
• power derives from the dependency of actors on others 
• power derives from manipulating zones of uncertainty 
between actors 
• sources of power must be scarce, essential, and non-
substitutable 
• power reflects jockeying for control to advance inter-
ests 
 
 
 
 
• Lewin (1951) 
• French & Raven (1959) 
 
• Pettigrew (1975) 
 
• Salancik & Pfeffer (1977) 
 
• Bacharach & Lawler (1980) 
• Crozier & Friedberg (1977) 
 
• Mintzberg (1983, 1989) 
 
• Kanter, Stein & Jick (1992) 
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2.2.1 The individual-psychological perspective of power 
The individual-psychological perspective (or the substantivist perspective as Fried-
berg, 1993, calls it) views power as being an attribute of the individual and that it is human 
nature to seek power. Power resides in the hands of its possessor (Berle, 1969). For some 
authors, the search for power is a compensatory mechanism that seeks to counterbalance 
feelings of inferiority (Adler, 1966). Power thus appears as a correction to a human defi-
ciency. As Ouimet (1990) outlines, however, power is also defined as the capacity of an indi-
vidual to manipulate his or her environment to obtain desired results. Various authors have 
written extensively on power in fields as diverse as systemic family therapy (Haley, 1969) and 
organizational study (Kanter, 1977), arguing that power is the capacity to obtain something, 
and this capacity depends on the understanding or perception that the detainer of power has 
of his or her environment.  
Dahl (1957), who proposed one of the earliest definitions of power, saw the study of 
the concept of power as a “bottomless swamp” because of its complexity. Dahl nonetheless 
proposed a definition of power which today remains one of the most quoted definitions: “A 
has power over B to the extent that s/he can get B to do something that B would not other-
wise do”. This definition leaves us with little tangible material to identify and to research is-
sues around power, however. Also, in Dahl’s view, power seems to be exercised only when a 
person affects the behavior of the other, whether it be from a forceful way or from simple 
persuasion. Unused or potential power seems ignored. Another criticism that can be brought 
against Dahl’s definition of power is that power relationships involve more than individual 
or psychological characteristics. Power exercised by a group or department, for example, is 
ignored by Dahl. 
Another often cited author, David Mechanic (1962), defines power as “any force that 
results in behavior that would not have occurred if the force had not been present” (p. 351). 
Based on Dahl’s work, Mechanic found that “lower participants” exercised considerable per-
sonal power and influence in their organizations even though they had no formal authority. 
Citing examples from many types of organizations, Mechanic theorized that power resulted 
not only from authority (“formal power”) but also from access and control over persons and 
information, replaceability of persons, and personal attributes (“informal power”). The no-
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tion of informal power has been supported by other authors such as Bennis, Berkowitz, Af-
finito and Malone (1958), who pointed out that power does not always reside in established 
positions of authority in organizations. Power remains a characteristic of the individual in 
this perspective, however. 
Kaplan (1964) is another author emphasizing the psychological aspects of power. 
Kaplan focuses on personality, and he argues that power can be reduced to acts of individu-
als, and that individual acts are always a function of personality. Kaplan introduces the no-
tion of the environment by stating that situational factors can also influence power. The 
concept of relationship, however, is absent. 
  Wrong (1968), for his part, distinguishes between potential power and actual power. 
While a person can have actual power through authority or hierarchy, s/he also can have 
potential power, that is, power that exists without using it. Such power depends on the sub-
jective perception of other persons that potential power can and will be used when neces-
sary. Thus, not all power relationships are authority relationships. Power can exist even when 
left dormant, bringing to light the subjective perception of power. Wrong’s contribution that 
an individual can control sources of power by examining the expectations and perceptions of 
others, is thus an important one. It is also important because it expands on the purely indi-
vidual view to include some environmental elements. 
Concerning other writings on power, the psychological and social-psychological lit-
erature on leadership, motivation, and satisfaction roots itself in the individual-psychological 
perspective that behavior is motivated and controlled by the quest for rewards and approval. 
McClelland (1970), for example, analyzes power in terms of needs satisfaction, implying that 
people have a need that can only be met by controlling or exerting influence on others. 
McClelland views power as having two contrasting aspects. The first aspect, the personal 
propensity of power, incites individuals to engage with others where gain is at the expense of 
others. This form of power shows a state of psychological immaturity where the individual is 
centered solely on himself or herself. The second aspect of power, its social or positive side, 
on the other hand, incites the individual to engage with others where all parties gain. The 
individual is concerned with collective gain because s/he puts at the disposition of others his 
or her power to help them reach their objectives. Winter (1973), for his part, finds that the 
propensity of individuals to satisfy needs is driven by the reach for objectives. This propen-
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sity can be measured in individuals by examining their thoughts, visualizations and the 
themes that arise when they are confronted with the notion of power (Ouimet, 1990). 
Thus, the individual-psychological perspective of power views power as within the 
individual, also as the capacity of an individual to obtain things from others. These lead to a 
principal criticism of this view, however, as it emphasizes that individuals simply possess 
power. Because power is viewed as an individual attribute, this approach overplays the im-
portance of psychological factors, ignoring the effect of environmental factors such as strong 
political and economic constraints. We know little of the interaction between various levels 
of factors (individual, organizational, social, cultural, etc.) that combined, comprise power. 
This perspective also fails to discuss organizations as systems, implying that power exists 
only in a static dimension, not as something that is in a constant state of interaction and flux. 
 
2.2.2 The relational perspective of power 
While the individual-psychological perspective of power has received limited support 
in the past, much more has been written recently on the relational dimension of power. This 
perspective, which shows a significant shift from prior theories, identifies power as a social 
relationship (between individuals) rather than strictly an individual attribute (within individuals). 
Power is placed in a situation where there is interaction. For power to exist there must be at 
least two actors (Ouimet, 1990; Friedberg, 1993). Walsh et al. (1981) sum this up well: 
“Power is not something that is formally distributed in the organization, em-
bodied in its structure according to the hierarchy of authority, and possessed 
by individuals and groups. Power characterizes the relationships between in-
dividuals and groups; it is a characteristic of the patterns of interaction within 
an organization. It is something produced and exercised and not something 
possessed.” (p. 133) 
 
As Ouimet (1990) describes, there are variations within the relational perspective of 
power, each with their own focus. The first is a school of thought inspired by Lewin’s (1951, 
1952) force field theory, which sees power as originating in interpersonal exchanges. The 
second focuses on the dependent dimensions of relationships.  
Among the first authors in the interpersonal exchange perspective were French & 
Raven (1959). These authors define power as the maximum influence that A can exert on B, 
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with the influence being the result of two forces created by the actions of A and B. These are 
the force for change desired by A and the force of resistance of B. 
French and Raven also identify five bases of power, which are what power holders 
control that permits them to influence or manipulate the behavior of others. These are re-
ward power, coercive power, legitimate power (authority), power through possessing exper-
tise, and referent power (identification through association with others who possess power). 
The authors examine the effects of these power bases on attraction (the recipient’s sentiment 
toward the person who uses power) and resistance to the use of power. Their research 
shows that using power from different bases has different consequences. Reward power, for 
example, increases attraction and minimizes resistance. Coercive power, on the other hand, 
decreases attraction and causes high resistance. Raven (1965) later identified a sixth source of 
power, namely informational power as distinct from expert power. In more recent writings, 
Raven, Scharzwald and Koslowsky (1998) further differentiated authority power into four 
distinct sources: position power; legitimate reciprocity power (where the target complies af-
ter the initiator has done something positive for the target); legitimate equity power (where 
compliance is demanded to compensate for hard work or harm inflicted on the initiator); 
and legitimate dependence power (based on a norm of social responsibility that obliges a 
person to assist another who is in need of assistance).  
Other research has continued to make further distinctions between sources of power 
identified by Raven. Coercion and reward power, for example, have been sub-divided into 
personal and impersonal versions as it was found in some studies that men were more likely 
than women to use the more “impersonal” forms of power and coercion, while women were 
more likely to call upon social norms such as legitimate dependence. (Johnson, 1976; Raven, 
Schwarzwald, and Koslowsky, 1998). 
 Despite its earlier psychological leanings that focused on individuals possessing 
power rather than exerting it between two parties, French and Raven’s typology remains 
widely used today in its variant forms. It is notable that French & Raven’s (1959) typology of 
bases of power has been adapted to different settings and different disciplinary contexts such 
as familial relations (MacDonald, 1980), education (Erchul & Raven, 1997), marketing and 
consumer psychology (Gaski, 1986), and health and medicine (Raven 1988). These recent 
writings have expanded to include social and gender elements as dimensions of power, and 
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they have begun including relational elements. The relation between different sources of 
power and how strategies and counter-strategies are generated remains under-developed, 
however.  
In research based on French and Raven's notion power, Pettigrew (1975) discusses 
the resources that individuals and groups have in organizations. The author outlines five po-
tential power resources: expertise, control of information, political access and sensitivity, 
stature, and group support. The base of an individual’s power rests on the possession, con-
trol, and tactical use of the five resources. Pettigrew goes further than French and Raven, 
however, by viewing power as not just something possessed by individuals, but as a rela-
tional phenomenon. “Power is generated, maintained and lost in the context of relationships 
with others… Power involves the ability of an actor to produce outcomes consonant with 
his perceived interests” (p. 195). 
Salancik and Pfeffer (1977), for their part, define power as simply “the ability to get 
things done the way one wants them to be done” (p. 470). Power derives from the contin-
gencies facing an organization, and when these contingencies change, so do the bases of 
power. Power also derives from activities of staffs who try to influence organizational deci-
sions in their own favor, particularly when their own survival is threatened by the scarcity of 
resources critical to the organization. This goes along with the belief that persons in an or-
ganization are active determinants of their destiny within the organization, and that they are 
not merely passive beings (Friedberg, 1993). 
The second school of thought in the relational perspective of power highlights the 
dependent nature of power relationships. Power is a common resource allowing both parties 
in a relationship to attain their objectives (Ouimet, 1990). Emerson (1962), for example, out-
lines a dependency theory based on social exchange.  
“Social exchange provides a parsimonious way to examine social relation-
ships; moreover, power is a central aspect of an exchange approach to social 
relationships, and dependence or interdependence constitutes the point of 
departure of analyzing power.” (Bacharach and Lawler, 1980, p. 19) 
 
According to Emerson (1962), dependence is what makes exchange an important 
part of all social relationships. Without dependence, there is no need for exchange. This is 
built upon the assumption that dependence is a part of social life and that exchanges are 
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natural aspects of any social relationship. In this sense, the outcome of an actor's actions is 
not only dependent on his or her own behavior but also on what other actors do in response 
to his or her behavior. 
Bacharach and Lawler (1980) build upon Emerson’s power dependence theory and 
suggest that dependence is the foundation not only for social relationships, but also for each 
actor’s power in a relationship. As the authors state, “It seems clear that dependence is in-
herent in social life. A strong case can be made for treating dependence as a formal dimen-
sion of power and making power a central concern of almost any sociological analysis” 
(1980, p. 21). Thus, power is a function of dependence. The greater the dependence of per-
son A on person B, the greater B's power in the relationship. In terms of application to the 
study of power, dependency must be examined within a network of relationships, not only 
between two parties. 
Bacharach and Lawler find that besides dependence, there are two other aspects of 
power that are important. The relational aspect of power implies looking at interactive situa-
tions in organizations by examining three types of groups: work groups, interest groups, and 
coalitions. Work groups are those formed by the structures of an organization, such as a de-
partment or through the hierarchy. Interest groups are defined as groups of persons (actors) 
who work toward a common goal and who do this work “beyond simply their interdepend-
ence with regard to the conduct of work” (1980, p. 8). Coalitions, for their part, are de-
scribed as groupings of interest groups who are committed to achieving a common goal. 
These groupings are based on joint action against other interest groups. This notion of coali-
tions was examined as far back as 1959 by Dalton, who found that cliques were an important 
component of power systems because they formed across organizational lines. According to 
Dalton, cliques (coalitions) are formed to defend organizational members in the face of real 
or imagined threats to their security. 
By examining the formation of interest groups into coalitions and the patterns of 
conflict between different coalitions, Bacharach and Lawler theorize about the process of 
bargaining and negotiations that occur between groups in organizations. They find, for ex-
ample, that it is essential to study coalitions because these “can undermine, modify, or but-
tress the power relations formally established by the hierarchy of authority” (1980, p. 214). 
Therefore, to study power, one looks at power across groups and the tactics that these 
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groups employ. Coalitions and other groupings are important to our examination of organiz-
ations because they enforce the notions of interactions and relationships between groups.  
Another important aspect of power is its sanctioning nature. This makes for a living or 
dynamic model of analysis. When one has the ability to manipulate rewards, punishments, or 
both, one can exert power over others. 
In summary, there are three formal dimensions to any power relationship: the de-
pendence aspect, the relational aspect, and the sanctioning aspect. These three dimensions 
must be used as a starting point for any analysis of power. Also, “power must be embedded 
in the social relationship and not treated as an attribute of a single person, group, or organi-
zation” (Bacharach and Lawler, 1980, p. 26).  
What Bacharach and Lawler do not address, however, is individual or micro-level 
strategy-making at length. Not every strategic behavior of individuals aims to form coalitions 
or to grab power. Individuals sometimes act simply to preserve what they have, not to gain 
more power or to defeat rivals. Also, Bacharach and Lawler fail to describe coalitions in 
terms of groupings of individuals, concentrating instead on coalitions formed between cor-
porate partners. Again, the human services sector is left out. 
In the relational perspective of power, other authors have expanded on the above 
concepts. Based on the groundwork of French and Raven (1959), Crozier and Friedberg 
(1977) and Friedberg (1993) provide support for the notion that power is not something that 
individuals simply possess, but something that emerges from the relationship between actors. 
Power is not evenly distributed among actors in organizations. Some actors are more power-
ful than others are because they possess one or more types or sources of power, which is a 
relation of force from which one party can obtain more than the other. It is also the capacity 
of certain individuals to influence or act on other individuals, or to avoid being influenced or 
acted upon by them. Based on their study of French bureaucracies, the different sources of 
power that Crozier and Friedberg identify are: expertise or specialization of skills; control of 
the relations between an organization and its environment; control of the communication 
and information between different parts of the organization; and authority and rules, or for-
mal or legal power.  
These sources of power create zones of uncertainty for others in organizations because 
they are dependent on those who control the sources of power. This notion of dependency 
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of one person on another’s sources of power is key to understanding the functioning of or-
ganizations. For Crozier and Friedberg, factors such as wealth, prestige, authority and 
strength, which French and Raven first identified, enter into play mainly by providing oppor-
tunities to widen their margin of freedom. They are not the determinants of power. 
Crozier and Friedberg’s concept of power is often quoted in the literature because of 
its dynamic view of organizations and because of its applicability to a wide range of organiza-
tions. It has its limits, however. Crozier and Friedberg minimize the role of psychological or 
emotional reactions to change. They also tend to ignore a person’s past history and experi-
ences in making decisions and in dealing with power. Sometimes, for example, decisions are 
made simply on impulse. These limits are not insurmountable, however, because Crozier and 
Friedberg have provided us with a strong framework for analyzing power in organizations. 
Crozier and Friedberg’s strategic model of power strategy formation will be described later 
in this chapter.  
Another prolific writer in the field, Jeffrey Pfeffer (1992) discusses power from a 
similar perspective. Pfeffer echoes Kanter’s (1979) and Mintzberg’s (1983) statements that 
people generally dislike the development and use of power in organizations. “It is as if we 
know that power and politics exist, and we even grudgingly admit that they are necessary to 
individual success, but we nevertheless don’t like them” (p. 15). According to Pfeffer, power 
and politics are intertwined. Organizational politics are defined as “the exercise or use of 
power, with power being defined as a potential force” (p. 14). Also, not all decisions and ac-
tions of individuals and groups in organizations involve power to the same extent. 
Pfeffer (1992b, p. 30) provides a definition of power that combines elements of 
structure, social psychology, and relationships between individuals: 
“Power is the potential ability to influence behavior, to change the course of 
events, to overcome resistance, and to get people to do things that they 
would not otherwise do.” 
 
Because it combines several points of view in a dynamic way, this definition also re-
flects the interdisciplinary nature of the concept. 
Pfeffer states that power is used more frequently under conditions of interdepend-
ence between individuals or groups, because when there is little interdependence there is no 
need to use power to influence others. Interdependence exists when “one actor does not 
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entirely control all of the conditions necessary for the achievement of an action or for ob-
taining the outcome desired from the action” (p. 38). In essence, whenever individuals need 
others to help them in their tasks, they create interdependence. 
Interdependence also results from the scarcity of resources. When there are fewer re-
sources, it is more difficult to obtain what one wants, and there is more need to develop 
power and influence in these situations. This is likely to occur in organizations where there 
are specialized tasks, and where people depend on the skills of others that they themselves 
do not possess. 
Mintzberg (1983) is another much cited author who has brought together research 
from many sources over the years. Summarizing prior research, Mintzberg shows that there 
are four systems of power in organizations: authority, ideology, expertise, and politics. These re-
semble Crozier & Friedberg’s categories of power. Each system of power that Mintzberg 
identifies relies on elements that are not evenly distributed across an organization, such as 
expertise and authority, and that give rise to power games. Mintzberg’s review of the litera-
ture finds that systems of power depend on five bases or means of using power. The first 
three bases of power are control of resources, control of a technical skill, and control of a 
body of knowledge. These sources of power must be essential to the survival and activities of 
the organization, scarce or hard to find, and non-substitutable (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977). These 
characteristics make the organization dependent on the holders of the resources. The two 
remaining bases of power are the legal right to impose choices, and access to the holders of 
power in the organization. 
Like Mechanic (1962), who refers to power as either formal or informal, Mintzberg 
(1983) uses the terms “legitimate” and “illegitimate” to describe power. Legitimate power is 
power obtained by virtue of office or through rules and regulations. Illegitimate power, 
which Mintzberg also describes as political power, refers to those powers that are informal 
and that bypass legitimate authority. Some staffs in professional organizations, for example, 
often have considerable discretionary power in their actions because their superiors cannot 
supervise everything they do. They also often engage in games that are designed to bypass 
the official hierarchy. Mintzberg’s review shows that power that is legitimate is often inade-
quate to deal with change because the illegitimate power systems often outpace the legitimate 
ones. As the author states, “the system of politics seems to be an almost inevitable compo-
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nent in major organizational change” (p. 230). When an organization faces unexpected am-
biguity or uncertainty, or what Mintzberg calls a “dynamic environment”, existing power re-
lationships are destabilized, resulting in confusion and giving rise to politicized or illegitimate 
relationships. By “uncertainty”, we mean a lack of information about future events, so that 
alternatives and their outcomes are unpredictable (Hinings et al., 1974). Mintzberg says that 
under circumstances of strong uncertainty, which are found in most organizations going 
through profound transitions, illegitimate power or strong politics are likely to emerge and 
take over until a new stability emerges. Conflict often follows under such circumstances, and 
the system of power is significantly and permanently altered. In Mintzberg’s (1983, p. 239) 
words, “shake the Jell-O vigorously enough, and the cherry will have to find a new resting 
place”. 
In terms of strategic behavior in organizations, Mintzberg also shows that people at 
different levels of an organization use different tactics. Upper level management, for exam-
ple, is more likely to use authority, privileged access to information, and political skill to 
bring change to a desired direction or outcome. Lower level staffs, on the other hand, will 
tend to rely on those tools more accessible to them, such as their hold on expertise and the 
possibility of regrouping as a unit against management. Many combinations of these power 
sources are possible, and these make up the games in an organization.  
Thus, Mintzberg finds there is formal and informal power in organizations. He also 
reveals ways these power sources are used. In a lengthy summary of the literature on power 
in organizations, however, Mintzberg found no study that thoroughly examined the relation-
ship between the different games played by the actors in organizations. Mintzberg also noted 
the lack of a conceptual framework to help understand the system of games that is found in 
all organizations. This provides further impetus for our research to study power strategy 
formation in organizations. While Mintzberg has probably written more than any other au-
thor has on the subject of power, he also has been criticized for his views. Friedberg (1993), 
for example, severely criticizes Mintzberg’s model of power as mechanical and static, that it 
defines power as simply the equilibrium between forces, and that it offers no explanation of 
how these forces maintain and reproduce themselves. Mintzberg also minimizes the cultural 
and psychological dimensions of power, thereby reducing his analysis of power to structural 
elements. Friedberg (1993) also finds that Mintzberg’s view of power in organizations “kills 
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imagination, curiosity, and the spirit of interrogation” (p. 188). Epistemologically speaking, 
this may induce researchers to think they understand the organization without really com-
prehending all its complex dynamics. 
Kanter, Stein and Jick (1992) are other major authors worthy of mention concerning 
power in organizations. For these authors, power reflects the jockeying for control that oc-
curs when groups of individuals try to advance their own interests and to claim some of an 
organization's resources. Jockeying for power, say the authors, sometimes results in shifts in 
control, where various parties challenge the leaders. A process of negotiations between the 
parties ensues. Thus, the official hierarchy in an organization does not solely determine 
power. It also depends on the agreements struck between interest groups. Bargaining, jock-
eying for position and alliance formation are elements that determine power to a large de-
gree. When organizational change is large and when an organization becomes unstable, 
alliance or coalition formation processes are more noticeable. This is especially true in rap-
idly changing environments. 
A striking gap in all the above writings is that there is no detailed discussion of 
power as it relates to non-profit organizations. The human services sector is certainly large 
enough to merit some attention by the major authors, but Pfeffer (1992b) and Kanter 
(1992), among other prolific writers, ignore it in their writings. Examples that Pfeffer takes 
from Xerox and General Motors are interesting, for example, but they are not really appro-
priate to the mental health context that is being studied in this research. Mintzberg (1989), 
for his part, does discuss these organizations, but he limits his review to examples such as 
the National Film Board of Canada and to universities, ignoring organizations such as com-
munity mental health centers. Therapists in mental health centers have expertise and skills 
that take years to develop and that are not easily or rapidly replaceable. In private corpora-
tions such as Xerox, the training process allows for much quicker replacement of workers. 
This implies that we cannot discuss scarcity of resources in the same terms for both types of 
organizations. Additionally, because of the hierarchical and status differences between pro-
fessionals in human service organizations (e.g., doctors often have the most power in hospi-
tals), concepts of power from the organizational and management literature cannot be 
applied directly to these types of organizations. In non-profit organizations, jockeying often 
revolves around professional concerns, whereas in the corporate world, power is often lim-
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ited by economic concerns. The above writers in the industrial organizational literature do 
not adequately address these dynamics.  
 
2.2.3  Summary and discussion on the concept of power 
In summary, there are several dimensions to power. Our review has identified that 
individuals do not possess power, but they exploit it in a relationship with other persons or 
groups of persons. Individuals possess the resources behind power, however. They use these 
resources in attempts to have others behave in certain ways. Individuals do not have power 
but power relationships. Power is dynamic in nature, varying between situations and people. 
No single theory about power adequately explains power processes in organizations. 
The most useful definition that can be attached to the concept of power is advanced by Pfef-
fer (1992), that power is the ability of one person or group of persons to influence the be-
haviors of others, to change the course of events, to overcome resistance, and to get people 
to do things they would not normally do. To this, we can add Friedberg’s view of power that 
emphasizes the ability of actors to manipulate a relationship by exploiting constraints and 
opportunities in any given situation. This emphasizes that power has many facets. First, 
power can be at the individual level although it always involves more than one person. Sec-
ond, power is used with a goal of trying to change some aspect of the behavior of another 
person or group of persons, or to change how things unfold. Third, power is not only multi-
dimensional, but there are many standpoints from which power processes may be viewed. 
For example, departmental rules and regulations do not only bind a social worker. S/he also 
is bound by a set of professional norms and ethics that ensure such power will not be abused 
(Hasenfeld, 1992). This highlights the sometimes subtle and hidden nature of power in hu-
man service organizations. Fourth, individuals obtain authority (formal power) from their 
hierarchical position created by their organization. Individuals use more than hierarchical 
positions, however. They have psychological characteristics (e.g., leadership abilities, cha-
risma), sources and bases of power, and opportunities that arise and where power can be 
exploited or developed.  
What are the implications for the study of power in the human services sector? 
Taken separately, these dimensions do not correspond to the real life in organizations and 
explain only the foundations of power. To account for the dynamic nature of power, these 
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dimensions must be understood in relation to one another. The definition of power that 
guides this research emphasizes the unevenness or asymmetrical nature of the distribution of 
power. Human service organizations, characterized by professional bureaucracies are exem-
plary of this unevenness, and one can expect some power plays around this. Second, power 
has a dual nature, having visible and hidden elements. As Frost (1987) says, administrators 
asked to describe the power distribution in organizations have little trouble agreeing that it 
exists, and they can easily identify what it looks like. This is the visible side of power. In hu-
man service organizations, legitimate power that emanates from the hierarchy and structure 
is thus easy to identify in an organizational chart and in job descriptions. As for the hidden 
and subtler form of power, power derived from professional expertise (which is a scarce and 
hard-to-replace resource in the human service field) is at the root of some of the struggles, 
conflicts, and strained relationships that occur between staffs in these centers. 
While professional bureaucracies such as the one being studied are strong examples 
of uneven power distribution, they also demonstrate the dependent nature between profes-
sionals. Social workers, for example, are often dependent on psychologists for psychological 
testing. Psychologists, for their part, are often dependent on social workers, who are particu-
larly adept through their training at searching out and organizing community resources. 
Thus, even if they are on the same footing hierarchically, they each possess something that 
the other does not have, namely specialized skills. This is strongly emphasized in the writings 
of Crozier, Mintzberg, and Hasenfeld. 
Finally, because power is relational, discussions about power strategy formation will 
have to account for relational dynamics while not ignoring individual dimensions. With these 
characteristics in mind, we now turn to the literature on strategy formation. 
 
2.3 WHAT IS "POWER STRATEGY FORMATION"? 
The concept of strategy formation has drawn much attention from researchers in dif-
ferent fields. Some authors have even called the field of strategy research a “crazy quilt” of 
perspectives because of the proliferation of theories, perspectives, and research (Eisenhardt 
and Zbaracki, 1992). 
Despite the abundance of writings on the matter, much of the literature is far re-
moved from the human services sector. In lengthy reviews of strategy formation, for exam-
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ple, Euske & Roberts (1987), Zbaracki & Eisenhardt (1992), and Hart (1992), among others, 
totally ignore the human services sector. They review only industrial organizations and cor-
porations. This is typical of the literature on strategy formation. Most of the literature also 
focuses on strategy formation as an upper management function, ignoring lower levels 
(Woolridge & Floyd, 1990). 
In the last section, the definitions of power were divided into individual and relational 
clusters. We will now examine how power and strategy formation interrelate in organiza-
tions. Our contribution in this section is to synthesize theory and emergent debates, and to 
adapt the concepts found in the industrial literature to the human services sector. 
As Henry Mintzberg (1989, 1994a) says, ask anyone what the word strategy means and 
s/he will probably define it as a kind of plan, a specific guide to future behavior. Mintzberg 
finds that when persons are asked to describe strategies they have used, they tend to describe 
them as patterns of action they have carried out over time, also as conceptions of how to 
deal with their environment for a time. Strategies are “patterns in a stream of decisions” 
(Mintzberg, 1994a). 
Summer et al. (1990), for their part, define strategies as “the set of decisions and ob-
jectives regarding the range of businesses a firm chooses to operate and the competitive ap-
proaches used by these businesses”. Eisenhardt & Zbaracki (1992) refer to strategies as 
“those fundamental decisions which shape the course of a firm” (p. 16). This is supported by 
other authors such as Harvey & Brown (1988) who find that strategy is a course of action 
used to achieve major objectives, and Hax (1990) who views strategy as a “coherent, unify-
ing, and integrative pattern of decisions” that a person or group of persons make. 
Strategies also refer to actions that are new, complex, without predetermined out-
comes, and important in terms of the resources needed and the impact on the future of the 
organization. Desrosiers (1982) defines strategies as “actions and decisions perceived by the 
actors as important in terms of their possible impact on the future of the organization” 
(p. 3). In addition, if business strategies can be emergent, as Mintzberg (1983) argues, it be-
comes impossible to determine if decisions that persons make are strategic or not without 
the benefit of afterthought and analysis. It is therefore necessary to refer to the individual 
perceptions and actions of the actors in their organization (Desrosiers, 1982; Crozier & 
Friedberg, 1977; Friedberg, 1993).  
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Kanter (1992) and Bacharach & Lawler (1980) offer a different focus with emphasis 
on process. Kanter, for example, finds that strategy relates to “identifying the need for 
change, creating a vision of the desired outcomes of change, deciding what change is feasi-
ble, and choosing who should sponsor and defend it” (p. 377). Persons making strategies 
“tune in” to their internal and external environment to assess change processes. Bacharach & 
Lawler (1980), offer a similar emphasis on process, but with bargaining and coalitions as cen-
tral elements. 
Strategy also is defined in other ways. Friedberg (1993) argues that strategy is an at-
tempt to structure human relationships. Someone’s acting out of anger at his or her superior, 
for example, could be categorized as an impulsive act that is not thought through, but if re-
peated often, it can mask an attempt to structure a relationship. Friedberg’s definition strays 
from the majority of definitions by describing strategy in terms of relationships, while other 
authors prefer to concentrate on the wider-meaning term process. 
A common thread of these definitions is that they refer to sets of decisions over time 
that have cohesion between them. They also emphasize patterns of actions between several 
players that guide future behavior. Because these patterns involve several players, relational 
elements come into play. 
Three other characteristics are important to note. One is that strategies may be made 
and acted upon by individuals or groups of individuals on behalf of the organization. An-
other is that strategies most often involve a limited number of participants because they are 
sometimes confidential or are made by small numbers of persons at executive levels. A third 
characteristic is that strategies include many types of behaviors. In a study specifically aimed 
at human service organizations, Jansson and Simmons (1984) studied fifty hospital social 
work units. They identified many behaviors aimed at minimizing uncertainties within organi-
zations and external funders, such as establishing affirmative action programs and creating 
ombudsman positions that buffer the organization from external pressures from govern-
ment, the courts, and consumer groups. Other strategic behaviors that were identified in-
cluded participation on high-level planning committees, making one’s department or unit 
indispensable to others being perceived as critical to a range of practical needs of the organi-
zation, and enhancing territorial boundaries for one’s unit to prevent overlap by other de-
partments. In essence, strategies involve a whole range of actions by individuals and groups. 
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2.3.1  Strategies versus tactics 
When one thinks of strategies, one also thinks of tactics. The Random House Dic-
tionary (1980) defines tactics as “methods of achieving one’s goal” and “manoeuvres for 
gaining advantage or success”. Tactics refer to individual actions, whereas strategies are gen-
erally referred to as a series of actions over time. For the purposes of this research, we will 
define strategy and tactics as a single phenomenon along a continuum, with tactics referring 
to the actions not necessarily related to one another. Strategy refers to a larger stream of ac-
tion, events, and decisions through which intents are realized, frustrated, or modified over 
time within a particular context. 
Applying these definitions to power, strategies provide the means through which 
power can be organized, exercised, maintained, and enhanced. Strategies are sets of decisions 
over time that can be examined to study power processes. Sets of decisions made by organ-
izational actors, therefore, are a manifestation of strategy formation or the manipulation or 
exercise of power (Frost, 1987; Friedberg, 1993). 
 
2.3.2  Strategy formation versus strategy formulation  
Mintzberg (1977, 1989) and Mintzberg & Waters (1982) distinguish between strategy 
formation and strategy formulation. Formulation of strategies means the conscious or explicit ac-
tions and thoughts by individuals to carry out a decision. Individuals may use formal plan-
ning and analytical techniques to formulate their strategies. Formation of strategies, on the 
other hand, is implicit rather than explicit, is not necessarily a conscious action, and refers to 
how decisions are generated. Formation of strategies is a process that assumes people learn 
as they go. The study of strategy formation thus requires hindsight by looking at past actions.  
The distinction between the two terms is important because “formulation” of strate-
gies is a misleading term that minimizes the fact that people learn with each action they en-
gage in and adjust their future actions accordingly. When strategies are formed, they involve 
many types of behaviors that are not necessarily conscious or deliberate. This dissertation 
examines the process of formation of strategies rather than the formulation of the strategies 
and does not further distinguish between the two. 
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A review of strategy formation reveals that the concept has its origins in the deci-
sion-making and strategy implementation literature. Dufour (1991) has identified four clus-
ters of decision-making and strategy implementation theories in the literature. We have 
borrowed liberally from his synthesis and will summarize the important points, as they are 
applicable to the present research. The four clusters are the classical model, the behavioral 
approach, the contingency approach, and the political approach. As Dufour points out, these 
perspectives are neither mutually exclusive nor independent. There is an overlap between 
several of these models, and they can be put together in any number of combinations to 
study strategy formation. They will be presented independently, however, as they are in the 
literature. Because other authors have expanded on these concepts, only an overview of their 
principal contributions will be presented. Table 3 summarizes these perspectives. 
We have identified two additional clusters of approaches as they pertain to strategy 
formation. While Dufour integrates cultural dimensions into the behavioral perspective, the 
present analysis shows that the cultural perspective has generated sufficient literature to be a 
category in its own right. More importantly, the cultural perspective distinguishes itself from 
other perspectives by its unique focus on cultural elements. The cultural approach will be 
divided into two subsets, organizational culture and social culture. 
The second additional cluster of theories that we have identified refers to the models 
that set out to combine various elements from other models. We have called these multidi-
mensional models. The focus is away from single elements but towards single frameworks that 
attempt to envelop multiple elements. In keeping with the interdisciplinary nature of this dis-
sertation, we will examine these models closely. 
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Table 3 
CLASSIFICATION OF THE DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES 
OF POWER STRATEGY FORMATION 
 
 
PRINCIPAL PERSPECTIVES OF POWER  
STRATEGY FORMATION 
 
EXAMPLES OF  
LEADING AUTHORS 
 
The Classical Perspective
• strategy formation is a series of rational steps 
• Operational Research 
• strategy formation is an analytical process 
 
 
• Andrews (1971) 
• Andrews (1971) 
• Channon (1978); Ansoff (1978) 
 
The Behavioral Perspective 
• bounded rationality 
• garbage can model  
• Organizational Development (OD) 
• strategy formation as a discontinuous process 
• logical incrementalism 
 
 
• Simon (1955) 
• Cohen, March & Olsen (1972) 
• Bennis (1969) 
• Hedberg & Jonsson (1978) 
• Quinn (1980) 
 
The Contingency Perspective
• the Contingency approach 
• the “fit” approach 
 
 
• Katz & Kahn (1966); Salancik & Pfef-
fer (1977); Astley & Van de Ven 
(1983) 
 
The Cultural Perspective
• organizational or corporate culture model 
 
• societal or ethnographic culture model 
 
 
• Allaire & Firsirotu (1985); Schein 
(1990) 
• Faucheux (1978) 
 
The Multidimensional Perspective
• creation of dilemmas; contextualist model 
• strategy involves cognitive, social and political 
processes 
• option lens model 
 
 
• Pettigrew (1985); Dufour (1991) 
• Hax (1990) 
 
• Bowman & Hurry (1993) 
 
The Power Relations and Games Perspective
• strategies are planned or emergent; strategies are 
organized into games 
• strategy formation as manipulation of zones of 
uncertainty 
• strategy formation as coalitions and alignments 
 
 
• strategy formation as leverage and co-optation 
• power strategies are formed at surface and deep 
levels 
 
 
• Mintzberg (1983, 1989, 1994a) 
 
• Crozier & Friedberg (1977); Friedberg 
(1993) 
• Bacharach & Lawler (1980); Sum-
mers (1986); Selvini-Palazzoli et al. 
(1984) 
• Garguilo (1993) 
• Frost (1987) 
Chapter 2 — Theoretical Framework    
 
34
The Classical Perspective of Strategy Formation 
The Classical Model of strategy formation is grounded in the principles of scientific 
management “as a comprehensive set of rational precepts to guide the administrative proc-
ess” (Dufour, p. 22). The model holds that strategy formation and implementation is a tech-
nical, non-political activity driven by top management in organizations. In this sense, strategy 
formation is a sequential and methodical action by the organization to reach its goals. It also 
assumes a stable and predictable environment. 
The foundation of the Classical perspective is the Rational model. According to this 
approach, decisions are made by following a series of rational steps. First, the decision-maker 
considers all available alternatives. Second, s/he identifies and evaluates the consequences of 
each alternative. The final steps is choosing the alternative that is preferable given the desired 
goals, and designing a course of action or plan to achieve those goals (Meyerson & Banfield, 
1955; Ansoff, 1965; Andrews, 1971; Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Porter, 1980). 
In addition to the Rational model, Operational Research (O.R.) fits under the classi-
cal perspective of strategy formation. O.R. uses mathematical simulations to find the best 
decisions and actions to take concerning desired outcomes. This model assumes that by con-
trolling certain variables, the outcomes of decisions can be known. Strategies are thus 
formed accordingly because outcomes are predicted ahead of time. Channon (1978) has re-
viewed these statistical models of strategy formation, and he proposes that quantifiable ana-
lytical techniques now can be used to study decision processes, calling strategy formation an 
“analytic” process. Early attempts at using analytic techniques, such as Operations Research 
that used rational or logical analysis of economic or other goals, failed because management 
defined them and because they excluded human subjectivity (e.g., the personal values of 
those making decisions). Models that were developed later in the 1960’s and 1970’s incorpo-
rated the subjective values of managers. Ansoff (1978) for example, proposed several steps 
in the strategy planning process, starting from a first step of establishing measurable objec-
tives at the outset, to generating plans and action programs that capitalize on opportunities 
and eliminate weaknesses, to a review and recycling procedure for further planning. This 
early analytical approach also encountered difficulties, however. Finance personnel who had 
little management experience and who concentrated on financial forecasts in their planning 
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staffed many strategy-planning units. This arrangement had little value in long-range fore-
casting and strategy making. 
According to Channon, a contingency-oriented analytical approach to strategy plan-
ning has emerged since these early attempts, where middle-line and operational managers are 
now included instead of excluded from analysis. Also, less quantifiable elements such as po-
litical risk are now being included. Thus, strategy formation now includes more qualitative-
type input from persons at lower levels of organizations. There is less emphasis on quantita-
tive projections in planning and strategy formation. 
A weakness of the analytic models is that they primarily use mathematical or statisti-
cal analysis through simulations and probabilistic models, thereby remaining at a mechanistic 
level. Human behavior is much too complex to be reduced to mathematical models and 
simulations. The analytical model does not discuss strategy formation as a relational process, 
and there is no discussion of power issues. We find out little about the dynamics of other 
employees such as therapists and clerical staffs in power strategies. Also, statistical planning 
and often-used terms like “strategic portfolio planning” do not apply to human service or-
ganizations. In essence, the analytical model has little application in the context that we wish 
to study. 
Another problem with many of the classical models of strategy formation discussed 
above is that they assume that persons have complete knowledge of all facts, and that the 
manager’s task is to make sense of all these facts to make the best decisions. Some decisions 
are very rational and calculated (e.g., financial cutbacks), while others are not (e.g., spur-of-
the-moment decisions when there is not enough time to analyze all alternatives). The empiri-
cal research shows that there are cognitive limits to the ability of humans to process and un-
derstand all that there is to know about given situations (Dufour, 1991). As Dufour points 
out, these theories tend to hold the environment as constant, predictable, and unchanging. 
Because the classical model of strategy formation assumes a stable environment, it cannot 
adequately explain the actions of persons and groups of persons in turbulent environments 
such as the one we are studying. While decision-making may follow patterned steps, it cycles 
through different decision phases, repeating and going along various and sometimes unpre-
dictable paths (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1993). In addition, by concentrating on strategy 
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formation as the purview of top management only, it fails to examine strategy formation of 
persons at lower levels of the organization and recognized their importance. 
The classical models of strategy formation fail to take into account the political na-
ture of many decisions. The classical model can also be criticized because of its passive view 
of human behavior. People do not simply respond like machines to directives from the top. 
They bring with them values, beliefs, and cultural interpretations to events. There are thus 
many dimensions to decision-making that are absent in the classical approach. 
 
The Behavioral Approaches to Strategy Formation 
As Dufour (1991) points out, more than just organizational structure and procedures 
must be manipulated in strategy formation. Human behavior must be influenced for strate-
gies to take effect. 
The Behavioral approach is based on the premise that organizational decision-
making is less rational and mechanical than classical theorists had predicted (Simon, 1955). 
Because individuals cannot process all the information and options that are available about a 
situation, and because of biases in human judgment, they cannot make decisions optimally. 
Individuals can only attain limited or “bounded rationality”. Also, they rely on cognitive 
maps to organize issues and events into manageable categories (Dutton & Jackson, 1987; 
Schwenk, 1988 ; Hart, 1992). From the available information, decision-makers make the best 
assessment they can and come up with a satisfactory solution to the problem, therefore “sat-
isficing” or making satisfactory rather than optimal decisions (Simon, 1955; March & Simon, 
1958; Cyert & March, 1963). 
In the Behavioral approach, resistance must be overcome for successful organiza-
tional change to occur. Individual motivation, commitment, and interpersonal co-operation, 
for example, are needed to overcome resistance, and personality traits and cognitive styles 
must be matched to strategies if the strategies are to be successful (Wissema et al., 1980; Szi-
lagyi & Schweiger, 1984). Much of the literature in this approach thus focuses on individual 
characteristics such as psychological attitudes and behaviors of persons and groups.  
Advocates of the individual characteristics approach emphasize that individual per-
ceptions and attitudes can influence willingness to implement changes. Dufour cites studies 
carried out in this regard (Gupta & Govindarjian, 1983), and criticizes them for lacking a dy-
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namic view of strategy formation, and for leading to a trait theory of behavior. The studies 
ignore the context in which the strategies occur. 
As characterized by Dufour (1991), other models within the Behavioral perspective 
include the Strategy-Manager Matching approach, the Garbage Can model of strategy forma-
tion, the Diffusion of Innovation model, and the Organizational Development (O.D.) 
model. In the Strategy-Manager Matching approach, managers must be chosen according to 
their appropriateness to the organization’s strategies. Careful matching of personality traits, 
cognitive styles, behavioral characteristics, and personal values of individuals is essential for 
success in implementing strategies. This is a weakness in the model because perfect matching 
of personal traits and strategies cannot be done in an accurate way because personality traits 
are so variable. The empirical validity of the claims of this approach is put into question. 
There also is considerable fuzziness in operationalizing the concepts for research, leading to 
questions of empirical validity (Dufour, 1991). Finally, the Strategy-Matching approach does 
not take into consideration that strategies may change as they are being carried out. The ap-
proach on its own has little real-life application in the industrial and human services sectors.  
The Diffusion of Innovation model is another approach in this perspective, but it 
shifts from individual characteristics to the role and skills of implementing strategies (Nord 
& Tucker, 1987). As Dufour (1991) states, “it is generally assumed that the way changes are 
communicated to the people who are affected by them, and the role of the opinion leaders 
and ‘product champions’ … are critical in facilitating or impeding change and use of innova-
tion” (p. 41). The opinions and actions of leaders in organizations thus principally influence 
strategy formation. Some of the problems identified with this approach are that the findings 
are not easily transferable to human service settings because the research focuses on techno-
logical innovation strategies only. This approach fails to take into account structural and en-
vironmental factors by focusing on leaders only. 
The Garbage Can perspective of strategy formation, for its part, finds that strategy 
emerges out of “organized anarchy” (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972). This approach for ana-
lyzing how decisions are made and strategies formed comes from observations in universities 
that showed much ambiguity when people made decisions. Decision processes are character-
ized by “collections of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision 
situations in which they may be aired, solutions looking for issues to which there might be an 
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answer, and decision makers looking for work” (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972, p. 1). The 
behavior of individuals in organizations is thus often non-purposeful and random, because 
goals are unclear. Strategies flow from unpredictable sequences of events emerging from a 
“garbage can” mix of ideas and behaviors.  
Some problems with the Garbage Can model are that individuals are assumed to be 
passive with regard to decision processes. Second, decisions tend to be studied outside of the 
original context, as if each decision could be studied apart from the others taken in a given 
context (Friedberg, 1993). The spillover effect of one decision on another is ignored, and the 
focus is almost entirely on random sequences of events, rather than on ones that are 
planned. The empirical research does not really support this perspective, and it is less em-
pirically robust than some of the other approaches examined (Dufour, 1991; Eisenhardt and 
Zbaracki, 1992). 
Organizational Development (OD) approaches also fall under the behavioral per-
spective of strategy formation. Pettigrew (1985) has extensively reviewed these and thus we 
will only present an overview here. This branch of organizational study applies findings from 
the behavioral sciences to the management of organizations and strategy formation. As Du-
four (1991) says, while OD has been practiced in industrial organizations since the 1950’s, it 
is relatively new to human service organizations such as hospitals and mental health centers. 
Dufour divides the OD Perspective into two sub-categories. The Classical OD category 
holds that attitudes, interpersonal relations, and organizational climate are part-and-parcel of 
strategy making. It is a process for bringing about organizational change, and it assumes that 
successful strategies are more likely to be realized when people participate in them rather 
than being imposed on them. Strategy formation would thus have to involve persons at 
many levels of organizations. The second subcategory of Organization Development is the 
Contemporary version, which is still emerging according to Dufour. In this category, it is 
believed that contextual variables such as the social and economic environment constrain or 
facilitate the implementation of strategies. Exactly which variables are to be accounted for is 
not clear, however. As Dufour (1991) points out, empirical studies are still limited and ex-
ploratory in nature, and they remain at the descriptive level.  
Among the criticisms of OD is that it puts the focus on human elements to the ex-
clusion of structural, contextual, and temporal features (Dufour, 1991). The Behavioral Per-
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spective also tends to ignore power and political issues, and structural change as a means to 
effect change is not examined. The role of conflict in strategy formation is overlooked, such 
as when existing ways of sharing resources are threatened, when resources decrease, or when 
people try to seize new opportunities. 
Quinn (1980), for his part, has proposed “logical incrementalism” to explain strategy 
formation. In logical incrementalism, rather than trying to reach ideal goals as in the Rational 
perspective, top managers give a general sense of purpose and direction that guide the ac-
tions of members of the organization. Because organizations must adapt continuously to ex-
ternal forces that are often unpredictable and complex, they cannot rely on pre-planned 
strategies. They proceed incrementally, by making decisions and taking actions according to 
the needs of the moment.  
The Behavioral approach comprises other models. Hedberg and Jonsson (1978) find 
that the emergence of strategies is greatly affected by the discontinuities in the environment, 
by crises, and by changes in organizational myths. This means that uncertainty and changes 
in the environment create uncertainty in decision-making, from which originates the term 
“discontinuous”. Transitions between strategies are considered as changes in the way mem-
bers of organizations perceive and interpret the world. According to this perspective, strate-
gies are “integrated sets of ideas and constructs through which problems are spotted and 
interpreted, and in the light of which actions are invented and selected” (p. 90). Strategies are 
sets of rules that guide an organization’s search for solutions to problems. These rules, which 
originate in the beliefs and myths that people have, provide the interpretations of reality 
upon which organizations act. Myths are explained as theories that provide a filter for under-
standing the world and motivation actions of individuals.  
In terms of process, the main proposition in Hedberg and Jonsson’s model is that 
organizations develop over time through wave patterns of myths. They further suggest that 
the attitudes and behaviors of decision-makers are the most important factors behind this 
wave pattern of myths. There are spurts of enthusiasm, built largely on wishful thinking, fol-
lowed by a decline in the directing force of the leading idea or myth. This decline is due to 
the push-effect of crises in the organization, leading to increasing uncertainty in the organiza-
tion. The final decline ends in a crisis, where the organization often accepts a new strategy 
without struggle between the proponents of the new and old strategies. A new wave of proc-
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esses takes over by inducing a pull-effect and reducing the amount of uncertainty that occurred 
during the decline of the former myth. New rules of the game are thus formulated. 
Myths and rules are thus operationalized into strategies that provide the basis for ac-
tion in organizations. Strategies serve a dual purpose. The first is gathering feedback into 
categories provided by the frames of reference or myths that people have of the way their 
world works. The second is a filtering function, that of screening out signals that are incon-
sistent with their myths. Through these functions, people work at reducing uncertainty in the 
environment through the use of strategies when stakes are high and they feel a sense of cri-
sis. 
The model the authors propose puts emphasis on the interaction between the envi-
ronment and the perception that people have of that environment. It also implies that strat-
egy-making has social and cultural elements, and that it is not just a rational process. The 
authors also put a focus on uncertainty by showing that it is central to the explanation of dis-
continuities in the strategy making process. When myths are shifting and when competing 
strategies develop out of different frameworks, for example, confusion is likely to result. Ar-
guments in favor of the new strategy will have to be mainly emotional in nature because a 
shared cognitive or rational framework has not yet developed. When new myths become es-
tablished and decision-makers share the same knowledge and frame of reference, strategy 
formation becomes a continuous process instead of a discontinuous one. A contribution of 
this theory is that it takes the focus of strategy formation away from the management level 
and makes it an organization-wide phenomenon. While the model proposed by Hedberg and 
Jonsson is interesting, it suffers from empirical application, especially in the human services. 
It focuses on cognitive and culture frames of reference, dealing little with the elements of 
power in strategy formation. 
A common thread among the above behavioral models of strategy formation is that 
they use a larger view of strategy making than the Classical perspective which focuses mainly 
on managers. Reasons given for including people from different hierarchical levels in organi-
zations in strategy formation include difficulties implementing strategies (Galbraith & Ka-
zanjian, 1986; Hart, 1992) and high levels of change in the environment (Ansoff, 1979). 
Persons at other levels of the organization are thus included as having an influence on 
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strategies. This perspective thus provides a more realistic view of strategy formation than the 
classical or rational model described earlier. 
Among the weaknesses already mentioned are that while this perspective includes 
non-management personnel, it still emphasizes the role of management in overcoming resis-
tance to change. The top-down and managerial focus of the behavioral perspective ignores 
strategy formation at lower levels. It lacks the ability to distinguish between corporate strate-
gies and the micro-strategies used by employees. The primary emphasis is on environmental 
variables at the expense of other factors such as power and politics. 
 
The Contingency Perspective of Strategy Formation 
The third perspective of strategy formation that Dufour (1991) identifies is the Con-
tingency approach. With the growing realization that organizations were not entities in them-
selves but dealt with other organizations in a systemic way, researchers began examining the 
influence of the environment on organizations. This does not suggest that the environment 
was ignored earlier in the human relations movement of the 1940’s and 1950’s, but that the 
environment was secondary in focus to more individual and clinical orientations (Friedberg, 
1993). These theories could not extend their analysis to the outside world. Strategy forma-
tion was explained through learning and socialization processes.  
In the 1960’s, environmental factors became the focus of research for about the next 
fifteen years and represented an important change in paradigms. The study of internal proc-
esses gave way to analysis of organizations in terms of formal structures. Changes in research 
methodologies included less emphasis on monographic analysis and more on statistical 
methods. 
The Contingency Approach views organizations as open systems, and it examines 
the exchange relationships between organizations and their environment. As an open system, 
an organization acquires input from the environment, processes it, and then dispenses the 
output to the environment (Katz and Kahn, 1966). It expands on the Classical approach by 
emphasizing exchange relationships of the organization with its environment. Further as-
sumptions of the Contingency approach are that “a mismatch between the organization and 
its environment may prove detrimental to the organization in either the short or long run” 
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(Dufour, 1991, p. 33). Strategies thus work to help realign the organization with its environ-
ment (Christensen, Andrews & Bower, 1978). 
According to Dufour (1991), the Contingency approach is grounded in the same set 
of assumptions as the Classical approach in that strategy formation requires a series of tech-
nical, non-political and administrative activities. Dufour divides the Contingency perspective 
into two sub-categories: the Contingency approach, and the “fit” approach. 
The Contingency approach views situational and contextual variables such as organ-
izational size, uncertainty in the environment, and technology as important determinants of 
the structure of organizations: “Contingency theory assumes that contextual constraints have 
binding effects on organizational operations” (Astley & Van De Ven, 1983, p. 253). The em-
phasis of strategy formation is placed on assessing the attributes of the organization and the 
environment, then to fit the structure to the changing environment. The “fit” perspective, 
for its part, finds that key administrative and organizational mechanisms can be “fitted” to 
strategies to increase their effectiveness: “An important assumption underlying this perspec-
tive is that these elements can be consciously designed to constitute an internally consistent 
organizational form” (Dufour, 1991, p. 36). 
Salancik and Pfeffer (1977) are two well-known proponents of the structural contin-
gency model. They argue that power is “one of the few mechanisms available for aligning an 
organization with its own reality” (p. 470). They believe that institutionalized or “clean” 
forms of power — authority, legitimization, centralized control, regulations, and manage-
ment information systems — often act to buffer organizations from reality and obscure the 
demands of their environments.  
Citing studies from various public and private organizations, namely universities, re-
search firms, factories, banks, and retailers, Salancik and Pfeffer found that to understand 
how power is used, one must look outside organizations towards the environment to find 
which contingencies are critical or what groups mediate the organization’s outcomes. In 
terms of process, scarcity, criticality, and uncertainty are three conditions that are strongly tied to 
strategy formation. When resources in the environment are scarce, individuals may strategize 
around controlling or maintaining these resources because they are important to others. 
When these resources are critical to the organization, strategies will revolve around holding 
onto them or obtaining them. Strategy formation also is tied to uncertainty in the environ-
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ment. Under conditions of uncertainty, there often exists little consensus about what to do, 
and thus individuals and groups will use these opportunities to engage in strategies to get 
things done their way. 
According to the structural contingency theory of power, power derives from condi-
tions or contingencies that face an organization. When the contingencies change, so do the 
bases for power, particularly when survival is affected by the scarcity of critical resources. 
This affects strategy formation in several ways. First, those who hold power will not give up 
their positions easily. They will pursue policies that guarantee their continued dominance 
over certain elements, such as naming certain functions that are critical to the organization, 
and making rules, procedures, and information systems that limit the potential power of oth-
ers. Second, individuals or groups may work purposefully toward misaligning the organization 
with its environment through the same mechanism, “ensuring that the organization will 
never be completely in phase with its environment or its needs” (p. 483). This creates uncer-
tainty and forces others to adjust continually to new circumstances.  
In essence, to understand strategy formation in an organization, one needs to look 
outside it, to its environment, to examine the characteristics of the context and the problems 
arising from it.  
A frequent criticism of the contingency approach is that it is essentially determinist. 
Environmental factors such as uncertainty, technology and organizational size are viewed as 
determining the structure of organizations, leaving little room for power issues and internal 
political processes that might influence strategy formation. There also is little empirical sup-
port for a simple deterministic relationship between strategy, structure, and environment. To 
paraphrase Friedberg (1993), structural contingency theorists remain prisoners of a perspec-
tive that considers the environment and the context as impersonal factors that the organiza-
tion must adapt to. In addition, as Dufour states, “depending on which body of empirical 
evidence is used and on which part of the strategic process is observed, both ‘structure fol-
lows strategy’ and ‘strategy follows structure’ can be valid propositions” (1991, p. 37). An-
other difficulty is that the Contingency perspective cannot explain why similar organizations 
in different environments often function or perform similarly. Strategy formation thus can-
not be entirely explained by the environment. 
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The Cultural Influence Perspective of Strategy Formation 
To paraphrase Dufour (1991), the Cultural perspective of strategy formation is one 
of the latest waves of explanation for strategy formation. While Dufour includes this per-
spective in the Behavioral perspective discussed earlier, the present review splits it into its 
own section because it is analytically useful to understanding the less tangible and informal 
characteristics of organizations. 
In the present literature review, we identified two separate applications of the con-
cept of culture to strategy formation. The first application of the term culture pertains to the 
corporate culture of organizations, or the set of beliefs, representations, views, norms and val-
ues shared by individuals in organizations about how they should conduct their business 
(Schein, 1985; Lorsch, 1986) and that distinguishes one organization from another (Harvey 
& Brown, 1988). As Schein (1990) puts it, any definable group with a shared history can 
have a culture. If the organization as a whole has shared experiences, there can be what 
Schein calls a “total” organizational culture. The idea behind this model is that corporate cul-
ture influences the way that strategies are devised. In a more precise definition, Schein de-
fines corporate culture as, (a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b) invented, discovered, or 
developed by a given group, (c) as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation 
and internal integration, (d) that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, there-
fore (e) is to be taught to new members (f) as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in 
relation to those problems. 
Harvey & Brown (1988) summarize five characteristics that describe an organiza-
tion’s culture: individual autonomy — the degree of responsibility, independence, and the op-
portunities for exercising initiative for members of the organization; structure — the degree of 
rules and regulations, and amount of direct supervision used to control member behavior; 
support — the degree of assistance and warmth provided by managers; performance incentives — 
the degree to which incentives in the organization (i.e., salary increases, promotions) are 
based on member performance; risk behavior — the degree to which members are encouraged 
to be aggressive, innovative, and risk seeking. 
“By combining each one of these characteristics, a composite picture of the 
organization’s culture is formed. The culture becomes the basis for the 
shared understanding that members have about the organization, how things 
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are done and the way members are supposed to behave.” (Harvey & Brown, 
1988, p. 386) 
 
Corporate culture can thus be described as patterns of assumptions and behaviors that try to 
deal with the changing environment. 
In terms of strategy formation, deeply held assumptions often start out historically as 
values, then gradually are taken for granted and take on the character of assumptions. These 
assumptions are a potential source of resistance or an “invisible barrier” to change (Lorsch, 
1986; Allaire & Firsirotu, 1985). Conversely, corporate culture can be a “lever that could be 
used to mobilize and channel the energies of organizational members” (Dufour, 1991, p. 43). 
In this way, managers integrate cultural considerations into their strategies. These assump-
tions are based on the study of practices in successful Japanese and American organizations. 
Some of the ways that corporate culture is studied are through ethnographic analysis 
of organizational stories, rituals and rites, and symbolic manifestations, also through analysis 
of survey research using Likert-type scales, and studying the history of the organization in 
longitudinal analysis. 
In terms of direct application to organizations going through major change, Schein 
(1990, 1996) identifies several strategies that leaders can use to produce desired changes in 
culture. Leaders may highlight threats to the organization if no change occurs, while encour-
aging change as desirable. Rewarding the adoption of new directions while punishing old 
ways of thinking can be part of this. Leaders can articulate a new set of assumptions by pro-
viding a new role model. Leaders can appoint new persons to key positions in the organiza-
tion because these persons can bring in new assumptions. Seduction and coercion can be 
used to adopt new ways of behaving that are more consistent with the new directions of the 
organization. Some leaders create visible scandals “to discredit sacred cows [and] to explode 
myths that preserve non-desired traditions” (p. 117). Finally, leaders can create new emo-
tionally charged rituals concerning the new directions. 
A weakness in Schein’s discussion is that it focuses on leaders taking the responsibil-
ity for change. It gives only slight notice to change that originates at lower levels. Addition-
ally, we cannot assume that all organizations have an over-arching culture, because members 
do not always have a common history from which culture develops (Schein, 1990). Also, the 
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corporate culture model of strategy formation is sometimes applied in a mechanical way. 
Quoting Smircich (1983, in Dufour, 1991), 
“The talk about corporate culture tends to be optimistic … about top man-
agers molding cultures to suit their strategic ends. The notion of corporate 
culture runs the risk of being as disappointing a managerial tool as the more 
technical and quantitative tools that were faddish in the 1970s.” (p. 45) 
 
Another difficulty with cultural models is that they are usually researched with quali-
tative methods that make it difficult to generalize to other settings. This leads to considerable 
debate over the validity of corporate culture studies (Dufour, 1991). 
The second application of the concept of culture that we identified in the literature 
relates not to organizational culture in the traditional sense, but to culture as it pertains to 
ethnic identity and larger societal groups. Faucheux (1978), for example, suggests that we can 
understand strategy formation by studying the national, cultural, and societal context of peo-
ple. The author contrasts assumptions concerning strategy formation implicit in the Anglo-
Saxon and Latin cultures. While Anglo-Saxon culture tries to minimize social conflict by co-
operation and consensus (bottom-up management), the Latin culture tends to employ a 
“top-down” approach. “Latin culture prefers to exacerbate conflicts of an ideological nature 
in order to avoid working together” (p. 136).  
By examining these differences, Faucheux finds that Latin culture is accustomed to 
centralized control based “on the exercise of a single power and a hierarchic authority”, 
whereas Anglo-Saxon culture attempts to obtain consensus and use common value systems 
when designing strategies. In terms of application, Anglo-Saxon managers tend to delegate 
and include levels of participation of their staffs in their strategy making more than Latin 
managers. Culture would thus be an important dimension of strategy formation. 
Faucheux’s discussion of strategy formation as a cultural process is weak in that he 
does not discuss it as a process, nor does he include other concepts of organizations. We do 
not know what aspects of culture are influential. His ideas also suffer from little empirical 
study, and his examples are principally from examining historical periods. Some authors have 
noted that national culture is not a sufficient explanation for differences in performance be-
tween companies in different countries (Ouchi, 1981; Pascale & Athos, 1981). It is not clear 
whether something as abstract as culture can be measured to determine its influence on 
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strategy formation, and application to the human services sector is absent. Although this ap-
proach opens up new ways of thinking about strategy formation and provides food for 
thought, it remains too fuzzy to be applied in a scientific way. 
 
The Multidimensional Perspective of Strategy Formation 
Hart (1992) writes that strategy formation has been examined from many angles.  
“These varying approaches have spawned a bewildering array of competing 
or overlapping conceptual models. Indeed, during the past three decades, au-
thors have developed scores of different strategy-making typologies.” 
(p. 327) 
 
The author also finds that “associated empirical work has covered such a wide range 
of considerations that little cumulative knowledge has resulted. A conceptualization that is 
capable of providing a framework for ongoing research is lacking” (p. 327). The Multidimen-
sional Perspective includes research that attempts to integrate elements from different per-
spectives into a framework rather than focusing on single elements. 
Hax (1990) is an author who has addressed the concept of strategy formation in this 
perspective. Hax defines strategy as a coherent, unifying, and integrative pattern of decisions 
that a company makes. Strategies give rise to plans to reach long-term goals, action pro-
grams, and priorities for allocating resources, and they engage all levels of the firm. Accord-
ing to Hax, strategy formation is the result of combining three different processes: 1) the 
cognitive processes of individuals who understand the external environment of the firm and 
its internal capabilities; 2) the social and organizational processes that contribute to internal 
communications and the consensus of opinion; and 3) the political processes that address 
the creation, retention, and transfer of power within the organization. Strategy formation is 
an evolutionary process that emerges from what an organization’s members do. In terms of 
analyzing strategies in organizations, strategies “are discovered by following the footprints of 
the major steps a firm has taken in the past. Often this path of strategic footprints … indi-
cates the organization’s future destination” (p. 35). Defined this way, strategy formation be-
comes a balance between past learning and trying to shape new directions that may lead an 
organization away from the past. 
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Hax also contrasts two approaches to strategy formation. The first is the formal ana-
lytical view that regards strategy formation as a formal process aimed at identifying all corpo-
rate, business and functional strategies of the organization. An opposite view, the power 
behavioral model, regards behavioral theory as better describing what occurs in strategy for-
mation. In this latter approach, strategies originate in the goals and structures of the organi-
zation, the politics of making decisions, bargaining and negotiation, the role of coalitions, 
and “muddling through”. Hax argues that neither of these opposite approaches by them-
selves fully explain strategy formation because strategy is often “murkily communicated and 
practiced covertly” (p. 34). A combination of the two approaches is thus necessary to fully 
grasp strategy formation. 
One problem with Hax’s view of strategy formation is that there are difficulties in 
applying it to human service organizations. Terms such as growth, diversification, and divestment 
that the author uses are intended more for private industry and the competitive financial 
domain than for human service organizations such as mental health centers. Mental health 
organizations, for example, do not have to position themselves within the “marketplace” as 
do private corporations. Another problem is that strategies are not only aimed at long-term 
goals. Micro-level strategies are ignored. Finally, Hax’s model sees the Chief Executive Offi-
cer of an organization as the person responsible for administering strategy formation proc-
esses. While this may be correct for some organizations, Hax ignores the contributions that 
other employees of organizations make to the strategy formation process and that they are 
often at the head of directional changes in an organization. Professional bureaucracies, for 
example, often put much power in the hands of their employees by including them in the 
strategy processes of the organization. Managers, therapists, and support personnel thus all 
have a role in strategy formation processes because they also are strategy makers.  
Pettigrew (1978), for his part, views strategy formation as made up of social and po-
litical decision-making processes, which he integrates into a “contextual model”. The contex-
tual model provides a historically bound, processual and contextual report of events to 
understand strategy formation. The author defines strategies as “choices that are made in-
volving individuals and subgroupings of individuals at various organizational levels, that de-
velop into the pattern of thinking about the world, evaluating that world, and acting upon 
that world” (p. 78). Strategy making, for its part, is defined as “a flow of events, values, and 
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actions running through a context” (p. 79). As Pettigrew explains, analysis of strategy forma-
tion must be contextually based. It must be based on the location of a strategy in time and in 
context, which includes the culture, environment, structure, internal politics, and history of 
the organization.  
For Pettigrew, the study of strategy formation involves the analysis of identifiable 
and also more discrete decision events, the pathways to those events, and the connections 
between successive decisions over time. Studying the context surrounding decisions is very 
important, which means understanding the location of strategy in time, the culture of the 
organization, its environment, the organization’s tasks and structure, and the leadership and 
internal political system of the organization. Historical antecedents to events are very impor-
tant in understanding how strategies are formed. 
  “Yesterday’s strategies will provide some of the pathways to and inputs for 
today’s strategies; and today’s strategies will have a concept of the future built 
into them.” (Pettigrew, 1978, p. 79) 
 
Pettigrew explains that at any point in time, an organization will face dilemmas that 
require the organization to make choices. The process of resolving these dilemmas is strat-
egy-making, and it is influenced by organizational factors, culture, tasks, leadership, and in-
ternal political factors. Strategies emanate from the decision processes concerning which 
dilemmas and which ways of resolving these dilemmas will be selected. As new dilemmas are 
brought to the attention of the organization, or old dilemmas are kept at the forefront, vari-
ous parties in the organization place demands on the resources of the organization. Analysis 
of strategy formation thus depends not only on what demands are made, but also on how 
the parties mobilize power around their demands. Strategy formation can thus be extended 
to all parties in an organization. 
Dilemmas are likely to be pushed forward for discussion and decision on the basis of 
firmly held value positions about the organization’s future direction. They also may come 
into play in the belief that the resolution of those dilemmas will have a consequence on the 
activities, roles, and power of individuals or subgroups. The dilemmas faced by different or-
ganizational members will depend on several factors. The structure of subgroupings in the 
organization, the complexity and uncertainty of the dilemmas, the importance of the dilem-
mas for various parties, the existence of value positions and problem solving styles, external 
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pressure, and the history of the relationship (and of personal likes and dislikes) within the 
organization will affect the types of demands. As Pettigrew says, for some people, a strategy 
may simply be a case of “If he’s for it, I’m against it.” 
Finally, strategies concerning the dilemmas faced by organizations evolve from the 
attempts of the different parties in an organization to mobilize power in support of their 
demands. For strategy formation, it is not just the possession of power or the resources sur-
rounding power that is important, but also the ability to use the power, and the relevance of 
the power resources to others in the organization. 
Further, key elements for analyzing the meaning of demands to the different actors 
are values, language, beliefs, and myths. The presentation of demands on the organization 
can be observed through the use of metaphors and myths, which are devices for simplifying 
and giving meaning to complex issues that evoke concern to the participants. 
“Myths serve as ways of legitimizing the present (demands) in terms of a per-
haps glorious past, of reconciling apparent dilemmas, and of explaining away 
the discrepancies that may exist between what is happening and what ought 
to be happening. As such, myths provide part of the social cement that links 
old strategies with new strategies and that justifies the very existence of the 
new strategy.” (p. 86) 
 
Values and myths are important to the study of power strategy formation because, as 
Pettigrew argues, different parts of an organization may see the dilemmas and opportunities 
in a different light. Dufour (1991) and Pfeffer (1981) have carried out further discussion of 
this theme. The Symbolic Action perspective, categorized by Dufour as a political approach, 
discusses these in terms of strategy formation. As Dufour states, the symbolic action per-
spective emphasizes the importance of political language and symbols in implementing deci-
sions and in forming strategies. On this, Pfeffer (1981, p. 211) says, 
“Political language and symbolic action can have consequences for mobiliza-
tion and motivation of support, for cooling off or placating opposition either 
inside or outside the organization and for organizing activity within the or-
ganization around the issue of implementation.” 
 
One of the advantages of Pettigrew’s contextualist model outlined above is that is 
goes “beyond the analysis of change and [begins] to theorize about changing” (Pettigrew, 
1985, p. 15). It places strategy formation within a context, and it examines it as a process in-
volving the emergence of demands and problems. It also enforces the study of the historical 
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antecedents to events within organizations. Also, the dilemmas that Pettigrew discusses are 
compatible with the emergence of problems that led to power games within organizations. 
Dilemmas force individuals and groups to make choices about what they want to do accord-
ing to their subjective perception of the world. The study of myths and beliefs behind organ-
izational problems is also emphasized.  
Other authors have continued in the line of Pettigrew’s Contextualist thinking. 
Waema and Walsham (1990) provide some support to Pettigrew’s concepts to strategy mak-
ing in the information systems field. These authors view strategy making as a continuous 
process occurring in a constantly changing context. They find that traditional logical ap-
proaches to strategy formation ignore the context of process by concentrating only on for-
mal steps. The authors emphasize that it is essential to understand organizational, social, and 
political contexts in which a system is to be analyzed. Changes in one of these levels (e.g., in 
the socio-economic level of the organization) affect contexts at other levels (e.g., the corpo-
rate culture). 
While Waema and Walsham provide little empirical support to their arguments, they 
nonetheless carry Pettigrew’s model away from the purely “managerial” world to the infor-
mation systems field. Application to the human service field remains absent, however. 
Dufour (1991) has provided support for Pettigrew’s Contextual model with applica-
tion to the human services sector, finding that a mixture of behavioral and political models 
“had the best potential value in describing and explaining the processes and outcomes of 
implementation investigated” (p. 498). In a qualitative study examining the closure of hospi-
tal maternity units in England, Dufour found that a set of three interacting groups of factors 
affected the implementation and rate and pace of change: the nature of the locale, leadership, 
and the quality of the proposal for change. 
The nature of locale refers to the geography surrounding the organization, the num-
ber of competing organizations in the area, the rate and pace of change in the local popula-
tion, the socio-economic status of the area, and access to support from local interest groups. 
Other factors included perceptions and attitudes of the local population about their hospi-
tals, the timing of the change proposals versus the national climate of opinion, and the cul-
ture of the locality. These factors are important because they contribute to the power sources 
of the groups involved. 
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Together with the nature of geography, leadership was another factor important to 
the implementation of strategies. The role of leadership, however, was found to be much 
less dramatic than the literature often portrays: “[The] view that leadership behavior in man-
aging organizational change has much to do with routine processes as opposed to extraordi-
nary episodes of imagination, persistence or skill” (Dufour, 1991, p. 455). 
Leading a change proposal can be accomplished through legitimating strategies such as 
influencing how people feel about change outcomes, creating a climate conducive to change 
by genuine consultation and by creating credibility for management, and by strategically re-
ducing service levels prior to the actual closure of maternity units. 
Enforcing strategies represent another way of leading change proposals. By using power 
and legal authority to defeat opposition, leaders are able to push ahead with their proposals 
regardless of the strength of the local opposition. Consultations with those affected remain 
symbolic rather than genuine or are used simply to inform them of the coming changes. 
Leading proposals for change can also take the form of bargaining/negotiating strategies. 
These strategies are employed to “get something done”, not to prevent resistance or to de-
feat opposition — even if it is at the expense of some of the original intentions. To ensure 
the approval of change, strategies used include reducing expectations to acceptable levels 
before consultation takes place. Another strategy includes splitting potential opposition by 
promoting new developments allowed by the change (e.g., providing additional hospital beds 
in a second community hospital to minimize the impact of total closure of the first). 
The third crucial factor to implementation of strategies that Dufour (1991) identified 
was the quality of proposals for change. While managers may provide impassioned pleas and 
guarantees that the organizational changes will be for the better, “the need to develop a solid 
case … based on sound facts and well-reasoned argument is clearly supported in the litera-
ture” (p. 473). Strategy formation by providing accurate facts and information includes shar-
ing analysis of these facts with conflicting interest groups, especially when proposed 
organizational changes are controversial. 
“The more decision making power is shared between people who do not 
quite trust one another, the more formal analysis tends to become important. 
Formal analysis is often done to obtain information … but people also use it 
for communication, direction and control, and for its symbolic value in con-
veying messages of rationality, concern and willingness to act. Analysis may 
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help to determine the content of decisions, but it also acts as glue — binding 
the decisions of different individuals together to create an organizational de-
cision. To understand the role of formal analysis in organizations, we must 
understand how it is related to the social interactive context.” (A. Langley, 
1989, cited in Dufour, 1991, p. 476) 
 
Despite presenting recent qualitative research in the human services sector, Dufour 
does not study employees at all levels of the organization. He focuses on the implementation 
of strategies (closure of hospital maternity units) from a management level only, leaving out 
strategy formation from other employees. Dufour’s focus on maternity units also is prob-
lematic for our purposes because of the institutional focus of the study. Applicability of his 
findings to the present research (a community mental health center) will require caution be-
cause of the different types of organizations studied. Dufour’s research nonetheless remains 
one of the few empirical studies carried out in settings other than corporate organizations. 
The concepts he proposes will thus be retained for further consideration. 
Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) present another attempt at a multidimensional 
model of strategy formation. These authors define strategic decision-making as “the funda-
mental decision which shapes the course of a firm” (p. 17). According to the authors, the 
literature on strategic decision-making resembles a “crazy quilt” of perspectives. The authors 
find that traditional literature on decision-making rests on tired debates about single goals 
and perfect rationality, and on unrealistic assumptions about how people think, behave, and 
feel. 
Eisenhardt and Zbaracki review the traditional paradigms of strategy making. They 
find that organizations are accurately portrayed as political systems where there is conflict 
between the objectives that people have within the organization. They also find some truth 
in the bounded rationality perspective of decision-making, which finds that individuals have 
limited ability to process information. The authors find that existing debates about which 
theory best explains decision-making are tired and constraining, however, and that debates 
should go beyond what exists in the literature. The garbage can model, for its part, has little 
relevance to modern organizations and has little empirical support. A combination of the 
boundedly rational and political perspectives makes more sense according to the authors.  
The Option Lens model is another model that attempts to integrate findings from 
other research. According to Bowman and Hurry (1993), there are four important theoretical 
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themes in strategy formation: resource allocation, strategic positioning, sense-making, and 
organizational learning. The first two themes, resource allocation and strategic positioning 
(e.g., taking actions now to provide future benefit) assume rational decision-making by man-
agers, and are more suited to economic analysis than behavior analysis. They also concen-
trate on planning for future opportunities. Sense making and learning, on the other hand, are 
themes found in behavioral process theories and assume that strategies emerge out of situa-
tions. In sense making, managers interpret events, and their intuitive beliefs influence the 
decisions they take. The values, assumptions, and beliefs that they hold are influenced by 
their life experiences, and they focus more on the future than on immediate behavior. 
The authors bring together the themes in an “option lens” model that provides addi-
tional insights into strategy formation. Grounded in the basic intuition that people seek to 
“keep options open” in situations that involve an unforeseeable future, and supported by 
theories of financial economics, this view integrates resource allocation, sense-making, or-
ganizational learning, and strategic positioning. For example, managers follow some degree 
of rationality in the way they make decisions by using statistical and financial analysis. They 
also use sense making, in that intuition sometimes plays a role in unstructured or chaotic en-
vironments by giving “the next best thing to a gut feeling” (p. 774). In this sense, planned 
strategies are not always helpful during turbulence because planned goals can change as op-
portunities change. According to the option lens model, people always keep their options 
open (e.g., they may choose not to engage in risky strategies during turbulent periods of or-
ganizational change.) 
A weakness of this model is that it offers little in terms of analyzing dynamics in or-
ganizations. It remains at the descriptive level and does not really address the strategy proc-
ess or methodology. Empirical application is thus weak. As with many other articles on 
strategy formation, it addresses industrial corporations only and focuses exclusively on fi-
nancial investment.  
A conclusion that can be drawn from this review of the principal multi-dimensional 
models is that while many models claim to be integrative, few successfully bring all the ele-
ments under a single umbrella. This is presumably because of the very complex nature of 
multi-dimensional models. What lacks is a central focus that would assemble the different 
models. As Van de Ven (1992) states, research on strategy formation is diverse and cannot 
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be contained within a single paradigm. Except for Dufour’s work, which offers empirical 
evidence and methodology to support the Contextual model, most multi-dimensional mod-
els above are weak at providing the tools with which complex strategy formation can be 
studied.  
While the study of strategy formation is seen as one way of solving major problems 
across different levels of organizations, its focus remains on senior management. A related 
weakness is that much of the literature on strategy formation stems from the private or cor-
porate domain, not from the human service field. The literature refers a great deal to “strate-
gies for competitive advantage”, “strategies for growth”, “retailing strategies for positioning 
products” and so on, which are far removed from the world of human services organiza-
tions.  
It may thus be unrealistic to have a model linking all aspects and variables. Such a 
model would be unspeakably complex and would require a very difficult conceptual effort. 
We now turn to another perspective of strategy formation that spans several elements in or-
ganizations by focusing on relational issues and how they are used in strategy formation.  
 
The Power Relations and Games Perspective of Strategy Formation 
Politics are usually considered negative but unavoidable elements of organizations. 
According to Summers (1986), however, “politics” does not have to be a dirty word meaning 
corruption and opportunism by members of an organization even if these appear occasion-
ally. Rather, the power relations and games perspective views organizational members as 
“players” or “actors” with distinctive points of view and interests, who work in and outside 
of the formal system in attempts to change the organization. The actors attempt to exercise 
control and influence the course of organizational events, both as individuals and collec-
tively. 
This perspective describes people as having the ability to choose because they hold 
some form of power. It also assumes that people engage in at least some politics or games in 
their organization. Politics are defined as observable, sometimes covert, actions by people to 
enhance their power in a situation (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992). Games, for their part, are 
defined as mechanisms that actors use to structure and regulate their power relations while 
preserving some freedom to act in their own best interests (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977). This 
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perspective has generated enormous amounts of literature because it is intimately tied to the 
concept of power. 
As discussed earlier, conflict relations are part-and-parcel of organizations, but the 
emphasis of strategies is not only on resolving dysfunctional conflicts. It also focuses on the 
tactics used by individuals and groups to make the best of conflict (Dufour, 1991; Friedberg, 
1993). Some authors in this approach identify power through attempts to control resources 
(Pettigrew, 1973), others on coalition formation (Bacharach and Lawler, 1980; Summer, 
1986) while others put the focus on the manipulation of “zones of uncertainty” (Crozier & 
Friedberg, 1977; Friedberg, 1993). 
Mintzberg (1989) is an author who has recognized that strategy formation occurs not 
only at the top of organizations, but also at all other levels. Strategies should not just be the 
responsibility of upper management but also of all members in an organization: 
“The notion that strategy is something that should happen way up there, far 
removed from the details of running an organization on a daily basis, is one 
of the great fallacies of conventional management.” (p. 31) 
 
This would, in part, explain why strategy formation focused only on management 
fails. Many top-level executives function under the assumption that all actions must be 
planned ahead of time and that strategies are predictable, instead of realizing that they must 
deal with other persons’ strategies that often emerge unexpectedly or without clear intention. 
Thus, in terms of the process of strategy formation, individual actions turn into patterns of 
action. While not all actions of individuals are strategies, often a series of behaviors or ac-
tions will turn into a strategy when examined retrospectively. In this way, strategy often be-
comes evident or explicit only after the fact (Mintzberg, 1994). 
Mintzberg also finds that strategy involves more than just planning actions for the 
future. Mintzberg holds that strategies either are planned or emergent. Planned or formulated 
strategies are those that have intended actions behind them and that are brought about de-
liberately. Thus, in the case of planned strategy, there is formulation of strategy, then imple-
mentation of strategy. Emergent strategies, on the other hand, are those that form in 
response to evolving events or situations, and that are not necessarily planned or thought of 
ahead of time. They represent a convergent pattern that forms among the different actions 
taken by members of the organization, one at a time, and can develop inadvertently, without 
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the conscious intention of persons, often through a process of learning (Mintzberg, 1994). 
Following this thinking, planned and emergent strategies represent the two end points of a 
continuum, with all strategy formation being somewhere along that continuum. This implies 
that power and games can be either planned or emergent. 
Applying these views to power strategy formation, Mintzberg criticizes the old view 
of strategy formation as being “equated with planning, with deliberate, premeditated strate-
gies which are then implemented” (Mintzberg, 1985, p. 317). The old view of strategy forma-
tion is restrictive because it does not reflect the dynamic and sometimes unpredictable nature 
of organizations and their environment today. Power strategy formation, according to the 
author, must reflect both conventional strategy making (e.g., management must make strate-
gies around staff cutbacks) and non-conventional strategy making, (e.g., one-time decisions, 
which are meant to be ad hoc, becoming precedents that create patterns and then turn into 
strategies). This leads to what Mintzberg calls a grass-roots model of strategy formation 
characterized by six principles: 
• “Strategies grow initially like weeds in a garden; they are not cultivated like toma-
toes in a hothouse” (Mintzberg and McHugh, 1985, p. 194). This implies that 
strategies are often unpredictable in the way they will arise and evolve. 
 
• Strategies can take root in any kind of situation. Sometimes the environment im-
poses patterns of strategies on organizations. In other cases, managers simply 
“fumble” into strategies that develop in their minds and later emerge in a form 
that makes everyone believe they were planned. 
 
• Strategies become organizational when they become collective and displace more 
established strategies. Patterns of actions sometimes simply spread and become 
collective strategies. 
 
• The process by which strategies work their way through organizations may be 
conscious but need not be. Patterns of actions may be recognized only after they 
have become collective. 
 
• The spreading of new strategies tends to occur in periods of divergence with es-
tablished or prevalent strategies. This is supported by research by Miller and 
Friesen (1980, in Mintzberg and McHugh, 1985) that shows change functioning 
in cycles of convergence and divergence. New strategies sometimes replace es-
tablished strategies in such cases. 
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• To manage the strategy process properly is to recognize emergent strategies and 
to “create a climate within which a wide variety of strategies can grow … and 
then to watch what does in fact come up” (Mintzberg and McHugh, 1985, 
p. 195). 
 
To paraphrase Mintzberg (1977) further, strategy formation is not a regular, nicely 
sequenced process running through time. An organization may function in a stable environ-
ment for months or years and suddenly find itself in a turbulent environment where no 
strategy is successful to counteract the rapid changes that occur. 
As mentioned earlier, games are defined as mechanisms that actors use to structure 
and regulate their power relations while preserving some freedom to act in their own best 
interests (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977). Mintzberg applies this definition to power and strategy 
formation in the following way. Based on systems of power (authority, ideology, expertise, 
and politics), Mintzberg describes five groups of games that are commonly found in organi-
zations. These are the ways that individuals organize their strategies:  
• games to resist authority (e.g., activities ranging from mild protest by lower-level em-
ployees by delaying implementation of programs, sabotaging them, or disobeying or-
ders outright); 
 
• games to counter resistance to authority (e.g., senior managers making legitimate and ille-
gitimate use of information (controlling access) to try to persuade lower level em-
ployees to accept plans for change); 
 
• games to build power bases (e.g., building alliances by attaching oneself to someone well-
placed in the organization, and using the cloak of professionalism). Rosabeth Kanter 
(in Mintzberg, 1983) even suggests that individuals and groups use these games to 
build power bases because “people without sponsors, without peer connections, or 
without promising subordinates [remain] in the situation of bureaucratic uncertainty” 
(p. 193). Strategies include secrecy, denying an outsider’s competence, protection of 
one’s knowledge base through control of training, and building mythologies around 
skills and expertise; 
 
• games to defeat rivals (e.g., a top executive can pit line managers against staff specialists 
to divide and weaken their power as a group); 
 
• games to effect organizational change (e.g., going to influential persons outside the organi-
zation to blow the whistle on certain behaviors or activities deemed as inappropri-
ate). 
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Applied to professional bureaucracies (Mintzberg, 1989) such as mental health cen-
ters, there are several key areas that are important to strategy formation. First, Mintzberg be-
lieves that games will revolve around the basic mission of the organization (e.g., concerning 
the services it offers). In mental health centers, this mission is controlled by social mandate 
and by individual professionals because the organization relies on the skills and knowledge 
of their professionals or specialists to function. The professionals work relatively independ-
ently, but at the same time, they are dependent on one another for their specialized skills and 
expertise. Professionals are left to make their own decisions regarding their work because 
“years of training have ensured they will decide in ways generally accepted in their profes-
sions” (p. 184). Their “professional judgment” is informed judgment influenced by profes-
sional training and affiliation. 
Another focus for games in professional bureaucracies includes inputs to the system, 
principally around the selection of professional staffs, the determination of clients, and the 
raising of external moneys. An organization would not likely hire a Psychologist, for exam-
ple, without consulting other Psychologists about the candidate’s credentials and experience.  
Professionals also hold power and strategize around the means to perform the basic mis-
sion of the organization, notably in the purchase of equipment and in the design of facilities. 
Two-way observation mirrors are examples of this, where therapists have insisted that ob-
servation rooms be included as essential equipment to perform their work. 
Mintzberg adds that the structure and form of governance of the professional organization, 
such as the formation of committees, are influenced by the formation of strategies by the 
different parties involved. Committee issues often revolve around issues of power. 
As Mintzberg suggests, the cloak of professionalism is an important strategy tool in 
professional organizations. As a result, professionals in these organizations control much of 
their own work, leading to what Mintzberg describes as an inverse pyramid of power with 
the professionals up top and the administrators down below to serve them.  
The games described earlier inevitably lead to several types of problems in organiza-
tions: problems of co-ordination, problems of discretion, and problems of innovation. Prob-
lems of co-ordination exist because professionals often act very independently from other 
professionals and support staffs in the organization. This leads to conflict and continual re-
assessment of programs when individuals do not agree with the basic structures of these 
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programs. This also leads to problems of discretion when professionals “ignore not only the 
needs of their clients but also those of the organization itself. Many professionals focus their 
loyalty only to their profession, not on the place where they happen to practice it” (1990, 
p. 190). Problems of co-ordination and of discretion also relate to another type of problem, 
those of innovation, because innovations in social service organizations sometimes cut 
across different professions. Programs are most often designed to function in stable envi-
ronments, and innovation may disturb this by creating unanticipated needs and pressures. 
Professionals thus often resist innovation by forcing new problems into old “pigeonholes” 
or ways of functioning because they do not want to break away from established routines or 
standards. This makes it very difficult for organizations to come up with creative solutions. 
When professionals are subjected to strong pressures to solve these problems with 
bureaucratic solutions, and when they feel powerless to maintain their professional inde-
pendence, a common strategy is to form a united front by unionizing. 
“[W]e have a vicious circle of dysfunction. Bottom-up professional organiza-
tions are progressively transformed through increasing technocratic controls 
and administrative centralization into top-down machine ones; the response 
of the professionals is to seek unionization, which instead of arresting the 
process, only accelerates it.” (Mintzberg, 1989, p. 193) 
 
Unionization may have the paradoxical effect of increasing a group’s power but at 
the same time undermining individual control over issues. Unionized professionals act 
through representatives they elect, bargaining directly with the administration of the organi-
zation. As a result, union representatives and senior administration often bypass middle-level 
administrators. “[O]nce these wedges are driven in and held fast by collective bargaining, the 
likelihood of removing them becomes remote” (p. 194). While professionals have a united 
front to represent their interests, they lose some individual autonomy or control over their 
work. 
In summary, Mintzberg relates power to strategies by defining the different types of 
groups and activities that individuals engage in when facing organizational challenges in their 
organizations. Concerning professional organizations such as mental health centers, he finds 
that certain types of power and strategies (e.g., actions revolving around expertise) are more 
prevalent because of the nature of the work in these organizations. Administrators in profes-
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sional organizations are likely to have to deal with strategies revolving around the cloak of 
professionalism and unionization. 
A weakness in Mintzberg’s model of strategy formation is that it is based principally 
on corporate organizations with only limited attention to professional organizations. In 
terms of applicability to human service organizations, it is difficult to confirm Mintzberg’s 
findings because he did not examine small-scale or micro-level strategy formation of em-
ployees. We do not know, for example, what factors will influence strategy formation of 
small groups of employees. Finally, Mintzberg’s examination focuses on large-scale historical 
reconstructions of strategy in organizations other than the human services sector. 
Friedberg (1993) has criticized Mintzberg’s categories as too mechanical and re-
moved from reality because the focal point is on structure rather than on action. Mintzberg’s 
categories would thus answer the question “To which category does this strategy belong?” 
rather than “How does this strategy work?” Also, power plays are understood as equilibrium 
of forces, which is a static and mechanical view of power relations. Whether or not one 
agrees with these criticisms, however, Mintzberg has pioneered the study of strategies by tak-
ing them away from the purely theoretical level and bringing them to the front of the stage 
of organizations. 
The Power Relations and Games perspective includes the Strategic Model proposed 
by Crozier and Friedberg (1977; Friedberg, 1988, 1993). This paradigm of organizations 
brings together and articulates well the notions of power and strategy formation in organiza-
tions. Unlike the American origins of many perspectives, the strategic model originated in 
France, and it has become a widely accepted model of organizations. The authors believe 
that focusing on individual and group temperament, which is the mainstay of the human re-
lations approach to organizations, cannot adequately explain manifestations such as work 
slowdowns. The authors criticize the human relations perspective of organizations for seeing 
the behavior of individuals as passive and led by forces beyond their control, and not seeing 
them as active makers of their destiny. In other words, Crozier and Friedberg see an organi-
zation’s members as actively creating the reality they inhabit. 
Crozier and Friedberg suggest that relationships exist at different levels. First, indi-
viduals are in relation to one another in organizations. Evidence of this is shown through 
their emotional and psychological involvement such as tension, aggressive behavior, and in 
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collaborative behavior. The formation of informal groups that often bypass the official hier-
archy or structure of an organization also shows the existence of individual relationships. 
Besides being in relation psychologically and socially, individuals are in relation to one an-
other through their job functions. Subordinate-superior relations are examples of this. Fur-
ther, individuals will attempt to modify their job functions, within the constraints imposed 
by the rules of the organization, to avoid or escape the pressures or expectations of their col-
leagues and to maintain their margin of freedom. 
Relationships also exist between the individual and the organization. The formal hi-
erarchy and regulations of the organization, or its formal structure, place constraints on what 
individuals may and may not do. Individuals, for their part, also place certain constraints on 
the organization by controlling relations with its environment. Trade unions and professional 
associations that represent the employees of the agency and that put pressures on the agency 
concerning job security and professional issues are examples of relationships between indi-
viduals and the organization.  
A third level of relationships exists between the organization and its environment. 
The environment comprises all elements not directly under the control of the organization 
but those nonetheless enter relationships with it. Pressure from the community or from 
funding sources such as the provincial government to establish certain intervention pro-
grams in human service agencies is an example of this. In the children’s mental health center 
that is being studied here, evidence of a relationship with the environment is found in the 
pressures that various community groups put on the agency to have their cultural groups 
represented on the board of directors. Details will be presented in Chapter 4. 
The three levels of relationships we have outlined above are the key to understanding 
power strategy formation. They can be analyzed using four key elements of organizations: 
collective action, games, sources of uncertainty, and power that were described earlier. First, organiz-
ations are seen as systems in which individuals and groups of individuals actively determine 
their own destiny. Second, the actors are collectively involved in a series of power games in 
which they evolve strategies that govern what they do. By games, the authors mean strategies 
that actors use to engage and manipulate resources and means, and that are used to control 
power relations while preserving some freedom to act. When exercising power, actors gener-
ate games. The actors use these strategies to gain whatever advantage is possible within the 
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constraining rules of the game. The authors call this a concrete action system, a containing system 
where games take place, and where conflicts, negotiations, alliances and interactions occur. 
Thus, there are games, rules for the games, and mechanisms of regulation. 
Also, actors playing out the games in organizations are not equal. Some are more 
powerful than others because power is not evenly distributed. Power is defined by Crozier & 
Friedberg as the capacity of certain individuals to influence or act on other individuals, or to 
avoid being influenced or acted upon by them. The different sources of power that Crozier 
and Friedberg identify are: 
• expertise or specialization of skills; 
• control of the relations between an organization and its environment; 
• control of the communication and information between different parts of the 
organization; 
• authority and rules; formal or legal power.  
These sources of power are sources of uncertainty because persons or groups in the or-
ganization are dependent on the individuals or groups who control these various sources of 
uncertainty. Thus, all strategies inevitably deal with an uncertain future because people don’t 
have full knowledge of other persons’ resources and motives (Friedberg, 1993). Thus, power 
strategies are closely related to the sources of uncertainty in an organization. 
The notion of dependence mentioned above has received much attention and sup-
port from several authors (Mechanic, 1962; Jacobs, 1974; Pettigrew, 1975; Salancik & Pfef-
fer, 1977; Kotter, 1979; Bacharach and Lawler, 1980; Pfeffer, 1992) and is tied to the notions 
of criticality, scarcity, and non-substitutability of resources and skills we discussed earlier.  
In essence, the formal structure or hierarchy of an organization does not necessarily 
reflect the true nature of the power relationships within it. Informal processes also play a 
large role. An understanding of both is required. 
In terms of operationalizing their model, Crozier & Friedberg’s Strategic Model sug-
gest that power relationships and strategy formation may be examined through four principal 
areas in an organization: 
• who occupies the system’s critical functions; 
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• the dominant forms of communication (i.e., secrecy and rumors, are 
often used to control or divert communication); 
 
• the structure of the various games, or the ways in which games inter-
act with one another; 
 
• the emergence of problems or dilemmas that lead to temporary but 
highly active power games. 
 
Through the elements mentioned above, the strategic model provides a useful way of 
examining what happens inside organizations by examining them from a relational point of 
view. Analysis of the organizational relationship provides a means to describe how an or-
ganization functions in terms of power relationships.  
Linking relationships to change, Crozier & Friedberg explain change as an opportun-
ity for strengthening or developing new relationships. These new relationships form new 
power games that are related to the four sources of power in organizations (expertise, con-
trol of relations with the environment, control of communication and information, and au-
thority and rules). For the participants of the power games, these changes can be felt as 
dangerous because they modify or eliminate their tactics, strategies, sources of power and 
areas of uncertainty, thereby limiting their choice of actions and margin of freedom. Turbu-
lent change can therefore be a threat to one’s stability and power in a system because it con-
tinually displaces the sources of uncertainty, making the future very unpredictable for all 
actors.  
Concerning change, Crozier and Friedberg (1977; Friedberg, 1993) find that strategy 
processes can be understood through the following principles:  
• actors in organizations rarely have clear objectives in mind. They alter, remove, 
and discover new objectives as they go because of unpredictable consequences of 
their actions and those of others. 
 
• actors are active in their strategies and are not directly determined by them. As 
Crozier and Friedberg state, even passivity can be the result of choices. 
 
• while actors rarely have clear and unchangeable objectives in mind, this does not 
mean they behave irrationally. Instead of pursuing rational objectives, actors con-
stantly pursue new opportunities when they engage in relationships. 
 
Chapter 2 — Theoretical Framework    
 
65
• strategy has both offensive and defensive characteristics. Strategy is offensive 
when actors try to take advantage of opportunities to improve their situation. 
Strategy is defensive when actors try to maintain their margin of freedom. 
 
Thus, strategy can include a wide variety of behaviors. For Crozier and Friedberg, 
strategy can be applied to most behaviors and situations because of these characteristics. The 
behavior of actors in a given situation relates to two principal dimensions. The first is the 
actor’s personal history, referring to the experiences the actor has had that influenced his or 
her cognitive development, perceptions, and ways of entering into relationships. The second 
dimension concerns the constraints and the opportunities that come from participating in 
structured games in an environment of interdependence. These dimensions are tied into 
strategy formation because each actor estimates his or her chances of gaining or losing. Ac-
tors may adopt a losing strategy temporarily when faced with change, hoping that the game 
will turn in their favor in the longer term. 
Change does not always imply negative events, however. As Crozier & Friedberg 
(1977) and Loye & Eisler (1987) state, change and turbulence do not just represent the de-
struction of what exists, but they also imply new growth. This means new opportunities for 
an organization to change and to realign power, and to learn new ways of dealing with 
change in the future (Leifer, 1989). By capitalizing on periods of turbulence, some actors in 
an organization may even gain advantage over others by taking risks they would not nor-
mally consider under non-turbulent conditions.  
Examples of strategies that Crozier and Friedberg have identified in their research on 
organizations in France are the short-circuiting of communications, withholding and “doc-
toring” information, working-to-rule, disrupting operations, and claiming autonomy by using 
the cloak of professional expertise. These strategies can have profound effects on an organi-
zation’s capacity to act on its goals of change. In Scheff’s words (in Mintzberg, 1983, p. 192), 
these strategies can “stalemate a vigorous program of reform” in an organization. 
In essence, Crozier and Friedberg’s strategic model of change shifts the focus away 
from the individual (the focus of many of the perspectives of organizational change we have 
examined earlier) to the changing relationships and strategies that accompany transform-
ations in organizations. Change involves much more than new boxes in an organizational 
chart. Change means that people learn new games and restructure their power relationships. 
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In other words, because actors behave differently during turbulent change, the games or 
strategies that they employ are key elements in understanding change.  
Instead of starting from preconceived ideas about human nature under given condi-
tions or contexts, the strategic action model allows us to explore the nature of the games 
played by individuals and groups yet discover the elements that organize a given context, 
whether they be cultural, affective, or material elements. 
A criticism of Crozier and Friedberg’s work is that it is not clear about how to study 
the games that people play in smaller organizations because it focuses on larger bureau-
cracies such as governments. Also, the authors do not expand on change from the point of 
view of turbulence (e.g., tumultuous events). They do not clarify how uncertainty relates to 
power in such circumstances, except to say there is manipulation of sources of uncertainty. 
This incites us to explore their theory further concerning how people use strategies in deal-
ing with change, with a particular focus on uncertainty and turbulence. 
Despite these limits, Crozier & Friedberg’s model of organizations has received 
widespread support from several other researchers. Mintzberg (1983), for example, has ex-
panded on some of Crozier & Friedberg’s work by examining other types of organizations 
than French bureaucracies to provide further evidence strategy processes relate to the organ-
izational games. Salancik & Pfeffer (1977) also have carried out research that supports these 
concepts, although their research focuses on industrial organizations. Further evidence of 
strategy formation supporting Mintzberg’s and Crozier & Friedberg’s models is found in 
coalition models (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; Summers, 1986; Mannix, 1993; Garguilo, 1993) 
and in the field of family therapy (Selvini-Palazzoli, 1984). The principal models will be re-
viewed here to demonstrate how these concepts are useful to the study of strategy forma-
tion. 
As explained earlier in this chapter, Bacharach & Lawler (1980) build on the resource 
dependency model first proposed by Emerson (1962) to focus on strategy formation on coa-
litions in organizations. Coalitions are groupings of persons or interest groups who are 
committed to a common goal, and that are based on joint action against other interest 
groups. Summers (1986), for his part, defines coalitions with the focus on resources: “a coa-
lition is … a temporary alliance of parties that involves the joint use of resources for pro-
moting a common organizational interest” (p. 2). Mannix (1993, p. 2) explains coalitions as 
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“any subset of a group that polls its resources or units as a single voice to determine a deci-
sion for the entire group”. In essence, coalitions are collective vehicles for making decisions 
and exercising power. 
Coalitions are formed to defend against real or imagined threats to one’s security, 
and as such represent one of the manifestations of power strategy formation. Summers 
(1986) studied coalition formation in management groups and found that strategic actions 
around coalition building can be viewed in three stages. First, a manager becomes a stake-
holder in an issue, taking on the role of “organizer” by attracting others to participate in a 
collaborative effort or power game. As Bacharach and Lawler (1980) emphasize, the man-
ager thus enters a new relationship or activates old ones. There are many reasons for becom-
ing a stakeholder in an issue, such as an obligation of one’s position, a direct order, a critical 
event, entrepreneurial behavior of the manager, rewards and payoffs, or accidental condi-
tions originating in the organization’s environment. Thus, a manager may build a coalition 
from self-interest or be pushed into forming one.  
The second stage in coalition formation is the identification of potential coalition 
members. Managers may seek out others with complementary interests for the purpose of 
flowing resources, demands, or influence. The interdependent nature of the relationship is 
evident when we consider that power will be involved in this stage. 
The third stage of coalition building occurs when managers begin mobilizing the coa-
lition towards action. Because strategy formation in terms of coalitions occurs through the 
exchange between individuals, mobilizing members takes place through inducements across 
lateral and vertical levels of an organization (Summers, 1986). This use of power may include 
influence and persuasion to contribute to one’s coalition. Potential coalition partners may 
thus gain certain resources or access to them by joining the coalition. 
Certain factors may affect the degree to which managers may mobilize potential 
partners. The structure of the organization is important in that the “taller” the hierarchy, the 
further away lower level actors are from persons who normally control resources and infor-
mation and access to them. In organizations with a flatter organizational hierarchy, middle 
managers have wider access to members outside their immediate job areas because they are 
closer to most forms of power.  
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More recent and detailed studies of coalition building processes have revealed that 
groups with an unequal power balance between them are more likely to form coalitions than 
groups that are more equally balanced in terms of power (Mannix, 1993). Also found, how-
ever, was that unbalanced groups in terms of power had more difficulty reaching agreements 
than power balanced groups. Low power players in these groups tended to focus on protect-
ing their position, while higher power players focused on demanding their “deserved” out-
come. This led away from a group focus, reducing the likelihood of an integrative agreement 
for the group. Applied to professional organizations, this implies that therapists, who gener-
ally hold equal power when compared to one another, might form stronger units than 
groups comprising different hierarchical positions or levels. This also implies that coalitions 
may sometimes have a damaging effect to a group’s goals, thereby leading to further strategy 
formation. 
A criticism that is leveled against coalition research is that coalitions are aimed more 
at the study of lateral relationships than of supervisor-subordinate relationships (e.g., coali-
tions are more likely to form between persons at the same level in an organization). Also, 
while coalitions may be studied readily in large organizations, their empirical application is 
less clear in smaller organizations such as community mental health centers because of the 
reduced number of actors and possibilities for forming coalitions. Additionally, the clearly 
managerial bias of the coalition studies leaves us in the dark concerning this type of strategy 
formation at other levels of organizations. While these weaknesses imply caution, however, 
we have no reason to believe that the concept of coalition formation cannot be adapted in 
some form or other to our study. 
While studies on coalition formation provide input on strategy formation processes, 
there are other types of research focusing on power relations and games that merit attention 
here. Garguilo (1993) focuses on structural analysis to examine the different types of lever-
age or co-optation that actors use over others in organizations. The author examines one 
aspect of strategy formation, which he calls “two-step leverage” or “strategic co-optation”, 
which means that in some situations, actors use not only direct co-optation of other actors 
(through application of direct power such as authority over subordinates), but also indirect 
co-optation. 
Chapter 2 — Theoretical Framework    
 
69
Gargiulo proposes a continuum of four types of co-optation that actors use in or-
ganizations. In complex co-optation, person A cultivates co-optation ties with person B, but 
s/he also cultivates co-optive ties with person C as a way of further securing control over B. 
Two-step co-optation, occurs when person A builds co-optive ties with person C as a way of 
controlling or constraining person B through indirect means. Direct co-optation occurs when 
person A builds relationships with B and does not involve a third person. Finally, avoiding co-
optation occurs when person A performs his or her functions without building co-optive rela-
tionships with either person B or C, basically avoiding co-optive ties altogether. 
In practice, Gargiulo suggests that two-step strategies are more likely to be observed 
in periods that are marked by conflict in an organization. In such situations, two-step ma-
neuvers may be unavoidable because “once interdependent players … start expressing con-
flicting views on crucial policy decisions, a smooth co-optive relationship between them is 
unlikely to arise (or to endure)” (p. 17). As to the types of organizations in which two-step 
co-optation is more likely to occur, the author suggests that it is a general phenomenon that 
varies across types of organizations. He adds that organizations that have a high degree of 
organizational politics, such as those that contain highly discretionary positions that do not 
fall under hierarchical rules, are more likely to see two-step leverage strategies. This would 
seem to imply that members of professional organizations such as community mental health 
centers are likely to involve this in their strategy formation. 
Co-optation tells us several things about strategy formation. First, it supports what 
other authors have said about hierarchy in organizations. There are some positions that are 
not regulated by hierarchical rules, implying that power cuts across the boundaries and lines 
officially drawn by organizations. This would imply that strategy formation is not only a 
managerial activity and that attention must be given to other levels of organizations. Second, 
the existence of co-optation confirms that people will use both direct and indirect means of 
power on others. This means that some maneuvering takes place in concealed fashion or in 
ways that are not immediately apparent because they involve third parties. Third, human ser-
vice organizations, which are often characterized by high levels of professional discretion 
that crosses hierarchical boundaries, are likely candidates for co-optation. 
As with most other research reviewed so far, empirical application to the human ser-
vice context is absent. Garguilo examined co-optive relationships only in an agricultural 
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business firm in South America. Another weakness is that power strategy formation involves 
more than just coalition building and co-optation. The importance of the past history of 
members in the organization, the types of changes that occurred in the organization, and the 
importance of the context of the changes are minimized. Nonetheless, the concept of co-
optation is an interesting one that should be explored further. 
While most studies of coalition formation have taken place in corporate organiza-
tions, the field of family therapy (through the disciplines of psychology, social work, and so-
ciology) has extended the concept of coalitions to families as organizations. The systemic 
family therapy model is particularly useful to analysis of power dynamics because it is based 
on methods in family therapy designed to foster change in dysfunctional family systems, de-
spite multiple power struggles and strong resistance to change. As Kets de Vries and Miller 
(1984) say, “much of what has been written about dysfunctional family interaction and fam-
ily communication patterns is directly relevant for providing insights into faulty supe-
rior/subordinate relationships in organizations” (p. 95). This implies that there may be 
parallels between family systems and business/mental health organizations. The work carried 
out by Selvini-Palazzoli et al. (1984) is particularly interesting because it extends the concept 
of coalition to include alignments between organizational members. It also goes beyond the 
boundaries of family therapy because the author has applied the concept to systems such as 
schools.  
Selvini-Palazzoli is the leader of the Milan school of family therapy, which defines an 
organization as a structured system characterized by the functioning of its parts that can be 
differentiated from other organizations by the games it plays. At the risk of over-simplifying, 
Selvini-Palazzoli defines games as the relationships that coordinate the different parts of an 
organization. This is similar to Crozier and Friedberg’s (1977) and Mintzberg’s (1983) view 
of games that we discussed earlier. In this sense, all organizations, whether they are as small 
as families or as large as government agencies, are looked upon not just by their demo-
graphic characteristics but by their structures, rules, and games. Games are revealing of the 
way in which a group functions, and this is where the richness of this approach lies. 
Organizations will always face a certain degree of instability or disorder. When this 
disorder stays within tolerable limits, the system will function properly and behavior patterns 
will remain predictable. As clinical research has shown, however, the stability of a system 
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often occurs at the great discomfort of one or more of its members, which creates relational 
problems within the family. For some families, this instability becomes part of their normal 
functioning and sometimes is desired by members because it becomes a coping mechanism. 
It keeps members who normally hold power, “on their toes”. In essence, we can find evi-
dence of power games in families. 
In terms of observing power relationships, we can sometimes find a “symptom” 
(e.g., anger, blaming, conflict) in one individual or a group of persons that represents a dys-
functional interaction somewhere else in the system (Minuchin, 1974; Selvini-Palazzoli et al., 
1984). 
Selvini-Palazzoli et al. apply these concepts to larger systems such as human service 
organizations, and they provide a framework to examine clues as to how they function by 
looking at the power relationship between the members. People group and regroup during 
turbulent change. Alignments are examples of this. Alignments are defined by the way system 
members join or oppose one another in carrying out their functions, and they refer to how 
supportive or non-supportive of one another members are. Coalitions are alignments and oc-
cur when individuals engage with sympathetic persons against opponents to minimize or 
eliminate powerful resistance. Triangulation (Minuchin, 1974) is also a form of alignment and 
occurs when each of two persons draws in a third to ally with him or her against the other. 
Every movement that this third person makes causes one or the other partner to feel ganged 
upon. Because problems fail to be worked out between the first two persons, the third be-
comes part of the problem-solution process. In essence, it is through these types of align-
ments or regroupings that individuals strengthen their efforts against a formal and informal 
structure that they cannot handle alone. Thus, these different patterns of behavior provide 
evidence for the types of power relationships that individuals engage in. The literature across 
several disciplines is abundant in its support of the concept of alignments, especially of the 
formation of coalitions (Mechanic, 1962; Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; Pfeffer, 1981; Mintz-
berg, 1983; Summers, 1986; Mills & Murgatroyd, 1991; Kanter, 1992; Garguilo, 1993). 
  These patterns of behavior also are linked to the formal and informal rules, myths 
and beliefs that individuals have of the organization as a whole (Pettigrew, 1978; Kets de 
Vries and Miller, 1984; Mills & Murgatroyd, 1991; Hart, 1992), and to the rituals they engage 
in (Imber-Black, 1988, 1990). By examining the structural boundaries around people and 
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groups, also their rules, myths and beliefs that are an everyday part of organizational exis-
tence, these authors find that we can gain useful insight into the engagement of individuals 
with one another, and thus how they structure their relationships and games. Just as families 
have “rules” regarding interaction within the family, members of organizations also have 
“rules” about interaction within the organization. One common rule guiding managers, for 
example, is to place a boundary and rarely to talk about their management and personal 
problems with subordinates. This is based on the belief by some managers that talking about 
problems would weaken their position in the eyes of others, especially if these persons are 
subordinates. Conversely, subordinates may not be inclined to show their weak points to 
higher managers, even though they may discuss these openly with their peers. Another 
commonly held belief that guides behavior is that managers don’t know and understand the 
work of front-line staffs. Thus, rules and beliefs can influence coalition formation in organi-
zations.  
Selvini-Palazzoli’s approach examines the types of alignments that organizational 
members engage in. The emergence of alignments is evidence that individuals are trying to 
stabilize turbulence and uncertainty through games and power strategies. The model also 
emphasizes the importance of placing manifestations of strategy formation, or alignments, 
within a structural, social and cultural context. The family therapy perspective includes many 
of the elements discussed previously concerning strategy formation. It helps operationalize 
strategy formation by providing several levels of analysis. At the macro level, it examines the 
place of a group within the larger system, within the community, and within the societal con-
text. At the micro level, it provides accurate descriptions of the actions and behaviors of in-
dividuals and groups. It also helps understand the dynamics between the visible and not-so-
visible nature of power without hunting for psychological motives for the behavior. Thus, 
applied to organizations such as mental health centers, this model recognizes political and 
relational processes. Unfortunately, empirical application to organizations other than family 
systems and some school settings is lacking. 
One further model in the Power Relations and Games perspective merits attention 
here because of the way it builds upon many of the concepts already mentioned, while main-
taining a central focus on power and games. Based largely on Crozier & Friedberg (1977) 
and Mintzberg (1983), Frost (1987) focuses on the games that actors play at different levels 
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of organizations to explain power and politics. In the following section, we will borrow lib-
erally from Frost’s writings because of the comprehensive nature of his model. 
 Frost supports Crozier & Friedberg’s view of organizational games as involving “so-
cial actors, payoffs, and a set of interpretive strategies that specify the rules, data, and suc-
cessful outcomes in the game” (p. 527). Power games are more likely where conflict over 
control, struggles for collaboration, and uncertainty exist. This makes Frost’s model particu-
larly useful to the present research because of the closeness of these characteristics to the 
setting that is being studied. 
There are four assumptions leading Frost’s discussion about strategy formation: 
1) organizational life is significantly influenced by the exercise of power by organiza-
tional actors; 
2) power exists both on the surface level of organizational activity and deep within 
the structure of the organization; 
3) communication plays a vital role in the development of power relations and the 
exercise of power; 
4) the manipulation and exercise of power is expressed as organizational games or re-
lational dynamics; power is embedded in organizational games. 
Organizational games on the surface level of organizations involve the exercise of 
power by actors to get what they want from decisions, negotiations, and interpersonal inter-
actions. This involves strategies by actors to confront others to gain their compliance, strate-
gies to avoid resistance and to prevent the emergence of controversial issues, and strategies 
to resist the influence of others. These strategies can be used in downward relationships (e.g., 
interactions between supervisors and their subordinates), lateral relationships (e.g., interac-
tions with peers), and upward relationships (e.g., interactions with persons at higher levels of 
organizations). Based on the resource dependency model discussed earlier, strategies revolve 
around resources that are irreplaceable, that are central to the work carried out in the organiza-
tion, that are pervasive in that they are linked to the activities of many other actors in the or-
ganization, and that have immediate impact on the organization when the resources are 
withdrawn (Hinings, Hickson, Pennings, & Schneck, 1974). 
Frost has compiled several types of strategies from prior research that demonstrates 
manipulation of power at the surface level. Kipnis, Schmidt and Wilkinson (1980), for ex-
Chapter 2 — Theoretical Framework    
 
74
ample, provide empirical evidence of seven power strategies related to surface games. These 
include reasoning (using facts to support an argument), coalition building (mobilizing people 
around a central issue), ingratiation (impressing leaders by adhering to behaviors and values 
thought to be desirable by them, using flattery, creating goodwill), bargaining (negotiating 
through exchange of benefits), assertiveness (using a forceful approach), using higher au-
thority (gaining the support of people higher up in the organization), and sanctions (using 
rewards and punishments derived from the organization). Other power strategies that Frost 
has identified in the literature include appeals to altruism (“do it for the good of the com-
pany”), deceit (Wiseman & Schenck-Hamlin, 1981), and exploitation of one’s charisma. 
These have been supported by recent research carried out in the industrial context. (Yukl 
and Falbe, 1990; Barry and Shapiro, 1992; Falbe and Yukl, 1992; Yukl and Tracey, 1992; 
Guerin, 1995; Yukl, Kim and Falbe, 1996) 
Regarding how games are played between different hierarchical levels, Frost indicates 
that actors involved in downward (supervisor-subordinate) power relationships tend to use 
assertiveness and sanctions to a high degree, and moderate use of ingratiation, bargaining, 
and appeals to higher authorities. Strategies are often dependent on the objectives of the su-
pervisor, however. 
“Supervisors report the use of ingratiation when assigning work to others, 
reasoning and assertiveness when trying to improve the performance of oth-
ers, and reasoning tactics to gain acceptance of change.” (p. 523) 
 
Members involved in upward (subordinate-supervisor) power relationships, on the 
other hand, have more limited power resources at their disposal when they want to influence 
persons higher-up.  
“Actors are likely to engage in manipulative persuasion (the actor is open 
about the existence of his or her influence attempt but hides the true objec-
tive) or to use manipulation (the actor conceals both the intent and the fact 
that he or she is making an influence attempt). Strategies of reason, ingrati-
ation, and coalition are likely to be used to get things accomplished.” (p. 524) 
 
 A reason for lower use of assertiveness in upward relationships is that managers view 
it as inappropriate and respond negatively to assertiveness strategies. (Yukl and Falbe, 1990) 
Research has shown that these tend to be associated with lower supervisor performance as-
sessments and the subordinate’s promotability. (Thacker and Wayne, 1995) 
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 There is evidence, on the other hand, that more neutral strategies such as reasoning 
in interactions with supervisors may lead to the supervisors inferring that reasoning is associ-
ated with effective interpersonal skills. Kipnis and Schmidt (1988) and Yukl and Tracey 
(1992), for example, find that a manager may consider an employee who provides logical ar-
guments, presents factual evidence, and offers clear explanations to support his or her point 
of view as having effective interpersonal skills.  
Thus, sanctions (taken in the liberal sense of working to rule and withholding or de-
laying services) are not likely to be used by lower levels because they are usually not available 
to them as a source of power, and because they may not have the desired effect when they 
are used. 
Middle managers, for their part, might be described as having upward-downward 
power relationships because they must simultaneously manage subordinates and deal with 
persons at higher levels. They are often in a difficult position because their strategies are 
aimed at multiple levels in different directions. As Frost states, middle managers must often 
“go to bat” for their subordinates to maintain influence over them, all the while carrying out 
the orders from above. Frost provides no specific examples of strategies used by middle 
managers in upward-downward power relationships, although recent research has shown 
that strategies of risk taking and risk aversion may be linked to low aspirations or hopes of 
success. (March, 1988; Thaler & Johnson, 1990; Bolton, 1993; Greve, 1998) 
Organizational members involved in lateral (peer-peer) power relationships tend to 
establish networks with peers (Kotter, 1985) and develop coalitions (Kanter, Stein & Jick, 
1992). Strategies may invoke the use of reason by appealing to established rules to persuade 
members to settle differences, and appealing to higher authorities. 
Organizational power games in deeper levels of organizations, for their part, are coded 
in cultural values, beliefs, and practices in and around organizations. This type of power is 
thus a real but mostly unperceived part of organizational functioning. Frost believes that 
manipulating deep power is not easily accomplished because it originates in relationships be-
tween actors at an earlier point in the history of the organization. It is difficult to predict and 
control cultural aspects of an organization, for example, when the culture of an organization 
has been evolving for some time. Deep level strategies are associated with language, ceremo-
nies, symbols and settings (p. 523). Actors may consciously attempt to use these strategies to 
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disguise power relationships, to increase the legitimacy of their decisions, and to encourage 
others to share in the meaning they wish to convey about their actions.  
Some aspects of deep level power are difficult to use in strategy formation, because 
they are so deep within the organization. 
“Deep level power is embedded in complex terrain… Furthermore, some as-
pects of this kind of power are likely to be so deeply buried that they cannot 
be understood, tapped, and manipulated from the surface of organizations. 
We may be able to explicate deep structure power, but there may be some re-
sidual that is so much a part of us that we cannot gain enough ‘distance’ to 
discover and understand it all.” (p. 525) 
 
Strategies and games regarding deep structure power thus remain difficult to pin 
down, and this is compounded by the fact that little literature has probed the question 
(Frost, 1987). Nonetheless, some research exists that leads us to understand the basic nature 
of these games. Deetz (1985) and Conrad & Ryan (1985), for example, find that naturaliza-
tion, neutralization, legitimation, and socialization are political dynamics occurring at deep 
levels. Naturalization serves to “depict existing relations as the natural outgrowth of events, as 
part of natural law, and prevents discussion of them” (Frost, 1987, p. 533). Neutralization, on 
the other hand, is a way of embedding or hiding one’s values by treating one’s position as if 
it were value-free. Assessing another person’s activities through quantitative formulations 
that are defined as rational, value free, and thus neutral, is an example of this. Legitimation, for 
its part, includes using higher-order explanations that cannot be questioned. By invoking 
loyalty to the organization or sacrifice for the good of the organization, for example, power 
holders are able to advance their ideas and manipulate other persons, even if the ideas are 
not in the best interests of these persons. Finally, socialization is the fourth dynamic of deep 
structure games, which is accomplished through “mechanisms of learning and orientation 
that shape desired attitudes, behaviors, and interpretive schemes of some players to the 
benefit of others” (p. 533). Raven, Schwarzwald and Koslowky (1998) support the notion of 
deep level dynamics when discussing issues of fairness, reciprocity (“You owe something to 
me because I have done something for you”), and equity (“I have really put a lot of myself 
into this.”) 
In essence, the key to Frost’s model is that games may occur at surface and deeper 
levels, and that actors sometimes tap both levels in forming strategies. Frost cites an example 
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from an ethnographic study carried out by Rosen (1985) in an advertising agency, where sen-
ior management manipulated the language, gestures, and the context of a breakfast ritual 
(deep structure) to ensure acceptance of the structure, goals and practices of the organization 
(surface structure) by employees. In this case, the executive favored one social reality over 
others and tried to impart this view of the world to others through strategies at the surface 
and deep levels. Others such as Raven, Schwarzwald and Koslowski (1998) have equally ex-
amined power sources and strategies that are not apparent at the surface level but that in-
voke the use of norms to increase social pressure. The experimental aspect of Raven, 
Schwarzwald and Koslowski’s study and its leanings toward purely psychological definitions 
of power, however, make it difficult to apply directly to the context of the present research. 
In summary, Frost’s model builds upon many of the important elements described 
earlier while maintaining a focus on power in organizations. This model allows us to under-
stand the interplay between power and strategies at different levels of organizations by exam-
ining the games that are played. An advantage is that the model allows us to locate games by 
specifying the different types of strategies within them, thereby helping us examine the proc-
ess of strategy formation as it unfolds. Another strength is that there is a clear focus on 
power relationship across organizations, not only from the top. Strategy formation is thus 
conceptualized as an organization-wide phenomenon and process, and the model proposed 
by Frost provides theoretical and methodological tools that allow us to search for evidence 
on how strategies relate or mesh between levels. 
Some questions remain unanswered in Frost’s explanation of strategy processes, 
however. While we know that at the surface level, different tiers of an organization may pos-
sess different types of power, and that consequently they manipulate power in different 
ways, there is little empirical evidence to compare use of deep level power by actors at dif-
ferent levels.  
Another weakness in Frost’s approach is that it has little empirical application to the 
human services sector. As with most other studies on strategy formation, the focus is clearly 
on industrial types of organizations that are quite different from human services organiza-
tions, as was argued earlier. While the model is largely based on a compilation of prior indus-
trial research, it nonetheless provides a basic framework for operationalizing existing theory 
in the human services domain. This opens the door for the present research to examine 
Chapter 2 — Theoretical Framework    
 
78
some of the differences in using power at different hierarchical levels, with specific applica-
tion to human service organizations.  
 
2.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The literature review outlined in this chapter indicates there has been extensive con-
ceptual development in the area of strategy-formation. To paraphrase Dufour (1991), the 
number of perspectives presented above is explained by the diversity of processes at play in 
strategy formation. It is noteworthy, however, that the field remains fragmented despite the 
richness of the literature, and no single model adequately explains everything about strategy 
formation. Also, most prior literature has focused on one set of actors (top management) 
and one general type of organization (industrial/corporate) much to the exclusion of others. 
There has been little application to the human services sector. 
Different factors may explain these gaps in the literature. First, each approach tends 
to focus on different variables, and this makes an overall view difficult to achieve. Also, 
some concepts relating to power span disciplinary boundaries and have application in several 
fields of study. We have seen examples that strategy formation is a cultural phenomenon, an 
analytic process, a historical process, a political process, a leverage process, and so on. Each 
perspective has sought to develop a vocabulary and concepts proper to its group. This has 
led to some incompatibility between perspectives, not only in vocabulary but often in phi-
losophy.  
While the management literature has been traditionally strong in describing the con-
tents and effects of change, it remains weak in operationalizing such concepts and analyzing 
the processes behind change. Only recently has there been evidence of research with the fo-
cus on processes. The literature also shows a weakness in studying processes other than at 
the management level. The applied study of surface and deep structure power that we will 
carry out in the present research will thus begin to fill this gap.  
Despite varied in its explanations of strategy processes in the literature, there are 
nonetheless several common threads that Frost’s model pulls together. Not all theories focus 
on power, but most recognize that power is an inherent element in organizations, and that 
conflict and collaboration are part-and-parcel of the way people function in them. Power is 
the ability of persons to influence the behaviors of others, to change the course of events, to 
Chapter 2 — Theoretical Framework    
 
79
overcome resistance, and to get people to do things they would not normally do. Strategies are 
sets of decisions and actions over time that are aimed at gaining something, minimizing 
losses, or maintaining the status quo. Power strategy formation refers to the ways that strategies 
are used to manipulate power sources and situations of uncertainty. Power and strategy for-
mation are intimately tied through the relationships that people engage in. Power is an inte-
gral part of life in organizations, and strategy formation is an important manifestation that 
power exists. 
Three characteristics are deemed necessary for power to exist: a source of power 
must be essential to others in the organization, scarce, and not easily replaceable. Addition-
ally, there are three dimensions to all sources of power: dependency, relationships, and sanc-
tions. These are the starting points for any analysis of power. 
 Another important element is that persons are primarily active determinants of their 
destiny. In terms of power, this means that they are not passive beings experiencing power. 
They are active in the formation of power, its structures, and its environment. It follows that 
they actively work at making strategies and discovering others. In essence, everyone influ-
ences everyone in an organization. We believe this is equally true in non-profit organizations 
and in industrial/corporate organizations. 
Strategy formation must be examined in a relational sense. Attempts to focus solely 
on individual characteristics cannot provide adequate explanations for what occurs in terms 
of power strategy formation. In essence, power only arises and can be observed through so-
cial interactions, whether among individuals or social units such as coalitions. At a funda-
mental level, power strategy formation should be understood as the activation of persons 
who are in interaction around the manipulation of sources of power in different levels of 
organizations. 
The context in which strategies take shape is very important to understanding proc-
esses that are happening. As emphasized by Pettigrew (1985), Waema & Walsham (1990), 
and Dufour (1991), “context” must include the internal and social context of organizations, 
historical antecedents, the content of what is happening, and processes that are occurring 
within the context of the strategies.  
While not all behaviors of individuals and groups are strategic in organizations, most 
actions can be tied in some way to a pattern of action over time. Additionally, as Friedberg 
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(1993) and Mintzberg (1983) have explained, it is illusory to think that strategy formation is 
completely calculated through objectives that are planned ahead of time. Sometimes, behav-
ior is only considered strategic after the fact. The study of power strategy formation there-
fore includes the study of behaviors of people, whether or not they consider their behavior 
as strategic at the time. 
No single discipline can explain fully the strategy formation processes occurring in 
organizations. The interdisciplinary model proposed by Frost transcends this problem, at 
least to some degree, by examining relational issues and incorporating many key elements 
discussed above. The model thus tries to bridge the gap between disciplines, and as a result, 
leads to a better understanding of the power processes in human service organizations. It 
also allows us to study power strategy formation from an applied perspective that is 
grounded in the day-to-day life of organizations, as opposed to a purely theoretical or labora-
tory approach. 
Concerning the present study, the fact that the literature focuses principally on indus-
trial organizations does not imply that the findings cannot be applied to human service or-
ganizations. It is more likely that the concepts have some value and that they shed some light 
on the processes occurring within them. This research examines how these concepts can be 
applied to the human service field. 
  Thus, through a power relations and games model of power strategy formation, this 
research examines what the bases of individual and group power are in a human service or-
ganization, what power games exist, how these games are played, and how the games relate 
to one another at different hierarchical levels. Covering about three years in the history of 
the selected organization, this dissertation analyzes data from a mental health center that has 
gone through turbulent change and that is still feeling the effects of these changes. From a 
combination of twenty-eight initial interviews and several follow-up interviews, observations, 
and reviews of the organization's documents, data were available on how staffs at all levels 
perceived the changes and acted upon them. The next chapter describes the methodological 
design used to reach the research objectives. 
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C h a p t e r   T h r e e 
 
Research Methods 
 
 
“There are neither good nor bad methods but only methods  
that are more or less effective under circumstances  
in reaching objectives on the way to a distant goal.” 
(George Homans, 1949) 
 
 
 
 
Studying the relational experiences of employees in a turbulent organizational con-
text poses several methodological problems for the field researcher. These problems arise 
from the complexity of the concept of power strategy formation and from the difficulty of 
studying organizations in general. In the following section, the general research approach of 
this study will be presented. Data collection will be described, followed by the approach for 
presenting results and data analysis. There will be a discussion regarding dealing with poten-
tial biases.  
 
3.0  RESEARCH APPROACH 
An issue faced at the beginning of the research was whether power strategy forma-
tion should be studied using quantitative or qualitative methods, or both. Because the goal 
was to describe the unfolding power strategy formation, a research strategy that emphasized 
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the points of view of the employees involved and the nuances of how they deal with turbu-
lent change was selected. The research also needed to focus on what significance the em-
ployees gave to their actions and those of others, and also to interpret these in the historical 
context of the organization. While qualitative and quantitative research methods are not mu-
tually exclusive (Friedberg, 1993; Van Maanen, 1979), the focus was principally on a qualita-
tive exploratory research approach. 
Quantitative methods are by far the most frequently used in the field of strategy re-
search. A survey of top management journals (Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Man-
agement Review, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of Management, Management Science, Strategic 
Management Journal, for example) showed that the overwhelming majority of studies use quan-
titative methods (Schwenk and Dalton, 1991). The qualitative approach to research, on the 
other hand, is being used more and more in the field of management and organizations 
(Podsakoff and Dalton, 1987; Demers, 1990; Gummeson, 1991). This is surprising given 
that qualitative methods have been employed in other fields for decades. This may be a 
holdover from earlier decades when qualitative research was either “not theoretical enough 
or the theories were too ‘impressionistic’ ” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p.15). Even from early 
work in the field, nonetheless, qualitative research was recognized for its “sensitivity in pick-
ing up everyday facts about social structures and social systems” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, 
p.15). Also, the “qualitative method was the only way to obtain data on many areas of social 
life not amenable to the techniques for collecting quantitative data” (p.17). Furthermore, 
“qualitative researchers tend to lay considerable emphasis on situational and often structural 
contexts, in contrast to many quantitative researchers, whose work is multivariate but often 
weak on context” (Strauss, 1987, p.2). 
A few authors are notable for their contributions to qualitative research. Several well-
known authors, such as Mintzberg (1979, 1983), Morgan (1986), Pettigrew (1973), and 
Chanlat (1990), to name a few, have sought to establish a qualitative approach in its own 
right in the study of organizations. 
Thus, this research is essentially qualitative. To paraphrase Dufour (1991), the re-
searcher’s personal interests in understanding the daily life of social service organizations 
from a front-line perspective led the choice of the broad research question and the research 
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strategy. As stated earlier, the research seeks to understand the relational experiences of em-
ployees in an organization, with emphasis on power strategy formation in a turbulent organ-
izational context. This research goal was selected after having reviewed the literature on the 
subject, and also after pondering questions about personal experiences with such an organi-
zation.  
Given the general objective of this study to explore and develop concepts, insights, 
and understanding from patterns in the data rather than to test hypotheses, a qualitative 
analysis was chosen because it is highly appropriate, practical and effective for this kind of 
study (Taylor & Bogdan, 1984; Yin, 1989). The selected research strategy is capable of cap-
turing some intangible aspects of the process of power strategy formation, the points of view 
of the actors involved, the nuances of how they deal with turbulent change, and the context 
in which events occurred. As such, the research is at least partly “grounded” in the data and 
not necessarily in prior theory (Friedberg, 1993; Strauss, 1987; Glaser and Strauss, 1967). At 
the risk of oversimplifying the term, “grounded theory” refers to a general style of research 
“without any particular commitment to specific kinds of data, lines of research, or theoretical 
interests”. It uses techniques such as coding to generate conceptual categories from the data 
(as opposed to verifying only if data fit into pre-existing conceptual categories), as well as 
writing researcher memos about preliminary findings, opinions and initial conclusions (even 
if these initial conclusions seem to be remote), and constant comparison of data as analysis 
progresses (Strauss, 1987, p. 5). The researcher thus has an obligation to compare on an on-
going basis all overlaps, associations, similarities and differences within single sources of data 
and between them. If data do not fit into existing categories or explanations, then categories 
are modified or new ones created instead of discarding data that do not “fit”. This process 
continues as data are “checked out during succeeding phases of inquiry” (p.17). When the 
researcher arrives at a point where analysis no longer contributes to discovering anything 
new about a category, then that category is said to be “saturated”, and analysis continues un-
til saturation in other categories. This ensures “conceptual development and density” (p. 5). 
Thus, the process is one not only of organizing data but also of organizing ideas or concepts 
that emerge from the data analysis. 
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In essence, inductive qualitative methods such as grounded theory start from the ac-
tor’s experiences to reconstruct the particular characteristics of the field. Priority is thus put 
on discovering what is in the field and on developing descriptive and interpretative models 
that “stick” to the characteristics of this field. (Friedberg 1993) 
The following sections will discuss the application of this qualitative approach to the 
organization studied. The points that are addressed are the following: 
• the development of the research topic 
• the methods of collecting the data 
• the selection of the study site and persons who were interviewed 
• the methods of analyzing the data 
• the possible sources of bias and limits of this research. 
 
 
3.1  STEPS IN COLLECTING THE DATA 
Selection of the research site 
The Northern Mental Health Centre1 was chosen as a study site for several reasons. 
First, it is an organization whose employees have recently experienced turbulent change due 
to a structural transformation, a split from a psychiatric hospital, a new community mandate, 
and severe economic constraints. Second, an initial inquiry made with potential candidates 
ensured at least twenty to twenty-five participants.  
For practical reasons, a single site was chosen because of issues of consistency of the 
information gathered. Only a limited number of persons could be interviewed because of the 
complexity of the subject. Analysis of a larger number of interviews and accompanying ob-
servations, materials and notes would not have been practical for a single researcher. Also, 
the researcher was able to use his personal influence as a former employee in the organiza-
tion to “dig into” that site, making access to the significance of the data higher than it would 
have been in an unfamiliar site. 
The history and context of the organization ensure that there is ample variability be-
tween subjects within the single site. The Northern Mental Health Centre is physically and 
operationally divided into five separate units, four of them clinical (Anglophone #1, Anglo-
 
   1 The name has been changed to maintain anonymity. 
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phone #2, Francophone, and Native), the other an administrative unit. Each of these units, 
or clinical teams as they are called in the organization, has their own history, context and way 
of functioning. The Francophone team, for example, has historically been apart from the 
other units physically and in terms of clinical orientation. The Francophone team has seen 
the greatest changes in terms of clinical approach and programming over the years. Some of 
its former personnel, for example, spurred the community in 1987 into demanding inde-
pendent Francophone services geared to their culture. It is also the only unit that maintained 
a community day-treatment program during the turbulent changes that occurred in 1990. 
Anglophone team #1, on the other hand, comprises the staffs that have worked with the 
organization the longest. It is by far the most senior unit in terms of history with the organi-
zation. Anglophone team #2, for its part, is distinguished by having the largest number of 
junior staffs in terms of union seniority. The Native unit, unlike the other teams, comprises 
only two staff members for the moment. It came onstream only in 1992. Presently it is on 
the same site as administration. It does not have the turbulent history of the other units, al-
though it is as driven by political and cultural forces as are the others. 
In addition to differences between the teams in the organization, there are also dif-
ferences between the staffs in general. About half of the employees (about twenty) of the 
Northern Mental Health Centre were employed by the former psychiatric hospital before the 
organizational split in 1990. The other half of the employees, ranging from upper administra-
tion to therapists to clerical staffs, were hired after 1990 and have a shorter experience in the 
organization. Thus, there are differences in the levels of turbulence that employees have ex-
perienced. The researcher used these differences to advantage when comparing and analyz-
ing the data. These differences will become apparent in Chapters Five and Six when 
comparing different groups of staffs in terms of power strategy formation. 
In essence, there was ample variability in terms of employment history, relationships 
with management, and levels of turbulence in the organization to warrant study of a single 
site. Also, as stated earlier, practical issues meant that the number of interviews had to be 
limited. Perhaps most important in the choice of a study site was the researcher’s own fa-
miliarity with the history of the agency, its personnel, and the changes that had occurred 
prior to the study. While participation was voluntary, the researcher’s personal knowledge of 
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the participants and their experiences increased participation and sped the process of estab-
lishing trust as a researcher in the setting. 
Participants in this type of research must be able to verbalize about the phenomenon 
being studied, to identify it, to agree to explore and to share their personal experiences for 
research purposes (Lapalme, 1991). From an epistemological point of view,  the participants 
in this study were not naive informers, but equals with the researcher in terms of recon-
structing and reflecting on their experiences. 
Another practical reason for choosing the Northern Mental Health Centre was the 
availability of written material about the site. The researcher had obtained several govern-
ment documents about the proposed design and functioning of the new mental health centre 
during his employment at the psychiatric hospital. 
Thus, personal knowledge, access to documents, access to staffs and the ability to re-
late to and understand the events were important principal factors in choosing the site. 
 
 Gaining entry to the research site 
As Taylor and Bogdan (1984) state, gaining access to an organization is often one of 
the difficult and long steps a researcher undertakes in a study. Van de Ven (1987, p.333) also 
emphasizes this in his writings: “If organizational participants perceive little potential use of 
a study’s findings, there is little to motivate their providing access and information to an in-
vestigator.” Gaining access to the mental health centre in the present study was not guaran-
teed nor immediate, despite knowing many of the employees personally and having first-
hand knowledge of the issues they faced. 
In May 1990, while still an employee of the psychiatric hospital, and just six months 
before the transfer of staffs between the old and new organizations took place, the re-
searcher wrote a letter to the executive director of the new organization asking permission to 
study his agency. Permission was granted on the condition that before the data collection 
phase, discussion take place with the management of the organization about the research. 
In August 1992, after a telephone conference with a group of senior and middle 
managers,  entry into the organization was granted. It was noteworthy that during the tele-
phone conference, several questions were raised concerning the possible effect of the re-
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search on the staffs. Given that the researcher had personal relationships with many staffs 
and that he had intimate knowledge of the organization, some managers feared this would 
“resurrect buried skeletons”, “stir up old emotions”, or “revive old wounds”, to use their 
own words. They also stated that “much energy had been put into working through or put-
ting aside past conflicts and fears”. There was even a suggestion that someone else carry out 
the interviews in the researcher’s place. 
These concerns were addressed by ensuring that the content of the interviews would 
probably be enhanced because of the researcher’s personal knowledge of the organization. 
The study could benefit them because it might help staffs understand the difficulties the or-
ganization was going through. In this regard, the research would be useful because it would 
allow staffs to vent their feelings concerning emotionally charged issues to an outsider who 
understood their difficulties. The management team was reassured that the researcher would 
be sensitive about reviving the past. Full access to the organization was then granted. 
 
 Data collection  
The importance of having several sources of evidence for data collection in qualita-
tive studies to increase the validity of the findings is well documented (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967; Miles and Huberman, 1984; Yin, 1989; Grawitz, 1990). Data collection in the present 
research relied on four sources.  
Personal recall of events: The first method was the researcher’s personal recall of 
the events that had occurred between 1984 and 1990, while an employee of the psychiatric 
hospital. While in the last months of employment at the hospital, the researcher began jot-
ting down some of the historical events that had been important to him as a therapist and 
then as a manager. Dates, names, and details of events that were thought to be important to 
a potential research were written in a personal logbook. This information helped put to-
gether facts around the twists and turns of the organization during the divestment of the 
mental health centre.  
Review of official documents: The second method of data collection was an ex-
amination of official documents relating to the organization’s structure, mandate, and history 
of the turbulent changes. This included a historical reconstruction of events, which has been 
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used successfully by other researchers in organizations (e.g., Mintzberg, 1985; Demers, 
1990). 
The researcher began collecting documents before leaving the organization in 1990, 
and made copies of public documents believed helpful in reconstructing the historical and 
political context of the organization. Also, the researcher was given a variety of documents 
such as annual reports, service plans, job descriptions, a Board of Directors training manual, 
a working document on leadership in organizations, and a few memorandums from the Min-
istry of Community and Social Services at the beginning of the interviews in 1993. Although 
this method of data collection was not as comprehensive as the other methods used (inter-
views and participant observation), it was necessary to enhance understanding of the context 
of the turbulent changes. It also helped structure the interviews in that participants were 
asked to provide explanations of their understanding of these documents. Review of these 
documents thus helped corroborate and augment evidence from other sources such as inter-
views. When documentary evidence was contradictory to other sources instead of corrobora-
tory, this pushed the researcher to explore the differences further (Yin, 1989).  
In-depth interviews: The third and primary method of gathering or “producing” 
data (Rhéaume & Sévigny, 1988) involved in-depth semi-structured interviews and follow-up 
telephone calls. As Crozier and Friedberg (1977) state, analysis of power strategies in an or-
ganization requires that primary emphasis be put on the experiences of the participants. It 
was pointless in this study to examine power relationships without talking to those who ex-
perienced them.  
The interviews were semi-structured as they directed the participants to certain sub-
ject material. An interview guide helped keep a focal point. A fixed questionnaire was elimi-
nated in order to get as close to the participants as possible, and to grasp the essence and 
nuances of their experiences. This left room for key data to emerge and to explore any un-
usual data. 
While having some structure, the interviews nonetheless focused on the experiences 
of the participants as they wished to relay them. This allowed the participants to express in 
their own words how they experienced turbulent change and how they maintained or modi-
fied their power relationships within the organization. This type of interview had the advan-
Chapter 3 — Research Methods    89 
 
 
tage of not being limited to preset and unchangeable standardized questions, thus allowing 
exploration of unexpected issues that arose. We did not expect that issues relating to the 
past, for example, would arise so frequently and with so much emotion.  
Flexibility in the interviews allowed exploration of this in some detail, inciting the in-
terviewees to think about and discuss the process of turbulent change. It also allowed them 
to elaborate on material they felt was important about this issue. A list of questions that 
framed the interviews are presented in Appendix B.  These questions are based on prior per-
sonal knowledge of the organization, on the literature concerning the process of strategy 
formation, on a review of documents about the agency and its political context, and on ques-
tions other researchers have used in their own studies (e.g., Dufour, 1991). 
Participants in the study included staffs who had been employed with the new men-
tal health centre for at least six months and who had gone through at least one recent turbu-
lent period in the organization’s life. They included persons at all levels of the agency, from 
upper and middle administration, to therapists and clerical support staffs. In keeping with 
the findings of the literature review, which found that much of the existing research focused 
primarily on management, non-management employees were included because they experi-
enced the turbulent changes as much as managerial staffs. As Mintzberg (1989) has shown, 
employees at all levels of the organization holding power and playing games characterize 
professional bureaucracies. Including non-management personnel in the research was thus 
very important to understanding strategy formation. 
Regarding “turbulent change”, the term means change that has a disruptive, pro-
found, and permanent effect on the structures and power relationships of an organization, 
thus introducing great uncertainty in an organization and its environment. Turbulent change 
is characterized by its menacing nature to employees (e.g., job security, role, working condi-
tions, leeway in job), and the inability of these employees to formulate clear short-term and 
long-term goals and to define the means to attain these goals.  
By keeping the cut-off point for participation in the research at a minimum six 
months of employment with the organization, the participants had time to experience 
change within the organization and to gain a sufficient grasp of its functioning to be able to 
relate to the research objectives. This period was based on prior discussions with some par-
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ticipants, who said that it took about six months in the organization before they began un-
derstanding the pace and nature of the changes. 
At the time of the data collection, the organization that was studied comprised forty-
eight (48) employees divided into one administrative unit and four clinical teams. The admin-
istrative team consisted of the Executive Director, the Clinical Director, a finance director, 
and a person in charge of clerical or support staffs in administration and across the organiza-
tion. Each of the other four units were clinics situated in offices across the city, and each was 
comprised of one team leader reporting to the Executive Director, seven to ten clinical staffs 
and one or two support staffs/secretaries. While most clinical staffs were therapists, others 
were attached to special mental health programs such as prevention. 
Twenty-eight individual interviews were carried out during a three-week period in 
January 1993. The reason for choosing this time frame was that is was a turbulent period and 
was convenient for the participants. The Clinical Co-ordinator of the organization, who was 
the contact person for the research, had circulated the research summary to all staffs and 
canvassed them about their willingness and availability to participate in the research. Twenty-
eight staffs agreed to participate. Because of scheduling difficulties, one interview was carried 
out by telephone after leaving the research site. Participants included three senior managers, 
three middle managers, eighteen therapists, and four clerical staffs.  
The interviews lasted from 1 to 2½ hours, with the average being 1½ hours, and 
they were held in each participant’s office. Two of the interviews also included professionals 
who were former employees prior to the divestment, who had been with the organization for 
many years, and who helped put the history of events leading up to the divestment into per-
spective. Their interviews provided information from an outside perspective. 
Each interview began with a brief reminder of the goals of the research and the con-
fidential aspects of the study. Each participant signed a “Consent for Tape Recording” (Ap-
pendix A) and then taping began with a tape recorder. One participant refused to be 
recorded on tape. For this interview, the participant permitted written notes as the interview 
progressed. 
The first question in all interviews was about the participant’s current job functions 
and title. This allowed the researcher to place the interviewees in their current context and 
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also to break the ice for those participants who did not know the researcher prior to the in-
terview. Each interview then continued with a start-up question: “If you were to describe your 
organization’s functioning in a few words, what three words would you use?” This start-up question 
helped to frame the research for the interviewees, to stimulate discussion, and to begin ex-
ploration of their experiences. 
Participants were occasionally prompted with additional comments or questions 
when clarification or more information were needed, or to explore important issues that 
arose during the interview. In line with ensuring that the participants reflected on their ex-
periences, the researcher viewed his role as one of allowing the interviewee a great deal of 
latitude in expressing themselves, but nonetheless one where the researcher was active and 
moved the process forward. Even though the interviews were taped, notes also were taken 
to help as memory aids during later research phases. 
After each interview, a one-half page summary of the interview was prepared which 
addressed five key questions: 
• What persons, events, or situation were involved? 
• What were the main themes or issues in the interview? 
• Which research questions were central to the interview? 
• What new hypotheses, speculations, or guesses were suggested by the inter-
view? 
• Where should energy be placed in the next interview, and what sorts of in-
formation should be sought? What are the target questions for the next in-
terview? 
 
This procedure is based on Miles and Huberman’s (1984) work that allows cycling 
back and forth between thinking about the existing data and generating strategies for collect-
ing new data. Miles and Huberman see this as a “healthy” method because it allows correc-
tion of blind spots that may arise as the research progresses. These sheets were not meant to 
be exhaustive, but they represented a first reduction of the data that would allow retrieval of 
information quickly and act as a guide for the following interviews. 
Also after each interview, notes and impressions of the interview were converted 
into “write-ups” of the session to help preserve and clarify their meaning and context. As 
Miles and Huberman state, it is important to write these notes as close as possible to the in-
Chapter 3 — Research Methods    92 
 
 
terview because general field notes contain only one-half or less of the actual content of the 
session. 
One of the sources of bias introduced by personal interviews is poor recall of events 
and inaccurate articulation (Yin, 1989; Dufour, 1991). While a few of the interviewees had 
minor difficulties remembering exact dates of events, they generally described most events 
quite easily because many events had occurred in the months prior to the interviews. Recall-
ing events thus did not present any problems because in most cases, memories of organiza-
tional changes that had occurred were still vivid, making it easy to come up with examples. 
Participant observation. A fourth source of data was loosely based on participant 
observation, which provided additional insight into the dynamics of the organization. This 
helped the researcher gain access to events that would have been otherwise inaccessible, and 
it also provided some opportunity of perceiving reality from the viewpoint of someone inside 
the organization instead of external to it (Yin, 1989). As Patton (1990) states, 
“The participant observer is fully engaged in experiencing the setting under 
study while also trying to understand that setting through personal experi-
ence, observations, and talking with other participants about what is happen-
ing.” (p. 207) 
 
When possible, the researcher interacted with staffs outside the formal interview 
context and took notes of formal and informal interactions among staffs. This occurred dur-
ing the three-week interview period in January 1993. In observing their activity, the re-
searcher noted who was involved, what was being done and said by staffs, and how they 
went about what they normally do. This information was useful in learning about the formal 
and informal patterns of communication, the dominant forms of communication, who oc-
cupies the critical functions of the organization, and how rules, myths, and beliefs play in 
power relationships. This supplemented information that was gathered through the review of 
the official documents and individual interviews. Personal information from personal experi-
ence with the history of the organization also was used. Staffs were fully aware of the role of 
the researcher in the organization. As with notes taken during individual interviews, notes 
taken from participant observation became an integral part of the analysis. 
Personal knowledge of the organization and acquaintance with many of the employ-
ees eased the researcher’s integration into the work setting. Nevertheless, to paraphrase Pat-
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ton (1990), the researcher had to avoid being so intrusive or predictable in his observations 
that every time someone saw him coming they knew what was going to be asked. To coun-
teract this, natural opportunities were sought to engage the participants in informal inter-
views to find out from them what had been occurring in the agency and what significance 
they attached to events. There also was social chitchat with employees who had not seen the 
researcher for more than two years, asking questions concerning the doctoral studies. This 
was a very normal process that was encouraged. Thus, unstructured times in lunchrooms, at 
coffee breaks with the employees, and in the hallways were considered valid sources of in-
formation. Additionally, through direct involvement with participants in formal and informal 
ways, the researcher observed not only the structured activity of the organization but also 
what took place on the periphery of formal activity. 
There are potential biases introduced by participant observation. The researcher was 
careful to avoid certain dynamics, such as assuming certain attitudes or being forced into a 
position of advocacy, which would have been contrary to the original intention of carrying 
out an exploratory study. Under such circumstances, research has shown that some partici-
pant observers become so involved in the dynamics of the organization that they become a 
supporter of a group of persons in the organization (Yin, 1989). This would have been quite 
easy given the researcher’s personal acquaintance with many staffs. Patton (1990), for his 
part, warns that people behave differently when they are being observed or evaluated than 
they would if no observation were taking place.  
Several steps were taken to counter these biases. First, the researcher’s role and ex-
pectations, and how data were to be used, were explained to the participants. Also, while en-
gaging in discussions concerning highly charged issues with some staffs, the researcher 
avoided letting his own opinions lead the interviews. This was verified through the verbatim 
transcripts. Second, the researcher used a personal logbook or journal to describe daily ex-
periences in their context. This helped increase awareness of personal biases when analyzing 
the data (Miles and Huberman, 1984; Yin, 1989). 
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3.2  METHODS OF ANALYZING THE DATA 
As in many other research projects, presenting the findings for this study offered 
several challenges. The first challenge was the huge volume of the data of more than one 
thousand pages of transcripts, notes, documents and other materials gathered during the re-
search process.  
A first run-through of the data produced 87 coding categories, combined from prior 
theoretical categories and adding new categories as data analysis progressed. This was re-
duced to approximately 40 categories in a second analysis of the transcripts because some 
codes were combined with others that were similar or were eliminated because they were less 
relevant to the study than first thought. 
While this study does not focus on quantitative analysis of the interviews, there were 
nonetheless about 600 references to the sources of power in the transcripts. Additionally, 
there were over 1000 references to strategies that staffs had used or perceived that others 
had used. These high numbers are not surprising given the fact that power was such a fact of 
life for the participants, in some cases on a daily basis for several years. The investment that 
the participants had in power issues in the organization was considerable, as described by 
one participant: 
“I think that this agency, more than a lot or more than most, has been con-
sumed with just this topic for about three or more years. It’s something that 
we talk a lot about, so it’s something that we kind of developed a fluency or 
some degree of comfort about conceptualizing about power.” (Therapist) 
 
A second challenge was organizing all the data and coded material into a coherent 
explanation of the process of power strategy formation. As Pfeffer (1992) states, there is no 
final or correct way of doing this, even when a single organization is studied. As power was 
integral to the day-to-day organizational life of the participants, comparisons were made 
through different ‘slices’ of the data to provide crosschecks for analysis. From the data, it 
seemed important to compare staffs who had been employed with the psychiatric hospital 
prior to the organizational split in 1990 and who transferred to the new organization, with 
staffs that were hired by the new organization in or after 1990. This level of comparison was 
important because it helped contrast the experiences of the participants who had gone 
through the organizational change with those who did not have a long history with the or-
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ganization. For reasons of clarity and brevity, staffs hired before the organizational split in 
1990 will be referred to as “veterans”, while employees hired in or after 1990 will be called 
“newcomers”. Participants included thirteen newcomers and eighteen veterans.  
A second level of comparison was based on the researcher’s review of the literature, 
which showed differential use of power sources and strategies along hierarchical lines. In the 
present study, this has been operationalized in terms of comparing senior administrators 
(n=3), team leaders (n=3), therapists (n=18), and clerical staffs (n=4) in their power sources 
and strategies. Such groupings maintained the anonymity of the participants, who would 
otherwise have been identified through their individual comments. 
A third level of comparison of strategies was between the different satellite teams 
comprising the organization, which is divided into four separate physical sites. Comparing 
data across these three levels (length of employment as measured by a cutoff point, position 
within the organization, and physical work site) thus permitted analysis from several angles.  
The method of analysis was based on Miles and Huberman’s (1984) and Strauss’ 
(1987) methods of qualitative analysis because this represented a practical way of reducing 
the large amount of data to a more manageable size. These authors have written extensively 
on the topic and are regarded as leading experts on this kind of analysis. 
Collecting four sources of data meant that a large amount of data was gathered. The 
tape recordings of the interviews were typed verbatim. Each participant’s typed transcript 
was sent to them in sealed envelopes because many of them had asked for a copy of their 
interview. None of the participants asked for corrections to the transcripts, but several called 
to describe further events that had occurred since the end of the interviews. These follow-up 
conversations were not taped but were recorded as notes and added to the log. 
Each interview was summarized into one or two-page synopses. Tables about the 
different strategies that individuals and groups had identified during the interviews were 
made to collate information and transform it into visual format. This stage of analysis re-
mained at a descriptive level. All themes relating to relationships, power, and strategies that 
appeared in the transcripts were noted, no matter how tightly or loosely connected. Special 
attention was paid to perceptions, myths and beliefs about the organization, attitudes, opin-
ions, actions taken, references to turbulence, strategies, and uncertainty concerning power 
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relationships. We chose these as elements of analysis for several reasons. First, as Crozier 
and Friedberg (1977; Friedberg, 1993) state, these elements provide the essence of how em-
ployees are engaged in power relationships and how they are experiencing turbulent change. 
Second, as Imber-Black (1988, 1990) and Mills and Murgatroyd (1991) state, beliefs, myths 
and rules offer insight into people's thinking and actions about given subjects. They provide 
essential information on the functioning of an organization, and on the processes driving 
power strategy formation in individuals. 
The interviews and other written materials were coded using descriptive codes (e.g., 
“senior administrator/manager” was coded “admin”) to be able to sort and retrieve the in-
formation more quickly when needed. We used a computer program (AQUAD 4.0) to help 
speed retrieval of information through coding and also to help find the existence of patterns 
in the thousand or so pages of data. Guided by a hybrid of inductive approaches to analysis, 
we had prepared a list of codes before analysis of the data. We added, modified, or deleted 
certain codes to fit the data as the coding progressed. The purpose of the computer coding 
was not to count categories but to help find and organize emerging themes. 
Several such iterations through the transcripts and summaries were necessary to ex-
haust the themes and clusters of ideas that arose. When there were no significant new 
themes or clusters of ideas, we knew this was approaching saturation of the data (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987), which then led to another stage for a higher level of abstrac-
tion. 
Analysis of the data thus involved more than just simple reduction. Based on the 
summaries and coded transcriptions, we used visual displays (charts and tables) to put 
themes in relation to one another. A computer program was used to speed this process. 
Mapping, by using symbols such as double lines, arrows, and encircling certain areas of the 
visual displays, helped understand visually how the different themes were related or unre-
lated to one another. This method of using visual displays is long familiar to family therapists 
and sociologists who draw sociograms to show the relationships between different parts of a 
system. This made the narrative text less cumbersome and more organized, and it allowed 
easier comparison of resemblances and contrasts between the interviews. As Miles and 
Huberman (1984, p.79) state, “the chances of drawing and verifying valid conclusions [by 
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using visual displays] are very much greater than for narrative text”. The last step thus in-
volved examining how each theme played on others in the visual displays, tables and charts. 
Following Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) and Miles and Huberman’s (1984) suggestions, 
we made it a point to write impressions, hunches, and speculations in a logbook. Writing 
down these impressions and hunches helped avoid early judgements about the material. 
 
3.3   MINIMIZING SOURCES OF ERROR, AND ENHANCING THE VALIDITY OF THE 
FINDINGS 
One of the strengths of the inductive approach also is ironically one of its weak-
nesses. The sheer abundance and complexity of the data collected in qualitative studies can 
leave the researcher with little more than a pile of transcribed notes that have no meaning. 
Also, because verbal means were used to gather much of the data, participants needed to be 
articulate and interested in the theme being studied. This issue was not an important factor, 
however, because we studied professionals who are articulate through their profession, and 
who have invested much time and energy in the changes that have occurred in their organi-
zation. 
There are several potential sources of error to consider. The first recalls the episte-
mological debate of objectivity versus subjectivity in research. The subjective nature of inter-
views undoubtedly extends into data analysis because words have different meanings in 
different contexts, and because subjectivity is inevitable (Patton, 1990; Haworth, 1991). Ha-
worth (1991) says this well: “no matter how much we pretend otherwise, subjectivity and 
inter-subjectivity precede investigation of data, and the choice of what to study is a value 
choice.” As Crozier and Friedberg (1977) and Madisson et al. (1980) state, however, it is less 
important to have the data reflect the “objective” reality than to understand that the data 
reflect the way the interviewees subjectively perceive and experience that reality. Perceptions 
are important “whether or not they are misperceptions of what ‘actually’ happens.” (Madis-
son et al., 1980) Thus, the data were treated as indicators of the subjective choices made by 
the actors in the organization. What the participants said was taken as an expression of their 
strategies and games or of their perceptions of the actions of others. In this way, we were as 
close as possible to the meaning of the experiences of the participants. 
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A potential bias was the researcher’s familiarity with the research setting. Having 
worked for six years in the local psychiatric hospital until its organizational split in 1990 and 
having worked with some of the participants of this research, we were mindful of subjective 
bias interfering with the data collection, also of jumping to early conclusions about what par-
ticipants said and did. Several elements helped control personal biases in this research. First, 
we had not been involved with either the psychiatric hospital or the new mental health cen-
tre for two-and-one-half years and had neither future employment nor financial link or obli-
gation with either organization. Also, the researcher had been physically away from the city 
and had at most limited contact with a few of the employees. In this sense, it was easier to 
examine the organization from a distance and for interviewees to be freer in their responses 
without fear of repercussions. 
Related to this is the fact that respondents may select answers or distort information 
to conform to certain norms or expectations generated by the research. This form of bias 
was controlled by informing all respondents that their answers were confidential. We used 
neutral probes or comments when participants requested clarification of any questions or 
statements.  
Concerning these biases, Emerson (1988) says that the goal of qualitative research is 
not to eliminate biases but to consider them as part of the field being studied. Other re-
searchers (Taylor and Bogdan, 1975); Douglas, 1976; Bachelor and Joshi, 1986) also come to 
similar conclusions that the methods used must not eliminate subjectivity, but they must 
show how the subjective experiences of participants are useful in understanding their rela-
tionship with the world (Lapalme, 1991).  
Strauss (1987) also defends the use of personal knowledge: 
“[A]nalysts bring experiences of various kinds. If not new to the research 
game, then they bring research skills and savvy to their analyses. What is in 
their heads also in the way of social science literature also affects their analy-
ses… Equally important is the utilization of experiential data, which consists 
not only of analysts’ technical knowledge and experience derived from re-
search, but also their personal experiences… These experiential data should 
not be ignored because of the usual canons governing research (which regard 
personal experience and data as likely to bias the research), for those canons 
lead to the squashing of valuable experiential data… Experiential data are es-
sential data … because they not only give added theoretical sensitivity but 
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provide a wealth of provisional suggestions for making comparisons, finding 
variations, and sampling widely on theoretical grounds.” (p. 11) 
 
Nonetheless, Strauss adds that this is not “a license to run wild” when carrying out 
research and that careful control of data collection, coding, and memoing are necessary. 
Thus, researchers are able to carry out studies of familiar settings when they use dif-
ferent types of resources: knowledge of the experiences of other researchers, a reflective atti-
tude toward the act of research itself, being aware of how one’s perspective influences 
fieldwork, comparing different perspectives or points of view (Chapoulie, 1984), carefully 
documenting all procedures so that others can review methods for bias, and being open in 
describing the limitations of the adopted perspective (Patton, 1990). In this sense, personal 
knowledge does not necessarily create an insurmountable obstacle to the study if handled 
prudently. On this point, we agree with Scriven who emphasizes the importance of being 
factual about events instead of trying to be distant from them: “Distance does not guarantee 
objectivity; it merely guarantees distance” (in Patton, 1990, p.480). 
Personal knowledge thus was beneficial to this study. It provided certain hunches 
and insights during and after the interviews, and for the analysis of the data. Thus, it often 
became the basis for exploration that might not otherwise have happened. In many instances 
it lent the researcher credibility in the eyes of the participants. The researcher’s prior knowl-
edge of the setting and of many of the participants was, in Smaling’s (1992) words, not so 
much of a hindrance as an entrance into the field. It may be said, therefore, that familiarity 
with the organization enhanced the validity of the findings. 
The tape recording process may have introduced bias. Research shows that tape re-
cording inhibits the expressiveness and warmth of communication for some participants. 
(Guilbault, 1984) Participants in these cases appear more formal and serious than they nor-
mally would. For the present research, however, the participants were comfortable with the 
recording process. The researcher’s personal knowledge of many participants aided this 
process. Questions of trust were therefore less important than they would have been with a 
stranger. Secondly, most of the participants were accustomed to videotaping themselves dur-
ing therapy sessions they conducted with clients. They were thus familiar with being ob-
served and having people judge their work. Only one person refused to allow the tape 
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recording of the interview. Having no prior acquaintance with this person prior to the inter-
view may have contributed to her reticence. 
In terms of bias that could have been introduced by the technical process of re-
cording, there were very few problems concerning tape jamming, loss of material when cas-
settes were turned over, background noise and inaudible voices on the tapes. Only a few 
words of the interview were lost when cassettes were turned over. More problematic were 
those cassettes where participants spoke softly, making transcribing the interviews more dif-
ficult. References in the notepad helped reconstruct the missing words. Where words could 
not be identified, they were indicated by “ ??? ” in the transcripts. 
Another source of bias in this study includes relying on memory to recall past events 
and distorting information. Certain steps were taken to minimize problems of reconstruction 
and recall error. Because of the ongoing nature of the changes in the mental health centre, 
narratives were compared for actions that had occurred more recently with that closer to the 
time of the organizational split in 1990. Comparing ongoing accounts to past accounts pro-
vided a check on recall to determine if the recent data were richer in detail and perhaps more 
accurate in terms of information and structure about the organization. Probing also was used 
to clarify vague information or stimulate recall, which is a standard technique in this form of 
data collection (Summers, 1986). 
Concerning the distortion of information, it is not unusual for respondents in most 
types of interviews to oversimplify reports, minimize the tentative nature of their actions at 
the time of the event, and place themselves at the centre of the activity (Summers, 1986). We 
tried to minimize this bias during the interviews by focusing on both context and specific 
behaviors around power strategy formation, such as acquiring resources, gathering informa-
tion, and mobilizing support from others. This helped identify the characteristics of their 
situation.  
Information about key events and other actors involved in the organizational 
changes also was sought at several times during the interview. Participants were asked to 
provide: 1) a general summary of the organizational changes that had occurred; 2) a chronol-
ogy of events (recall is often facilitated by placing events in proper sequence); and 3) answers 
to specific questions about acquiring resources and information, and the sources to these 
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elements. This format encouraged recall, helped participants to decompose their own ac-
counts, and tested reliability. If the answers to similar questions were different, we asked the 
participant to clarify the answers. 
Additionally, we cross-referenced the accounts of the participants to provide an en-
hanced picture of the organization. This helped provide a check on the accuracy of the data. 
Thus, potential problems due to recall error were minimal, and the accounts of power strat-
egy formation were as reliable as they could be using this type of research method and data. 
Concerning the validity of the findings, we used multiple sources of evidence or 
“slices of data” (Strauss, 1987) — documents, personal knowledge, multiple individual inter-
views using a common semi-structured format, a variant of participant observation, and fol-
low-up telephone calls to the interviews — to enhance the likelihood that the findings 
represented the power dynamics in the organization (Miles and Huberman, 1984; Yin, 1989; 
Patton, 1990). Interview material was cross-checked between the interviews themselves and 
against documents provided by the organization. We examined the data for patterns between 
the participants, the different sources of information (interviews, meetings, observations, 
documents, log book, memos, informal notes), the content of the interviews (perceptions, 
opinions, attitudes, actions taken by participants), and also the circumstances surrounding 
the opinions and actions of the participants (levels of turbulence, length and type of experi-
ence with the organization). Thus, validity was enhanced by placing emphasis on how inter-
pretations of the various participants meshed or conflicted with each other and with other 
sources of data. 
External validity is an issue that can be important in single-site research, but as 
Bower (in Demers, 1990) states, this problem is less important when one is developing the-
ory, as opposed to testing it. Nonetheless, one cannot escape the issue of whether the study 
is representative of other organizations or of an atypical population. (Demers, 1990) No 
claims are made from this research as to its external validity (whether its findings are appli-
cable to other contexts or settings). Having worked in several organizations and having stud-
ied many others, however, we believe there are no reasons that make the mental health 
centre that was studied very different from other such centres having undergone large 
change. 
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Finally, the methods employed may not have fully grasped the reality of the experi-
ences of the participants. In addition, because of the limited number of persons being stud-
ied and the limits inherent to using any research method, the findings presented in this 
research may not fully be representative of what goes on in other centres going through tur-
bulent change. These are normal limits of most types of research. Further research examin-
ing other case examples is necessary to explore strategy formation in other contexts. 
This dissertation does not call for new methodology. Clearly, no single method of 
investigation is appropriate to all issues that can be studied in an organization. This is a limit 
that all researchers must face. In this sense, it is not our goal that the findings form a defini-
tive or fully objective description of the strategy formation processes occurring in organiza-
tions. The emphasis is on illumination and understanding of power strategy formation rather 
than on quantitative explanation. We regard the findings as a step toward a broader under-
standing of the process of strategy formation, and particularly the role of power strategy 
formation in turbulent contexts. 
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Historical Context of the Organization  
 
 
 
“I find it really hard that as a group of human service providers who 
know an awful lot about systemic change in families, we never  
apply the theories to our own kind.  I find that outrageous.” 
(Therapist) 
 
“You're either a person who perceives power as good or perceives 
power as bad. You can never be neutral about power.” 
(Therapist) 
 
“Turbulence is having eighteen bosses in one year.” 
(Therapist) 
 
 
Chapters Four, Five, and Six form the empirical core of this study. Chapter Four de-
scribes historical events leading to the organizational split of the mental health centre from 
its parent psychiatric hospital. Information about this will be paraphrased liberally from the 
“New Directions” report prepared by a local Steering Committee (1988) which designed and 
implemented the organizational changes. Following a description of the historical context, 
the structure of the new organization is presented. The chapter ends with a discussion of 
events that the participants described as particularly turbulent and that created much uncer-
tainty for them in the organization. Chapter Five, for its part, describes the sources of power 
emphasized by the participants, and Chapter Six describes the strategies used to deal with the 
turbulent changes and uncertainty that staffs experienced.  
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4.1  DESCRIPTION OF THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
4.1.1 Provincial legislation for community services 
In the mid 1980’s, several circumstances culminated in a decision by the Minister of 
Community and Social Services of Ontario to establish a new mental health facility in 
Northern Ontario. Two important events occurred at the provincial level. The first was the 
proclamation of the Child and Family Services Act, which designated a new organizational 
framework for delivering services to children under the Ministry of Community and Social 
Services. The second event was a study commissioned by the Ministry of Health of Ontario, 
which recommended that mental health services be divided into two distinct branches, insti-
tutional and community. 
 
4.1.2 Local audit of the psychiatric hospital’s children’s services 
Important events also occurred at the local level. An audit of the local psychiatric 
hospital, completed in the Fall of 1986, recommended the development of a community-
oriented children’s mental health centre, as opposed to a hospital-based model. During the 
same period, a local Francophone advocacy group began demanding control over social ser-
vices to their culture. The director of the Francophone Children’s Mental Health Centre re-
signed from the hospital to protest the slowness of the hospital in recognizing Francophone 
interests in mental health services. He also claimed that being employed at the psychiatric 
hospital and being Francophone were incompatible. In the weeks following his resignation, 
the Director mounted a large media campaign that was highly critical of the hospital for what 
he claimed was its anti-Francophone attitude.  A slew of letters-to-the-editor in local news-
papers and heated discussions on the issue followed. This left the remaining Francophone 
workers at the hospital in the unenviable position of being caught between supporting Fran-
cophone rights and culture, and criticizing their employer. This led to a split among some of 
the Francophone staffs as to their allegiance. 
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4.1.3 Pressures for recognition of cultural identity in services 
Following the resignation of the director of the Francophone children’s mental 
health centre in 1986, pressure continued to mount on the hospital and on the ministry to 
institute a model that respected culture, but more importantly, that provided control over 
decision-making by cultural groups. The strategy of the advocacy group was clear from 1986 
to 1990: to create pressure points at every opportunity by using the media, attacking the 
credibility of the hospital as incapable of offering quality services, and invoking the right to 
self-determination as a cultural group. 
The Francophone advocacy group continued its strategy of pressure and submitted a 
proposal to the Ministry requesting transfer of control of Francophone mental health ser-
vices to its group. The proposal called for a distinct and organizationally separate mental 
health service in the community for this group. This ultimately led to a meeting with the 
Minister of Community and Social Services in November 1986, as requested by the advocacy 
group. At the meeting, the Minister stated his intention to support culturally appropriate ser-
vices, but not in separate organizations as called for by the Francophone group. 
Five principles were to guide the new organization: 
• the establishment of a new and separate bilingual child and family intervention 
corporation; 
 
• the establishment of clear lines of authority between the Ministry of Community 
and Social Services and the new Corporation for the total management and con-
trol of funds for the delivery of Child and Family Intervention Services; 
 
• the establishment of distinct service streams under the new Corporation for both 
the Francophone and non-Francophone populations in the catchment area; 
 
• the establishment of mechanisms permitting split governing jurisdictions by this 
new Board over the management of culturally appropriate services streams; 
 
• the organizational separation of a medical and non-medical service delivery sys-
tem. 
 
In August, 1987, the Minister appointed seven local persons to a Steering Committee 
to develop an action plan around the development of the new children’s mental health cor-
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poration. These seven persons were chosen based on the diversity of their backgrounds, 
ranging from the practice of law to administering a multi-cultural centre. 
 
4.1.4 Community consultations and input 
After an initial orientation as to the mandate and five principles guiding the new cor-
poration, the Committee went about a phased-in approach involving extensive community 
consultations. The Steering Committee requested input from seventy-six community groups 
and organizations. There were public announcements of scheduled meetings and open fo-
rums to seek maximum participation and input from the community. Twenty-six groups or 
organizations and twelve individuals responded with written and oral presentations. Com-
munity consultations took place from January through May 1988 to gather concerns and 
recommendations. 
 
4.1.5 Limited funding 
Concerns from community groups revolved around several themes. The first theme 
related to limited funding. Most submissions alluded to the fact that some programs, such as 
prevention and in-home counseling, were not being implemented because existing funds did 
not allow them to carry out “effective child treatment.” (Steering Committee, 1988, p. 40) 
Related to limited funding was another common theme, insufficient staffing for the mental 
health needs of the area. Service providers, consumers and referring agencies such as school 
boards identified waiting lists as a key issue. The Steering Committee recognized the under-
allocation of resources of the region as compared to other areas of the province, and it rec-
ommended a slightly higher per-capita allocation to maintain culturally and linguistically ap-
propriate services. 
 
4.1.6 Poor connection with the community 
Additionally, service providers in the community did not feel the existing system of 
mental health delivery through the psychiatric hospital was responsive to their needs. They 
felt poorly connected to the hospital, which some described as physically and philosophically 
distant. 
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Poor awareness of the wide range of existing children’s mental health issues and ser-
vices was frequently cited. This was in part due to the inconvenient physical location of the 
psychiatric hospital (a former tuberculosis sanatorium) away from the main arteries of the 
city, and of a lack of understanding of mental health issues in general by consumers. 
A related theme was the need for a community-based organization, located and op-
erated by the community. This would enhance access and outreach to those in need, place 
the focus of treatment in the consumer’s normal environment, and it would increase net-
working between professionals. The establishment of prevention and early identification 
programs were cited as possible benefits of a community approach. 
While local Francophone advocacy groups were calling for a separate system of men-
tal health delivery for their culture, there was substantial opposition to this concept from 
other groups. 
“Some discussants expressed the concern that a system of parallel services 
could lead to a less than efficient delivery system and that the development 
of a multi-disciplinary clinical approach would be compromised. Moreover, 
the aforementioned shortage of resources would suggest that, at least at pre-
sent, any attempt to effectively provide all the required services in both lan-
guages is infeasible.” (Original emphasis) (Steering Committee, 1988. p. 41) 
 
Nonetheless, the Committee felt that appropriate linguistic and cultural representa-
tion at the Board of Directors level of the new organization was essential to create an at-
mosphere of respect for the language rights and cultural background of individuals. 
“The example of the Native person in our community who has no one with 
whom she can communicate in her native tongue, much less comprehend 
non-verbal communication or understand her circumstances, is a compelling 
example to the need for change. The service is grossly inadequate.” (Steering 
Committee, 1988, p. 45) 
 
The above applied equally to the Native and Francophone populations. 
 
4.1.7 Disagreements around proposed structure and model of service delivery 
Other themes emerging from community consultations included resistance to the 
proposed “non-medical” model of intervention. Some felt the separation from the psychiat-
ric hospital would be an artificial one given that the new organization would still have to rely 
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on the psychiatric hospital for many of its inpatient and consulting services. Others felt that 
co-ordination of services with other community organizations was sorely lacking. 
Thus, a list of interrelated concerns and recommendations emerged from consulta-
tions with the community. Despite the common nature of the concerns expressed by com-
munity groups and organizations, however, the Steering Committee was aware of the 
controversy that some of the recommendations would create. Early on, the Steering Com-
mittee recognized that, 
“global acceptance of any set of recommendations was highly unlikely, given 
the presence of various heterogeneous groups, each with their own particular 
agendas and preconceived notions about how the perspective bilingual Cor-
poration ought to be structured. Indeed, we would be remiss if we did not 
point out that certain of the five guiding principles of this Corporation have 
been subject to serious questioning during the information gathering phase.” 
(Steering Committee, 1988, p. 40) 
 
This dynamic was particularly important in the design of the new organization be-
cause lack of recognition of the different cultural groups in the community would have 
amounted to political suicide. 
 
4.1.8 Employees’ perceptions of  having no input 
It is important to note that most staffs felt they were given little opportunity for in-
put into the design of the new corporation despite the public forums that were held. Some 
staffs accused the Steering Committee of purposefully avoiding them and not wanting to 
“contaminate” the new model of service delivery with old ideas. As a result, the directors of 
the two children’s mental health centres of the hospital and a group of staffs met for several 
intensive sessions to design a model of their own that would be more in line with their 
thoughts and beliefs about a new children’s mental health centre for the community. While 
they submitted this alternative proposal to the Ministry of Community and Social Services, 
however, it had no impact on the final model. 
Thus, the milestones described above led to the establishment of a new children’s 
mental health centre. 
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4.2 THE NEW ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Because the children’s mental health organization was mandated to deliver culturally 
appropriate services to the different cultural groups in the community, the new structure in-
corporated a matrix model with two levels of input to the Board of Directors. The first level 
is that of the administrative hierarchy with an executive director who manages a group of 
clinical teams and support services. The second level is a group of community committees 
that provide input directly to each of four clinical teams. Each committee has representation 
on the main board of directors. Table 4 is a representation of the organizational chart. 
The organization has a traditional hierarchy with a central board of directors, an ex-
ecutive director and professional staffs. The principal differences between the new structure 
and the old psychiatric hospital lie in the community advisory communities. Whereas the 
hospital comprised two mental health centres, one Francophone and one Anglophone, each 
reporting through the hierarchy to a central board, the three community advisory commit-
tees of the new organization have power and responsibilities of their own. 
The Board of Directors of the new organization has fourteen members: eight from 
the Community Advisory Committees, and the remaining six elected at large from the com-
munity. Three board members are from the Francophone Community Advisory Committee, 
two from the Native Advisory Committee, and three from the third Community Advisory 
Committee. The Board has ultimate authority for all matters of the organization. Each 
Community Advisory Committee, on the other hand, is designed to be responsive to client 
needs, to provide input and advice, to set priorities, and to design programs in a culturally 
appropriate way. 
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Table 4 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF THE NEW 
CHILDREN’S MENTAL HEALTH CENTRE 
 
 
 
CLINICAL COORDINATOR ADMINISTRATIVE COORDINATOR
and
Clerical Support Staff
Francophone
Community Advisory Committee
TEAM LEADER
and
Francophone Team Staff
Native
Community Advisory Committee
TEAM LEADER
and
Native Team Staff
TEAM LEADER
and
Anglophone Team #1 Staff
Anglophone
Community Advisory Committee
TEAM LEADER
and
Anglophone Team #2 Staff
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
14 members
 
 
 
 
Note 1:  Anglophone Teams #1 and #2 share a single Community Advisory Committee. Source: Steer-
ing Committee (1988), Exhibit B. 
 
Note 2: The Community Advisory Committees are placed below the Team Leaders for clarity only.  
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The senior administrative tier of the organization comprises the Executive Director, 
the Clinical Co-ordinator, and the Administrative Co-ordinator. This tier occupies the tradi-
tional roles found in human service organizations, with the Executive Director acting as the 
bridge between the board and other members of the organization. The Clinical Coordinator 
oversees clinical matters and supervision for the entire agency, while the Administrative Co-
ordinator ensures the smooth functioning of the financial and support aspects of the agency. 
Senior management is located in a central office downtown. Meetings of the board of direc-
tors are held on a rotating basis in the four satellite clinics that comprise the organization and 
that are situated throughout the city. 
Below the senior administrative level is the middle management tier. The middle 
management level of the organization comprises four team leaders, who have full authority 
and responsibility for the cases being handled by their teams. Team leaders not only provide 
guidance and supervision to therapists reporting to them but are responsible with their 
Community Advisory Committees for planning and implementing services that are culturally 
appropriate to their community. Each Community Advisory Committee does not have full 
authority over their team leader, but they are expected to work in close co-operation. 
Each of the four teams is designed to be somewhat independent in terms of providing 
culturally appropriate services to their clientele. They are encouraged to be interdependent by 
interacting with one another and receiving their central direction from senior administration 
and the board of directors. Teams comprise seven to ten staffs, including secretaries. They 
are situated in areas of the city that are consistent with their primary target group. The Fran-
cophone team, for example, is located in an area of the city where there is a heavy concentra-
tion of Francophone residents. 
Thus, there are four levels in the new organization: 1) a central Board of Directors, 
2) the Executive Director and two senior Co-ordinators, 3) four teams led by team leaders 
who represent the middle management level and who supervise therapists, and 4) three 
Community Advisory Committees that provide advice to each of their respective teams.  
To bring these levels together and make the divisions of responsibility work effec-
tively, the Executive Director and the two Co-ordinators have a responsibility for providing 
central direction while respecting cultural diversity: 
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“It is understood that the Executive Director and the Clinical Co-ordinator 
would be expected to cultivate an atmosphere conducive to inter-team 
co-operation and joint consultation. This is considered a prerequisite to the 
multi-disciplinary approach to treatment which enables the case manager, in 
this case the team leader, to readily access the specialized skills available to 
the organization.” (Steering Committee, 1988, p.12) 
 
The children’s mental health centre opened officially in December 1990, with staffs 
divided into four satellite teams that moved out of the hospital in phases over the next two 
years. The present research was carried out approximately six months after the last group 
had left the hospital. 
When the Executive Director was hired in February, 1990, he was placed in offices 
which were several miles from the staffs at the psychiatric hospital (staffs who would in the 
coming months fall under his authority). While the directors of the two mental health centres 
raised some concerns about the physical distance between the new executive director and the 
staffs, they received little in terms of answers. Their desire was to have the executive director 
work with staffs and feel what they felt, so that he would have a better understanding of 
their daily successes and problems. They surmised that the distance was more than just coin-
cidence or lack of space at the hospital site. They felt that the new board of directors wanted 
their new executive to remain as distant as possible from the daily functioning of the hospital 
to avoid being “contaminated” by hospital politics. Staffs were able to meet with the new 
Executive Director only a few times from February, 1990, to the end of the summer that 
year.  
Another important issue during the transition was the possibility of financial cut-
backs to the organization. At the time of the organizational separation from the hospital in 
1990, funding was set aside for the new organization in terms of office space, equipment, 
and ongoing maintenance. As the organization took shape, however, it became apparent that 
there would be financial problems in the near future. 
“What was established when we took over was a Francophone and an An-
glophone wing. They existed as wings, if you will… As government comes 
along and sets this up and does not give us all of the protected base dollars 
we need to operate this agency with the three components, so they recognize 
that it requires three million dollars to operate this place, to allow the Native 
entity to come into place as it was meant to come into place, they don’t pro-
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vide us the dollars on an ongoing, repetitive, year-by-year guaranteed dollar 
allocation. … They know it’s three million dollars. As they look into their 
coffers, they had 2.5 million of guaranteed repetitive dollars that I can count 
on year by year, base dollars, protected base dollars. They have the other five 
hundred thousand in a one-shot allocation based on the fonds-de-tiroir, what 
they’re left with… Well, if you look at the economic times we’re in, we’re sit-
ting here, and at what point do we rush out and hire all these people with one 
shot dollars and maybe have to turn around and lay them off possibly in the 
same fiscal year when your guaranteed dollars come in at the last minute if 
they come in at all.” (Senior manager) 
 
In summary, divesting or separating existing children’s services from the local psy-
chiatric hospital created a new children’s mental health centre. This followed several years of 
often-bitter conflict between community groups and the hospital. The new organization 
faced financial shortfalls within the first few months of operation. 
 
4.3  DESCRIPTIONS THAT THE PARTICIPANTS GAVE ABOUT UNCERTAINTY AND 
TURBULENCE IN THEIR ORGANIZATION 
 
“It was always stressful because there was more than one thing. We didn’t 
know where our offices would be. We didn’t really know what kind of work 
we’d be doing. We knew there would be a new approach to intervention, but 
we didn’t know practically how we’d work. We didn’t know if we’d even have 
a job. We were being threatened with layoffs. There were many things all at 
once.” (Therapist) 
 
As described above, uncertainty related to several elements in the organization. Be-
fore examining the different sources of power in Chapter Five, it will be helpful to examine 
briefly how the participants described uncertainty and turbulence in their organization. This 
will lay out the context for the power sources and strategies described in the next two chap-
ters. 
As discussed in Chapter One, uncertainty is the inability to predict results or outcomes 
of an action or series of actions. Thus, there is uncertainty in situations where there is a lack 
of information about future actions or events, or where organizational members feel that 
future plans are indefinite, vague or doubtful. Turbulence, which is intimately tied to the theme 
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of certainty/uncertainty, is defined as events that may range from a situation where actions 
and outcomes are entirely predictable, to a situation where nothing is predictable. 
Uncertainty was described in several ways by different groups of participants in this 
study. More particularly, there were differences in the amount of references to uncertainty 
between newcomers and veterans. Veteran staffs referred to uncertainty four times as often 
as junior staffs. This may be explained in part by the greater amount of experience of veteran 
staffs with the organization and its transition when compared to new staffs. One also might 
hypothesize that veteran staffs were more invested in the transition between organizations, 
having more to lose, thus having a keener interest in discussing it. 
There also were qualitative differences between newcomers and veterans in terms of 
their descriptions of turbulence and uncertainty. Five themes seemed particularly important 
to the participants: the lack of clear policies and procedures, unmet expectations during the 
transition, job security, financial cutbacks, and uncertainty around the continuation of spe-
cific intervention programs. 
 
4.3.1 Lack of clear policies and procedures 
The lack of clear policies and procedures was troublesome for several staffs during 
the transition. As they were setting up the new organization, senior management staffs (who 
are all newcomers) and team leaders particularly found that policies and procedures were of-
ten inadequate and poorly fitted to current organizational needs because of the rapid pace of 
change. Senior management staffs were forced to deal with this in unusual ways. 
“We were creating systems, and as we were doing things, we would make 
procedures, not the policy but the procedure, so that we had things in place, 
and then eventually I would take those procedures and worked with them to 
create a policy. So I did things kind of backwards.” (Senior manager) 
 
The confusion around policies and procedures was compounded by what several 
staffs described as the lack of leadership. All senior management personnel were new, and all 
but one of the team leaders was new to the organization. Their knowledge of past ways of 
functioning and of the players was therefore limited. Difficulties in attempting to design 
policies and procedures from the bottom-up, and avoiding referring to older hospital poli-
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cies, were compounded by urgent time pressures to quickly come up with minimum stan-
dards which staffs could adhere to. 
“We were very focused on interpreting the new policies which at times were 
at odds with what had gone on before… A lot of attempting to correct 
glitches, little things that went wrong because we were literally creating a sys-
tem and interpreting it and dealing with the problems on it all at the same 
time, because the policy we would be talking about tomorrow is probably 
one we developed yesterday. There was a very short period between thinking 
and implementing.” (Team leader) 
 
Veteran staffs described the void in policies and procedures somewhat differently 
than new staffs. Rather than focusing mainly on the pressing need for designing new policies 
and procedures, some veteran staffs felt that much of what had been set up and accom-
plished in past years was purposefully being ignored or discarded: 
“Nobody ever understood what the hell we were doing in this organization. 
We were making it up as we went along… There’s a new boss coming 
through every month. In the one meeting he’s going to have time to have 
with me, he’s not going to be able to figure out what I do let alone tell me to 
do it differently… Turbulence was when I went to my team leader for the 
first time in his capacity as my boss and he said ‘Oh, I think it’s so exciting to 
begin creating this agency from nothing’. I said something like, ‘That’s an in-
teresting perspective on it’. He overlooked the fact that I’ve been working at 
the job for twenty years.” (Therapist) 
 
This was reflected by several veteran staffs, who felt that senior management in-
creased uncertainty by ignoring policies and procedures that were used at the former psychi-
atric hospital and the experiences of veteran staffs for ways of dealing with problems. There 
was evidence of differing viewpoints in terms of policies and procedures. New senior and 
middle managers wanted to start from a clean slate to ensure policies matched the needs of 
the new organization without being duly influenced by past ways of functioning. Veteran 
therapists felt their long years of experience in working with policies and procedures were 
being ignored. 
 
4.3.2  High expectations for better working conditions 
Expectations that veterans had for improvement of working conditions also were 
tied to uncertainty and turbulence. While new staffs were not in a position to describe what 
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it was like to experience the transition between the two organizations, it was clear they ob-
served the effects in veteran staffs who had experienced the divestment. 
“I’m not really a part of this, but one of my senses about turbulent change is 
that the people who came from the old organization, many of them, had a 
clear set of expectations about what they were going to be doing in the jobs, 
who they were meant to be, and so on.” (Therapist) 
 
This was echoed by several veteran staffs, who began realizing that while they may 
have had jobs with the new organization, they would not obtain all they thought they would 
get. 
“All the while, I’m having to look at worst-case, best-case scenarios, and 
that’s another definition of turbulence as far as I’m concerned… During that 
transition those parameters were very strained. I was envisioning everything 
from unemployment for all of us, to the best-case scenario obviously being 
full employment, maybe even improved wages, maybe even a better contract 
negotiation. Those opportunities were there too… We didn’t come over to a 
huge pile of money that we could negotiate better wages from. It didn’t turn 
into a pot of gold at the end of the rainbow, but we still have our jobs.” 
(Therapist) 
 
“I think we were made a lot of promises to and given a lot of reassurances 
prior to divestment that things of course would be better. Of course, they 
would be better. How could they possibly be as bad as they were at the psy-
chiatric hospital?” (Therapist) 
 
Thus, veteran staffs had expectations for outcomes of the divestment from the psy-
chiatric hospital. For some participants, there was a huge letdown in terms of expectations 
for improvement in working conditions. There also was a general expectation that past his-
tory would somehow fade as the new organization took on employees from the psychiatric 
hospital. Veterans particularly were left wondering when the new organization would find its 
much-wanted new identity. 
“I don’t quite know where it’s coming from, you know, suddenly out of no-
where you feel you get something coming up to do with old history, so old 
history lives more in the present. I think that is turbulent. I think another as-
pect of turbulence is for the agency to find a new identity to kind of shed the 
identity of being part of the psychiatric set-up and to find a new identity in 
the community. The children’s mental health centre was part of the psychiat-
ric hospital. It’s now got to find a new identity within the community.” 
(Therapist) 
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4.3.3  Letdowns concerning a new organizational identity 
Letdowns about creating and adopting a new identity that staffs could attach to were 
a key issue. There is evidence that some of the expectations for change were very high to 
begin with. 
“I think we made many attributions about the steering committee that I don’t 
think were accurate. I think we believed them to be much more in charge and 
knowing much more about what they intended to do, and what they wanted 
to do, than what they really did… We wanted it to be well thought out, we 
wanted it to be more concrete and more planned and directed than what it 
actually was. In actual fact, my sense of it, once I began to meet directly with 
those people in negotiations was, for the most part, they didn’t know what 
the hell they were doing either. They were like blind people feeling their way 
around an unfamiliar room too.” (Therapist) 
 
In essence, the task of designing an entirely new organization to replace an old model 
of service delivery and be more responsive to staffs’ needs was indeed a large one from the 
outset. Uncertainty and turbulence were key dynamics. It is not surprising that the overflow 
of enthusiasm for the design of a new organization, and the accompanying high expectations 
placed on management personnel could not be met, and that disappointments followed. 
There were feelings of betrayal around this issue. 
“There is a sense of being betrayed by some of the older staff. They felt be-
trayed by the psychiatric hospital and the players there and the present ad-
ministration, and I’m not sure what that means, why people feel betrayed or 
confused or whatever, but there is a lot of feeling there and I have been very 
aware of it.” (Therapist) 
 
Along with feelings of betrayal, there were strong feelings of abandonment expressed 
by the participants in the study. Veteran employees described their relationship with the psy-
chiatric hospital as strained throughout the divestment period.  
“One agency was using the strategy of ‘They’re not ours anymore, you take 
over the responsibility’, and the other agency was using the strategy ‘We’re 
not ready yet’. It was like parents fighting over the custody of their children, 
but meanwhile who didn’t realize their children were left alone.” (Therapist) 
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4.3.4 Perception of non-interest, distance, and abandonment from the  
psychiatric hospital during the turbulence 
 
There also was limited support from the hospital’s board of directors leading to and 
during the divestment period. For many years, employees at the hospital had complained 
that their administration was distant from them and their concerns. The board of directors 
met only once with staffs concerning the possible separation of the outpatient children’s 
treatment services from the hospital, even though staffs solicited such meetings on several 
occasions throughout the divestment period. Staffs thus felt little support and did not feel 
hospital management was fighting to protect them through this process or making the transi-
tion easier.  
Many therapists felt that the Steering Committee was purposefully being distant, 
much as hospital management was described. 
“I think the standing committee attempted to meet with us on several occa-
sions, but a lot of it was nice and glossy work.” (Therapist) 
 
There are several other examples of feelings of distance and non-interest on the part 
of senior management in both organizations. Staffs often said that for years their children’s 
outpatient department was located in a run-down building on the hospital campus that re-
ceived only minimal repairs when needed. When the final decision to separate from the hos-
pital was rendered by the Ministry, the hospital delayed further repairs to the children’s 
outpatient building because it was believed the staffs would move out soon into new quar-
ters in the community. Once empty, the buildings were to be abandoned. As it was, staffs 
moved out of the hospital grounds in phases, despite initial reassurances that all would move 
out at the same time. The Francophone team left in July 1991, the second team (Anglo-
phone) in August 1991, and the final team (Anglophone) in May 1992. Thus, the final group 
of staffs remained more than one-and-one-half years in the old building after the separation 
of the department from the psychiatric hospital. 
One of the participants described his feelings with much emotion concerning the ef-
fects this had on staffs: 
“… that awful building… You know, you watch those old western movies 
and you get those shots of ghost towns in the west, a tumble of hay going 
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down the road, the doors just sort of creak and there’s no sound. That’s what 
that building was like after a while. Half the lights didn’t work. That building 
was bad enough being in, but where there was nobody else in it but six of 
us… A lot of the people at the hospital didn’t even know we were there. 
Even the people I’d worked with in the hospital’s back cottages thought that 
we’d gone… They didn’t know we were still in that building even though 
there were clients coming and going.” (Therapist) 
 
Staffs felt abandoned at several stages of the separation process, increasing their 
questioning of the whole divestment process and giving them the feeling of ‘hanging’ with 
no real answers, nor ownership, nor leadership. 
 
4.3.5  Job security 
Job security was another key issue for staffs. As might be expected, financial con-
cerns were important for staffs given financial shortages and cutbacks in the organization. 
Newcomers and veterans related to job security differently, however. 
First, veterans were preoccupied by the possibility of not having their union recog-
nized and the existing contract transferred to the new organization. This was particularly dif-
ficult for a member of the union negotiating team: 
“I saw myself not just in contract negotiations but in contract negotiations 
that had a nasty flavor to them, which was that there was a very high poten-
tial for the new administration to not recognize the union… In other words, 
the offer could have been ‘If you want to come and work for us, you’re cer-
tainly invited to come along, but not as union members’. That potential was 
very much there and until we had what we called a recognition agreement 
signed by the new administration… That time was tremendously turbulent 
for me.” (Therapist) 
 
Despite years of service with the former organization, many members were facing 
the real possibility of not having jobs with the new organization, or at least not having exist-
ing rights recognized. 
As the final days for signing a recognition agreement were approaching, veteran 
staffs were faced with more turbulence and uncertainty, namely having to choose whether 
they would stay as employees of the psychiatric hospital and exercising their union bumping 
rights, or choosing to go as employees of the new organization. On the last day before the 
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agreement was signed, staffs were told to make a final decision, but many claim the hospital 
purposefully did not provide information about what jobs they would retain if they stayed 
with the psychiatric hospital. This led to accusations of favoritism when some staffs discov-
ered at the last minute that three or four staff members remained with the psychiatric hospi-
tal when they were offered new positions there. All of these actions meant ongoing 
uncertainty and turbulence, with employees feeling no real sense of direction. 
“Although the words were being said, some of the actions were not occur-
ring, you know, that delay in signing the contract, delays in obtaining infor-
mation from the psychiatric hospital. I think we were feeling in a no-man’s 
land.” (Therapist) 
 
4.3.6  Financial cutbacks 
Financial cutbacks also became part of the reality of the organization within the first 
year of operation. The way that this information was circulated to staffs was particularly 
troublesome for some members. 
“The Executive Director came to us just before the Christmas holidays and 
dropped a bomb with all that was going to happen with the new budget, that 
there were going to be cutbacks, how we were going to survive. Everybody 
was in a panic. That put a lot of pressure on us. Staff reacted and became 
anxious, and they didn’t know what was going to happen with the cutbacks. 
We didn’t want to lose staff like L... and D... on our team… The Executive 
Director started in a really explosive way.” (Therapist) 
 
While veterans because of seniority were more assured than new staff members of 
keeping their jobs, they were nonetheless very concerned about what the changes would 
mean in terms of job functions. A new staff explained this well: 
“The organization now has changed. It’s now recruiting different kinds of 
people, probably more highly trained people than some of the people who 
were there at the start many years ago, and I think that’s been very threaten-
ing to a lot of the older staff from the old organization. Times change, and 
one needs to become more highly trained and qualified…” (Therapist) 
 
Thus, it may be that some veteran staffs felt threatened by newer employees who 
came to the organization with more academic qualifications and preparation. This undoubt-
edly would have increased uncertainty in the eyes of the veteran staffs. 
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4.3.7  Perception by therapists that skills and experience were not valued 
The feeling of many employees that their former employer, the psychiatric hospital, 
did not appear to value their services, experience or skills compounded uncertainty. 
“The hospital was not courting anybody in terms of ‘Geez, you guys have 
done excellent work. We’d like to find places for as many of you as possible’, 
or anything along that line. Nothing was done… Well, they sort of pointed to 
a couple of people and got them. They offered them positions, which was 
fine. The writing was on the wall — I’m of no value.” (Therapist) 
 
This sentiment was echoed by most of the veteran staffs. They felt not only that their 
jobs and union rights were on the line, but that their skills and years of experience were not 
being valued by the old and new organizations. 
 
4.3.8  Uncertainty around the continuation of intervention programs  
Uncertainty around the continuation of intervention programs also was an issue re-
lated to the turbulence that the agency’s employees experienced, particularly for veteran 
staffs. Programs that were long-standing or pilot projects thought to be “safe” from cut-
backs were now being questioned due to the transition between the two organizations. Part 
of the problem for the Executive Director at the time of divestment is that the team leaders 
(middle managers) were still in the process of being hired. Staffs were looking for assurances 
of the continuation of existing intervention programs, but the Executive Director did not 
want to bind future middle managers to specific programs. 
“As we were going through divestment … the Executive Director was saying 
‘We don’t want to traumatize you, but yet the position will be maintained for 
a period of time until we can clarify things.’ That may have been helpful from 
his perspective of reassuring us going into the organization. It also created a 
lot of stress for people in prevention…” (Therapist) 
 
Staffs attached to a pilot prevention project experienced much uncertainty as they 
felt they had to continually justify the program to senior administration to ensure its survival. 
Administrative personnel making no firm commitments on intervention programs com-
pounded this: 
“We were trying to explain what prevention is, so we were in a position of 
trying to teach our employer who we are, what the work is, who our clients 
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are. We didn’t like the word ‘client’ because we were primary prevention 
working at empowerment… It’s totally different than the clinical program, so 
we were caught with having to try and justify and explain who we are and 
what kind of work we did, and who our population was… The three of us in 
some ways thought that we were always trying to justify our position and our 
work within the organization.” (Therapist) 
 
“Quite often when things get shaky, like cutbacks and these kinds of issues, 
prevention is becoming more either a political tool and, well, we’re not sure. 
We’re always feeling uneasy about the role of prevention. Sometimes we feel 
like we’re under a microscope in terms of the work that we do.” (Therapist) 
 
In essence, some staffs were unclear whether their program would continue under 
the new organization. They also were unsure about the value that senior management was 
putting on their specialized skills, making some feel they were struggling for the existence of 
their work in the organization. 
 
4.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
In the preceding section, we outlined the key events and milestones leading to the 
organizational changes at the psychiatric hospital along with some of the principal descrip-
tions of staffs around uncertainty. The separation of the children’s mental health centre from 
the local psychiatric hospital followed several years of conflict, and the result was a radically 
different organizational structure.  
When viewed in the largest sense, it appears that turbulence and uncertainty pene-
trated many aspects of organizational life in the centre that was studied. Participants de-
scribed uncertainty as a central element to policies and procedures, unmet expectations, job 
security and financial cutbacks, and the possible termination of intervention programs. 
Also described were differences between veteran staffs and new staffs in the way 
they described uncertainty and turbulence. Obviously, some differences are attributable to 
the different experiences staffs had in the organization. It is noteworthy, however, that vet-
eran staffs were more vocal than new staffs about certain types of concerns such as job secu-
rity. One might expect newcomers to be more concerned about such an issue because they 
would be the first to lose their jobs under financial cutbacks. One possible explanation is 
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that for veteran staffs, job security issues peaked when they were asked to decide whether 
they would transfer with the new organization and maintain their seniority rights in the un-
ion, or remain with the psychiatric hospital and exercise bumping rights in other hospital 
departments. It also is possible that some veteran staffs felt threatened by newer, more quali-
fied staffs, especially in an environment where job security was not assured.  
Veteran staffs also had more invested in the changes that occurred, and this might 
explain, at least in part, their fluency in discussing uncertainty and turbulent events. Also 
linked was uncertainty around the continued existence of prevention programs, to which 
senior administrators would not commit themselves. 
Feelings of betrayal were identified and seemed linked to broken promises and let-
downs in terms of expectations. It is reasonable to assume that expectations were tied to old 
history, and that this old history was brought into the new organization by veteran staffs. 
This was compounded by the slowness of the new organization to develop a strong identity 
that was distinct from the former psychiatric hospital. Some staffs described this partly as 
still living in the past. Again, these descriptions were mainly from veteran staffs because 
newer staffs had not experienced the history of the organization. 
Much of the uncertainty and turbulence in the organization was due to financial 
problems. For two years in a row, the Executive Director discussed a $500,000 financial 
shortfall to employees in staff meetings just prior to Christmas. The sense of urgency this 
gave undoubtedly increased uncertainty and heightened the sense of turmoil that staffs had 
concerning the cutbacks. While it is not possible to determine the exact motives behind the 
timing of the announcements and the way they were carried out, it is reasonable to believe 
they were designed to create a sense of urgency to push people out of their “comfort zones” 
or usual ways of behaving. In essence, staffs were not able to anchor themselves in past suc-
cesses because senior management was trying to build the organization from “scratch”. 
In the next two chapters, we will examine how the participants dealt with uncertainty 
in terms of power strategies. To recall the objectives of this study, we will examine what the 
bases of individual and group power were, what power games existed, how the games were 
played, and how the games related to one another at different hierarchical levels. As de-
scribed in Chapter Two, it is assumed that the employees actively used different sources and 
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means of power available to them to manage the uncertainty. A few of the questions that will 
be addressed in the next two chapters are: What kinds of power strategies did the employees 
use to deal with the uncertainty they faced? What was the differential use of power strategies 
between veteran and newcomer staffs? How did senior administrators, middle managers, 
therapists, and clerical employees differ in their use of strategies to deal with uncertainty? 
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C h a p t e r  F i v e 
  
The Sources of Power Employed by the Participants 
 
 
 
“People will believe that the higher you are up on the thing, 
the more power you have. Often, the more powerless you can feel.” 
(Senior manager) 
 
“My role is so central that I’m like the meat in the sandwich. I’m between levels.” 
(Team leader) 
 
 
 
This chapter begins with a brief review of the definitions of the sources of power as 
derived from the literature in Chapter Two. We then provide descriptions of each of the 
sources of power as the participants in the research depicted them. This is followed in the 
next chapter by a description of how the sources of power were employed in terms of power 
strategy formation.  
As described earlier, power was a fact of life for the participants, as demonstrated by 
the 600 or so references to power and 1000 strategies that were coded in the interviews. We 
found that the participants were quite verbose about the sources and strategies of power they 
employed, again confirming their years of experience and involvement in the subject. 
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5.1 THE SOURCES OF POWER 
In Chapter Two, we identified eight sources of power from a diverse base of litera-
ture on power: 1) formal legal authority; 2) the use of coercion or intimidation; 3) the ability 
to give rewards or to impose reprimands; 4) expertise or specialized skills and knowledge; 5) 
the ability to control relations between an organization and its environment, and the ability 
to control resources; 6) the ability to control information and communications between dif-
ferent parts of the organization; 7) controlling access to power holders; and 8) referent or 
charismatic power. 
We also found that three important criteria are necessary for power to exist. First, 
sources of power must be rare, in short supply, or not easily accessible to all members of the 
organization. Second, sources of power must be irreplaceable or very difficult to substitute. 
Third, sources of power must be essential to other persons or groups in the organization. 
Power involves dependency of one person on another person’s resources.  
It also will be recalled that power is not necessarily something possessed but is exer-
cised in a relationship between two or more persons. Finally, there is a sanctioning aspect, 
meaning that any power relationship contains sanctions or potential sanctions. The ability to 
manipulate these sanctions, thus the outcome of the actions of others, is essential for power 
to exist. 
 
5.1.1  FORMAL LEGAL AUTHORITY 
The transcripts revealed that the participants were far more verbose about formal or 
legal power than any other source of power. There are several possible explanations for this. 
First, the Ministry of Community and Social Services granted formal authority to the Steer-
ing Committee that planned and led the development of the new organization and the new 
board of directors. The hierarchical structure of the organization had been a topic that elic-
ited much conflict over the past several years, and the participants thus had much to say 
about it. The radical change in the formal structure that occurred following the divestment 
of the two organizations was a topic that was easy to discuss and to provide examples for. 
Formal authority is a reality in all human service organizations that employ professionals and 
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is perhaps the most visible form of power because it affects every person in the organization, 
regardless of level or position. 
We made several comparisons between different staff groupings to determine the 
principal themes related to legal authority. Veterans and new staffs were similar in terms of 
their concerns around legal power. This is not surprising given that legal power is the first 
source of power that one normally encounters when entering or leaving an organization (for 
example, staffs are hired, fired, or promoted by their superiors). Relevant observations also 
were gathered by studying staffs according to their hierarchical position in the organization. 
The data revealed several forms of formal authority as a source of power, namely policies, 
procedures and rules and regulations, hierarchical position in the organization and lines of 
authority, the court system, and labor union rights. We will describe these here. 
 
Senior Management’s Focus on Policies and Procedures: 
Senior managers described policies and procedures as ensuring consistency across 
the organization. Due to the decentralized nature of the mental health centre, which was di-
vided into four satellite clinics, it was particularly important that all persons followed the 
same clinical and administrative processes throughout the organization. A senior manager 
was particularly emphatic about this: 
“That’s why I think that policies and procedures are so important. That’s 
why I’m placing so much emphasis on having our policies and procedures in 
place, because with decentralization, we have to be able to refer to something 
tangible and know where they stand, especially if there’s a team manager 
caught in between upper and … You’re on the firing line every day, and you 
don’t know what you’re expected to do. If things aren’t clear, you can have a 
real problem, so your controls have to be very tight and your policies and 
procedures have to be in place.” (Senior manager) 
 
It also was clear from the interviews that senior managers used policies and proce-
dures to try to counteract some of the effects of the turbulent changes that were occurring. 
In essence, a procedure was viewed as an effective way of getting a message across, reducing 
uncertainty by providing clear direction to staffs, and getting things done in a predictable 
way. 
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Team leaders, for their part, described the difficulty of having to design new policies 
and procedures as time went on, in some cases from one day to the next. They spoke little 
about policies as a source of power through the turbulent transition, however. This is par-
ticularly noteworthy because team leaders are the immediate supervisors of the therapists 
and clerical staffs, and one would assume that they would have used policies and procedures 
as one way of exerting authority on their employees and reducing uncertainty. Unfortunately, 
they faced much uncertainty because new policies and procedures were designed only as 
problems arose. This contrasts sharply with the way therapists described how team leaders 
and senior managers used policies and procedures, however. While senior managers de-
scribed policies as useful tools to ensure consistency, therapists described them as a source 
of control by middle and upper management levels. 
“Our team leader all of a sudden gave us policies and procedures to read. 
‘There you go’, she said. ‘Read them and sign them, and now you know 
what’s in them’ … In there, we read things that didn’t make sense to us, and 
we had solutions to improve them. I asked the team leader if we could possi-
bly change some of the policies. She said no because technically they had al-
ready been approved… And they claim they want us to participate!” 
(Therapist) 
 
Organizational Structure Complicating Lines of Communication: 
A second source of formal power is an extension of legal power through the struc-
ture of the organization and lines of authority. As presented earlier in the organizational 
chart (Figure 4.1), the children’s mental health centre has an Executive Director at the top of 
the hierarchy, one Clinical Co-ordinator and one Administrative Co-ordinator who each re-
port to the Executive Director, then four team leaders or managers who are responsible for 
the day-to-day functioning of each satellite clinic throughout the city. Although the Co-
ordinators report directly to the Executive Director and have functions that span all aspects 
of the organization, they do not have authority over the team leaders. The participants dis-
cussed this reporting structure at length. 
The prime function of the two Co-ordinators is to co-ordinate clinical and adminis-
trative activities across all segments of the organization. Neither of the Co-ordinators of the 
organization has legal power over other staffs as designated by the official structure, how-
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ever. Their influence lies in the expertise, advice and problem-solving skills that they bring to 
the Executive Director and the Board of Directors of the agency. This creates functional 
problems for them in terms of day-to-day operations. 
“The least enjoyable is dealing with the team managers because they don’t 
report to me… If things happen that a person should be reprimanded on or 
should be brought to that person’s attention, I have to bring those matters to 
the Executive Director, and I feel like a snitch. Yet, in my capacity as Co-
ordinator, certain things have to be followed, certain functions and rules have 
to be followed so that we know that if someone is really screwing up I could 
deal with it, but I’m not their boss.” (Senior manager) 
 
Both Co-ordinators are thus sometimes put into difficult positions because they 
must co-ordinate the actions of all staffs while having no structural authority to deal with 
problems that might arise. 
“It’s an awkward situation because if there’s a one-time slip-up or something, 
let’s say we’re dealing with a problem and it only happens once, I’ll pick up 
the phone and call and I’ll say, ‘This should be done and you didn’t do it. 
Please refer to this policy and procedure. If there isn’t one, do something 
about it.’ I have to tell the Executive Director, and I feel [awful].” (Senior man-
ager) 
 
The structure of the organization thus prevents the Co-ordinators from administer-
ing and dealing effectively with issues because of having to pass through team leaders to ac-
complish certain managerial tasks. Conversely, the job of the team leaders also is made more 
difficult because they do not have a direct link to the Co-ordinators, who are sometimes in a 
better position to deal with issues. 
“Sometimes for the team managers another frustrating part is that if I know 
that I went to staff directly with the policy and procedure, it would be so 
much easier for me. It would be easier to administer, no doubt about it. It’s 
just that I have that middle layer. I’m not trying to get rid of the middle layer. 
It’s just another layer that I have to train. They in turn have to pass it on, 
which never gets quite passed on correctly, and it always comes back and it 
just seems like you’re always revisiting something… It would be a lot easier 
to have the team managers report directly to the Co-ordinator, to have the 
Co-ordinator totally responsible for day-to-day functions, with your Execu-
tive Director dealing strictly with the political and board issues. That would 
be so much easier.” (Senior manager) 
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In essence, in an attempt to flatten the organizational hierarchy through a “simpler” 
reporting mechanism, the designers of the new organization inadvertently made the lines of 
communication more cumbersome for senior managers and team leaders. For team leaders, 
however, this brings about a special twist to structural power. Team leaders are the conduits 
between senior management, therapists, and the different cultural standing committees 
(Community Advisory Committees), and they have clinical responsibility for intervention 
programs. In terms of legal authority as a source of power, the team leaders carry the great-
est amount of power next to the Executive Director, meaning that the two Co-ordinators are 
limited to consulting rather than directing. This also means that the team leaders do not have 
to deal directly with the Co-ordinators to create change and influence either the standing 
committees or the Executive Director. 
With these increased responsibilities and dealing with multiple levels of the organiza-
tion, the team leaders often must deal with issues that take away from their principal focus of 
managing the satellite clinics. One of the team leaders used an interesting analogy for this:  
“There is something that I think is often forgotten here. Because my role is 
so central in the organization, I’m like the lunchmeat in the sandwich, caught 
between two layers. I don't feel I have as much time and energy to invest into 
strictly team dynamics.” (Team leader) 
 
This was echoed by one of the senior management Co-ordinators, who felt that the most 
frustrating part of the job was “feeling like the baloney in the sandwich.” 
 
Senior Management’s Emphasis on Proper Lines of Communication: 
The flattening of the hierarchy in their new organization initially was encouraging for 
therapists, for their part, especially when they compared it to the psychiatric hospital. They 
quickly became frustrated by senior managers’ insistence on following prescribed lines of 
communication, however, while senior managers did not always follow their own guidelines. 
“The Executive Director wants to know about anything that gets communi-
cated, but yet he refuses to communicate directly with us. Everything has to 
be communicated through the hierarchy. Don’t you find that a bit weird? … 
Even to the extent in the communication, they don’t want us as front-line 
people to even phone payroll and say, ‘I think there was a problem with my 
pay check’. I don’t really understand it.” (Therapist)  
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This emphasis on following proper channels of communication was perhaps the 
most problematic issue for therapists in their relationships with other levels of the organiza-
tion. There are indications of reprimands if lines of communication are not followed. 
“They’re pretty stiff about their preferring everything to go through your 
team manager. That’s their, meaning administration, preference for commu-
nication… You’re kind of scolded if you forget and you call the Administra-
tive Co-ordinator and want to know how much vacation time you have, or 
[you get from the team leader something like] ‘why didn’t you go through me 
first’.” (Therapist) 
 
“There is a definite pecking order in the sense of following appropriate chan-
nels if you have an issue to deal with… I could probably go directly to the 
Executive Director or the Clinical Co-ordinator, but my sense is that it would 
create bad feelings or whatever. It would have to be handled with diplo-
macy.” (Therapist) 
 
As a relational dynamic, the presence of possible reprimands implies that staffs at 
different levels occasionally crossed boundaries.  
 
More Structure Leading to More Informal Channels of Communication: 
It appears that as senior management emphasized lines and structures more and 
more, informal communication channels were developing. 
“There are boundaries that are crossed because I know that some people 
don’t necessarily go through supervisors… Despite the formal hierarchy that 
exists, I also get the sense that there is a lot of informal negotiation that takes 
place behind the scenes… I think certain boundaries are crossed inappropri-
ately by certain people, which tends to create maybe a sense of discontent in 
the staff or whatever.” (Therapist) 
 
It is ironic that at the same time as senior managers were putting strong emphasis on 
proper lines of authority and not crossing boundaries, the Board of Directors of the organi-
zation authorized the presence and participation of a staff observer from each satellite clinic 
at each of their respective Community Advisory Committee’s meetings. The purpose of this 
was to receive direct staff input, and to some degree, to deal with accusations that team lead-
ers were filtering information to and from the Community Advisory Committees and that 
staffs had no say in running the organization. One of the dangers with this approach for sen-
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ior management was a greater possibility that informal alliances and coalitions would form 
between therapists and Committee members. Strategies around this are discussed in Chapter 
6. 
In essence, the structure and lines of communication prescribed by the organiza-
tional structure seemed to enhance communication problems between different organiza-
tional levels. It would be reasonable to assume that the more steps that are involved in the 
communications process, the more distance the communication must cover, and the greater 
the chance for errors, problems and conflict. The crossing of boundaries implies greater op-
portunities for power games around lines of communication. 
 
Legal Versus Moral Authority in Terms of Power:  
The court system represents another source of legal power. While there was only 
limited discussion about the topic, it was apparent that there would be court battles over hir-
ing practices involving cultural issues. Requirements that clinical positions in the Aboriginal 
satellite clinic be advertised as “Bilingualism required — English and Ojibway”, for example, 
were fiercely fought by the union as unnecessary. The senior management level, on the other 
hand, supported by the Board of Directors of the organization, was as determined to see the 
bilingual requirements advertised as the union was to see the requirements dropped so that 
equal access would be granted to all staffs, regardless of cultural background. It is interesting 
that while some staffs believed that senior management had the legal right to determine job 
requirements, they did not have the moral authority to do so. As expected, few therapists and 
clerical staffs described themselves as involved in these legal battles because the issues were 
out of their hands and being tackled by senior management and union representatives. At 
the time of this study, the issue was far from being resolved.  
There were thus indications that claims to cultural rights were used as an element of 
power, and it would be reasonable to assume that there were power plays around this issue.  
 
Labor Union Contracts: 
A final subcategory of formal or legal power was represented by labor union con-
tracts. Given the history of conflict in the organization, it was no surprise that issues related 
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to unions were described as a legally sanctioned source of power. Therapists were the princi-
pal discussants on the subject, stating that until the new organization formally signed a new 
contract with the union or recognized the old contract that had been previously signed with 
the hospital, they felt powerless. The contract in itself thus represented a very powerful tool 
and motivator for both senior managers and therapists. Team leaders, for their part, made 
few comments about union contracts as sources of power, probably because they were not 
involved in negotiations and labor grievance procedures. In a sense, team leaders were more 
removed from contractual issues because other persons in the organization were given that 
responsibility. It is also possible that team leaders were more preoccupied with other dynam-
ics, such as those related to issues of lines of authority and their being ‘sandwiched’ between 
upper and lower levels. 
In summary, legal or formal power took on several different forms for the partici-
pants in this study. The descriptions of legal power that were gathered from the participants 
go beyond the regular definitions that authors such as Mintzberg (1983) and Bacharach and 
Lawler (1980) give of legal power when they write that it relates principally to legal preroga-
tives granted by those who are authorized to grant them. While there was some overlap be-
tween the different forms of power that were discussed in this category, we identified that 
policies and procedures, organizational structure and lines of authority, the court system, and 
labor union contracts were contributors to legal sources of power. This implies that legal 
authority does not only come out of the structure of an organization but also is related to 
other aspects such as cultural rights. It would seem important not to ignore that subtypes 
exist in analyzing power sources and strategies. 
The absence of discussion about legal power from the clerical group was noteworthy. 
First, this may be explained in part by the small number of participants in this group. More 
important, however, the clerical staffs did not describe themselves as heavily involved in un-
ion business, nor did they regularly attend union meetings. They also did not describe them-
selves as involved in issues crossing boundaries or lines of authority. As will be discussed 
later, clerical staffs did relate somewhat to other forms of power, however. 
Several issues were related to the organizational structure. The Clinical and Adminis-
trative Co-ordinators, for example, have no legal power over other staffs in the organization. 
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Basically put, team leaders are in a position of having legal power over both of the Co-
ordinators because they may choose to ignore their recommendations, with the Co-
ordinators having no recourse but to go to the Executive Director. In terms of dynamics, 
this sometimes led them to be caught in conflicts between the Executive Director and team 
leaders, or being triangulated or made a third party in situations that were not of their doing. 
It also could be argued that it is to the advantage of team leaders to maintain the pre-
sent hierarchical structure if they wish to retain as much legal power as possible. Under the 
current structure, team leaders report directly to the Executive Director and they do not 
have a hierarchical link to the Clinical and Administrative Co-ordinators.  
“What happens is that, let’s say they have a problem with a Co-ordinator, 
they could do that Co-ordinator a lot of harm because they report directly to 
the Executive Director.” (Senior manager) 
 
This implies the team leaders have legal power over persons who are “higher” than 
they are on the organizational chart. As a result, it is reasonable to expect power games 
around this issue. This will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
5.1.2 COERCION OR INTIMIDATION 
This source of power is based on the fears that it creates in persons. The target of 
coercion perceives the holder of power as a person who can make their life difficult. The 
capacity to suggest to other persons a desired behavior is based on actual or potential pun-
ishments, and it must appear as an offer that one cannot refuse.  
In terms of interpersonal relations in the type of organization we studied, coercion 
may take shape through moral or interpersonal pressure including playing on the shame or 
guilt of others, threats of job loss, demotion or displaying strong disapproval or dissatisfac-
tion with the actions of others. The predominant characteristic of coercive actions is the 
presence of strong negative verbal language or other actions that induce fear or strong dis-
comfort, and that may endanger a constructive relationship between the parties. (Guilbault, 
1984; Côté, 1986) 
A long history of conflict was characteristic of the relationship between the different 
parties involved in the divestment of the children’s mental health centre from the psychiatric 
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hospital, including persons in the new organization. This led us to examine the data for spe-
cific examples of possible coercion, but there was little evidence that coercion or intimida-
tion were overtly used by any of the participants. This is not to say that there were no 
attempts at intimidation, but the participants in the interviews did not discuss negative 
“strong-arm” sources of power.  
Some therapists described themselves as motivated by strong anger against senior 
management in both the psychiatric hospital and the new organization, but they stopped 
short of saying that they specifically used coercive means. There are several possible reasons 
for this. First, one must have the ability to use intimidation effectively because of its strong 
negative connotation. There also must be an occasion or opportunity to use coercion, and 
the target of the coercion must feel the actions of the other as very discomforting.  
Many participants in this study described themselves as ready for battle because of 
the years of conflict leading to the divestment. They described themselves as not ready to use 
openly coercive means, however, because it was not their preferred approach or “style.” 
“I love conflict models when I never have to face the person that I’m con-
flicting with. I hate personal conflict. I really am quite chicken when it’s in 
my face.” (Therapist) 
 
“I don’t like to ruffle feathers. That’s my nature.” (Clerical staff) 
 
There also were indications of goodwill between the parties during the initial transi-
tion period that would minimize opportunities or necessity for coercion. 
“We had felt [our way around a relationship with the Board of Directors], 
due to some of the internal wars we had previous to divestment with our 
administration at the psychiatric hospital. We very easily could have been 
seen as in a warring mood. From a union point of view, we were pretty bat-
tle-hardened from what had occurred before… I had all the lieutenants I had 
before. All of the executive within the union was the same executive that had 
gone through some of those battles. I don’t get the impression that we came 
on with our shields up. In fact, one of the very clear and deliberate responsi-
bilities that I gave myself was to bring those shields down and say no, we al-
ready live with a new face here now.” (Therapist) 
 
In essence, there was little evidence to suggest that the participants used coercive 
means, because they preferred to use collaborative approaches rather than outright coercion 
and strong-arm tactics. It would be reasonable to assume that staffs at all levels wanted to 
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work towards a positive resolution of conflicts, and that they were concerned about the de-
structive effect that this source of power can exert on relationships with others. Coercion, in 
effect, would lead to apprehension and defiance. Some staffs did admit that while they had 
thought about coercion, they would have to be pushed to the limit to invoke it because there 
were only so many risks they were willing to take before sacrificing their employment. They 
chose means less destructive than coercion, such as assertiveness and rewards and repri-
mands, as discussed below. It follows that the participants believed the more co-operative 
they were with each other, the less likely retribution or retaliation would take place. It would 
appear that coercion has a high cost when used. 
 
5.1.3 REWARDS AND REPRIMANDS 
French and Raven (1959) identified rewards and reprimands as sources of power and 
as an integral part of organizational functioning as early as 1959. For some writers, however, 
there are problems distinguishing between coercive and reward/reprimand power. As 
French and Raven (1959, p. 446) point out, “Is the withholding of a reward really equivalent 
to a punishment? Is the withdrawal of punishment equivalent to a reward?” We have chosen 
to separate “coercive power” from “reprimand power” in this section because coercion has a 
stronger negative connotation, whereas reprimands do not necessarily induce as much ap-
prehension. We recognize that the two may exist along a spectrum, however. 
 
Little Emphasis on Rewards: 
It is interesting that there were no references to rewards and reprimands by any of 
the team leaders, clerical support staffs, and senior managers, and only a few indications in 
the largest group of participants, the therapists. Why were there so few references, and why 
only from therapists?  
The absence of discussion about rewards was not surprising given the long-standing 
conflictual relationship between staffs and their former and current employers. Participants 
may have been less apt to discuss rewards, given that the focus of the study was on turbulent 
change in the organization, thereby inducing a mindset of answers in the participants. We 
also are led to wonder if rewards were given low value as a source of power in the organiza-
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tion. More particularly, therapists described their organization as hierarchical and driven by 
lines of communication, efficiency, and control. Although they would have willingly ac-
cepted rewards of any kind, one might say that therapists were accustomed to conflict with 
their superiors and did not have expectations of receiving material or personal rewards (e.g., 
extra days off, praise, expressions of empathy after a hard day). 
Studies carried out on communication processes provide evidence that social work-
ers are not likely to employ many positive-oriented comments, which are a form of reward, 
in their work with other professionals. In a study examining verbal communications between 
social workers and school personnel, for example, Guilbault (1984) found that less than one 
percent of all verbal communications were aimed at supporting other staffs or at reducing 
their discomfort during meetings about clients. This may mean that staffs ascribed a low 
value to verbal rewards aimed at improving relations, such as positive comments and praise. 
Regarding reprimands as a source of power, there was only limited discussion by the 
participants. Some therapists described that administrative personnel admonished them 
through verbal means, particularly when lines of communication were not followed. 
“They’re pretty stiff about their preferring everything to go through your 
team manager. That’s their, meaning administration, preference for commu-
nication. I perceive that they violate those rules more often than they really 
permit us to violate them. If the Executive Director wants to call me, he’ll 
call me, but if I call the Administrative Co-ordinator and ask something then 
that person will say, ‘You should go through your team leader’… They can 
violate it whereas we can be in trouble… You’re kind of scolded if you forget 
and call the Administrative Co-ordinator and want to know how much vaca-
tion time you have or [you get something like] ‘Why didn’t you go through 
me first?’ [from your team leader].” (Therapist) 
 
“I don’t think [calling the Ministry] would be allowed. It would have to go 
through the channels, and I’m sure if it didn’t that there would be some big 
repercussions.” (Therapist) 
 
Performance appraisals were viewed as another way that reprimands were carried 
out. 
“Going to a team manager for consultation [on a difficult case] is probably 
pretty dumb because then you’ve got a problem, right? … So the next time 
you have an evaluation, that could be used against you, so why would you 
want to tell him you’re having a problem?” (Therapist) 
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Despite these examples, however, there was little evidence of actual reprimands oc-
curring, or of the threat of using them as a source of power and control. It may be that 
therapists believed the more co-operative they were with senior and middle management, the 
less likely retribution or retaliation would take place. Another possible explanation may be 
that senior and middle managers employed subtle non-verbal means of communicating rep-
rimands, and for that matter, rewards. Also, in some situations, overuse of rewards can re-
duce their value in the long run. Other possible reasons include the verbal nature of this 
research and the limited number of observations of non-verbal interactions that were gath-
ered. It was impossible to track all non-verbal interactions of the participants because this 
was not the goal of the research. 
The few references to reprimands that were highlighted in the data, however, oc-
curred only in interviews with therapists. Reasons for this include the larger size of this 
group of participants when compared to senior management, team leaders, and clerical sup-
port staffs. It may also be that the recipients of reprimands are more apt to discuss them 
than the initiators of the reprimands. In essence, therapists may have discussed reprimands 
with the researcher out of anger and lack of understanding as to the reasons behind them. 
Finally, the physical distance between senior management and the therapists may have re-
sulted in a lower number of reprimands from senior levels of the organization. Because sen-
ior management personnel are situated away from therapists, who are in satellite clinics 
across the city, they may not have the opportunity to observe behavior that would result in 
reprimands. This also would depend on the team leaders, who may choose not to report in-
cidents to higher levels of the organization, which would further the negative relationships 
between staffs. 
 
5.1.4 EXPERTISE, SPECIALIZED SKILLS, AND KNOWLEDGE 
To use Mintzberg’s (1989) system of classifying organizations, the children’s mental 
health centre that was studied is a professional bureaucracy characterized by power that is dis-
tributed rather than concentrated. The expertise of professionals enters into play because the 
organization requires them to carry out complex and specialized work that is accomplished 
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through skills developed by extensive training. Professionals thus gain power through their 
base of specialized knowledge and skills that are scarce, non-substitutable, and essential to 
the survival of the organization. 
In the current study, there was evidence that expertise and specialized knowledge and 
skills were tied to power. This is certainly not surprising given that the organization studied 
is a professional bureaucracy. What types of expert power existed? What issues were related 
to expertise and power? 
Clinical expertise as a source of power is the mainstay of the present organization 
because of the specialized knowledge of social workers, psychologists, child and youth work-
ers, and other types of counselors working there. There are different types of expertise in the 
present organization, depending on the hierarchical level. The Executive Director is a spe-
cialist in managing multi-dimensional organizations. A criterion for his hiring was experience 
in managing cultural issues. 
“If you look at the job description that was there for this particular position 
back when, they weren’t looking for someone with necessarily clinical experi-
ence, but they were looking for someone that they described in many ways as 
a seasoned administrator and really someone with administrative background, 
and I guess political sensitivity to the different cultural milieus given the kind 
of organization this one was meant to be.” (Senior manager) 
 
The Administrative Co-ordinator has expertise in working with budgets, financial 
statements, payroll financial auditing, and setting up policies and procedures, expertise that 
no other person in the organization possesses. The Clinical Co-ordinator has expertise in 
diagnosing and treating a wide range of clinical mental health problems, with a particular ex-
pertise in consulting with staffs on difficult cases, also in providing clinical leadership to 
other staffs of the agency. Therapists, for their part, described themselves as having strong 
skills in treating psychosocial problems in clients, and in designing and implementing pri-
mary prevention programs in the community. Thus, each level has an area of speciality. 
Administrative, financial, and clinical expertise were not the only types of specialized 
knowledge described by the participants. Clerical staffs, for example, described themselves as 
carrying out specific reception and organizational tasks in dealing with staffs and the public. 
They were particularly proud of their capacity to adapt quickly to a changing environment, 
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such as being able to replace staffs in other satellite clinics who have different job descrip-
tions, at a moment’s notice. While support staffs are not normally seen as “professionals”, 
they nonetheless carry out tasks that require knowledge about specific functions. While every 
member of an organization is an expert in some way (Crozier, 1964), however, power is 
gained only through those skills that are difficult to reproduce. In the case of support staffs, 
it may be argued that expertise is not a primary source of power because of the substitutable 
nature of their skills. 
In essence, there were different types of expertise or knowledge required because of 
the division of labor and the social mandate of the organization. Related to these were two 
principal themes: the lack of recognition of past experience at the psychiatric hospital and 
the resultant setting of boundaries between hierarchical levels, and cultural issues. These are 
explained below. 
 
Senior Managers Not Valuing Therapists’ Past Work Experience: 
A frequent theme was that therapists felt senior management had little knowledge of 
the skills required to carry out the functions of the therapists. Most of the therapists said that 
upper levels of the organization had little appreciation for the difficulty of the work accom-
plished. 
“I don’t think [senior management] knows what we do. They really, funda-
mentally do not even know or appreciate what we do… For specifics, I think 
the Executive Director has not ever worked in the field. The only practical 
experience he’s had is with the mentally retarded. I find that anytime he 
makes a comment about our type of work, it minimizes and expresses an un-
der-appreciation for what we do, and the complexity and the stresses of our 
work.” (Therapist) 
 
“I don’t believe the Executive Director knows what I do. He’ll pretend he 
knows, but I don’t think he has any idea of the work that we do, as he didn’t 
even before. When they were coming to take over, did he ever take a minute 
to come and talk to any of us to see what we were up to, what we were all 
about?” (Therapist) 
 
For some participants, the focus of the agency seemed more on completing paper-
work properly than on using one’s skills and experience in therapy. 
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“I would say this agency has put quite a high priority on paperwork. I guess 
they need to be accountable. I recognize that, and they’re trying to get ac-
credited, so that’s important, but I also think that part of that comes from 
the background of the training of the Executive Director, that this is his 
strength. So of course he can’t emphasize the clinical end because he doesn’t 
know it. What else can he do except push the policies, procedures and pa-
perwork?” (Therapist) 
 
Regarding providing input to the organization, the therapists felt generally frustrated 
at the lack of recognition of their expertise, and that expert knowledge counted only if it co-
incided with what senior management wanted. 
“In the beginning we believed that what we were saying and what we were 
doing, and the kinds of things that we were getting, were being considered as 
valid and valuable, that kind of stuff… As time went along, I began to feel 
like this is just lip service. We’re being asked to input but it’s some sort of 
bureaucratic strategy that’s being used, that somebody’s learned somewhere.” 
(Therapist) 
 
There also is evidence that expertise was equated with academic qualifications as op-
posed to years of professional experience in the field. 
“There is an issue about staff who are qualified versus those who aren’t. 
There are supposed to be a few clinicians who are not qualified, but they’ve 
been at their job for years. Those people consulted the union because there 
was talk about laying off eleven persons, and there were rumors that … well, 
it was all never confirmed. It was all rumors.” (Therapist) 
 
“It’s no unknown fact that [a few of us] are probably the least educated out 
of everybody that is here in terms of degrees… I’m sorry, I’m not apologiz-
ing, but this agency definitely looks at your paper credentials and lets you 
know that you do not have your B.A.… People are not looking for skills and 
what you can and cannot do, and what you can accomplish… [My ten years 
of experience] mean nothing. What’s important is what you have on that pa-
per. It’s not important all the good we do and all the good reports that we get 
from schools. The Executive Director couldn’t give two shits about us.” 
(Therapist) 
 
The general sentiment for therapists is that they did not feel respected in the skills 
and expertise that they brought to their job, and that their expert input was not valued. For 
senior management, however, academic qualifications were an important aspect of expertise. 
These suggest two further dynamics. First, they imply that expertise of the therapists was 
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diminished as a source of power because senior management did not recognize it openly and 
showed a lack of appreciation for its value. On the other hand, therapists may have drawn 
clear boundaries between themselves and senior management by distancing themselves from 
management, and by showing they had little in common in terms of skills and experience. 
This would be in an effort to increase their expert power. In essence, this demonstrates that a 
person or group of persons may increase their power by minimizing the essential value of 
the skills of another person. It also shows that a person may attempt to increase his or her 
power by emphasizing the differences in skills and experience between oneself and another. 
 
Cultural Identity As A Source of Power: 
Cultural issues also were related to expertise power. The Native clinic of the organi-
zation, for example, was designed specifically to address the psychosocial problems of Abo-
riginal people. The organization sought to hire clinical staffs with specialized skills and 
experience to deal with these clients. One requirement was to have lived on a Native reserva-
tion. The other was a claim by the Native Community Advisory Committee that persons 
with Aboriginal ancestry were the only qualified persons that could offer Native services, and 
that traditional academic qualifications were less important. One example provided was that 
traditional therapy approaches were not effective in the Native culture, and that “Elders” 
were often consulted to suggest other methods to deal with problems. Due to the small pool 
of Native professionals having completed Bachelor’s or Master’s degrees in Social Work, 
Psychology or related social sciences, the organization chose to hire a Native person with 
less than the required academic qualifications and work experience. Not surprisingly, this 
caused much conflict with the union, which threatened legal action if the organization chose 
to waive the hiring requirements for some positions while insisting candidates meet mini-
mum requirements for others. In terms of dynamics, the Native unit strongly felt that the 
union was biased against Native people, and this caused much friction between representa-
tives of the two groups. This was echoed in the Francophone unit, which felt that more than 
simple bilingualism was necessary, and that therapists needed to have a strong understanding 
of the subtleties of the Francophone culture. This all but eliminated non-Francophone can-
didates from these positions. In terms of sources of power, the union was trying to block or 
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counter moves by senior administrators that would change hiring practices, and thus the 
status of the union in hiring. 
In summary, expertise as a source of power revolved around several issues, most no-
tably the lack of recognition of past work experience and accomplishments, and cultural dy-
namics. The scarcity and non-substitutability of skills was shown to be especially important 
for power in the Native clinic. Also, the refusal of senior management to recognize the past 
work experience of staffs seemed to reduce the value of their skills as essential to the organi-
zation.  
 
5.1.5  CONTROLLING RESOURCES, AND CONTROLLING RELA-
TIONS BETWEEN AN ORGANIZATION AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 
 
There was some evidence from the participants that power was ascribed directly to 
controlling resources. Senior management, for example, determines and monitors budgets 
for all satellite clinics in the organization. Refusal to approve certain expenses would thus 
represent a form of control over the organization’s resources. Conflicts over resources fo-
cused on three main elements for the participants: uncertainty around possible financial cut-
backs, choosing new equipment and furniture, and claims to cultural rights for controlling 
resources.  
 
Controlling financial resources and costs: 
Despite the financial cutbacks the organization faced, some therapists felt that senior 
management was excessively controlling in trying to reduce costs. During a meeting just be-
fore the Christmas holidays, for example, the Executive Director met with staffs in each sat-
ellite clinic to gather input on ways of controlling expenditures. What the Executive Director 
intended as obtaining input from therapists was perceived as trivial and controlling by them. 
“The Executive Director came to us just before the holidays and dropped a 
bomb with all the financial pressures of the new budget, that there were go-
ing to be cutbacks, how we were going to survive, etc. Everybody was in a 
panic. It definitely put pressure on us. Staff reacted and were distressed, and 
they didn’t know what was going to happen with the cutbacks. We didn’t 
want to lose staff like L… and D… You know, we wanted the agency to sur-
vive and so we tried to find means… We started talking about ways to keep 
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all staff, even a two-month shutdown. But after an hour of that, it was 
enough… It was going down to boxes of Kleenex, how we were going to cut 
down on boxes of Kleenex, paper clips, Xerox machines, trivial things… 
They’re talking about peanuts… We now pay twelve cents per page for pho-
tocopies if it’s personal. For a while, we didn’t even have boxes of Kleenex 
for our clients. We had to buy our own.” (Therapist) 
 
Despite their asking for input from all levels of the organization, however, senior 
management retained much of the control over financial resources, as they were legally man-
dated to do. It is arguable that while financial resources were essential to the functioning of 
the organization and in short supply (that is, not easily replaceable by other sources of fund-
ing), senior management did not have a large margin of freedom in terms of using financial 
resources as a source of power. They could not simply shut down the organization or one of 
its clinics to save money. Internal control was through limited means such as denying access 
to conference moneys to all staffs and minimizing photocopying and materials costs.  
 
Control over choosing office design and furniture: 
Other examples of resources as a potential source of power came when new furni-
ture was purchased as staffs were moving from the hospital to their new satellite clinics. In a 
constructive gesture, senior management wanted staffs to provide input, but the reaction 
they faced was resistance.  
“I wanted to change the furnishings. I felt that they should get bright colors. 
I wanted not a hospital setting but something professional, I felt that the 
staff had to be involved in choosing the furniture, in choosing colors and 
choosing layouts, and that was frustrating. [Staff] resisted because a lot of the 
components were purchased with computers in mind for the future. We 
started getting into conflicts about ‘Are you telling us down the road that 
we’ll have to use computers?’ I was just saying that we might as well have 
that in mind, because eventually computers are going to be here… Anything 
from the hospital I wanted to get rid of, right or wrong. I want to get rid of 
it. I decided that it would be nice to have a new clinic, new things. I wanted 
to pick up their spirits.” (Senior manager) 
 
Similar issues arose when choosing office designs. 
“We brought the decorator in and then said ‘Here he is guys’. That led to 
problems. Some staff didn’t care. One cared so much that he wanted to see 
more samples and fabric with a different texture, and the choice in the car-
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peting really wasn’t as broad as he thought it should be. In the meantime, 
central admin is saying ‘We have to order this stuff. Hurry it up’.” (Team 
leader) 
 
There is thus evidence that issues related to control of resources were present during 
the development of the organization, especially in the initial phases of the separation from 
the hospital. It can be argued that for staffs who were former employees of the psychiatric 
hospital, there had never been the opportunity for choice and control over resources such as 
furniture and office design. Despite their many complaints to the administration of the psy-
chiatric hospital over several years preceding the divestment, for example, their building was 
repaired only minimally and never remodeled. It is possible that when staffs transferred to 
the new organization, they carried with them old sets of expectations that their choices 
would not be respected. Some felt they could not exercise effective pressure around re-
sources and thus did not bother to try. 
 
Culture and the moral right to control resources: 
Cultural issues were intermixed with the control of resources. As described earlier, a 
Francophone advocacy group had been pressuring the government for years for the full con-
trol of financial and administrative resources to Francophones in the community. They were 
partially successful in their bid, as the new organizational structure included a Community 
Advisory Committee for the Francophone group. Control over financial resources, however, 
was given to the larger board of directors, of which three members were representatives sit-
ting on the Francophone Committee. The Francophone group nonetheless had secured 
funding to obtain staffs, offices, and clinical material for service delivery to their culture. 
Control over the Native satellite clinic’s resources quickly became a problem for sen-
ior management. As described in Chapter Four, although commitments were made that 
moneys for the development of the Native unit would be flowing from the government, the 
organization had yet to see the funds. In this case, the Ministry of Community and Social 
Services had the ultimate power in terms of resources by holding the purse strings. Native 
issues were not only related to the presence or absence of funds, however, but over the 
moral right to obtain and control them. Several staffs at all levels spoke of the government’s 
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mandate to recognize the Native population’s needs, and to increase services to this group. 
In essence, through the political commitments of the Ministry, the organization was obliged 
to provide resources and relinquish control because the money “belonged to the Natives”. 
At the time of this study, the issue remained unresolved, and because of the limited number 
of Native participants in the study, we have little information on the interplay between cul-
ture and the control over resources. Further studies along this line are certainly warranted. 
In summary, control over financial and material resources represented an important 
source of power in this organization. This placed the organization in a difficult position. 
While it had a role of ensuring consistency across the organization and of cutting costs 
through centralized control, it also had to respect the individual cultural and linguistic rights 
of each satellite clinic by recognizing the right to self-determination of the Native and Fran-
cophone units. As a source of uncertainty, control over resources carried much potential 
power. 
 
Being in a central position for resources: 
Control of relations with the environment also was an important facet in the power 
relations of the agency in terms of obtaining material resources. This was evident in several 
ways. One of the senior clerical staffs, for example, was responsible for dealing with land-
lords, suppliers, and other resource providers in the community. During our interview with 
this person, a telephone interruption provided an example of how she could control certain 
resources of the organization. 
“(After the telephone call) … There is an example of one of the things that will 
happen. That was one of the team managers. He’s having some problems 
with ice build-up at his back door and a stop sign that they wanted installed. 
My responsibility is to contact the landlord and have that situation cleared 
up. It’s not that they don’t know where to go. It’s part of the policy that this 
is my function, and also in fairness to the landlord, so they don’t have half-a-
dozen people calling them three or four times a day and not knowing who’s 
calling them from where. It’s one contact, which is me, and that makes it eas-
ier for actually everybody.” (Clerical staff) 
 
In essence, by virtue of her relationship with external service providers, this person 
had the potential of slowing down or speeding up repairs and flows of materials, somewhat 
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enhancing or frustrating the efforts of others to ensure the smooth functioning of the or-
ganization. 
 
Therapists increasing their latitude through external relationships: 
Control of relations with the environment also was evident in examples described by 
therapists, but in a different light. Due to the community-oriented nature of the organiza-
tion, several therapists worked with other professionals outside the agency on common in-
tervention programs. They felt this gave them some latitude and relationships that were 
beyond the direct control of senior levels of their organization. 
“There are four of us that are seconded one day a week to a prevention pro-
gram. That means one day a week we’re accountable to the program, not this 
agency. They’re quite respectful of that. I don’t account for the things, well, 
I’ll tell this agency the things I do in the program. If I want somebody’s ad-
vice, I’ll go and ask for it, but I don’t really account to this agency. It’s like 
they give me the program, so it’s given me some space.” (Therapist) 
 
In terms of power relations, senior levels were not in a position to gain full control 
over the professional relationships of its staffs with the outside because of the latter’s in-
volvement with external and prestigious intervention programs. With regard to the multicul-
tural aspects of the organization, it was possible for some staffs to increase uncertainty in 
senior management, and thus to increase their own margin of freedom, by developing links 
related to culture outside the agency. It would obviously be difficult for the organization to 
criticize or cease these external relationships because this would go against the mandate of 
the agency. According to some staffs, senior management felt “nervous” about these links 
because they did not know where they would lead politically. The implication here is that 
there were opportunities for possible coalitions between staffs and other organizations, and 
that these could possibly erode senior management’s power base. External professional rela-
tionships also acted as an “anchor” for several staffs, providing them with opportunities for 
professional growth that were outside the sphere of their own agency. 
Discussions about the structure of the agency also were associated with control of 
relations with the environment. There was an overwhelming feeling from the therapists that 
senior levels of the organization somewhat discouraged outside networking, and that remov-
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ing the “top” layer of the Executive Director and two Co-ordinators would resolve many of 
the relational problems both within and outside the agency. 
“If recommendations were ever that the top level of the Executive Director 
and Co-ordinators be removed, I think there would be many changes in the 
organization. There would be less power at high levels and things would be 
equal. There would still be the team leaders, but it would be much more 
shared in terms of the exchange of ideas. We would have more input and we 
would have more power as clinicians.” (Therapist) 
 
During the period leading up to the divestment, staffs felt that they might influence 
the changes that were going to occur by having access to government decision-makers. As 
the Steering Committee was designing the new model of service delivery, middle managers 
and therapists of the psychiatric hospital maintained that they should become involved in 
direct negotiations with the government in a belief this would influence the entire divestment 
process. This was met with no success, however, given that the government was dealing only 
with the Steering Committee of the new organization, and that they were not open to the 
idea of dealing directly with staff groups. 
“Individuals had firm beliefs that they could dictate the agency’s mandate, 
and it didn’t work. They were led to think that it should, and that was 
wrong… I have a belief that none of the therapists had an understanding of 
the power of the decision-making body that came from the Ministry of 
Community and Social Services, nor the Ministry of Health. Therapists, 
somehow, felt they had more input than the Ministry… Somehow, in this or-
ganization, front-line people had a belief that is inaccurate, a belief that they 
had more, because they had a clinical role, and because of their personal, pro-
fessional self-assessment, they thought that they had a more powerful contri-
bution than the senior administration at Queen’s Park. That was nonsense, 
pure nonsense.” (Therapist) 
 
In essence, the prospect to participate with the psychiatric hospital’s senior manage-
ment in negotiations with the government did not pan out and led to much disappointment 
and unmet expectations. Staffs were never given the opportunity to carry this through. 
Combined with a belief that they would be armed with the weight of clinical expertise, staff’s 
attempts to manipulate relations with the environment (e.g., the Ministry) failed. 
To summarize, control of resources and control of relationships with the environ-
ment were active power sources leading to and during the turbulent period experienced by 
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the organization’s staffs. The control of resources remained mainly in the hands of senior 
management and government officials by virtue of the control of financial resources. For the 
control of relationships with the environment, there were differences between different hier-
archical levels. Clerical staffs worked more closely with components related to material 
things, whereas therapists were more involved with trying to influence the direction of the 
agency by communicating with government officials. Clearly, the links or boundaries to the 
outside became the object of power strategies. Cultural identity entered into play. 
 
5.1.6 CONTROLLING INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 
BETWEEN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE ORGANIZATION 
 
“Information is power, and today everybody has information and they all 
have the same information, but they don’t necessarily believe it’s there, or it’s 
not believed they have it, or they don’t believe it’s been communicated, or 
they don’t believe it’s being shared with them.” (Senior manager) 
 
The quotation above summarizes well the dynamics around information and com-
munications as power sources in the organization that was studied. Controlling information 
is considered important because it influences the perception that persons have of their situa-
tion and thus the way they act (Morgan, 1986). Along with authority and expertise as sources 
of power, control of information and communications generated much discussion from the 
participants. While there were many dynamics around information and communications, the 
great majority related to mistrust around the sharing and manipulation of information. 
Mistrust around information sharing was an important issue throughout the transi-
tion period. As described in Chapter Four, staffs historically felt isolated from decision-
making processes at the psychiatric hospital, and these feelings were carried into the new or-
ganization. From early on in the development of the new organization, there were accusa-
tions that information was manipulated. 
“This organization manages information, manages percentages, its adminis-
trative linkages with the public and specifically with its board and its steering 
committee. There’s very much manipulation of information… Minutes are 
edited, for example. You know, it comes across in many ways. What is said in 
a meeting and how it is said in the minutes bear no resemblance to [what ac-
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tually happens]… Great fiction! [The minutes] reflect more a novel than real-
ity.” (Therapist) 
 
“They told us that we were moving from our day treatment building because 
it was too big and that there wasn’t enough money to pay for it, but when 
you compare the money we spent there versus the money it cost us to move 
here and all the renovations, things don’t add up… There were many things 
they didn’t tell us. We only found out the real reasons for the move several 
months later, [when they explained it was to get away from the stigma of the 
old therapy model.] What really gets me angry is that honesty can’t be there 
before the fact. Don’t say money when it isn’t!” (Therapist) 
 
A potentially explosive situation occurred when union personnel came into posses-
sion of confidential financial information that had not been shared with them. 
“Last year, after we were told about the possibility of losing twelve staff, the 
union reps mysteriously discovered in their mail boxes an unsigned and un-
dated document with items highlighted on it. It looked like a budget docu-
ment that the Administrative Co-ordinator had been working on. They 
started working with the numbers in the document and noticed there was no 
shortage of money. They confronted the Executive Director, who said that 
twelve persons had to go. They said ‘bullshit! According to our calculations, 
only one staff has to be laid off.’ … Everybody had those numbers, but the 
way they were highlighted was the key to it all, and if you didn’t have the key, 
you didn’t understand.” (Therapist) 
 
Information from the finance office was viewed as important not only because it 
provided complete information on the resources of the organization, but also on ways those 
resources were used or deployed by senior management. The information also had the po-
tential of embarrassing senior management in any discrepancies that were found. 
 
Sharing information and trying to increase its value: 
Senior management made several attempts to reduce the distance between them and 
other levels by holding meetings to gather suggestions for resolving the organization’s finan-
cial problems. They held these meetings in each of the satellite clinics with the intent of con-
veying facts about the seriousness of the finances of the organization. Veteran and 
newcomer therapists unanimously viewed this as a temporary pacifier, however. Many ac-
cused senior management of going through the motions of listening but of paying no atten-
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tion to the actual content or value of their suggestions. Senior managers, for their part, said 
there was little more they could do to convince staffs of the accuracy and completeness of 
the information that was shared. Mistrust was high. 
“One thing is that everybody tries to take control. When the Executive Di-
rector discussed the agency’s financial problems with us, staff said, ‘We want 
more information. We want all the information. Give us the full budget. 
Where is the money going?’ Once they got the information they said, ‘You’re 
not telling us everything’. Again, suspicion. ‘You’re not telling us everything. 
What is this line? Who’s greasing his pockets?” (Therapist) 
 
The physical distance between the administration site and the satellite clinics com-
pounded problems of mistrust around information. It was physically impossible for senior 
management staffs to meet weekly with lower-level staffs. This implied that therapists had 
fewer opportunities to use formal and informal influence to obtain information.  
In terms of relational dynamics, the therapists’ attempts to obtain information and 
thus to control it represents a challenge to the traditional boundaries between levels in the 
organization. Normally, one would expect major financial decisions to be a function of sen-
ior management levels with perhaps limited input from other levels. In the present organiza-
tion, however, the full sharing of information occurred and therapists became involved to 
some degree in organizational planning. By sharing or opening the problem to therapists and 
seeking their input, however, senior management may have inadvertently opened a door that 
was difficult to close. In further research, it would be interesting to examine the impact of 
such actions and to try to reverse them. 
Clerical staffs, for their part, described themselves as more distant from the prob-
lems described above, although they nonetheless observed them. 
“I think we really need to work on our communication. Again, that’s because 
we’re so scattered. One team might feel that they were told something, that 
they understood something, and the other team might feel ‘Nobody told us 
that. Geez, we didn’t know that’… Sometimes also, maybe something is said 
or something is going to be done, and it’s felt that maybe overall all staff 
don’t have to know right at the present time, but it would have been better if, 
overall, staff did know.” (Clerical staff) 
 
For one of the unionized clerical staffs working in the administration offices, know-
ing about confidential information often put her in potential conflict with her co-workers.  
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“You’re often caught in the middle where you’re talking with your peers. I 
might be talking to some of the receptionists, but I can’t because of my posi-
tion here, because you overhear so much confidentiality. My position is un-
ionized. When I go to union meetings, they look at you as if you’re a 
traitor… A lot of the time, since I’ve been here, the reason I haven’t gone to 
any union meetings is that if I hear, well you know that what you hear is con-
fidential and you go to a union meeting, and they’re going to bring up things, 
and I’d get very involved, and I would never want to disclose any confidenti-
ality.” (Clerical staff) 
 
 
Team leaders not openly exerting power in their central role: 
Central to all communications in the organization are the team leaders because they 
represent the conduit between senior management and therapists. They also are responsible 
for communicating with their Community Advisory Committee. When staffs have concerns 
they would like their Community Advisory Committee to address, they must pass these 
through their team leader. The power of such a central position had implications for upper 
and lower levels. 
“Different teams have different perceptions of where things are at, feel that 
they are included, excluded, feel that management treats them this way, and 
often it’s a reflection of their own manager, how he or she may react to them 
or may interpret what’s happening or may not be a good conduit of informa-
tion or may be an excellent conduit of information.” (Senior manager) 
 
By virtue of their position in the hierarchy, team leaders may be described as the 
“gatekeepers” of information in the sense that they may choose to pass on information, to 
delay or speed it up, or to alter its contents in their own favor. There was little evidence from 
any of the participants that team leaders employed information as a source of power, how-
ever. Several reasons may explain this. First, most of the conflict in the organization was di-
rectly between senior management levels and therapists. Team leaders said they put much 
effort in avoiding becoming “sandwiched” between the two levels by merely conveying the 
required information between the two levels and then letting the others “fight it out” be-
tween them. In essence, they steered away from issues that might have threatened their inde-
pendence or margin of freedom. Second, the manipulation of information could only have 
gone so far before other parties discovered it. Also, with the strong atmosphere of mistrust 
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that existed, manipulating the flow of information would simply have meant repeating the 
same patterns as other staffs, thus perpetuating the problem. 
In summary, information was shown to be a precious commodity in the organization 
in that there was much conflict around it. As important as the actual control of information, 
however, was the perception that some actors controlled and manipulated information. Ironi-
cally, while therapists said they could not depend on the information they received from 
management because it was inaccurate and biased, they nonetheless fought furiously to ob-
tain all the information they could. This may be understood as an effort to minimize their 
dependency on senior management in terms of information while trying to reduce the value 
of the information. The issue of trust appeared to be a major factor in this dynamic. The 
control of information provided much potential to disrupt the organization, or conversely, 
to assure its smooth functioning. 
 
5.1.7 CONTROLLING ACCESS TO POWER HOLDERS 
Power flows to those who can sway other powerful persons. In the present organiza-
tion, staffs were frustrated at their unsuccessful attempts to influence senior management, 
and they believed their only remaining recourse was accessing their Board of Directors and 
the Community Advisory Committees. Dynamics for this source of power revolved around 
three elements: contact with the Steering Committee prior to the organization’s separation, 
contact with government officials, and means of accessing power holders through the new 
organizational structure. We will discuss these here. 
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“Out with the old, in with the new.” 
Prior to the official launching of the new mental health centre in 1990, there was a 
general feeling by the therapists and middle management staffs that they did not have access 
to decision-makers. First, the employees of the children’s mental health centres in the hospi-
tal historically felt distant from their board of directors. As the new organization was taking 
shape in the late 1980’s, middle managers and therapists had a difficult time accessing mem-
bers of the Board of Directors of the psychiatric hospital to gain their support. Any requests 
to meet board members were met with statements from hospital administrators such as, 
“They are fully aware of the problem. They are dealing with it.” Second, despite several op-
portunities for accessing the new corporation’s Steering Committee through public forums, 
there was a strong feeling that the Steering Committee was avoiding anything to do with the 
psychiatric hospital, including its staffs, or simply going through the motions of talking to 
them.  
“I think the Standing Committees attempted to meet with us on several occa-
sions, so they did do that, but a lot of it was nice glossy work.” (Therapist) 
 
This was further emphasized when the newly hired Executive Director of the mental 
health centre told two existing middle managers at the hospital that they would have to reap-
ply for their own jobs in the new corporation, and that they were not guaranteed jobs there. 
In essence, the feeling was “out with the old, in with the new”. Contacting government offi-
cials also was discouraged, as evidenced by the verbal reprimand that one of the two Direc-
tors of mental health at the psychiatric hospital received when he contacted the Ministry 
concerning similar issues. Thus, accessing power holders at the Board and government levels 
to influence them was difficult at best.  
After the organizational separation, these dynamics remained. Therapists felt that the 
team leaders were limiting their access to information and to decision-makers by emphasiz-
ing official lines of communication. This was despite claims by senior management that great 
strides had been made to open communications. 
“If I look at what we’ve done to open communications, I think we’ve gone 
further than most organizations. Our minutes of board meetings, standing 
committee meetings are available to staff, so that’s theirs. If they want to dis-
cuss any point that is there they are free to do so. They’re even free to come 
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to me with any points that they feel is not being dealt with. They’ve been in-
vited, they’ve been informed that they’re invited to attend any board or 
standing committee meeting they wish to.” (Senior manager) 
 
Staffs obtaining limited representation on the Community Advisory  
Committees: 
 
At the time this study was carried out, and following pressure from staffs to keep in-
formed about the running of the organization, the Community Advisory Committees were 
expanded to include one staff representative from each satellite clinic as an observer.  
“We’ve opened the doors, we share minutes, and at the standing committee 
meetings, they’ve decided as teams that they wanted to have reps there, that 
they want to have people at all standing committee meetings. It’s their 
choice. We haven’t stopped that from happening. In the initial description, it 
said that any input the staff wanted to bring should be brought through team 
managers. Now they want to have input mechanisms other than by through 
the team managers.” (Senior manager) 
 
Thus, a change in organizational structure allowed access by therapists to the deci-
sion-makers of the agency. Although issues of mistrust remained, this was well received by 
staffs. 
“The Standing Committees did invite us, which is a positive thing. We basi-
cally have attended, but no voting power. It’s their agenda, but we can be 
there… We can also put things on the agenda. I think we need to be careful 
not to abuse that privilege, that we’re clear in terms of what issues get on to 
the Board. I’ve been invited, and other people have been invited to [make 
presentations] to their Standing Committees.” (Therapist) 
 
Providing staffs with full access to the Community Advisory Committees implied 
several potential problems for senior and middle managers, however. First, the potential for 
mixing roles was strong. While therapists had no right to vote on the Committee, they had 
the right to put items on the agenda of Committee meetings and of speaking on issues. Over 
the long run, some might come to believe they were part of the policy development level of 
the organization, although the agency was not designed this way. A related problem was the 
possible involvement of Committee members in the daily operation of the satellite clinics, 
which is a managerial function (Mintzberg, 1989). By accessing Committee members and 
explaining daily situations to them, Committee members were drawn into situations that 
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should not have gone beyond the team leaders, according to the structure of the agency. In 
essence, there was a strong possibility leading to confusion around “who is managing what”. 
This is a potential problem in that it reduced the authority of the team leaders. By being able 
to communicate directly with their Advisory Committees, there is no question that staffs 
could bypass their team leaders and go directly to the Board of Directors. 
“For example, I could decide tomorrow that I’m firing Joe Blo, or that we’re 
going to have a day of suspension of an employee for whatever. The last 
thing that makes sense in an organization, and that just kills organizations, is 
that the next thing you know, that employee or another employee phones a 
member of the board and starts saying this or that. The sad part would be if 
the board member said, ‘You’re kidding. He did that? That’s unreasonable’.” 
(Senior manager) 
 
This implied that team leaders would lose some power to filter information between 
levels if they chose to do so.   
In essence, structural changes that occurred just as this study was getting underway 
potentially had implications for the control of access to power holders within the organiza-
tion. Unfortunately, we were not able to determine the full effects or consequences of 
changing access to power holders on the dynamics of the organization because of the timing 
of the study. This would be a fruitful area for further research. 
 
5.1.8 REFERENT OR CHARISMATIC SOURCES OF POWER 
A person possesses referent or charismatic power when s/he demonstrates personal 
characteristics that attract others and that lead to identification to him or her. (Bélanger, 
Bergeron, Côté-Léger, and Jacques, 1979). These characteristics may include elements rang-
ing from charm, physical beauty, reputation, or success, all qualities that bring about admira-
tion. Identification stems from individuals wanting to imitate the person that is being 
admired. 
Careful review of the data for this study revealed no references to charismatic power. 
In relationships within same hierarchical groups and within each satellite clinic, charisma and 
identification were never mentioned as having an impact or being a driving force. This is not 
to say that staffs maintained entirely negative relationships with one another or that they did 
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not try to build trusting relationships. Many staffs had positive relationships with one of the 
Co-ordinators because they felt the Co-ordinator gave them much “space” in their actions. 
The focus of the interviews, however, seemed to have been on the conflict that staffs experi-
enced throughout the difficult divestment period.  
Some of the explanations for the lack of examples of referent or charismatic power 
include the fact that the semi-structured interviews may have guided the participants to dis-
cuss conflict rather than positive relationships. This is possible when one considers that the 
participants overwhelmingly discussed the years of conflict leading to the divestment from 
the psychiatric hospital, the ensuing turbulence, their letdown in terms of expectations for 
improvement, and the low level of trust between senior management and the therapists.  
It is possible that the absence of referent power was simply due to members not feel-
ing they had access to this type of power. Attempts by the organization’s leaders to employ 
charismatic qualities or means, for example, would probably have been met with suspicion 
from therapists. Unfortunately, the current examination is unable to find further reasons for 
this without entering the realm of speculation. Further detailed research into charismatic 
power during turbulent change periods may help determine factors that facilitate or inhibit 
its effects. 
 
5.1.9 CULTURAL IDENTITY 
The presence of cultural elements seemed to be an important factor in the turbu-
lence and uncertainty of the organizational changes that occurred, particularly in the Franco-
phone and Native units. In this section, we will argue that cultural identity should be 
identified as a separate source of power. 
As outlined in Chapter Four, conflict over the cultural control of service delivery was 
an important element leading to the establishment of the new children’s corporation. In the 
late 1980’s, the Minister of Community and Social Services decreed five guiding principles 
for the new corporation to try to bring the conflicts to an end. Three of the five principles 
related to cultural and linguistic issues: the establishment of a new bilingual child and family 
intervention corporation, distinct service streams for both Francophone and non-Francophone 
populations, and split governing jurisdictions over the management of culturally appropriate service 
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streams. This meant that the organization was officially mandated and directed to offer ser-
vices in French and in English. The government’s decree also forced the agency to respect 
the indigenous culture of Francophone and Native groups by providing them with control 
over services. As one of the participants described it, this was to be a highly touted model of 
service delivery for the province: 
“If I look at the Ministry, there were promises made that this was going to be 
the Cadillac structure that was the envy. They had been told by the Deputy 
Minister that we were the envy because of our structure and of the way that 
we respected culture. We were the envy of the Minister.” (Team leader) 
 
By examining the history of the organization, we find that cultural elements were 
woven into the design of the new mental health centre in its mandate, structure, and opera-
tion. Cultural elements ultimately dictated the structure of the new organization. 
In discussing power and turbulent change, several participants repeatedly mentioned 
issues specific to Francophone or Native rights and culture, and that these issues provided 
some degree of control to those groups. Three themes seemed to be particularly important 
in terms of culture: keeping a separate cultural identity for some satellite clinics, the sense of 
loss of control over decision-making by the Anglophone units, and disputes over job qualifi-
cations. 
 
Enshrining a separate cultural and linguistic identity for each satellite clinic: 
In terms of keeping a separate identity for each of the satellite clinics, there was little 
argument from the beginning as to why this was made a key element of the new organiza-
tion. 
“The actual splitting of the teams and those boundary divisions, when they 
were created, I don’t remember a lot of people speaking out against them. 
They were things that came down from the board as things that had to be 
imposed. It had to be this way. It was the best way to do it. It was the only 
way to guarantee a culturally sensitive agency, particularly for Francophones. 
I felt that if it’s that much in the balance, then let’s do it.” (Therapist) 
 
“At one of the cross-cultural workshops that we had, Francophone workers 
were able to say, ‘We need to be separate. We need separate locations’, which 
is a really hard thing to say… I guess what I’m trying to say is that I can ap-
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preciate why a French team and a Native team might choose to be separate 
because there are questions of assimilation.” (Therapist) 
 
Thus, issues of sensitivity to culture and of preventing assimilation of the cultures 
played an important role. There also were indications that culture was invoked as a source of 
power when agency-wide issues came to a head for the Francophone unit. 
“When the Executive Director comes and tells us that there is to be no more 
overtime, our team leader can say things like, ‘Our team doesn’t function that 
way. At the cultural level, the Francophones don’t live like that.’ … When it 
came time to centralize the library, our team leader disagreed that all books 
should be at a single location and said ‘Is it the Native and Anglophone 
workers who are going to read our French books’?” (Therapist) 
 
While therapists from all satellite clinics recognized the need for a separate identity 
for the Francophone and Native units, some of them felt that keeping them physically sepa-
rate was detrimental to the agency because this created comparisons and competition be-
tween the units. 
“Before, we had a strong feeling of togetherness when we were all in the 
same building at the hospital campus. We divided into three teams; we lost 
the sense of team spirit. Now, I find that there is a lot of competition be-
tween the teams that was never there before. There is competition in terms 
of length of client wait lists. There is competition between Francophones and 
Anglophones, and other team leaders are always asking us how long our lists 
are. They want to know to compare themselves and bring down their lists if 
they have to. When lists are long, there is pressure to do something.” (Thera-
pist) 
 
This type of dynamic stems from historical competition between the Francophone 
and Anglophone divisions at the psychiatric hospital, where some felt that the Francophones 
were receiving more funding per client than other hospital departments. Nonetheless, the 
recognition of the need for separate units was strong and generally supported by staffs. 
From senior management’s perspective, respect for culture was something that was 
legally and morally mandated by the provincial government and the community.  
“The Native community has always argued that the mainstream services 
don’t respond effectively to Natives, and Natives don’t access the traditional 
services that we have, which are the mainstream services. Why? The white 
man’s approach, solution, mind-set does not necessarily answer the Native 
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approach. It doesn’t include the Native component, world vision, etc.” (Senior 
manager) 
 
Senior management, and by extension the Board of Directors of the agency, thus 
were not in a position to question cultural issues because the moral and cultural realities of 
their community had to be understood and integrated into the organization. This would per-
haps increase uncertainty for opposing parties because culture was not something that could 
be negotiated. 
  Team leaders, for their part, felt that the cultural boundaries between the teams were 
useful to protect and enhance the identity of their teams. 
“If you look at Francophone interests, there was always this kind of issue in 
the agency. ‘What’s yours is mine, and what is mine is mine.’ They also had 
this thing, even though it doesn’t impact on us, they still had the veto or a say 
in what we did. In the Francophone unit, we have strong boundaries and 
we’re in our own site. There’s the whole question of identity. We’re all sepa-
rate. There is promotion of language and culture. We allow ourselves to be 
different than the other teams.” (Team leader) 
 
“One train of thought is the American, entrepreneurial, the gun-slinger ap-
proach to life, and the other one is more consensus. By way of this organiza-
tion we’re seeing more and more of that consensus in the Native group. If 
you look at their Standing Committee, they tend not to take motions where 
people vote. They discuss it until they come to a point where they can all 
agree. Different, much more consensus. Their culturally preferred position is 
that ‘We all agree’, so you may have to move things around a little bit to find 
a point of agreement, but the arrival at consensus is much more important 
than in the Anglophone and Francophone units. We tend to say, ‘OK. We’ve 
talked about this long enough. We’ve got other items on the agenda. We’ve 
got to take a decision. Let’s put it to a vote.’ Different dynamics… I think 
that we see the frustrations with Ovide Mercredi, who has been trained in the 
legal world and who has been brought up in, if you will, the larger societal 
context, is who is continually running into trouble with some Indians in the 
Northwest Territories who say, ‘He doesn’t speak for me. He never con-
sulted me’.” (Team leader) 
 
In essence, culture was used to strengthen the separate identity of cultural groups by 
drawing boundaries and emphasizing the differences between them. 
 
Increasing control for some perceived as loss of control for others: 
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Issues of gaining or losing control over certain decisions were described as related to 
culture. When examined historically, Francophones and Natives felt they were at the mercy 
of Anglophone decision-makers for the delivery of services. This was one of the original 
thrusts for a new model of service delivery in the community. In the new corporation, offi-
cial powers were now granted to cultural groups, implying less overall control for traditional 
power holders. 
“The organization was devised to be client-responsive, grassroots, the com-
munity involved, the whole thing around representation of minorities. The 
Anglophones lost in terms of power because they were always able to say, 
well, they always kind of had a veto over what Francophones wanted to do. 
... The way I see it is that the Anglophones are beginning to realize that they 
don’t have all the power. They don’t have the power anymore. They always 
did. They always had the inside track. They were always kind of able to veto 
things. Now, they’re not. Not only that, maybe some of the rest of us are go-
ing to be radically different. They lost.” (Team leader) 
 
Invoking cultural identity as power over determining job qualifications: 
There is also evidence that cultural issues heavily influenced disputes over job quali-
fications. As described earlier, there were strong conflicts between senior management and 
the union over relaxing hiring requirements for the Native team. These remained unresolved 
at the time of this study. Similar issues also had been raised against the Francophone unit in 
the past. 
“Certain positions have been designated as bilingual, such as the receptionist 
at the front. Some staff are excluded. Before, at the hospital, it was like ‘The 
secretary can just about say bonjour. That will suffice’. It was all that kind of 
thing. Here, even centrally, bilingualism is respected. It’s a working thing, not 
just superficial. It’s real. People can type in French and have full conversa-
tions, not just answer the phone. So, the others feel like they’re losing.” (Team 
leader) 
 
Francophone persons attributed their “success” at protecting Francophone positions 
to continued invocation of the moral right to culture and identity. 
In summary, the participants provided several examples where cultural identity pro-
vided strong influence over decision-making. Cultural identity was intermixed with issues 
around protecting the cultural identity of satellite clinics, removing control of decisions from 
non-minority groups, and insisting on cultural requirements to fill positions in the organiza-
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tion. In terms of uncertainty and relational dynamics, invoking culture strengthened the hand 
of one party while unbalancing the other. Where hiring practices had been standardized 
through labor negotiations and legal contracts, for example, senior management chose to 
bypass these requirements in a bid to obtain candidates with more experience with the target 
populations. Culture thus had an important role in the power games of the organization by 
representing something rare (e.g., many employees could not fill the Francophone or Native 
positions despite their academic and professional experience), not easily substituted (e.g., “only 
Natives can treat Natives”), and essential to meeting the organization’s multi-cultural mandate. 
Culture touched upon norms that are difficult to counter in any kind of argument. It would 
be difficult to bypass Native issues or close the Native unit, for example, given the mandate 
of the organization and of the provincial government to deliver culturally and linguistically 
appropriate services to the community. In terms of dependency, the organization faced an 
audit from the provincial government and strong community pressures if it did not fulfill its 
mandate. Any solutions that Native or Francophone persons could bring to these issues 
would thus help relieve the burden. 
In essence, culture may be considered a source of power, at least in the context of 
the human service organization that was studied. 
A characteristic of culture as a power is that it seems to work hand-in-hand with 
other sources of power, such as expertise. The example of hiring requirements in the Native 
unit, for example, showed that expertise in itself was not sufficient to fill the positions, but 
that belonging to a cultural group was needed. This goes beyond simple academic or profes-
sional qualifications. The same concept may be applied to legal authority as a source of 
power, for example. Many of the participants described senior managers as having to fulfill 
the cultural mandate of the organization, and no amount of legal authority could counter the 
argument that multicultural services were needed. It would thus seem that culture works in 
an integrated fashion or that it is “woven-in” with other sources of power by invoking his-
torical issues and current norms, thereby raising the stakes in terms of uncertainty. 
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5.2 CONCLUSION 
The separation of the children’s centre from the psychiatric hospital and the resulting 
creation of a new community organization in 1990 meant many changes would occur for 
service delivery in the community. These changes raised much uncertainty for staffs at all 
levels of the new organization. In some cases, they provided staffs with new opportunities or 
margins of freedom, such as their gaining observer status on each of the Community Advi-
sory Committees (Francophone and Native). 
In the preceding section, we examined the major turbulent events from the perspec-
tive of the participants in this study, in terms of sources of power. We described nine 
sources of power and provided examples of how these provided power to various groups. 
These are summarized in Table 5. We examined evidence that senior management tried to 
lower uncertainty by restraining the margin of freedom of other levels, such as by creating 
new policies and procedures and emphasizing lines of communication. Some of the events 
were destabilizing for some of the actors while simultaneously representing opportunities to 
capitalize on uncertainty for others. This does not assume that staffs engaged all situations 
characterized by uncertainty as sources of power, but that key events were chosen because 
they represented opportunities to enhance one’s margin of freedom and gain power.  
It is reasonable to assume that the organization tried to buffer some of the uncertain-
ties it faced by relying on formal power, especially by senior managers. Despite attempts to 
try to reduce uncertainty by designing new policies and procedures, however, some uncer-
tainty remained. Even with the most rigid enforcement of procedures, it would be almost 
impossible to accurately predict and control all situations. One might even argue that the 
more rigid procedures are, the more likely informal sources of power will develop. 
By studying power relations through examples such as dealing with uncertainty, we 
have gained a better understanding of organizational relations. In essence, the organizational 
chart presented in Chapter Four is only an official representation of formal power in the 
agency. Our study explored uncertainty, constraints, and margins of freedom of participants 
at each level, providing a wider and deeper picture of the organization’s functioning.
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Table 5 
OVERVIEW OF THE SOURCES OF POWER BY ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL  
 
SOURCE OF 
POWER 
 
SENIOR MANAGERS 
(Executive Director 
and Co-ordinators) 
 
MIDDLE MANAGERS 
(Team leaders) 
 
 
THERAPISTS 
(Therapists) 
 
CLERICAL STAFFS 
(Secretaries) 
 
Formal or  
Legal 
Authority 
 
 
• use of policies and proce-
dures to ensure consis-
tency. 
• use of court system to 
defend special cultural 
hiring requirements. 
• emphasis on communica-
tions through lines of au-
thority. 
• bypass union by asking 
for input directly from 
therapists. 
 
• invented policies as prob-
lems arose; much uncer-
tainty about what to fall 
back on as guides. 
• central to lines of com-
munication horizontally 
and vertically. 
• emphasized lines of au-
thority in communica-
tions. 
• say Native and Franco-
phone teams gained 
power at expense of An-
glophones. Now mostly 
autonomous legally and 
morally. 
 
• accused senior manage-
ment of bypassing union 
in lines of authority. 
• use of legal union con-
tract to challenge special 
hiring conditions. 
 
• no references to 
legal authority 
 
 Coercion 
 
 
• no references to coer-
cion. 
 
• no references to coer-
cion. 
 
• minor references to coer-
cion; preferred less dam-
aging means. 
 
• no reference to 
coercion. 
 
Rewards /  
Reprimands 
 
• no references to rewards 
or reprimands. 
• performance appraisals 
were only form of repri-
 
• no expectations to re-
ceive rewards during tur-
• said rarely received 
encouragement or 
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SOURCE OF 
POWER 
 
SENIOR MANAGERS 
(Executive Director 
and Co-ordinators) 
 
MIDDLE MANAGERS 
(Team leaders) 
 
 
THERAPISTS 
(Therapists) 
 
CLERICAL STAFFS 
(Secretaries) 
 mand used.  bulent times. 
• some margin of freedom 
in terms of assigning time 
off to staffs, but not dis-
cussed by participants. 
• felt that performance ap-
praisals sometimes used 
by team leaders as repri-
mands. 
rewards. 
 
Expertise  
 
• used cultural reasons to 
waive normal hiring re-
quirements. 
 
• no references to exper-
tise. 
 
• use of legal contract to 
challenge waiving of spe-
cial hiring requirements. 
 
• adaptability to rap-
idly changing envi-
ronments is 
important. 
Controlling Informa-
tion and Communi-
cations 
• Possessed confidential 
financial information of 
the organization 
• Potential embarrassment 
if discrepancies in infor-
mation found by others 
• Shared some $ informa-
tion with staffs, but back-
fired. 
• No references • Accusations that infor-
mation is “managed”. 
Disqualified information 
from above. 
 
• No references 
 
Controlling 
Resources and Rela-
tions With Environ-
ment 
 
• retain control of re-
sources through finances. 
• control of relations with 
environment somewhat 
limited due to profes-
sional affiliations and ex-
ternal collaborative 
 
• little control over re-
sources. Dependent on 
senior management. 
 
• some control of relations 
with environment gained 
through external collabo-
rative projects. 
• some control gained 
through professional af-
 
• limited control of 
flow of materials. 
• control of relations 
with landlords and 
suppliers. 
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SOURCE OF 
POWER 
 
SENIOR MANAGERS 
(Executive Director 
and Co-ordinators) 
 
MIDDLE MANAGERS 
(Team leaders) 
 
 
THERAPISTS 
(Therapists) 
 
CLERICAL STAFFS 
(Secretaries) 
projects.  filiation.
 
Controlling  
Access to Power 
Holders 
 
 
• loss of some power due 
to staffs now sitting on 
Community Advisory 
Committee. 
 
• can access board mem-
bers by virtue of sitting 
on Community Advisory 
Committees. 
• loss of some power due 
to staffs now sitting on 
Community Advisory 
Committee. 
 
• gained official status as 
observers on Standing 
Committees, thereby 
gaining access to board 
of directors. 
 
• no references 
Referent / Charisma 
power 
• no references to charisma • Possibility of influencing 
others through positive 
relationship, but no ex-
amples of charisma. 
• try to develop positive 
relationships. 
• no references to 
charisma. 
 
Cultural identity 
 
 
• cultural conflicts led to 
divestment of centre 
from hospital. Now have 
official mandate to offer 
services to Francophone 
and Native cultures. 
• used culture to waive 
hiring requirements for 
some positions. 
• used culture to enhance 
identity of teams. 
• invoked culture to “do 
things differently”; draw 
boundaries between 
teams. 
• Native and Francophone 
teams gained power at 
expense of Anglophones. 
• used to waive hiring re-
quirements for some 
 
• challenge from union of 
special hiring require-
ments through union 
contract and courts. 
 
• no references to 
cultural identity. 
 Chapter 5 — Sources of Power   167 
 
 
 
SOURCE OF 
POWER 
 
SENIOR MANAGERS 
(Executive Director 
and Co-ordinators) 
 
MIDDLE MANAGERS 
(Team leaders) 
 
 
THERAPISTS 
(Therapists) 
 
CLERICAL STAFFS 
(Secretaries) 
teams. 
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Several other observations are noteworthy. As could be expected, staffs used a variety 
of sources of power during the organizational restructuring period. While it was not our goal 
to carry out numerical computations on the data, it was nonetheless difficult not to notice 
the large number of references made about formal power, information power, and the con-
trol of relations with the environment, when compared to other sources of power. Several 
reasons may explain this. First, formal or legal power is present in most if not all organiza-
tions, regardless of their past history and development. Second, past history is an important 
factor. Historical conflicts around structure, control of information and communications, 
and relations with the environment were key dynamics at the psychiatric hospital before the 
organizational separation. Similar issues related to mistrust of information and bypassing 
lines of communications were prevalent in the new organization, despite the newness of 
management personnel and their attempts to “do things differently.” 
It is also likely that the members who transferred between the organizations carried 
“old baggage” from the psychiatric hospital into the new mental health centre. While ap-
proximately one-half of the participants of this study were former employees of the psychiat-
ric hospital, only one of the seven senior and middle level managers of the new organization 
was a former employee. Ironically, management faced similar conflicts to those that had ex-
isted at the psychiatric hospital in the period leading to the separation. In this sense, despite 
the newness of the managers, the organization was still dressed in some of the old clothes of 
the hospital in terms of power dynamics. This would emphasize the importance of including 
past history, context, and expectations of staffs in studying and dealing with power in or-
ganizations. Further research focusing specifically on the expectations of staffs prior to ma-
jor organizational changes, and how these expectations are met or not met, may provide 
clarifications as to the role of “old baggage” in terms of power dynamics.  
Our study of the sources of power in the organization supports the notion that per-
sons of different ranks in the organization have different access to the sources of power. By 
virtue of structure, some actors had more formal power than others did. Others, through 
their cultural background and heritage, were able to exert moral power by invoking cultural 
rights. What was common across all levels, however, is that sources of power were closely 
linked to uncertainty.  
 Chapter 5 — Sources of Power    169 
 
 
There were indications that many power relationships occurred directly between sen-
ior management and therapists. The absence or limited role of the team leaders in many of 
the dynamics (e.g., expertise, rewards and reprimands, and control of resources) may indicate 
their avoidance of these types of issues. It may also indicate that team leaders, despite their 
central role in the organization, chose not to act as buffers between upper and lower levels, 
or were not given the opportunity to do so. Avoidance, for its part, may in itself be a tactic in 
terms of minimizing one’s loss of power. The number of participants in the study is too 
small to provide further explanations without speculation, however. 
Clerical staffs were much less verbal than other groups in terms of sources of power. 
One cannot assume that they were less affected by the organizational changes that occurred 
or by the ensuing turbulence, however, but their relative silence in terms of power does im-
ply a more distant involvement. It is arguable that the organizational separation did not have 
the same impact on clerical or support staffs because the changes were aimed at producing a 
new model of service delivery. Clerical staffs do not rely on a “model” of service delivery to 
fulfill their functions, for example, and thus their participation in power struggles over ser-
vice delivery may have been minimal. In this sense, it is possible that the methodology of this 
study was not able to “reach” clerical staffs in the same way that senior management, team 
leaders, and therapists were able to participate. Further detailed research into how clerical 
staffs react to changes at other levels would provide useful information into dynamics at this 
level. 
There was considerable overlap in some of the sources of power. Expertise as a 
source of power, for example, was often entangled with issues of legal authority. This may 
imply that in human service organizations, sources of power are not necessarily “pure” types 
but that they are sometimes hybrids of one another. Further comparisons with other similar 
organizations may shed light on this. 
We have discussed cultural heritage as an important source of uncertainty, particu-
larly in terms of its impact on formal authority and expertise. By displacing or modifying 
standard hiring practices and methods of operation, cultural identity was a powerful force 
when it was invoked. In essence, the rules of the game may be changed radically by culture. 
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In the next two chapters, we will examine the interplay of culture as one of the elements in 
terms of deep-level strategies. 
Two sources of power were noticeably absent. Coercion was not a source of power 
that staffs considered or would admit to considering. This may stem from the fact that coer-
cion is generally not a desirable method of dealing with issues, and perhaps even more so in 
a professional context. Rewards and reprimands also were rarely discussed. This may be a 
characteristic on non-profit organizations in the sense that financial and material rewards are 
not at the disposal of senior management, as they are in industrial organizations. It is inter-
esting that even when rewards are expanded to include things such as praise, however, there 
were very few examples emerging from the data. It is possible that during the extreme turbu-
lence and uncertainty that staffs faced, rewards were given little value or met with mistrust, 
thereby lowering the potential of this source of power. 
Although issues of gender are sometimes at the root of power and conflict (Morgan, 
1986) these did not appear to be a factor in the present study. As Morgan points out, life in 
organizations is sometimes led by subtle and not-so-subtle gender dynamics, ranging from 
open discrimination (e.g., “this is a man’s job”) and sexual harassment, to being subjected to 
subtle male stereotypes that managers should be rational, analytical, non-emotional, and 
tough. In terms of the presence or absence of these factors in our data, no participant raised 
these issues as having any impact on power relations either in the current or past organiza-
tion. Unfortunately, the primary focus of our study did not include gender issues as a source 
of power in human service organizations. Further research into this issue is certainly war-
ranted. 
In terms of comparing new employees with veteran staffs, there were few important 
differences. Apart from the types of examples that they provided, new staffs were quite ver-
bose about the effects of the turbulent changes that had occurred prior to their arrival. They 
were also able to understand and relate to past turbulence because they were currently living 
its ongoing effects. This would imply that power exerts a “wave” or “ripple” effect, where an 
event produces effects that can be felt further away in distance and time. 
We did not study the relative strength or importance of each of the sources of 
power, nor make attempts to quantify them because this was not the object of this study. 
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Such research would face many methodological problems because past history and context 
often influence the intensity of the uncertainty that is experienced. Generalizing the findings 
would be difficult at best and may not provide valuable information because power relation-
ships are constantly changing in intensity. 
 Recalling comparisons we made between private and public organizations in Chap-
ter Two, our findings provide additional clarifications as to their similarities and differences. 
The mandate of industrial corporations does not necessarily include meeting social and cul-
tural needs because these organizations are generally run by profit motives. In human service 
organizations, however, increasing recognition of cultural heritage by governments forces 
public sector organizations to hire staffs that are capable of delivering culturally and linguis-
tically appropriate services. In this sense, culture may shape the structure of some agencies. 
Traditional hiring practices must be reviewed or waived, thereby displacing traditional mar-
gins of freedom in hiring. 
In terms of the “final product” that mental health centres provide, more and more 
groups of clients are advocating receiving culturally sensitive services. In terms of power 
strategies, this may imply changing the balance of power in conventional boards of directors 
and working committees. When elements of cultural identity are inserted into the equation, 
issues of expertise also are brought to the forefront.  
A further comparison between public and private organizations may be made. In 
terms of cost-benefit analysis and of production and output, financial cutbacks at the federal 
and provincial levels are forcing organizations to re-examine programs and staffing patterns. 
This is the case of recent (1995-98) Ontario Government budgets that slashed funding for 
several major social services by more than twenty percent, while eliminating others com-
pletely. In terms of power sources, this undoubtedly creates much uncertainty in all human 
service organizations. It remains to see if some of the players may turn these situations into 
opportunities. 
In closing this section, our discussion of the sources of power and some of their uses 
in a human service organization has provided us with a set of tools with which we can begin 
to decode power games and dynamics. These tools help us answer not only “Who has the 
power in this organization?” but also “What kind of power do they have?” and “How do 
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they use it?”. In Chapters 6 and 7, we will examine how the sources of power described 
above were employed in terms of power strategy formation. 
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C h a p t e r  S i x 
  
The Surface and Deep Level Power Strategies 
Used by the Participants 
 
 
 
“People will use power and coalitions and alliances in order  
to try to influence the system, and they engage in this 
dance that they neither can control nor predict.” 
(Therapist) 
 
“Physical separation between where senior admin sits and where  
the clinics are has led to a situation where the Executive Director  
isn’t seen until there’s an issue or something ceremonial.” 
(Team leader) 
 
6.1  SURFACE LEVEL AND DEEP LEVEL POWER STRATEGIES 
 
This chapter builds upon the last chapter by examining the manipulation of the 
sources of power into strategies. As defined in Chapter Two, strategies are patterns in a 
stream of actions. In more concrete terms, strategies are conceptions that a person has of 
how to deal with his or her environment over time (Mintzberg, 1989). There are surface level 
and deep level strategies. Surface level strategies involve the exercise of power to obtain what 
one desires through decisions, negotiations, and interpersonal relations. Power in its surface 
existence derives from dependencies on resources between and among actors (Frost, 1987). 
Deep level strategies, for their part, are coded in the cultural beliefs, values and practices of 
the organization, and are often used to disguise plays around power. Deep level strategies 
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may derive from surface level strategies in that over time “the unequal distribution of power 
becomes unnoticed and is hidden under the garb of a legitimate system of influence.” (Frost, 
1987, p. 514) They also are used to show others “the way things are”.  
In the next two major sections we will highlight examples of each of the surface and 
deep level strategies that emerged from the data. The beginning of each major section will 
present some basic statistical information then proceed with a detailed description of each 
strategy. The current chapter will focus on descriptions of the data. Detailed analysis and 
discussion about the strategies will be presented in Chapter 7, where power strategies will be 
discussed in relationship to uncertainty and sources of power. 
 
6.2 SURFACE LEVEL STRATEGIES 
 
Tables 6 and 7 compare the relative emphasis that the different staff groups placed 
on each surface level strategy. We have included this very basic statistical information to 
provide an indication of the degree of importance placed on each strategy by the partici-
pants. Simple computations were used to transform raw numbers into categories. The tables 
translate averages of each strategy into “below average”, “average” and “above average” 
categories. Average frequencies for each strategy were taken to minimize skewing due to un-
even group sizes. Numbers were rounded to the nearest tenth decimal place. Averages for 
each staff group were compared to the overall average and placed in the top third (above 
average), middle third (average) or bottom third (below average). Symbols (***) were used in 
the Tables instead of numbers to provide a general indication of the emphasis placed on 
each strategy, not an exact quantitative measure. When no examples of strategies were 
found, “not used” is indicated. As it is the goal of this research to focus on the qualitative 
aspects of the power strategies employed by the participants, further numerical calculations 
were not performed. 
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TABLE 6 
Comparison Of The Relative Emphasis Placed On Surface Level Strategies  
By Different Staff Groups 
(*** above average, ** average, * below average) 
 
Surface Level Strategy Senior 
Managers 
Team  
Leaders 
Therapists Clerical  
Staffs 
Altruism *** Not used Not used *** 
Assertiveness ** * ** * 
Bargaining *** *** ** Not used 
Coalitions * ** ** * 
Deceit Not used Not used *** Not used 
Psychological distance *** ** *** * 
Appeals to higher authorities *** * ** *** 
Ingratiation *** Not used ** ** 
Reasoning *** * ** * 
Sanctions Not used Not used *** Not used 
Working to rule Not used Not used ** Not used 
Managing lines of communication *** ** ** * 
 
Several cautions must be considered in examining the tables. The limited number of 
interviews means that the ratings we have presented in Tables 6 and 7 are for general com-
parisons only. While there were almost one thousand references to strategies in the inter-
views, some frequencies were so small that it would be imprudent to carry out statistical op-
erations on them. Also, strategies receiving an “above average” rating do not reflect that they 
were used frequently by staffs. The indication is only that the group used the strategy more 
on average than other groups. Further, some participants may have been more vocal than 
others about a particular strategy, thereby skewing the average. Taking overall and group av-
erages lowered individual bias. 
Of the total 968 references to surface and deep level strategies in the interviews, 
there were 806 surface level strategies (83%) identified. Clearly, surface level strategies were 
more abundant than deep level strategies because they are the part-and-parcel of interactions 
between staffs. They also are easier to discern by the researcher because they are not so 
deeply embedded or hidden in the organization’s functioning. 
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The most obvious observation from Table 6 is that the groups emphasized the dif-
ferent strategies unevenly. There are several possible reasons for this. First, as highlighted in 
Chapter 5, the different groups within the organization had different access to sources of 
power. Senior managers, for example, have the widest potential pool of resources at their 
disposal. It follows that their strategies potentially could access the largest amounts of 
sources of power. This was confirmed to a certain degree by a higher than average amount 
of use of many strategies. 
A second reason for unequal emphasis by the groups is that hierarchical position 
within the organization permits some groups to have more leeway. As will be discussed, sen-
ior managers had an easier time breaking their own rules, while lower level staffs were con-
tinually pressured by policies and procedures and the fear of sanctions. 
The presence or absence of some strategies is another factor to consider. Senior 
managers made no references to deceit, sanctions and working to rule. The fact that they 
never mentioned sanctions is at first surprising because it is within their purview to carry out 
sanctions on lower level staffs. Conversely, it is surprising that there were references to sanc-
tions as strategies by the therapists. We will explore some of the reasons behind this in detail 
in the section on sanctions below. 
It is evident that the strategies that have negative connotations, namely deceit, and 
sanctions received little attention by the participants. As we will find out, these may have 
been substituted by less negative yet strong social pressure strategies such as assertiveness. 
At this point in the analysis, however, it is unknown if there is a discernable pattern between 
groups in the use of strategies.  
Generally speaking, the senior managers as a group seemed to emphasize altruism, 
bargaining, psychological distance, appeals to higher authority, ingratiation, reasoning, and 
particularly managing lines of communication more than the other groups. There was aver-
age use of assertiveness, and below average mentions of coalitions. There were no references 
to deceit, sanctions, or working to rule as strategies. 
Team leaders referred to less types of strategies in the interviews and remained in the 
average range for coalitions, managing psychological distance, and managing lines of com-
munications. They made higher use of bargaining only, and below average use of assertive-
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ness, appeals to higher authorities, and reasoning. There were no references to altruism, de-
ceit, ingratiation, sanctions, and working to rule. 
Therapists, for their part, placed more emphasis on deceit, psychological distance, 
and sanctions than the other groups. This is interesting given that sanctions are not a normal 
part of the power base of front-line therapists. We will examine why this is so when we dis-
cuss sanctions. For all the remaining surface strategies, therapists were in the average range. 
Altruism was the only strategy not mentioned by the therapists. 
The clerical group was much less vocal about their use of strategies. There were no 
references to bargaining, deceit, sanctions, or working to rule. While the number of refer-
ences to strategies by the clerical staffs was low overall, there was higher than average men-
tion of altruism and appeals to higher authorities as strategies. 
Comparisons were made between newcomers and veterans. Table 7 compares the 
two groups in terms of emphasis on each strategy during the interviews. 
 
 
TABLE 7 
 
Comparison Of The Relative Emphasis Placed On Surface Level Strategies 
— Newcomers Versus Veterans — 
(*** above average, ** average, * below average) 
 
Surface Level Strategy Newcomers Veterans 
Altruism *** * 
Assertiveness ** ** 
Bargaining ** ** 
Coalitions ** ** 
Deceit * *** 
Psychological distance ** ** 
Appeals to higher authorities * *** 
Ingratiation *** ** 
Reasoning ** ** 
Sanctions * *** 
Working to rule *** ** 
Managing lines of communication ** ** 
 
There is uneven emphasis on strategies between newcomers and veterans. As with 
the comparison between the four staff groups earlier, caution is advised because the veterans 
group comprises no senior managers and no team leaders. Nonetheless, it is evident that 
newcomers had higher average use of altruism, ingratiation and working to rule. Deceit, ap-
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peals to higher authorities and sanctions received more emphasis by the veterans, with the 
balance of the strategies being roughly equal.  
Unequal emphasis between newcomers and veterans may be related to several fac-
tors. First, as highlighted in Chapter 5, the different groups within the organization poten-
tially have different sources of power, thus leading to differential use of strategies. Second, 
newcomers and veterans do not share the same history within the organization. For the 
newcomers, there is less knowledge about the players, history, and interactions with internal 
and external sources. Veterans have more knowledge about the internal and external work-
ings of the organization. In the next section, we will examine the qualitative aspects of each 
strategy by each group. 
 
6.2.1 APPEALS TO ALTRUISM 
The Random House Dictionary (1980) defines altruism as the unselfish concern for 
the welfare of others. Altruism thus assumes moral qualities such as benevolence and gener-
osity, and it assumes sacrifice for the sake of others. 
This strategy was noteworthy for its relative absence in the interviews. While admin-
istrative and clerical staffs made mention of this strategy, there were too few references to 
safely compare the relative emphasis between the groups. The mere presence or absence of 
this strategy cannot be taken as indicative of differential use because of the very low num-
bers. Nonetheless we will describe it as observed in the data. 
Very few of the participants discussed this as a strategy that they had used or that 
they had the intention of using, for dealing with the organizational changes that were occur-
ring. There are several possible reasons for this. First, given the difficult changes that the 
participants were experiencing, and the heightened emotions that accompanied them, it is 
not surprising that staffs did not “feel” like giving their time and energy selflessly to the or-
ganization. Second, participants described themselves as carrying out their duties out of pro-
fessional responsibility, not out of an altruistic sense. Altruism is not essential to the mandate 
or the survival of the organization and therefore would exert little power in terms of strate-
gies. Third, we found no links between altruism and trying to improve one’s personal status 
in the organization.  
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The low use of altruism as a strategy in the interviews may not mean that altruism 
did not come into play, however. To the contrary, it may mean that the withholding or with-
drawal of altruistic acts by staffs could have been used as a means of influence on the organi-
zation. One possible indication of its use would have been if employees refused to carry out 
special tasks for needy clients or agree to do any favors for others in the organization. It is 
difficult to verify this hypothesis, however, since evidence around this was not found. More 
detailed research into the use of altruism could explore what power sources are tied to altru-
ism, and under which conditions it is employed. 
 
6.2.2 ASSERTIVENESS 
In this study, assertiveness refers to using a forceful approach in relationships with 
others. This includes actions such as confronting verbally in a strong tone of voice. Our data 
showed many references to assertiveness as a strategy, as was expected given the high levels 
of conflict over the past few years. We divided these into three main dynamics that we would 
call “refusing”, “voicing”, and “avoiding”. 
 
Refusing to do something; refusing to recognize formal authority: 
Assertiveness was used as an outright refusal to do something that a superior had 
asked. For therapists, this ranged from refusing to sign a performance appraisal, not signing 
a routing slip, to refusing to work after 5 o’clock. We will discuss the performance appraisal 
example here as it provides a good illustration of how assertiveness was used.   
A therapist received his yearly performance appraisal from his team leader, but he 
did not agree with some of the recommendations because these had not been discussed with 
him prior to receiving the written report. 
“For the written evaluation, there were many things that we had never dis-
cussed in regular supervision. My team leader said that my skills and experi-
ence did not correspond to the model of the agency. She disqualified me to-
tally… She gave me a written performance appraisal to sign that she had al-
ready signed herself… I told her that I couldn’t accept the report. I refused 
to sign. She insisted that I sign so that we could go on to other things. I had 
to confront her. I refused to sign.” (Therapist) 
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This employee described the performance appraisal as a form of control that the or-
ganization was imposing and that was legally sanctioned. Agreeing to sign the report would 
have implied accepting the authority of the team leader and sanctioning it further. By refus-
ing to sign, however, the employee refused to recognize the formal authority delegated to the 
team leader. In this sense, the assertiveness of the employee forced the team leader to seek 
other means to carry out her functions, thus reducing the team leader’s margin of freedom 
and inserting some degree of uncertainty in the relationship. 
There was no mention of refusals as power strategies in the senior management, 
team leaders, and clerical staffs groups. This may be related to their positions within the hi-
erarchy. Senior and middle managers, for example, retain formal authority and thus may 
deny requests to subordinates simply by exerting their authority. Clerical staffs, for their part, 
also did not employ refusals as a strategy. The absence of assertiveness in all these groups 
may be explained, at least in part, by their choice to employ less aggressive means, as will be 
described later, under “avoiding”. 
 
Voicing concerns verbally, and verbal confrontation as strategies: 
The second theme related to assertiveness is what we call “voicing”. Linked partly to 
“refusing”, this refers to voicing one’s concerns by confronting another person verbally. 
“One thing I did was to speak up about my concerns. I told my supervisor 
that nothing made sense.” (Therapist) 
 
“As time went along, I began to feel like this is just lip service. We’re being 
asked to input but it’s some sort of bureaucratic strategy that’s being used, 
that somebody’s learned somewhere. It keeps people relatively pacified and 
inactive until something else is done which is not necessarily related to the 
input. I got to the point where I was in meetings and feeling very frustrated, 
and getting very angry, and saying things like ‘If you don’t want what we have 
to say, don’t ask. Stop wasting my time.” (Therapist) 
 
“When we moved to this building, they told us that the office where D… is 
right now, was smaller than our current one, so they said they couldn’t put us 
there. Then, when another clinician asked for this office, they said we were 
supposed to move into another office that was smaller than this one, and 
that’s when we got pissed off and said enough!” (Therapist) 
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Other examples of voicing included standing up to senior management in a forceful 
way by demanding that all financial information be put on the table for all parties to see, and 
asking pointed questions about the future of the new organization. 
“Last week there was a board meeting here in our building … You know 
when you see people come and go from here, people who normally have no 
business here. We sat down and said, ‘What’s going on? We know something 
is going on. Just tell us. Are the changes going to affect us or not? Tell us’.” 
(Therapist) 
 
In the data, only the therapists group seemed to use “voicing” as a strategy, and this 
was generally with regard to the control of information. While senior management claimed 
to have been on the receiving end of assertive strategies, they did not use them themselves. 
Neither did team leaders and clerical staffs. There are several possible explanations for this. 
First, the application of rules, as shown by management’s heavy emphasis on policies and 
procedures, may have lessened the need for assertiveness on their part. Second, senior man-
agement took pride in seeking input from staffs and thus managing through assertiveness 
was not viewed as compatible with the values of participation. Third, therapists may have 
been more apt to use assertiveness than managers did because they needed to intensify the 
relationship, in essence increasing uncertainty and escalating the stakes. There are indications 
that both the senior and middle manager groups did not want to intensify the relationship 
because of the already high conflict levels in the organization. Senior managers needed the 
collaboration of their subordinates to get things done. This is especially true for the two Co-
ordinators, who did not have a direct chain of command over the team leaders, but who 
needed their collaboration to carry out their functions. Clerical staffs, for their part, did not 
use assertiveness. This is consistent with their trying to stay out of the historical conflicts 
between therapists and senior management.  
 
Avoiding assertiveness as a strategy: 
A third theme that was prevalent in the data was that of “avoiding” assertiveness as a 
strategy. While a few participants overtly used assertiveness in their relations with others, as 
shown above, most said they were uncomfortable using assertiveness. Many participants de-
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scribed themselves as actively avoiding assertive measures because it was not their style to 
use such means. 
“Nobody enjoys confrontation. I certainly don’t.” (Therapist) 
 
“I’m not the type of person to pressure anybody. I’m kind of an easy-going 
person.” (Clerical staff) 
 
“I love conflict models when I never have to face the person that I’m con-
flicting with. I hate personal conflict. I really am quite chicken when it’s in 
my face.” (Therapist) 
 
Assertiveness also was avoided during the initial stages of the relationship between 
the union and the new organization: 
“Our intention [at the beginning] was just to see if we could just establish 
some sort of working relationship on a more positive note than we’d experi-
enced at the hospital. That was the way we were trying to do it. The process 
lasted for a few months, and we came to the conclusion of ‘Why don’t we 
wait until the thing is established and back off just a little’.” (Therapist) 
 
In essence, avoiding assertiveness or overt aggressiveness seemed to be a personal 
choice of not wanting to “rock the boat”. Therapists were not willing to take large risks 
when confronting superiors. 
When examining the data seen as a whole, assertiveness was related to several 
themes, notably refusing to carry out requests from superiors, and voicing one’s dissatisfac-
tion in ways that exerted social pressure. Outright assertiveness, however, was more noted 
for its absence in senior managers, team leaders, and clerical staffs, as explained by their 
preference for less aggressive means of pressure. It would thus be logical to assume that 
these groups used other sources of power.  
In comparing new staffs to veteran staffs, there were no significant differences be-
tween them in terms of refusing, voicing, or avoiding assertiveness. We might have expected 
veteran staffs to be more vocal than newcomers about their concerns and more proactive in 
their actions because of their past history and experience with the organization’s divestment. 
This did not appear to be a factor in the data that was collected. Veteran and new staffs alike 
made distinct attempts at avoiding assertiveness, especially in the beginning phases of the 
new organization. As the organization’s divestment moved ahead, however, assertiveness 
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turned to refusals and voicing. Unfortunately, our research did not involve the study of non-
verbal communications, through which assertiveness may be conveyed. Frowns, strong 
stares, and long silence, for example, might have been means that were used but not cap-
tured in the study. 
In terms of interactions with sources of power, assertiveness was primarily related to 
dynamics around information (e.g., “We demand that you give us the correct financial in-
formation”) and formal authority (e.g., “I refuse to sign this performance appraisal.”) 
 
6.2.3 BARGAINING 
In the present research, bargaining refers to negotiating through the exchange of 
benefits. We will not discuss the different types of bargaining here as much has already been 
written on the subject by other authors. We will nonetheless describe what our data revealed 
in this category. 
 
Creating a sense of urgency, and opening up the consultation process: 
The data showed one principal theme related to bargaining, namely negotiations 
around job security and material resources such as moneys and working conditions. Due to 
the severe fiscal problems of the organization, management consulted their staffs to consider 
different financial options. In terms of strategy, senior management created a sense of ur-
gency by presenting the critical nature of the problem and facts to lower level staffs, and 
claiming there was no other way to resolve the problems. One of the options was laying off 
eleven employees, mostly at the therapist level, but this would have meant cutting back a 
substantial amount of mental health services to the community. Another option was to ter-
minate certain intervention programs, closing satellite clinics and amalgamating others, but 
this also was out of the question because of cultural implications. A third alternative that was 
considered was maintaining the current work force but cutting back on the weekly work 
hours, thereby preventing layoffs. Even though this meant reopening the labor contract and 
smaller pay cheques, the latter was the preferred option of most staffs. 
“We’re looking for ways of helping so that there will be no layoffs. We are 
even ready to work four days per week or take two months of non-paid holi-
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days. We’re looking at ways of keeping staff. From what I understand, most 
people here want that. They don’t want layoffs.” (Therapist) 
 
“One thing that I think is very good is that with the deficit, the union and the 
management have agreed that they don’t want anyone to lose their jobs, that 
there may be cutbacks or rational layoffs or something to that effect, but 
hopefully no-one will lose their jobs.” (Therapist) 
 
“We had a meeting several months ago, a union meeting, and because the 
majority of us were there, the president asked us if it came down to layoffs or 
major changes, what would we decide to do. I couldn’t believe the response. 
It was all ‘No layoffs. We don’t want to lose anyone, no one’. We would take 
a four-day week, a month’s shutdown, whatever it takes. We would not want 
to lose one person. I couldn’t believe it. It was unanimous, and no one raised 
their hand and said ‘I’ve got a mortgage to pay, I can’t do that’ or ‘I’ve got 
kids going to university. I can’t do that.’ No one said anything. It was a 
unanimous decision that we would work a four-day week in order to keep 
our staff, which is kind of nice, because who knows what is going to happen 
come April.” (Clerical staff) 
 
One or two employees voiced some opposition to this approach because they had 
more seniority than others in their group and felt they were losing out to more junior staffs. 
This was not the general sentiment among employees, however, and a majority decision to 
keep all staffs prevailed. This led to some irony in terms of bargaining dynamics. By bringing 
solutions to the table, the union was attempting to narrow down the possibilities of action of 
senior management, in essence extending its own margin of freedom in bargaining. The un-
ion felt it could force management to accept its proposals by agreeing only to a reduced 
workweek and to no other alternatives that management came up with. Imposing such a 
choice may have ultimately helped senior managers, however, in that the union shut down 
other possible bargaining avenues. Senior members in the union would not be able to exer-
cise seniority bumping rights and maintain their full salary because the union agreed to 
shorter work weeks thus saving management from having to make this difficult decision. In 
this sense, the uncertainty that senior management faced was somewhat reduced because 
bargaining was not a long drawn-out process. 
It is interesting that in bargaining strategies, team leaders were bypassed in the play 
of power. Dynamics occurred principally between the senior management level and thera-
pists and clerical staffs, represented by the union. This is probably due to labor relations bar-
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gaining being the realm of senior administrators in the organization. In other words, team 
leaders had no control over the resources needed to engage in negotiations unless delegated 
by senior management. Mintzberg (1989) forms a similar conclusion for middle managers in 
professional bureaucracies, adding that unionization diminishes the influence of profession-
als in the administrative structure. While the middle management layer in our study was by-
passed in the bargaining process, there was evidence that it was not shielded from the effects 
of the bargaining strategies of other levels. The team leaders, for example, had to deal with 
the immediate concerns and anxieties of staffs with the announcement of possible staff cut-
backs. They buffered the impact between senior management and the union by “putting out 
fires.” The only limited “bargaining” the team leaders engaged in related to offering choices 
to therapists around office décor and design. By coming to a decision to offer different 
choices along a continuum, they in essence limited and controlled the result to a series of 
possible predictable outcomes. 
As for clerical staffs, there were a few noteworthy dynamics. Some of the unionized 
clerical staffs had access to confidential management information by virtue of their “float-
ing” between satellite clinics and the administrative offices, depending on where the heaviest 
workload was. This sometimes provided them with information that could have been useful 
to the union for bargaining. There is no evidence that such information was leaked to the 
union, however, or that it was used for personal benefit. In this sense, clerical staffs did not 
enhance the margin of liberty for themselves or for the union, nor is there evidence that they 
tried to increase uncertainty for administrative personnel through the manipulation of in-
formation. 
 
Splitting the solidarity of the union: 
There was evidence that senior management may have tried to split the solidarity of 
the union, and thus weakened the union’s bargaining position, by pointing out to staffs that 
the union was sometimes blocking progress. 
“It makes me think of divide and conquer. If senior management are feeling 
really threatened or insecure about things, there are ways to bring about 
changes… It started this year with the idea of layoffs.” (Therapist) 
 
Chapter 6 — Surface and Deep Level Strategies     185 
 
 
“The Executive Director came to one of our meetings and must have said 
the ‘union’ word twenty times, and things like ‘well, that’s up to the union.’ 
When he wanted to save money, his messages would be things like ‘If your 
union is asking for too much money and keeps asking for a raise, then there 
will be layoffs. You’d better tell your union to stop… It’s divide and conquer 
within the union.” (Therapist) 
 
These examples clearly point out the perception of some staffs that bargaining in-
volved bypassing the normal lines of negotiations. Consulting directly with the therapists and 
clerical staffs, providing them with the facts about the organization’s problems, and telling 
staffs that the burden of responsibility was on the union, provided evidence that senior man-
agement tried to bypass the union and split the opposition. Staffs described this as a strong 
method of raising uncertainty and enhancing the feelings of urgency about the situation. We 
will provide further evidence of these dynamics as a strategy later when we discuss lines of 
communication.  
There are other issues related to union-management labor relations that we could 
have explored, such as conflicts over job classifications. We limited discussion of such top-
ics, however, because they are not directly tied to the organizational transition and are not 
the primary focus of this study. 
In essence, the bargaining strategy was tied to the two types of power, namely formal 
power and information power. Through formal power the union could invoke bargaining as 
a legal process when labor issues were at stake. Ironically, the union also had its hands tied in 
that if the organization decided to go “by the book” in terms of layoffs, the union would 
have little choice but to follow the accepted terms in their contract. Senior managers ex-
ploited the opportunity by opening the consultation process to all staffs and union person-
nel. While this meant they were forced to share financial information with all staffs, it also 
helped put the ball into the union’s court. Information as a source of power also seemed im-
portant because financial information and financial planning were opened to all staffs of the 
organization. While financial information was no longer confidential, it nonetheless was used 
to legitimize the serious problems faced by the organization. 
With the aid of information as a source of power, the bargaining strategy employed 
by senior management involved creating a sense of urgency and crisis, in some ways reduc-
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ing the time line for negotiations and raising the stakes in terms of uncertainty for the union. 
The bargaining strategy showed that each of the partners tried to reduce the choices of the 
other.  
We did not notice differences between newcomers and veterans for this strategy. 
This is probably due to the issue at hand that involved all levels of the organization. 
 
6.2.4 COALITIONS 
Coalitions are attempts by persons to mobilize others in the organization. While coa-
litions may be formed in upward or downward relationships (e.g., therapists with their team 
leaders) and in lateral relationships (e.g., therapists joining with others of their own rank), 
coalitions also may involve other types of relationships. As our data confirms, and as Pfeffer 
(1981) points out, organizational politics may involve the formation of coalitions with per-
sons outside the formal boundaries of the organization. 
There were three basic themes emerging from the data concerning coalitions. These 
were related to the labor union, co-optation through external sources to the organization, 
and cultural identity. Coalitions occurred within hierarchical groups, and across them. 
 
“Divide and conquer” -- threats to the solidarity of the labor union: 
For the purposes of the present research, labor unions may be considered coalitions 
in that they represent a group of staffs who have a common interest and who pursue com-
mon goals. Unions may be viewed as “legitimate” coalitions in that they are legally recog-
nized and are generally permanent. When examining the history of this organization, it is safe 
to say that staffs tried to rally behind the union as a means of defending themselves against 
uncertainty related to job security. Some unionized staffs described themselves as “battle 
hardened” and “in the mood for war” after many years of conflict with the psychiatric hospi-
tal. They also felt confident that they were more experienced with union issues and negotia-
tions than the new management. One possible gain for the labor union in the new organiza-
tion was that it could now invoke strike actions, which it could not do at the psychiatric hos-
pital due to provincial restrictions of such activity in hospitals. There were several events that 
threatened the union coalition, however. First, while staffs were under a single union repre-
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senting over one hundred fifty employees at the psychiatric hospital, they were now split 
from the hospital in two separate locals. Negotiations were now separate and independent in 
each local, implying a loss in the strength of numbers. A second threat to the solidarity of 
the union was the splitting of staffs into teams and satellite clinics. This meant staffs could 
not easily discuss union issues, as they were accustomed to doing in the past when under a 
single roof.  
“I wonder if it isn’t divide and rule… We had a reputation as being articulate, 
extremely self-confident, ready to tackle, ready to use strategies for commu-
nity change to pressure the government, and this was quite a sophisticated lit-
tle work group. I think [the separation of the staff] scared people. I wonder if 
it wasn’t divided… From the point of view of keeping the workers separate, 
it works really well.” (Therapist) 
 
Physical separation as a threat to solidarity: 
The split into separate satellites and teams took some of the focus of coalitions away 
from the union and placed it on individual teams.  
“We work as separate teams but we provide the same service to the same 
community with the same boss. We work in different offices. I’m opposed to 
those kinds of boundaries because I think they build in prejudices that are 
useless in an organization… The physical boundary is the obvious one, but 
the concept that there are separate teams that provide the same service gives 
the impression that we are somehow in competition with each other. I’m not 
in favor of that kind of thing. I look at it as a step backward.” (Therapist)  
 
Cultural identity as a factor splitting labor union solidarity: 
A third threat to union solidarity related to the mandate of the agency to provide 
separate and culturally appropriate services: 
“If they had built a single building, they could have had three separate floors 
with the Francophone on one floor, the Anglophones on the other and so 
on, with a single coffee room, a single room where we could have eaten 
lunch together. That way, we could have shared ideas and discussed what was 
going on in the agency. I really had the impression that they wanted to sepa-
rate us, that administration wanted to separate us. If there were going to be 
cliques, they were going to be small cliques instead of large unhappy groups. 
There is more power in large teams than in small teams… [We’re now] easier 
to deal with because the group is much smaller and it’s divided more. In that 
sense, I think that administration wants us separated so that they may control 
us more.” (Therapist) 
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It would thus appear that coalition strategies by therapists were weakened from the 
start because of the smaller numbers of employees, the physical splitting of the workers into 
separate sites, and the cultural mandate of the organization.  
Other threats to union solidarity included accusations that senior management at-
tempted to split the union coalition. As discussed above under the bargaining strategy, the 
Executive Director was often described as trying to split the union’s solidarity around job 
issues. 
“If your union is asking for too much money and keeps asking for a raise, 
then there will be layoffs. You’d better tell your union to stop… It’s divide 
and conquer within the union.” (Therapist) 
 
Coalitions and invoking cultural rights in the Francophone and Native  
clinics: 
 
Given the polarization that occurred around culture in the history and design of the 
new organization, it was not surprising to see some disunity between staffs in the four clin-
ics. Many therapists, for example, suggested that while they supported the concept of cul-
tural diversity, splitting teams along cultural lines led to competition between the clinics 
rather than unity or tolerance. Therapists and clerical staffs felt they had lost the sense of 
togetherness that existed prior to the organizational separation, primarily because the focus 
was no longer on a single mental health centre but on several distinct clinics.  
“You have the Native, the French, and then there is the rest. That’s English 
and multicultural. The English committee is still looking for a raison-d’être. 
They don’t know exactly what is their function, how they get involved, how it 
should get to them, and listening to them talk, it’s far from resolved.” (Team 
leader) 
 
Despite being split from the larger group, however, Francophone therapists de-
scribed their team as having a very strong identity, being a tightly knit group, and not neces-
sarily needing the rest of the agency to survive. 
“If there is one thing that would be best for the agency, it’s that we’d become 
four separate agencies, that the Francophone team become its own mental 
health centre with its own government funding, with our team leader in 
charge. We wouldn’t need the rest of them.” (Therapist) 
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While that strategy had been unsuccessful with the Board of Directors, it was none-
theless much discussed by the Francophone and Native staffs. Members of the Anglophone 
team were relatively quiet concerning this strategy, presumably because they were not in a 
position to invoke culture as power and because they did not want to “stir the pot.” 
When one examines cultural issues and how team leaders related to them in terms of 
coalitions, there are indications that cultural identity was a strong factor in coalition forma-
tion with the Community Advisory Committees. For both the Francophone and Native 
units, culture was a legally mandated source of power. In essence, power was derived from 
the structure of the organization, and team leaders made clear attempts to use this to their 
advantage. When designing intervention programs specifically for the Francophone team, for 
example, the Leader of that team always sought the backing of her Community Advisory 
Committee, which then empowered her to implement the program, regardless of the wishes 
of higher management levels. One example was the closure of a Francophone day treatment 
program, which the Executive Director opposed. The team leader felt very strongly that the 
program should not continue in its present form, and with the backing of her Community 
Advisory Committee, the centre was closed despite objections from the senior management 
level.  
“I brought the issue to the Committee. They said, ‘This is what needs to hap-
pen for this program to function’, and then they directed the Executive Di-
rector… What was very nice is that the Committee said ‘The team leader has 
nothing to do with this. She is our employee. We have made the decision that 
we want this extra space here. We want to move people out.’ The Executive 
Director went to the Board of Directors to complain, but the Board ordered 
him to respect the Committee’s decision. I don’t know if other Committees 
would have got away with that… You have very strong people on the Com-
mittee, my school board people, and it’s through them that I got my staff to 
move out.” (Team leader) 
 
Similar dynamics were present for the Native unit, where the Community Advisory 
Committee was an ally both in terms of legal and moral support. Alliances with the Commu-
nity Advisory Committees provided the team leaders with protection against taking on indi-
vidual responsibility for their actions. In essence, cultural dynamics increased the margin of 
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freedom of two of the team leaders vis-à-vis the senior management level, and to some de-
gree the Board of Directors. 
 
Co-optation of persons external to the organization as a strategy: 
A third theme related to coalitions was co-optation through external sources to the 
organization. As discussed in Chapter Two, co-optation may take several forms. Two of 
these forms, namely complex co-optation and two-step co-optation will be described here, as 
they are relevant to coalitions. The other two forms of co-optation, direct and avoidance, do 
not refer directly to coalitions and will not be discussed here. 
As Garguilo (1993) points out, complex co-optation exists when person A cultivates 
ties with person B while also developing ties with person C. Involvement of person C is 
viewed as a way of securing additional control over person B. Two-step co-optation is a 
variation of this. “Rather than seeking an embedded relation with B, A secures B’s restraint 
by manipulating the social structure around B through the co-optive tie with C.” (p. 6) In 
essence, both forms involve a third party in direct or indirect ways. Such maneuvers or ma-
nipulations of relationships were evident in examples that we observed in the data. First, in 
terms of complex co-optation, one of the Co-ordinators found that labor negotiations 
around the union contract were very difficult and time-consuming. The Co-ordinator (per-
son A) tried to convince the Executive Director (person B) to hire an external negotiator 
(person C) so as to free up senior administration of this task. 
“Right now the Executive Director and I meet with the union. Only he and I 
meet with the union to do all the negotiations, and he is the negotiator for us. 
He is the one who talks. It’s something that I have not agreed with from day 
one. It’s a very difficult position to be in day-to-day management and then sit 
across the table and actually be the negotiator with the union. From day one, 
I was saying that we should have an external negotiator or someone from the 
Board… What I’ve started to do, and first of all because of my feelings with 
the negotiations, I felt that he and I didn’t have the total expertise, and so 
I’ve talked him into using external resources from a local law firm, which 
took a lot of talking because the Executive Director is a very proud man and 
he’s very confident, to the point if you were wearing a white shirt he would 
argue that it’s black. I call it the art of gentle persuasion. So I talked to him 
and said ‘Let’s use Mrs. T... She’s really good. She has a way of dealing with 
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things.’ So I draw on her. I use her to get to the Executive Director.” (Senior 
manager)  
 
In essence, while continuing to convince the Executive Director of her point of 
view, the Co-ordinator also sought an outside person to influence the Executive Director. 
Complex co-optation was possible because of her positive relationship with the Executive 
Director.  
 
Two-step co-optation: riding on the weight and reputation of prestigious  
external partners: 
 
There also were examples of two-step co-optation. In one case, several staffs had dif-
ficulty convincing the Executive Director of the value of their intervention program, espe-
cially in the face of losing staffs due to financial cutbacks. Emphasis on following the lines of 
communication in the organization hampered the group’s efforts to influence the Executive 
Director. Members, who had in many ways given up trying to influence him, thus co-opted 
external influencers. Being involved with professionals from other agencies in joint interven-
tion projects was the beginning of this strategy and facilitated it. 
“What I did was that I started working with agencies other than this one to 
develop joint funding proposals. So, at my initiative, several of us joined and 
made a consortium that put in a proposal for money. This money was pres-
tigious.” (Therapist) 
 
Co-optation of persons external to the organization was particularly effective in this 
case for several reasons. First, the Executive Director seemed to place a higher value on the 
opinions of persons outside the organization than on those from the inside. Participation on 
joint projects would thus gain some legitimacy for the group. Second, co-opting external 
persons was an excellent means of informing outside agencies of the happenings in the or-
ganization and of influencing its functioning. 
“Other community agencies are involved such as the Superintendent of Edu-
cation, whatever. So, what happens through this project is that I am able to 
report that things are not going well here… This committee is coming up 
with lots of movers and shakers on it. Those people are the movers and 
shakers. They are powerful people.” (Therapist) 
 
Chapter 6 — Surface and Deep Level Strategies     192 
 
 
Using one’s external links with the movers and shakers as a strategy: 
One of the advantages that therapists and clerical staffs maintained over senior and 
middle management was their knowledge of the ‘movers and shakers’ outside the organiza-
tion due to their longer history with the organization. This was often to their benefit in co-
optive strategies. 
“There are new people in upper management positions who are also new to 
the community, so you develop the stilted growth that goes along with how 
much do they really know about the playing field out there, whereas some of 
us have been here for years and have made this community our home, and 
already know who the movers and shakers are. They have that to learn on 
top of everything else.” (Therapist) 
 
Thus, two-step co-optation involved dealing with external sources as indirect means 
of power over the Executive Director. This strategy entailed risks, however, because of the 
potential consequences to the employees if their strategy was uncovered. 
What are the different conditions under which complex or two-step co-optation 
might be used? Without having a larger sample to study, it is difficult to answer this question. 
It is evident, however, that when a positive working relationship exists, or when opposing 
interests are not present, complex co-optation may be the strategy of choice because of its 
lower destructive effects on the relationship if the strategy is discovered. When a person 
cannot engage with another party because of a strained or limited relationship, such as the 
case for the group of staffs trying to convince the Executive Director of the value of their 
intervention program, direct co-optive means may not be effective. Two-step co-optation 
may be more effective under such circumstances. Co-optation as a form of coalition also is 
likely in situations where professionals have access to outside sources, such as professional 
associations or work on joint projects. Unfortunately, we cannot verify this hypothesis, due 
to the limited size of the group studied.  
For each of the three themes outlined above, we compared veteran and newer staffs 
in their use of coalitions as a strategy, and we found limited differences. There were some 
situations, for example, where veteran staffs were the ones to initiate coalitions, whereas new 
staffs tended to be “followers.” New staffs tended to be more cautious in their actions, even 
in situations where they would have had the support of other staffs. 
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“Because of the natural cohesion between myself and [the other two veteran 
members of the team], we’ll appear to make a statement vis-à-vis something 
we want to refer back to our manager. The newer workers tend to be a little 
more cautious, making statements like ‘We don’t want to rock the boat. You 
go talk to her. You seem to know more about this than I do. I’m taking a 
back seat’.” (Therapist) 
 
Staffs that had been with the organization longer found it easier to initiate coalitions 
because of their common past experience with the psychiatric hospital. 
“There are two other people who came with me [to this team]. Beyond that, 
everyone else is brand new, and not only brand new to us three, but brand 
new to each other. The vast majority of this team have never worked to-
gether, and that takes some cozying up. That takes some familiarization. That 
takes some getting-to-know-you kind of experience.” (Therapist)  
 
It is possible that some of these differences were due to new staffs having a more 
immediate and narrow focus because they lacked the past history. 
“They [new staff] tend to assess things in how it affects them in the here-
and-now, with a fairly narrow focus, whereas for some of us older staffs, I 
think we tend to look at more of an overall organizational thing, the larger 
picture.” (Therapist) 
 
Due to the limited size of the sample in this study, it is not possible to make further 
comparisons between new and veteran staff members around coalitions. It would not be 
surprising, however, to find that long-term employees would indeed find it easier to form 
coalitions because of their common background. 
Thus, coalitions changed from being based almost exclusively on union matters be-
fore the organizational separation, shifting in part to coalitions formed around cultural issues 
after the structural change took place. The union coalition was weakened by the organiza-
tional split, and in some ways substituted for coalitions around cultural issues in the Franco-
phone and Native clinics. 
It is reasonable to assume that coalitions intensified uncertainty, principally for senior 
management. One of the strengths of coalitions for staffs in this study was that it allowed 
members to speak as a combined voice. This helped prevent their isolation as individuals.  
One of the potential risks of any type of coalition is that the actors cannot control 
the actions of the others. While we did not find any evidence of this in the data, two-step 
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coalitions carried the risk of being discovered, and consequences may have ensued. Another 
risk of coalitions in the current study was that some staffs were described as “hot-heads” 
who would constantly try to gain the support of others, regardless of the value of their ar-
guments. 
In summary, coalitions were viewed from several perspectives. There was evidence 
of lateral coalitions (e.g., between unionized therapists) that seemed to weaken over time. 
Coalitions seemed to form along team lines or within cultural groups rather than following 
union lines. We also found evidence of external coalitions, as shown by the example of staffs 
aligning with their Community Advisory Committees around cultural questions. The fact 
that coalitions formed laterally and externally demonstrated the constant interplay of power 
variables within the organization. 
There may have been other factors that came into play for coalition formation. Pfef-
fer (1981), for example, suggests that factors such as age, rank in the organization, educa-
tional background, length of employment in the organization, and personal values all may 
influence coalition formation. We were not able to explore these individual factors with the 
exception of veteran versus newcomer status, however, because they were beyond the scope 
of this study. 
 
6.2.5 MANAGING THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION 
The emphasis on following the proper lines of communication in the organization 
provides evidence that strong dynamics were at play around this theme. Two principal dy-
namics emerged in this respect. These include enforcing lines of communication by senior 
management, and crossing of boundaries by senior management and lower-level staffs 
through legitimate and personal links. 
 
Enforcing the lines of communication: 
Enforcing the lines of communication in the organization was an element that all 
participants discussed as an important theme, whether they agreed with it or not. According 
to the official structure of the organization, therapists and secretarial staffs report to their 
team leaders. Team leaders, in turn, report directly to the Executive Director. Team leaders 
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also sit on their respective Community Advisory Committees. The two Co-ordinators, for 
their part, report only to the Executive Director. 
In terms of minimizing their contact with therapists and clerical staffs, senior manag-
ers were adamant about enforcing the boundaries as a strategy to ensure that roles remained 
clear in the organization. 
“I’ve tried to sever [direct contact with staff], not that I don’t want to talk to 
them, but they have a manager, and the manager is being paid to do a super-
vision job. Therefore, I firmly believe that they have to give them a place, 
and so when I have people calling directly I redirect them back to the team 
manager… I believe that if you’ve got a structure, use it.” (Senior manager) 
 
“I have no problem [with staffs contacting management] as long as there are 
processes, processes are clear, processes are respected and there’s respect for 
the roles that people have… It’s the day that it gets into what should be day-
to-day operational management, management’s arena, that if staffs want to 
get into that on a day-by-day basis, my god, you’re into chaos of who’s man-
aging what and where.” (Senior manager) 
 
Therapists and clerical staffs, on the other hand, described the setting of boundaries 
as rendering the organization inefficient. 
“I got into this ridiculous situation with my team manager, who was commu-
nicating with the Executive Director, then he was coming back and commu-
nicating with me. I’m trying to find out what money I am entitled to attend a 
conference, and he’s playing this gopher role.” (Therapist) 
 
Common across all of the interviews was that the role of the team leaders was high-
lighted as central to the organization. Senior management viewed the team leaders as neces-
sary conduits for all information from upper levels. Lower level staffs, on the other hand, 
described team leaders as just another layer of management. The two Co-ordinators, for 
their part, described themselves as dependent on the team leaders to implement the proper 
lines of communication because they did not have direct authority over staffs or team lead-
ers. Clerical staffs described themselves as uninvolved in these disputes, although they de-
scribed the layers of the organization as sometimes inefficient. As for the team leaders and 
their role in enforcing the lines of communication, these participants described themselves as 
the link between upper and lower levels of the organization who would move issues up and 
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down. None of the team leaders felt comfortable in enforcing the lines of communication, 
however, and they described it as an unpleasant but necessary part of their job.  
 
Limiting the role of the Community Advisory Committees: 
Regarding the Community Advisory Committees, senior and middle managers were 
quite vocal about limiting the role of the Committees, and they accomplished this through 
strict adherence to the organizational hierarchy. Senior managers, for example, did not want 
to see their formal powers eroded by having Board or Committee members becoming in-
volved in day-to-day business. 
“The responsibility of the Board should be on policy development, strategic 
direction-setting and Executive Director evaluation and performance ap-
praisal. But he manages what is below him, within the context of the policies 
that have been developed. If they start breaking those lines, or I start break-
ing those lines, there’s a problem.” (Senior manager) 
 
As a strategy to enforce the desired roles, the Executive Director used training ses-
sion manuals to guide Board members in their role. This is linked to a deep-level strategy, 
socialization, which we will discuss later in this chapter. 
Team leaders were similar in their desire to control the extent of Committee mem-
bers’ involvement in the day-to-day functioning of the organization. Their strategy involved 
putting the focus of Committee members on longer-term issues as opposed to operational 
ones. 
“They [Committee members] should stick to programming, vision, direction, 
and those kinds of things. I use them as a resource, not really for day-to-day 
stuff, but if there is something that is going to impact on the programming, 
for example if I wanted to bring forward a prevention program for date rape 
in high schools and I have a manpower problem, they say ‘Go with the Cadil-
lac model. If you’re going to go to the school boards, you’re going to be 
judged, so don’t scrimp. Wait if you have to’. I thought that was good advice 
and I should take that into consideration.” (Team leader) 
 
One of the important dynamics related to enforcing lines of communication was that 
therapists and clerical staffs had recently gained access and a recognized role on the Com-
munity Advisory Committees. Senior and middle managers thus were inclined to limit the 
role of the Committees because staffs now had a voice in them, implying a loss of formal 
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power and a narrower margin of freedom for the managers. Senior managers, for example, 
could no longer fully control access to the power holders (Board and Committee members) 
of the organization, nor could they control the flow of information to the Committees as 
easily as in the past. Team leaders also had an interest in confining the role of their Commit-
tees for the same reason. Therapists and clerical staffs, for their part, had gained legitimate 
power that would now provide them with access to power holders and access to information 
they may not have had otherwise. 
 
Justifying crossing hierarchical boundaries as a “consultation process”: 
Given the strong emphasis of administration on the management of boundaries, it 
was not surprising to find many examples of staffs trying to cross or rearrange these bounda-
ries in their favor. By the crossing of boundaries, we are referring to persons bypassing the 
formal communication mechanisms of the organization. 
Ironically, while senior managers constantly reminded employees that they were re-
quired to follow proper lines of communication, they were among the first to break their 
own rules. More particularly, the Executive Director decided to bypass the union to an-
nounce and discuss the financial difficulties the organization was facing. The Executive Di-
rector discussed the seriousness of the situation and asked for staff input on possible solu-
tions in his group meetings with therapists and clerical staffs in each satellite clinic. He ex-
plained this as an attempt to increase direct communication with staffs, but the union 
strongly opposed it. The union claimed that it retained the rights for bargaining, and that any 
discussions about changing working conditions or job security were its domain. Union rep-
resentatives thus claimed that senior management was not playing by its own rules. This led 
to accusations that senior management used these meetings to play staffs against their union 
and to create divisions within it. 
While the union opposed the bypassing of formal lines of authority, there were occa-
sions where therapists turned this into an opportunity. Several therapists, for example, were 
working on a joint project with other local social service agencies, and the Executive Direc-
tor wanted to keep abreast of all aspects of the project. He often involved himself in the de-
cisions of the group and wanted the project to take a particular direction. Staffs resisted his 
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involvement and at one point found it very difficult to modify his vision of the project. Their 
strategy was thus to support the Executive Director’s desire to be involved instead of oppos-
ing it. 
“We had been resisting running this program that he wanted, just resisting it, 
trying to frame it, trying to put it into something larger, trying to modify it. 
None of the things were working. We were frustrated finally and tried an-
other way. [The project] had come from the Executive Director to us. He 
had bypassed his hierarchies. He bypassed his own structures, his team lead-
ers, so the strategy involved using the structures that were there, and asking 
him to make the hard choices. [Normally], when we wanted to initiate a pro-
posal, we had to do work plans. This one came to us bypassing the structure, 
bypassing the procedures of the work plan. What we did then was to give 
him two plans and say to him, ‘Choose. Here’s the work plan to get you what 
you want that is agency-based, that you can control directly and you’ll lose 
one worker. It’ll cost you one full-time worker. Here’s another work plan 
that’s community-based. You’ll lose control, you won’t control this program, 
but it should come about, maybe not in the way you want it but it will come 
about. It will cost you one worker one day a week. The other one will cost 
you one full worker’… So in that strategy, A was a compromise to go and 
run the program, and B was to throw it back into his court until the tough is-
sues that need to be resolved were resolved, using the structures that will al-
low you allies in the system.” (Therapist) 
 
In essence, the strategy involved using the lines of communication in the same way 
as they had been manipulated by the Executive Director, and to do so in an open way. The 
first step was to accept the Executive Director’s position, thus taking a “step down” and re-
specting his position, then proposing choices or alternatives, and finally transferring the en-
tire responsibility of decision to him. This also had the effect of promoting alliances for the 
therapists in the sense that they now had legitimate external partners with whom they could 
align. 
Other strategies related to the crossing of boundaries included developing personal 
relationships with persons higher in the organization, and participating on various ad hoc 
committees. Some therapists and clerical staffs, for example, had developed personal rela-
tionships with the Co-ordinators, allowing them to telephone the Co-ordinators to address 
their concerns directly rather than going through their team leaders. This did not appear to 
be a prominent dynamic, however, as the Co-ordinators felt it would lead to more confusion 
about the policies and procedures and the roles of the team leaders. Senior management, on 
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the other hand, encouraged the participation of therapists and clerical staffs on ad hoc 
groups such as the newsletter committee. Some therapists admitted this helped them bypass 
their team leaders and access senior management directly. 
As for team leaders, the Executive Director’s actions of bypassing them had the ef-
fect of reducing their formal authority. On examining the organizational chart, the position 
of the team leaders in the hierarchy gives them access to senior management, therapists and 
clerical support staffs, as well as to the Community Advisory Committees. Normally, it 
would be the team leaders’ responsibility to negotiate and develop external projects, but be-
cause of the heavy involvement of the Executive Director, this was difficult. Involvement 
from senior managers limited their margin of freedom. Also, such dynamics tended to 
‘sandwich’ the team leaders between upper and lower levels in terms of trying to meet the 
demands of each level. Regarding the Community Advisory Committees, the influence of the 
team leaders was diminished when therapists gained access to the Committees. This allowed 
the therapists to legitimately bypass their team leaders and the Executive Director in dealings 
with higher levels. It also meant that issues that normally would be in the management realm 
could not be filtered effectively nor fully controlled by senior managers and team leaders.  
In terms of differences between veteran and new staffs in using lines of communica-
tion as a strategy, it was difficult to establish any similarities or differences because all senior 
managers and three of the four middle managers were new to the organization. 
In summary, the organization’s Board of Directors legally sanctioned participation of 
staffs in the Community Advisory Committees, and it changed the power balance of the or-
ganization by creating new zones of uncertainty. Opening the formal lines of communication 
did not seem to have a “corrective” effect on conflict within the organization, however, as it 
may have been desired. Instead, it appeared to maintain or heighten the conflicts because 
staffs could now bypass the traditional lines of authority. Emphasizing reporting relation-
ships and lines of communication was one way that senior management tried to deal with the 
new organizational reality. Ironically, the more the lines of communication were emphasized, 
the more the participants tried to develop informal ties. 
The dynamics of enforcing and crossing the lines of communication had several im-
plications for the organization. First, they blurred the traditional employee-Board of Direc-
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tors roles in terms of responsibilities. An example is therapists who fought for and gained 
access to their Community Advisory Committees. One of the consequences was that middle 
managers no longer occupied a central position in the organization, thus affecting some of 
their ability to manage information and access to power holders. Second, enforcement of 
lines of communication through procedures was met with resistance and attempts at short-
circuiting them. For human service organizations such as the one studied, this may occur 
through openly developing legitimate external alliances, such as participation on common 
community projects. In addition, turbulent organizational change appears to open the lines 
of communication for lower level staffs by presenting them with new opportunities, more 
particularly therapists. Manipulation of zones of uncertainty around these issues is thus to be 
expected. 
 
6.2.6 DECEIT  
The Random House Dictionary (1980) defines deceit as a trick or falseness. In terms 
of power strategies, this implies using a source of power in a covert way so that the target of 
the deceit has no knowledge that such action has taken place, at least until it is too late. 
While we did not find any indications that the participants had used deceit as a power 
strategy, there were many accusations that deceit had been used, primarily from therapists. 
The presence of such accusations raises possible dynamics around this strategy.  
 
Mistrust of information and discounting it entirely: 
Most of the accusations of deceit revolved around the manipulation and manage-
ment of information. Referring to the Community Advisory Committee meetings, one 
therapist described the minutes of the meetings as filtered and often false. 
“Minutes are edited… [Management is] revising history according to [its] 
own view of the world, and that’s very effective. If you respond to something 
and say ‘I think that policy stinks’, that would be edited to read something 
like ‘Staffs raised concerns about …’ Sometimes it’s even more blatant. 
Things are just left out. They disappear.” (Therapist) 
 
Many of the feelings around deceit seemed linked to past union-hospital experiences 
that were negative and that led to much mistrust. Many therapists, particularly veteran staffs, 
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said they could not rely on the information that senior management at the hospital provided 
to them. This appeared to carry over into the new organization, even though all the senior 
managers were new employees with no ties to the old organization. 
“There are lies… They just don’t give you the accurate truth… It’s difficult to have 
confidence in them. You mistrust people when that happens. It’s hard to trust 
them.” (Therapist) 
 
Accusations of using deceitful tactics also were present around the financial cutbacks 
the organization was facing. Some staffs felt that senior management was using ‘scare tactics’ 
as a way to make staffs agree to their proposals for change. 
“The reality was that they didn’t make any cutbacks at all, but they [scared us] 
for two or three months so that we would give in on certain issues… Those 
were underhanded strategies that were not necessary and that greatly affected 
staff.” (Therapist) 
 
Therapists also felt that the Executive Director was purposefully bringing up divisive 
issues for staffs to break their solidarity and weaken them. 
“I find he’s very strategic in what he does, and he tries to plot and set people against 
one another. He says things like ‘Well, it wouldn’t be a problem but we have to deal 
with these grievances from some of the clinicians’, and everybody knows the clini-
cian he’s referring to but it puts the pressure on those clinicians… He brings up hot 
potatoes, divisive issues.” (Therapist) 
 
In essence, it is possible that feelings of deceit emerged from the mistrust that ex-
isted at the psychiatric hospital and that was carried into the new organization. It does not 
appear that accusations of using deceitful strategies were based on any single event but de-
veloped as mistrust grew over time. 
 
“Playing dumb”: 
While most of the deceit strategies were blamed on senior management and related 
to downward relationships, there was an example where deceit was used within a lateral rela-
tionship. At one point during the negotiations around possible staff cutbacks, therapists in 
one satellite clinic felt they were not being informed enough of their union’s plans. They also 
felt an old boys network controlled the union. Their strategy was to work with their union 
steward and to pretend to have no knowledge about union procedures. 
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“My union is supposed to represent me, but it doesn’t really work that way. 
At one point we got mad and went to the union. We told them that our un-
ion representative didn’t want to talk to us. The union rep was there at the 
meeting, and we had planned everything in advance with her, of course. We 
are all strategists. The union asked her why she wouldn’t talk to us, and she 
replied ‘You told me not to talk to staff about the negotiations.’ The union 
then informed her that she could talk openly about the negotiations, to which 
she responded that she had no idea about what she was allowed to do. The 
union then admitted that many staff were new to the union, and that it had 
not properly trained its stewards about their role and rights.” (Therapist) 
 
In this example, staffs deliberately pretended to have no knowledge about union 
procedures so that the union leadership would recognize it was not consulting enough with 
its members. Staffs initiated actions by “playing dumb”, so to speak, with the result of con-
trolling some of the interactions of the other parties.  
What do the examples above have in common? First, mistrust seemed to have col-
ored the view of most therapists in that they could not have confidence in the Executive Di-
rector in particular, with some extensions to other senior managers. Second, negative experi-
ences of the veteran staffs at the psychiatric hospital seemed to have continued in the dy-
namics of the new organization. This would imply that the new management was not able to 
break the organization from past history despite many attempts. Third, there is a noticeable 
absence of discussion about the team leaders through the data relative to deceit. There is ab-
sence of any evidence that therapists and clerical staffs used team leaders as shields or tools 
in deceit strategies. One possible explanation for this is that the team leaders avoided being 
triangulated in the negative relationship between the union and senior managers.  
While there were many accusations concerning strategies of deceit, the very low 
number of such strategies implies that they were not a desirable means of achieving one’s 
ends. It may also be that the participants did not have the required control over situations so 
that their strategy remained undiscovered. Another explanation is that the participants may 
not have admitted to using tactics of deceit because of the negative connotation that these 
carry. Finally, participants said they did not want to reproduce the same patterns of behavior 
they believed senior managers used, thus avoiding use of trickery and deceitful strategies. 
Whether the feelings of deceit described above truly reflect the actual use of strate-
gies that senior managers used, or simply the perception that they were used, is an unknown 
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factor. In terms of relational power strategies, however, the feeling of being the object of 
deception was strong, indicating that uncertainty around accurate information existed. This 
supports other research by Frost (1987, p. 516), who found that “these behaviors are more 
noticeable in … competitive situations, contexts where uncertainty is likely to prevail and the 
use of power is likely to be prevalent.” 
It is noteworthy that accusations of using deceit through information management 
came principally from veteran therapists. While our data are too limited to fully explore this 
dynamic, this may be due in part to the heavier involvement of veteran staffs in union activi-
ties and their past experiences with the hospital. 
In summary, there were strong beliefs in the therapist group that information was 
manipulated, withheld, or filtered purposefully to fit senior management’s objectives. As a 
strategy, however, deceit was infrequently used to increase uncertainty and margins of free-
dom. While therapists denounced the Executive Director and believed he had intentionally 
misled them through deceit, we found no evidence that this had actually occurred. In terms 
of the sources of power that came into play, the control of information was a strong factor. 
 
6.2.7 INGRATIATION 
The conscious establishment of a positive interpersonal relationship as a means of 
influencing another person characterizes the ingratiation strategy. It emphasizes a personal 
approach through flattery and the deliberate creation of goodwill. In this section, we will ex-
amine how ingratiation was employed as a strategy by the different groups of participants.  
 
Openly valuing the skills of lower level staff: 
For the senior management group, references to ingratiation revolved around the 
qualities that senior managers described as necessary to be effective in influencing others. 
Showing their own limits by demonstrating that they did not have all the answers to the or-
ganization’s ills, and admitting to their mistakes were described by the two Co-ordinators as 
effective tools to develop a positive relationship, particularly downward relationships with 
therapists. 
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“I kept telling [the employee] ‘I’m not the expert. You’re the expert.’ I was 
hired to get this work done, but I needed the expert opinions of those I was 
going to work with. I said ‘You tell me how I should make it work.’ With that 
attitude, [the employee] came around nicely, but it took a lot of my time.” 
(Senior manager) 
 
As the example shows, ingratiation included bringing out the qualities of the other 
person, and of valuing those qualities. Valuing the input of the employees also was impor-
tant. 
“I think it takes a certain gut instinct, but I think it also takes experience with 
a variety of professionals in a variety of settings, and an openness in saying to 
the person, ‘Here’s what I’m considering. I’m not clear on what the impact 
would be on you. Can you tell me?’ instead of saying to them ‘I want you to 
do this’, and then they give you reasons why they can or cannot. Instead, up-
front giving them the opportunity to do that as part of the process.” (Senior 
manager) 
 
When dealing with lower-level staffs such as therapists and clerical staffs, the two 
Co-ordinators explained that it was important for them to allow staffs the time and opportu-
nities to express their opinions without cutting them off. It also was important to appear 
flexible and adaptable to the ideas of lower-level staffs.  
 
Gentle persuasion: 
‘Gentle persuasion’ was a variant of ingratiation that one senior manager used, par-
ticularly in upward relationships with other senior managers and the Community Advisory 
Committees. This was accomplished by laying selected facts on the table while never telling 
others that they were wrong in their decisions or opinions, and not confronting them di-
rectly.  
 
Absence of use of ingratiation by the Team Leaders: 
There were no examples in the data that senior managers used ingratiation as a strat-
egy with team leaders. While providing explanations on the absence of such data may lean 
toward speculation, it is reasonable to assume that the focus of the energies of senior man-
agers was on the therapists. Therapists represented the largest group of employees who were 
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gaining formal power through their participation on the Community Advisory Committees. 
Another explanation lies in the small number of participants in the senior management and 
team leaders groups, which may have reduced the possibility of obtaining detailed informa-
tion on this strategy. It may also be that senior managers simply did not use ingratiation with 
team leaders. It is difficult to verify these hypotheses, however, because of the limited num-
ber of examples. There were no examples of ingratiation as a strategy by the team leaders. 
 
“Being open and honest”: 
The senior managers often described being open and honest as one of the keys to 
successful strategies, especially in times of turbulence. This was not easily accomplished, 
however, in that the level of trust in senior and middle managers was generally low. The two 
Co-ordinators thus attempted to depersonalize situations by focusing on process rather than 
persons. 
“Let’s just assume that we’re messing up. That’s been an open, overt conver-
sation often enough that I think it’s sunk into most people that it’s not the 
person. It’s the process that got us into difficulties when we got into difficul-
ties, so let’s examine the process, free from personalities, to find a solution.” 
(Senior manager) 
 
The efforts of the senior managers to use a personal approach to exert influence 
over therapists and clerical staffs were not unnoticed by these groups. Many therapists, par-
ticularly in the Francophone group, noted that the Co-ordinators were often generally kind 
to them, and that they listened to their concerns despite trying to enforce the lines of com-
munication. One therapist felt, however, that senior managers of the new organization could 
not match much of the understanding and support she had gained from her manager at the 
psychiatric hospital. 
“[Our former team manager at the hospital] was unique. It was incredible 
what she did in giving us confidence [in our] work, giving me the confidence 
to go ahead, letting me to fumble for a couple of years and saying ‘Well, we 
tried this but it didn’t work. We’ve got to try something else. We’re going to 
throw that one out’.” (Therapist) 
 
Chapter 6 — Surface and Deep Level Strategies     206 
 
 
Thus, despite efforts by the senior managers to use personal approaches with staffs, 
comparisons with the past continued. The theme of lack of recognition of past work suc-
cesses and experiences by new managers reappears under the ingratiation strategy. 
In addition, all attempts at ingratiation through humor by the Executive Director 
were met with disinterest and mistrust by the therapists.  
“He’ll pop around a corner and stick his tongue out at you or insult you just 
as easily as throw his arm around you and say ‘Hi, how are you doing?’ ” 
(Therapist) 
 
“He [the Executive Director] comes in and he makes these yucky comments. 
I noticed he does it to a lot of women, and I know [others noticed this too]. 
He came in and said ‘It’s my birthday’, looking for kisses and stuff, and we 
went ‘OK’ and we just turned around and kept drinking our coffee, and no-
body said anything to him.” (Therapist) 
 
Such an example shows the personalized nature of the conflicts between veteran 
therapists and the Executive Director and the difficulty of attempting to use any personal 
means of influence under such circumstances. 
When examining the data from the clerical group, we found only a few references to 
ingratiation. One member of this group used humor actively. 
“I find that humor gets me through my day every day, every day at work, be-
cause we’re in stressful times. I think you know that, with the economy the 
way it is, with never knowing from day-to-day, month-to-month, year-to-year 
if we’re going to get our funding for next year so we can operate… I try to 
use humor whenever I can… When you’ve worked in a place long enough 
and dealt with people long enough, you can sense what you can and what you 
need to say and not say to people to make them a little comfortable and to 
release their stresses. So, I do it with humor. I try. I don’t know if I always 
succeed, but I try.” (Clerical staff)  
 
There were no other examples of humor as an active strategy by any other partici-
pant to establish themselves in the favor of others. This is not to say that use of humor was 
completely absent, but that it did not emerge from discussions about power strategies with 
the participants. 
To further examine ingratiation as a strategy, we compared new staffs to those who 
had been employed at the hospital prior to the organizational separation. A fact that could 
not be overlooked was the strong importance that the two Co-ordinators, both newcomers, 
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placed on positive relationships with lower level staffs. This is perhaps because of their rank 
in the organization, along with their newness to the issues. It is reasonable to assume that 
both Co-ordinators worked towards calming the storms occurring in the organization. Part 
of their responsibilities were in fact to co-ordinate the different parts of the organization and 
to make them work together smoothly. Not having been involved in prior battles, it may 
have been easier for them to use ingratiation without fear it would be perceived as deceit. 
The same did not hold for the Executive Director, however, whose attempts to develop less 
business-like relationships with staffs failed. Several veteran therapists, who were conscious 
of attempts by the co-ordinators to instill more positive relationships, but who failed to see 
the point behind the Executive Director’s attempts given the heavily strained relationship, 
corroborated this. 
 
Dealing with ‘old baggage’: 
Veteran staffs brought their past history into the new organization by using “old 
baggage”, including attitudes and experiences. We are reminded that therapists and clerical 
support staffs comprised most of the veteran participants, while all but one of the senior and 
middle management personnel were newcomers to the organization. Veterans did not feel it 
would be productive to use ingratiation, especially with higher levels in the organization, and 
said any efforts to do so would be a waste of time. New staffs, on the other hand, did not 
have the same history and investment in the organization as veterans. Part of the personal 
approach for the team leaders was thus simply to lend an ear to the frustrations of therapists. 
“There’s maybe less emotion for [my supervisor] because we’ve been here 
for a long time, and I know that my history here plays a big part in how I feel 
about certain things. I kind of let myself run wild, but he knows us now, and 
he knows when we’re doing that and he can kind of let that aside and take 
what we’re saying.” (Therapist)  
 
An atmosphere of mistrust: 
Besides past history, the question of trust seemed to be tied to this strategy. As men-
tioned earlier, attempts by the Executive Director to use humor to gain the favor of several 
therapists were rejected because the level of trust was extremely low. 
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It is interesting that in 16 of the 31 interviews in this research, there were no refer-
ences to ingratiation, and a complete absence of references to ingratiation by the team lead-
ers. When examined in the light of the avoidance of assertiveness and coerciveness as power 
strategies, it is interesting that the personal approach was not used more. There are several 
reasons for this. First, it is likely that the interview process did not gather all references to 
ingratiation. For this strategy, the participants may have resorted to spur-of-the-moment 
non-verbal or para-verbal means that they did not recall during the interview. This is sup-
ported by reviewing the transcripts of the interviews, where the participants generally spoke 
about what they said to others rather than about their physical behavior at the time. Smiles 
and other facial expressions, as well as body posture were not discussed as representing con-
scious strategies. 
A second possible explanation for the lack of strategies involving ingratiation is that 
some of the participants may not have felt it was important or effective to use ingratiation in 
their interactions with others. It was shown earlier that rewards as a source of power were 
few and far between, and positive comments and encouragement also were rare. Under such 
circumstances, ingratiation may have been perceived as deceitful if it had been used because 
of the strong conflict that characterized the relationships between senior management and 
the therapists. The relatively low emphasis on ingratiation thus may be tied to the conflictual 
relationships that pervaded the organization. The use of ingratiation as a strategy requires a 
personal approach that depends on a positive relationship between the parties. It is reason-
able to assume that it was difficult to make appeals to others, regardless of rank, under a 
conflictual relationship. 
A third explanation is that ingratiation may have been accomplished by different 
means or strategies, or intermixed with other strategies. Appeals to higher authorities, for 
example, may have included some forms of ingratiation that were not detected by the re-
searcher. 
In addition, because of the timing of this study, it was impossible to determine if 
therapists would be using ingratiation in their new relationships with the Community Advi-
sory Committees. No participant mentioned this strategy as one of the elements that would 
figure in their participation on the Committees. A follow-up study examining this would 
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provide further insight into this strategy. For the present research, we assume that since 
therapists were in a position of gaining power by participating on the committees, they 
would try to create goodwill by starting on a positive note, using the “foot-in-the-door” 
technique. 
In summary, there was uneven use of ingratiation when comparing different staff 
groups. Veteran staffs, particularly veteran therapists and clerical staffs, did not discuss ingra-
tiation as a power strategy that they actively used. The two Co-ordinators, on the other hand, 
emphasized the importance of personal qualities in minimizing the effects of the turbulence 
in the organization, and this was evident in their actions. There was little evidence of the use 
of flattery, although most participants discussed their desire for the creation of goodwill. 
Repetitions of past history and questions of trust may have led several participants to avoid 
ingratiation altogether to avoid perceptions of deceit. Charisma as a source of power did not 
appear to play a role. Margins of freedom were thus not necessarily increased or decreased 
through ingratiation alone. 
 
6.2.8 REASONING 
The reasoning strategy refers to using facts, information, and logical arguments to 
support one’s point of view. Invoking the reasoning strategy assumes that persons are ra-
tional and capable of drawing the correct conclusions from facts. In this section, we will ex-
amine different ways that the participants employed reasoning. While reasoning was not dis-
cussed as frequently as other strategies such as managing the lines of communication, differ-
ent uses did appear for various participants. 
 
Policies and procedures as the best way to deal with issues: 
As one might expect, the senior managers tried to reason with lower level employees 
by invoking the policies and procedures of the organization, often citing these to the em-
ployees, and referring the staffs to the written manuals of the organization. The senior man-
agers as the most efficient means of dealing with day-to-day problems described the policy 
manual and following proper lines of community as means of ensuring consistency. Thus, 
reasoning through the rules of the organization to settle differences of opinion or disputes 
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was a strategy that senior managers employed, particularly with the therapists. It also ensured 
that there would be an equal application of the rules to all staffs. 
 
Invoking common sense: 
Reasoning also took the form of invoking common sense. When asked what they 
drew upon in their reasoning strategies, one of the senior managers stated that she based 
herself on her own past experiences and common sense, and that she tried to transpose 
these to the present. 
 
Comparing with other mental health centres: 
Other examples of reasoning by senior managers included examining organizational 
processes at other mental health centres, gathering facts about their functioning, and using 
these facts in arguments to lower level staffs. When deciding on the number of paid hours 
that would comprise a full workday for the therapists, for example, senior managers sur-
veyed similar organizations across the province and determined that 35 hours was the norm. 
They also considered working conditions at the psychiatric hospital in terms of working 
hours and built these facts into their arguments and negotiations.  
 
Involving outside experts: 
There was limited evidence that reasoning took the form of involving outside ex-
perts. The Administrator Co-ordinator felt that the senior management team did not have 
the necessary experience to carry out all of its labor negotiations with the union. Her deliber-
ate strategy was to argue that labor negotiations were very complex, especially for new or-
ganizations, and that outside expertise would be needed to ensure successful negotiations. 
“I felt that [the senior management team] didn’t have the total expertise, and 
so I talked the Executive Director into using external resources such as a lo-
cal law firm, which took a lot of talking because the Executive Director is a 
very proud man and he’s very confident, to the point if you were wearing a 
white shirt he would argue that it’s black. I call it the art of gentle persuasion. 
I talked to him and said ‘Let’s use Mrs. H… She’s really good. She has a way 
of dealing with [difficult negotiations]’.” (Senior manager) 
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Presenting “hard data” to lower level staff: 
Senior managers also attempted to use reasoning in dealing with the employees on 
the issue of financial cutbacks. By presenting “hard data” to lower level staffs, namely budget 
figures that showed a deficit and the difficulties of overcoming it, senior managers felt they 
could appeal to the rational side of the employees. Unfortunately, many therapists discred-
ited the information they produced as inaccurate, distorted, and untrustworthy. 
 
Non-use of reasoning by team leaders: 
Team leaders were surprisingly silent about the reasoning strategy. Given their cen-
tral position in the organization in terms of communications and their responsibility of im-
plementing the rules of the organization, we expected many references to the reasoning 
strategy. This was not the case, however when we examined upward, downward, upward-
downward, and lateral relationships. There are several possible reasons for the relative ab-
sence of the reasoning strategy among the team leaders. The principal reason relates to the 
underlying conflict that had pervaded the organization for several years. As discussed earlier, 
information coming or emerging from senior management levels was mistrusted because 
there was a belief that such information was managed or modified to suit their purposes. 
This led to the therapists gaining official access to the Community Advisory Committees, 
which they believed would address problems relating to control of information and commu-
nications. It is probable that reasoning was not the strategy of choice for the team leaders in 
their upwards and downwards relationships because the information and facts they would 
have used were not viewed as credible by lower level staffs. Another reason for the lack of 
use of this strategy is that it may have been disguised under the neutralization strategy that 
we will explore shortly under deep level strategies. Under the neutralization strategy, values 
and beliefs are woven into facts and information, making these stronger and more difficult 
to argue against. Other possible explanations for the absence of reasoning as a strategy in-
clude that it is difficult to change a person’s opinions by any means once their mind is made 
up. In essence, people don’t necessarily listen when the other person’s ideas are too different 
from their own, no matter how factual they are.  
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Showing benefits to clients of different ways of working: 
For the therapists group, there was a relatively low number of references to reason-
ing as a strategy. Most of the examples relate to arguments with team leaders and senior 
managers about overtime work hours and the possible cancellation of certain intervention 
programs due to financial cutbacks. In all these examples, the therapists tried to show to sen-
ior managers the benefits of their points of view by arguing the advantages to clients and 
programs. Therapists occasionally intermixed this with their expertise and experience in the 
field. It appears that team leaders were bypassed in these arguments because all decisions 
relating to these issues were to be made by senior managers. 
For the clerical group, there were no examples relating to the reasoning strategy. Be-
cause of their peripheral role in the clinical and administrative decisions of the organization, 
clerical staffs were less likely to invoke the reasoning strategy. 
There were no particular differences in the reasoning strategy between new employ-
ees and veterans. Explanations include those already described above. Unfortunately, it is 
difficult to determine what level of insistence the participants placed on each of the strategies 
because the current research did not examine the intensity of each of the strategies.  
The reasoning strategy, by definition, calls upon information as a source of power. 
This was clear in the examples that we noted. Expertise also was a factor in that the partici-
pants invoked the work experience and training and included them as rational arguments. 
Finally, questions of trust seemed closely tied to reasoning. When employees believed that 
the information they were receiving was not trustworthy or had been manipulated in some-
one else’s favor, or if the information had no value for the opposing party, the reasoning 
strategy appeared weakened. Margins of freedom thus would not be increased under such 
conditions. This may be one of the principal reasons why the reasoning strategy was absent 
in many of the interviews. 
 
6.2.9  APPEALS TO HIGHER AUTHORITIES 
Kipnis, Schmidt and Wilkinson (1980) define upward appeals as invoking the influ-
ence of higher levels of the organization. While by definition, upward appeals involve lower 
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level staffs appealing to higher levels, we examined the data for interactions between all lev-
els and in all directions of influence. This provided a more accurate picture of interactions 
around this power strategy. 
We found only limited evidence of using upward appeals as a strategy to deal with 
the turbulent changes that occurred. While the evidence was weak, brief mentions about up-
ward appeals did occur in the therapists group. Appeals to higher authority related princi-
pally to therapists bypassing lines of authority and requesting help directly from the Clinical 
and Administrative Co-ordinators. This was possible because of the personal relationships 
that several therapists had developed with the Clinical Co-ordinator. For the clerical support 
staffs group, two of the four participants had developed personal relationships with the Ad-
ministrative Co-ordinator and they felt free to consult with the Co-ordinator if problems 
arose. This contrasts with the heavy emphasis that both Co-ordinators put on following the 
proper lines of authority. How is it that the Co-ordinators emphasized following the lines of 
communication while some therapists and clerical staffs felt they could bypass these same 
lines to consult with them? There are several possible reasons for this. First, the personal 
relationship that many had developed with the Co-ordinators increased their margin of free-
dom. Also, at least two participants mentioned that by virtue of their membership on agency 
committees (e.g., the newsletter and the negotiations committees), they could formally talk 
about issues with the Co-ordinators without fear of being told not to communicate with 
them. This was limited to a few participants, however.  
The fact that the therapists group gained formal access to the Community Advisory 
Committees is an indication that appeals to higher authorities had the potential of becoming 
an important strategy for this group. Through their direct contacts with Committee mem-
bers, the therapists group would now be able to use upward appeals as a strategy. Ironically, 
this was a strategy that was condoned by senior management and the Board of Directors. 
Unfortunately, the timing of our research did not permit further investigation of this issue. 
The team leaders, for their part, did not refer to appeals as a strategy in the research 
interviews. While they have formalized access to persons higher in the hierarchy, for example 
on the Community Advisory Committees and in senior management, they did not resort to 
this type of strategy. This implies that their position grants them considerable access to the 
Chapter 6 — Surface and Deep Level Strategies     214 
 
 
different levels of decision-making in the organization. The team leaders do not have to use 
upward appeals as a “strategy” because it is already part of their day-to-day work. 
There was only one reference to upward appeals in the senior management group, 
and this related to the Co-ordinators. In their positions, the Clinical Co-ordinator and the 
Administrative Co-ordinator do not have direct authority over the team leaders, therapists, 
and clerical staffs. As a result, the Co-ordinators are forced to deal with the Executive Direc-
tor for all issues coming across their desk and having to obtain his collaboration to get things 
done. This sometimes put them in an awkward position in that all problems that occurred at 
lower levels had to be reported to him. The Co-ordinators described this as feeling like 
“snitches” against lower level personnel.  
It remains that there were few examples of upward appeals through each of the lev-
els of employees studied. This may be explained in part by the negative connotation that 
some staffs, particularly therapists, gave to such a strategy. Like the use of ingratiation, ap-
pealing to higher authorities can be viewed as “selling out” by some staffs. We did not find 
evidence of this, however. The small number of participants in this group prevented us from 
exploring this dynamic further.  
Another reason for the limited use of this strategy relates to the strong emphasis on 
following prescribed lines of communication within the organization. Using upward appeals 
as a strategy was difficult because senior management continually enforced the lines of au-
thority, thereby discouraging this kind of activity in the organization. In essence, for the en-
tire group, upward appeals did not appear to be a prevalent strategy. 
 
6.2.10 SANCTIONS 
Earlier, sanctions were described as a source of power that applies rewards and rep-
rimands to obtain desired behaviors or outcomes. When used as strategies, positive sanctions 
(e.g., rewards) and negative sanctions (e.g., reprimands) are powerful not only by their actual 
application but also by their potential use. Under the context of this study, sanctions are ap-
plicable only downwards (e.g., by senior managers and team leaders) because they stem di-
rectly from the formal authority of these positions. 
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In examining rewards and reprimands as sources of power in an earlier section of 
this chapter, we found that there were few examples of rewards and reprimands by senior 
managers and team leaders. As for reprimands as a strategy, there were no examples at all in 
these groups. Of the 31 interviews comprising this research, there were only seven inter-
views that had references to sanctions, six of these from veteran therapists, one from a new 
therapist. The examples we found stem from the following themes: sanctions for bypassing 
lines of authority, for non-collaboration, and for carrying out tasks not in one’s job descrip-
tion. 
 
Feeling that sanctions would be imposed for bypassing the lines of communi-
cation: 
 
Bypassing the lines of authority was highly discussed by all participants in this re-
search. For the therapists, one way of increasing their margin of freedom was by bypassing 
their team leaders and going directly to senior management with issues and questions. As 
described earlier, this prompted senior managers to place heavy emphasis on following the 
prescribed lines of communication. Some therapists felt there would be sanctions or retalia-
tion if they tried to bypass these formal channels. 
“They’re pretty stiff about their preferring everything to go through your 
team manager … but it is violated I think on their end more often than per-
mitted, because they can violate it whereas we can be in trouble… You’re 
kind of scolded if you forget and call the personnel office and want to know 
how much vacation time you have [without first going through your team 
leader].” (Therapist) 
 
“I’m not supposed to phone the woman in payroll… You get reprimanded 
and told ‘Don’t phone downtown’. Part of it is controlling the communica-
tions.” (Therapist) 
 
Thus, one form of sanction that was applied by senior managers and team leaders 
was a verbal warning concerning organizational processes. A much more serious and formal 
form of sanction that was described by therapists was the threat that team leaders could use 
performance appraisals. 
“You are evaluated around here. It doesn’t mean much, but you do get evalu-
ated.” (Therapist) 
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Although attributed to only a few employees, the above quotation refers to the fact 
that veteran employees in one of the satellite clinics had more years of clinical experience 
and expertise than their team leader. They did not attach much credibility to the performance 
appraisals that their team leader would carry out of their work. Nonetheless, at least two 
therapists felt that performance appraisals would reflect negatively on their employment re-
cord. This implies that the threat of sanctions also was a threat to the margin of freedom of 
some lower level staffs. In other words, the possibility of sanctions was a deterrent to certain 
behaviors in that it reduced uncertainty for management.  
 
Sanctions for non-collaboration with senior management: 
A further related issue is that there were perceived sanctions for non-collaboration. 
One therapist was quite adamant about working with senior management rather than against 
them because of the negative consequences that non co-operation would entail. While she 
was not specific about how retribution would take place, she felt that sanctions would be 
applied both personally and to the program to which she was attached. 
 
Sanctions for expanding functions without permission: 
There also was evidence that sanctions would be applied if certain clinical staffs tried 
to expand their job descriptions without permission. Just prior to this research, three veteran 
Child & Youth Workers had made an unsuccessful labor grievance against the organization, 
claiming that their job tasks were similar to other therapists who had a higher job classifica-
tion. If the grievances had been successful, this would have meant not only higher salaries 
but also a higher job classification and more freedom in their interventions. This in turn 
would have meant increased professional discretion for them in their jobs. The Child & 
Youth Workers were not permitted by management to carry out therapy sessions with fami-
lies, only with children. To enforce the decision, there was close monitoring of the tasks that 
the workers would carry out. The threat of sanctions was always present. 
“We’re told that we can’t go back to how it was before, because at one time 
we did participate in the family meetings, and it seemed to be so much better 
when we did that because we had insight… There is nothing of that going on 
Chapter 6 — Surface and Deep Level Strategies     217 
 
 
anymore, and we’re told very specifically that is not our job, that’s not our 
description of our tasks to do, so we are not to do these things. We’re told 
that very clearly… They want to make sure that we stick to our job descrip-
tion because if we do more, they don’t want any grievances… I’m not saying 
that sometimes I just don’t go ahead and [meet with families]. Sometimes I 
do, and sometimes I don’t. I guess it depends how big the risk is. If I find 
that it’s too risky, then I’ll wait.” (Therapist) 
 
This dynamic was a long-standing one that carried-over from the psychiatric hospital, 
where the Child & Youth Workers had attempted unsuccessfully several times over the years 
to gain equal recognition as the other therapists in terms of job functions. They resented the 
lack of consideration of their capabilities and expertise by senior managers, and this led the 
managers to keep a close eye on their job functions. The perception that sanctions would be 
applied if they went beyond the boundary of their job description thus comes as no surprise.  
The mention of “risk” nonetheless raises the possibility that some employees were 
using their professional discretion to increase their margin of freedom. Given the highly 
charged relationship of some therapists with their team leaders and senior managers, how-
ever, the actual imposition of sanctions would have increased the likelihood of further con-
flict with the therapists. While sanctions can be powerful tools to restrict the behavior of 
others, managers said that sanctions would reduce any remaining collaborative spirit, in ef-
fect upping the ante in terms of conflictual relationships. Senior managers and team leaders 
said they gained little from the application of negative sanctions, and this is noted in the rela-
tively low emphasis on this strategy. In essence, there was enough conflict in the organiza-
tion without adding to it. 
 
Absence of positive sanctions: 
In terms of positive sanctions, there was a complete absence of references to rewards 
such as praise or monetary compensation as a power strategy. Given the financial context of 
the organization, material rewards such as raises, bonuses, or extra time off were out of the 
question. Regarding psychological or personal rewards, we believe a low value was ascribed 
to positive sanctions, that the focus was on organizational efficiency and control, and that 
therapists and clerical staffs had low expectations that they would receive rewards of any 
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kind. In terms of power strategies, the threat of sanctions may have reduced uncertainty by 
constraining the margin of freedom of therapists. Due to the limited number of interviews 
and the methodology employed, however, it is difficult to provide further analysis of the ab-
sence of positive sanctions and the rather low number of negative sanctions. Further study 
of this aspect is merited. 
 
6.2.11 WORKING TO RULE, BLOCKING PROGRESS, AND WITH-
HOLDING INFORMATION 
Working to rule refers to meeting one’s minimum work requirements in the organi-
zation while purposefully withholding any extra effort in completing one’s tasks. Adapted to 
human service organizations, this may include slowing down one’s work, restricting the 
number of clients seen in a given day, the outright refusal to work, and strike action. We 
have grouped working to rule, blocking progress and withholding information together be-
cause they each relate to exerting pressure and inhibiting the progress of the organization. 
 
Working to rule: 
There were only three brief references to working to rule in the thirty-one interviews 
comprising this research, and all three references were from therapists. Two of these came 
from new staffs, one refusing to work after 5 o’clock because senior managers would not 
approve flexible work hours when overtime occurred, the other feeling that creativity in his 
work was not being valued. This led these therapists to do only what was asked of them and 
no more. The third reference to working to rule came from a veteran member, who clearly 
stated that slowing down services or withholding them was not a strategy that she and most 
others would consider using for fear of retributions from management. 
One of the central dynamics of working-to-rule as a strategy is that it may turn the 
rules of the organization in the favor of lower level staffs. As Crozier and Friedberg (1977) 
argue, while organizational rules may constrain the freedom of subordinates, they also re-
strict the margin of freedom of higher level staffs by reducing their discretionary power. In 
the example provided above, senior managers did not want the therapists to “flex” their 
work week (e.g., working more hours on some days, less hours on other days), and this ulti-
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mately led one therapist to refuse to work evenings, when it would have been more conven-
ient for many clients. This attempt to constrain the freedom of a therapist also constrained 
management in its ability to meet the requests of clients. 
 
Withholding information: 
Concerning deliberately withholding information as a strategy, none of the partici-
pants mentioned that it had any importance in the dynamics of the agency. As mentioned 
earlier, there were many accusations that information coming from management could not 
be trusted, but there were no examples of withholding information. Clerical staffs were in a 
position to be able to withhold information or to procrastinate because of the central role 
they played in communications in the organization. Team leaders also could have exerted 
much pressure and power, especially on senior managers, by delaying or not passing on in-
formation of critical events occurring in each satellite clinic. This ultimately would not have 
served their purpose, however. Withholding information was not a strategy that was appar-
ent in the data. 
There are several possible explanations for the very low number of references to this 
strategy. The strategy had the potential of exerting tremendous pressure on upper manage-
ment because the expertise of the therapists was not easily replaceable and was essential to 
the organization. Management could not carry out the work of the therapists. Work stop-
pages would literally have brought services provided by the organization to a halt, leading to 
immediate repercussions in the community. This would have drawn clients into the organiza-
tion’s long standing conflicts. Up to this point, clients were not implicated and in all likeli-
hood were not aware of them.  
A second explanation lies in the fact that work stoppages or visible slowdowns 
would not have gained public sympathy. Mental health services at the psychiatric hospital did 
not have a high profile in the community when compared to medical services at other hospi-
tals, and attracting media attention would have been short-lived. This was first shown in 
1986 when one of the two directors of the children’s outpatient clinic at the psychiatric hos-
pital resigned from his position, protesting the lack of services to the Francophone popula-
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tion. The media campaign he initiated against the hospital lasted only a few days, and the is-
sue became once again a mostly internal one to the organization. 
A third reason for the rarity of work slowdowns and strikes is that these are contrary 
to professional ethics affiliation and responsibility. As stated above, clients would have been 
drawn into the organizational conflicts if the professionals had decided to carry through with 
plans of work stoppages. The repercussions on staffs from the community may have been 
detrimental to the organization as a whole. Whether this is a dynamic that occurs in similar 
organizations or if it is limited to the current organization is unknown.  
Not “rocking the boat” also may have been an issue for staffs in this new organiza-
tion. Given that there was much uncertainty around job security, strike action and slow-
downs would only have worsened the uncertainty. It also is important not to overlook the 
fact that working to rule is subject to reprimands or further sanctions by senior managers. 
While increasing and manipulating uncertainty is a key element in power games, staffs as a 
union were not ready or willing to carry through with actions that they felt would be detri-
mental to the organization as a whole. In essence, there was sufficient turbulence without 
adding to it. 
 
6.2.12 MANAGING INVOLVEMENT IN THE ORGANIZATION; PSY-
CHOLOGICAL DISTANCE 
The transcripts revealed many dynamics related to the intensity of the relationships 
between the organizational actors, particularly between the different hierarchical levels. By 
intensity of relationships, we mean the deliberate manipulation of the psychological or physi-
cal distance between persons as a means of exerting pressure. This strategy is not identified 
in the literature as a power strategy, probably because the focus has generally been on imper-
sonal issues such as structure, authority, and control of information. In contrast, the partici-
pants in our study frequently discussed how issues related to psychological distance were im-
portant to them and how these were linked to power strategies and the manipulation of un-
certainty. We thus add this section as an additional power strategy for the following reasons. 
First, strategies are defined as patterns in a stream of decisions. While the strategies outlined 
earlier all fit within the description of exerting power, a frequent dynamic appeared to re-
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volve around staying out of power struggles. In our research, the participants sometimes 
went out of their way to minimize or avoid power struggles, leading us to examine these ac-
tions in terms of strategies. Second, the actions they described consistently involved power 
sources and their manipulation, and the use of distance as a psychological strategy was a 
highly visible strategy involving multiple actors implicated in power games.  
 
Attempting to close the distance between organizational levels: 
Two principal themes were related to this strategy in the data: senior managers solic-
iting input from lower level staffs, and disengagement of the therapists. The first theme re-
fers to senior managers’ attempts to solicit input from all employees about the financial cut-
backs, ideas for the office layout, and suggestions for staff training. As described by all three 
senior managers, consultation with staffs was an important strategy in trying to break down 
the “we-they” dynamics between the managers and therapists.  
“When I was [designing] the satellite clinics, for anything that I did, I would 
meet with [staff] by groups, and what was important for me was to get their 
input because I wanted them to feel that they had a say in the changes.” (Sen-
ior manager) 
 
“We decided to canvass staff to ask them the areas in which they thought 
they had strengths and could maybe be teachers to others and do some train-
ing of their peers, areas where they felt they wanted training, or areas where 
they were weaker if you will, and might want training on, to identify what the 
needs were, and to identify what skills we had within our own body and 
maybe could do things internally without necessarily going external.” (Senior 
manager) 
 
Thus, creating forums for the exchange of ideas and input from therapists around 
different issues was a way of keeping in touch with the different facets of the organization 
and decreasing the psychological distance between the levels. If successful, this would reduce 
the uncertainty that senior managers faced during the turbulence in the organization.  
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Disengaging psychologically and attempting to increase the distance between 
organizational levels: 
 
As shown by their reactions, it is apparent that the therapists were very much aware 
of senior managers’ attempts to decrease the distance between the groups. Therapists, for 
example, did not participate much on agency committees because they believed their input 
was not valued and would have no influence on decision-making in the organization.  
“If we suggest something, they make it look like they’re going to look at it, 
but they really don’t. They don’t really co-operate with us in order to help us 
feel good about where we are and help us feel secure in this establishment. 
You don’t feel like you can trust too many people around here, and I’m talk-
ing about management way up. I have no respect for upper management be-
cause upper management does not respect what we do.” (Therapist) 
 
When asked about what they did about these feelings of mistrust, most therapists de-
scribed their actions as opposite to the goals of the senior managers. They seemed to disen-
gage themselves from the agency psychologically. 
“I just don’t bother. I won’t go out of my way to lash out at the person, but 
I’m not going to bother… I’m not going to put my name on a committee. 
I’m not going to go waste my time. People have done it too many times now 
and it gives nothing. At least if you saw that there was some kind of negotia-
tion. I’m not saying that we have to win all the time, but at least to negotiate 
and meet halfway of something, but there’s none of that.” (Therapist) 
 
“In a way I feel I’m here to do my job and collect my paycheck, and I don’t 
feel very committed to trying to influence change in this organization.” 
(Therapist) 
 
“One of my strategies is a survival strategy, keeping quiet and just doing my 
job. That’s what I do. It’s really being asleep on the job! … It’s like being a 
zombie. You just go through the movements.” (Therapist) 
 
“I don’t have any goals for the agency, and I don’t have any goals to establish 
any other programs or design any novel interventions or anything like that. I 
just want to be able to come to work and do my job.” (Therapist) 
 
Additionally, senior managers and team leaders reported unusually high levels of sick 
leave for the therapists group. These examples provide evidence of how physical and psy-
chological distance were used as a strategy. We contend that by being passive in the organi-
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zation, by withdrawing their collaboration and ideas, by acting as “zombies” and doing sim-
ply what they were told, the therapists were avoiding becoming triangulated or “getting 
caught in the middle”. In essence, there were conscious efforts by the therapists to distance 
themselves from the organizational politics. Besides being a psychological survival strategy 
for the therapists, passivity in their involvement also increased uncertainty for senior manag-
ers, who could not count on the ideas of the therapists to deal with the organizational turbu-
lence. Sick leave and time off, for their part, were described by at least two therapists as the 
only option that prevented senior managers and team leaders from controlling them. Sick 
time was one of the means of raising levels of uncertainty for managers. 
“I can’t function in a system where I’m going to lose my integrity. My only 
way is to get out of the system. There, management can’t control me. Our 
system is based on control, and I refuse to get involved in that… The things 
that interest me are now elsewhere outside this organization, and I’m disen-
gaging myself. To learn to be ill makes a lot of sense to me. It’s the only way 
to go in a system that doesn’t respect me.” (Therapist) 
 
As for the role of the team leaders in this strategy, one of the team leaders described 
her function as a protection that prevented upper level politics from affecting lower levels. 
“My role is so central that I’m like the meat in the sandwich. I’m between 
levels. In my role, I’m like an umbrella and I catch the shit. [My staffs] don’t 
hear a lot of the stuff that happens above, and they don’t need to hear it… 
The teams don’t need to know all that garbage. The front-line, their job is to 
take care of the clients.” (Team leader) 
 
The team leaders all agreed that the therapists and clerical staffs needed to be 
“heard” to address questions of mistrust, but they were at a loss to find the best means to 
deal with these issues. This problem was compounded by the heavy reliance of the senior 
managers on following the proper lines of communication while ignoring their own guide-
lines in soliciting input from the therapists. One of the team leaders described her actions as 
“just letting things happen” and letting the organizational dust settle. This was due to her 
view that during organizational turbulence, staffs in the organization took more isolated and 
polarized stances, therefore increasing the possibility that she would be in the line of fire be-
tween senior managers and therapists. By limiting her role, the team leader was effectively 
practicing boundary management. 
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Clerical staffs were relatively quiet on this strategy. Two of the four clerical staffs 
mentioned that they wished to stand away from the organizational politics and simply do 
their job. There were too few references from this group to draw any conclusions however.  
In essence, managing one’s involvement in the organization was more than just a 
coping mechanism, especially for the team leaders and therapists. In downward relationships, 
senior managers tried to address questions of trust and “we-they” dynamics by soliciting in-
put from staffs. In contrast, upward relationships were characterized by therapists’ attempts 
to avoid involvement in organizational politics while increasing uncertainty for senior levels 
of the organization through personal distance. Upward-downward relationships also were 
characterized by personal distance of the team leaders through non-involvement. 
Comparisons between newcomers and veterans in this strategy showed some small 
differences between the groups. Veteran therapists particularly disengaged themselves from 
involvement in the organization’s committees, except for union business. We believe a “con-
tagion” effect occurred, however, in that newcomer therapists adopted some of the same 
attitudes of mistrust. Further comparisons between the groups are difficult because most 
senior managers and team leaders were newcomers. Their hierarchical position and respon-
sibilities in the organization would lead them to be more engaged in the organization than 
therapists and clerical staffs. 
This strategy represents a composite strategy that has elements in common with sev-
eral strategies discussed above, principally ingratiation (addressing issues of trust) and man-
aging the lines of communication, and that adds the element of control of psychological dis-
tance. The sources of power included in this strategy are controlling access to power holders 
(this role of the team leaders was minimized when senior managers bypassed them and con-
sulted staffs directly) and managing information. The two principal dimensions of this strat-
egy relate to personal and structural elements. 
 
6.2.13  SUMMARY OF THE SURFACE LEVEL STRATEGIES 
In summary, the data show that there were a variety of surface level strategies em-
ployed by the participants. Different groups of staffs emphasized some strategies more than 
others. 
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Many of the surface level strategies reflected conflict. The dynamics around asser-
tiveness, bargaining and the clear absence of positive rewards, for example, were clear indica-
tions to any outsider that conflict was abundant and well entrenched. 
Senior managers were very vocal about the strategies they used or intended to use. 
They tended to focus on surface level strategies relating to the structure of the organization 
such managing lines of communication. Strong emphasis on reasoning also was observed. 
The team leaders did not resort to as many different types of surface strategies, par-
ticularly due to the background role amongst the conflicting relations between other levels. 
Therapists, on the other hand, maintained strong negative power relationships with 
upper levels of the organization. Maintaining a psychological distance was a strong dynamic, 
along with many accusations that deceit and sanctions had been used against them. Clerical 
staffs, for their part, were relatively absent in the dynamics. They did mention not wanting to 
screw things up intentionally for their superiors and to do the best possible job for the or-
ganization.  
Surface level strategies alone, however, do not account for all actions by the partici-
pants. By examining the deep level strategies in the next section, we will get a fuller under-
standing of the depth of strategies employed by the participants. As in the preceding section, 
we will present the deep level strategies in as much detail as possible. An analysis of the sur-
face and deep level strategies will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
6.3  DEEP LEVEL STRATEGIES  
Deep level strategies are disguised through attachment of beliefs, giving added mean-
ing to the arguments one puts forth. To paraphrase Frost (1987), these strategies attempt to 
distort the reality presented to others by embedding beliefs, values, or cultural patterns in the 
practices of organizations. Often, deep level strategies are hidden or grounded in the prac-
tices of individuals or organizations. There is not always the need for organizational actors to 
wield power in the system as they would use in surface level strategies.  
In the following sections, we will examine deep level strategies and how the partici-
pants in this research used them. The four types of deep level strategies identified are natu-
ralization, legitimation, neutralization, and socialization.  
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As with the surface level strategies, we carried out simple calculations to get a feel for 
the general emphasis placed on each strategy. The same methodological cautions discussed 
earlier for surface level strategies apply here. High emphasis is not representative of high fre-
quency but is an indication of higher emphasis relative to other groups.  
 
 
TABLE 8 
 
Comparison Of The Relative Emphasis Placed On Deep Level Strategies 
By Different Staff Groups 
(*** above average, ** average, * below average) 
 
Deep Level  
Strategy 
Senior 
Managers 
Team 
Leaders 
Therapists Clerical 
Staffs 
Naturalization ** * * *** 
Legitimation *** *** * * 
Neutralization *** *** ** * 
Socialization *** *** * Not used 
 
Deep level strategies represented 17 percent (n=162) of the total number of strate-
gies uncovered. Table 8 reveals that higher levels of the organization placed more emphasis 
on deep level strategies than lower levels.  
 
 
TABLE 9 
 
Comparison Of The Relative Emphasis Placed On Deep Level Strategies 
— Newcomers Versus Veterans — 
(*** above average, ** average, * below average) 
 
Deep Level Strategy Newcomers Veterans 
Naturalization ** ** 
Legitimation *** * 
Neutralization ** ** 
Socialization *** * 
 
Table 9 compares the emphasis that newcomers and veterans placed on deep level 
strategies. Newcomers were more likely to use deep level strategies than veterans were. Sev-
eral factors may explain this. As revealed in Table 8, senior managers and team leaders, who 
placed a high general emphasis on three of the four deep level strategies, are all newcomers. 
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The next four sections deal with the qualitative details of each of the deep level 
strategies. The chapter will end with a summary of the findings. Following this, Chapter 7 
will discuss the relevance of the findings and come to some conclusions. 
 
6.3.1 NATURALIZATION 
When actors invoke the naturalization strategy, they depict the existing relations as 
the natural outgrowth of events or as part of natural law. This is aimed at preventing further 
discussion of the events, and it serves to preserve existing power relationships. 
 
Falling back on what is known: 
The senior management group provided only a few examples of naturalization. As 
described earlier, senior managers strongly emphasized the lines of communication in the 
organization, and evidence of this was observed in the way they invoked this deep level 
strategy. Often having no policies and procedures to fall back on, the Administrative Co-
ordinator felt that she should fall back upon the policies used at the psychiatric hospital. 
“In the absence of any administrative policy and procedure, I cover myself by 
saying we will follow whatever the hospital had unless it doesn’t suit. I always 
fall back to that… When we first started, for example, if it was an issue re-
lated to sick leave and I hadn’t written a policy on sick leave yet, I would fall 
back on whatever the hospital had in place… When we signed over to the 
[new] agency, when we signed over the collective agreement, we also said for 
now, we’ll follow whatever the hospital has and we’ll write ours as we go 
along. We were a little more ahead on clinical policies in that they worked on 
that for three or four months, because they felt those were really important... 
For the administrative ones, we knew we had the hospital’s policies.” (Senior 
manager) 
 
The Co-ordinator reduced uncertainty by falling back to what was known to her (the 
old policies), thus reducing uncertainty for herself and lowering the margin of freedom of 
others. If there were disputes, this was an easy and natural way of saying “Do as you’ve al-
ways done until we tell you differently”, and it was an effective way of addressing any issues 
that might have come from resistance around policies and procedures. 
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Recalling past methods of doing things: 
There were several examples where the naturalization strategy called upon past 
methods of doing business in the organization. A senior manager who was trying to increase 
the efficiency through new time reporting sheets, yet having to deal with past history in-
voked by therapists provided one such example.  
“As much as staff wanted not to be reminded of whatever went on at the 
hospital, when I wanted to introduce a major change like a time sheet, I was 
faced with ‘That’s not the way we do it.’ Then I thought ‘On the one hand 
you’re telling me you want to change, and on the other hand you want to re-
sist it’.” (Senior manager) 
 
The above example demonstrates the dilemmas that the naturalization strategy cre-
ated for the organization’s actors. Senior managers faced double messages from lower level 
staffs. On one hand, therapists and clerical staffs initially had high hopes for change; on the 
other hand, they were accustomed to a certain way of carrying out their business and were 
not willing to accept just any change. This put senior managers in a “no win” situation by 
not being able to please any of the parties with whatever actions they took. The reminder of 
“that’s not the way we do it” emphasized the dilemma in terms of a naturalization strategy. 
 
Bring up inevitable future trends as a strategy: 
When it came time to choose furniture for each satellite clinic, there was consider-
able opposition from some veteran staffs because of the possibility that all therapists would 
have to use computers. 
“They resisted because a lot of my components were with computers in mind 
for the future… I was met with a lot of resistance from the others, then we 
started getting into conflicts about ‘Are you telling us down the road that 
we’ll have to use computers?’ I was just saying that we might as well have 
that in mind, because eventually computers are going to be here.” (Senior man-
ager) 
 
In essence, the Co-ordinator tried to emphasize to staffs that computers were inevi-
table in the organization, thereby trying to strengthen her position over other possible alter-
natives.  
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As for clerical staffs, discussions about computers seemed to fall within their func-
tions in the organization. In many ways, their jobs relied on technology and thus it was not 
surprising for them to support the use of computers and to see this trend as inevitable. 
 
“Natural” and inevitable cultural self-determination: 
For the therapists group, there were only a few references to naturalization. In addi-
tion to the example provided above, this strategy involved elements principally related to 
culture and mistrust emerging from the past. Many therapists believed that cultural self-
determination over mental health services was a natural trend from across the province and 
the rest of country, and that their organization could not escape it. For those therapists who 
agreed with the separation of the organization along cultural lines, invoking the naturaliza-
tion strategy helped deal with issues around assimilation of culture, beliefs and norms. For 
those who disagreed with the organizational structure and its cultural guidelines, it was more 
difficult to argue one’s points because this was the “natural” and inevitable way to go. 
 
Mistrust as a “natural” outgrowth of the past: 
Regarding dynamics related to mistrust, the participants often discussed the past his-
tory of the organization. Many veteran therapists described it as “natural” for them to mis-
trust senior management because of their past experience with the transition of the organiza-
tion. They seemed to justify their actions as consequences of the past history. 
“I think that a sense of suspiciousness and careful regard for anything that 
management does is a carry-over from the hospital and the divestment. I 
think old history keeps rearing its head, and when they bury it, or can you 
bury it? It’s part of something that you carry with you, so that the same kinds 
of things don’t repeat themselves, so it’s a learning process, it’s a caution that 
we have. I think that is a direct result. I think it does create some difficulties 
for new staffs because they’re looking for direction that can come from man-
agement, even within this organization. People who were part of the old or-
ganization through the transfer are always reading behind the lines. For ex-
ample, what does this mean? How is it being taken? How is it going to di-
rectly affect the workers? Have the lines been used correctly? Do we need 
more information, more clarification? Where is the information going? How 
is it going to impact on us as a group and individually? That’s important to 
recognize.” (Therapist) 
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The same worker alluded to differences between new staffs and veteran in their ac-
tions relating to past history. 
“It comes up, it connects, and it could be what triggers it is individuals too. 
There may be an issue that I want to look at because it triggers me. For one 
therapist it may be one thing, for another therapist, something else. I think 
this creates some difficulties for new staffs, those who have a history, and 
those who don’t… Critically, one of the things people have gone through is 
that there were stressful times. It comes up for each one of us differently, 
and I’m not saying that’s good or bad, but it does have an effect. Personally, 
it’s watching and being careful.” (Therapist) 
 
The emphasis on being careful and on watching the actions of the other actors in the 
organization were clearly linked to mistrust and rooted in the past. Senior union representa-
tives, who rationalized their own actions by claiming that management would carry on as 
usual, as managers “usually” behave, echoed this. Any new trust was short-lived. 
“As a union, we started talking with the executive director even before he 
was the executive director. We started meeting in fact with ‘Let’s try and do 
this differently than we’re doing things right now, because we were in such a 
state of war with the administration of the hospital. Let’s try to start off on a 
new foot to see if we can’t do things in agreement’.” (Therapist) 
 
“I think because of the history, there is reluctance on some workers’ part to 
believe that it will ever change, that management is never anything but con-
trolling.” (Therapist) 
 
There was a belief that everything to do with the former psychiatric hospital was 
“bad” or undesirable, implying that new ways of doing business would be automatically bet-
ter. Some therapists said that the new administrative staffs had reassured them of this from 
the outset. 
“I think we were made a lot of promises and given a lot of reassurance prior 
to divestment that things of course would be better. Of course, they would 
be better. How could they possibly be as bad as they were with the hospital?” 
(Therapist) 
 
 Differences between veteran and new therapists in the organization were apparent 
in the descriptions that they gave of the past. Newer staffs had not experienced the long-
standing conflict and turbulence and could only relate experiences that they had heard. Vet-
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eran staffs, on the other hand, seemed to describe stronger links between the past and their 
current actions. This may be explained mainly by their involvement with the affairs of the 
psychiatric hospital, their former employer. 
For the team leaders group, there were only three examples of the naturalization 
strategy, from two team leaders. The team leaders discussed culture as a historical trend that 
allowed Natives and Francophones to seek autonomy. One team leader defended the cultur-
ally led structure of the organization through the inevitability of culture as a guiding element 
in human service organizations across the province. By describing mainstream approaches to 
therapy as ineffective in the Native culture, the team leader emphasized that it was only natu-
ral for Native clients to return to the “Elders” and their traditional and historical ways. 
Another team leader invoked the naturalization strategy by arguing that seniority 
should be the guiding factor for choosing offices during the move from the psychiatric hos-
pital. The team leader felt that the “fairest” way of assigning offices to staffs was to go along 
lines of seniority, that this was the expected way of doing business, and that there was no 
other way of assigning offices without meeting with accusations of favoritism. 
The third example of naturalization in the team leaders group referred to the need to 
adhere to traditional roles in organizations. Describing skirmishes between the senior man-
agers and the Board of Directors over the Board’s insistence on expanding its role, the team 
leader mentioned that a widely held position in management circles was that boards should 
not interfere in the day-to-day functioning of organizations. The team leader was trying to 
point out that organizations always operated in this way, in effect, avoiding having to rein-
vent the wheel. 
There were no examples of the naturalization strategy in the clerical group. This ab-
sence is noteworthy because clerical staffs could have used uncertainty over policies and 
procedures to their advantage by saying things like “We’ve always done it this way before so 
why change now.” The strong control over policies and procedures by the senior managers 
may have limited the scope and effectiveness of this strategy for the clerical group, thereby 
discouraging their use of it. Further study on this would be necessary to draw any further 
inferences. 
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Invoking future trends and a sense of destiny: 
The examples provided above show that the naturalization strategy invokes a sense 
of history to show that one’s actions are based in natural law or are ‘destined to be’ because 
of trends emerging from past history. This in effect passes some of the responsibility or 
blame onto past history, making it more difficult for other parties to question the person’s 
actions. The fact that past events cannot be changed and that historical practices and trends 
are considered markers for future change compounds this. The naturalization strategy also 
appears to place additional value and pressure. 
Thus, in terms of power strategies, change efforts may be resisted or slowed down 
by claiming familiarity with past ways of doing things. The therapists group distinguished 
itself from the others by clinging to past history to justify its mistrust of senior managers. 
This was particularly true for the veteran staffs. The senior managers, on the other hand, 
found it difficult to counter this method of exerting power because doing so would have 
amounted to denying the negative past experiences of veteran staffs. Their focus seemed to 
be on structural and functional issues such as policies and procedures. The team leaders, for 
their part, did not try to prevent or counter the actions of the groups, but focused instead on 
the inevitability of culturally determined services. 
One possible explanation behind the infrequent use of this strategy by senior manag-
ers was that they could not easily invoke the past. Invoking natural laws such as “This is the 
way we have always done things” requires that the persons have experienced the past of the 
organization or at least have intimate knowledge of it. This was unlikely in the current con-
text given that all three senior managers were new to the organization, whereas the majority 
of therapists were veterans. 
The naturalization strategy invokes the past in direct ways by stating that things have 
“always been done this way, why change now?”. The strategy also addresses power in more 
subtle ways by tying one’s actions to historical mistrust that has existed in the organization 
but not being quite so forceful as in the direct approach. It is evident that veteran members 
are at an advantage over newer staffs because they may invoke both more easily. Newer 
staffs must resort to using examples that are more far removed from the experiences of the 
participants who have gone through the organizational turbulence. 
Chapter 6 — Surface and Deep Level Strategies     233 
 
 
One of the consequences of the naturalization strategy is that it may help depersonal-
ize potential conflicts by giving the appearance of distance. Another result is that personal 
values and beliefs are included to exert more pressure.  
In terms of sources of power, the naturalization strategy in this study borrowed 
mainly from authority and expertise (senior managers), and culture (therapists). Because of 
its strong ties to “natural” and historical rules or ways of doing things in the organization, 
this strategy emerges from issues relating to the past. 
 
6.3.2 LEGITIMATION 
Legitimation refers to invoking “higher-order” (Frost, 1987) explanations such as 
loyalty as a strategy. This makes it difficult for others to question one’s explanations since 
the reason advanced is in terms of loyalty or sacrifice. This effectively adds legitimacy to 
one’s point of view. While there were few examples found in the transcripts, we examined 
legitimation in each of the four employee groups of this study, and we found that there were 
differences in the way they dealt with the strategy  
 
Showing concern for the well-being of the other: 
 In the senior administrative staffs interviews, two examples were found. The first re-
lates to the illness of a therapist. The therapist had been off work several times in the past 
months due to illness. One of the Co-ordinators wanted to communicate directly with the 
employee’s physician to obtain more information about the string of absences due to ill-
nesses. The employee naturally refused to allow administrative personnel to talk directly to 
the physician, believing this was an infringement on her privacy. As a strategy, the Co-
ordinator invoked her concern for the well being of the employee: 
“[The Co-ordinator] said ‘It’s because we’re concerned about your health. We 
want to know if there’s anything that this agency can do to help you’.” (Thera-
pist)  
 
While giving the appearance of genuine concern for the well being of the therapist, 
the Coordinator’s actions were interpreted by the therapist as a control strategy. The thera-
pist feared that unwanted information would end up in her personnel file. 
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Using the principle of fairness and equity: 
The second example of the legitimation strategy referred to issues of fairness and eq-
uity. During negotiations to establish a contract for the employees, the senior managers were 
faced with many options as to job benefits and working conditions for its different sets of 
employees. To avoid accusations of favoritism or of neglect of certain groups, senior manag-
ers entrenched their decisions in a philosophy of “fairness”. 
“I came in trying to change, wanting to improve. I thought there was a lot of 
room for improvement. Administratively, I wanted to be fair. I think that was 
the biggest thing. I wanted fairness, I wanted equity, fairly distributed within 
all sectors of the agency. I have a firm belief in that.” (Co-ordinator).  
 
In this example, the Coordinator clearly identified her values and beliefs on this is-
sue. She used a higher order explanation related to fairness, making it harder for others to 
question her decisions around the benefits. 
It is notable that there were no examples of strategies by senior managers invoking 
employee loyalty to the organization. Since senior managers are responsible for ensuring that 
the organization’s mandate is fulfilled, we expected them to call upon the professional re-
sponsibilities and accountabilities of other employees to carry out this mandate. This was not 
the case, however, and there were no such examples of legitimation from the three partici-
pants in the senior management group. Several reasons may explain this. First, deep level 
strategies are more difficult to discern than surface level strategies. This is because deep level 
strategies are extensively disguised in the rules and values of the actors. Second, the semi-
structured interviews that were held with the participants may not have provoked discussion 
about this deep-level strategy. Third, we have every reason to believe that managers felt that 
legitimation strategies could not be used because of the poor reception they would have with 
lower level staffs, namely therapists and clerical staffs. Trying to invoke another person’s 
loyalty, for example, may require that the person calling on the strategy have a shared past 
history with the others. The level of trust between the senior managers and other levels also 
was low, bringing into play issues of credibility and motives behind the strategy. 
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It also is necessary for an actor to have a valid situation or opportunity to use the le-
gitimation strategy. If a person tries to invoke loyalty to an organization without having a 
pretext to do so, nor any credibility in the eyes of the other, the action may be seen as artifi-
cial or insincere. In the example provided above, there was a valid context, that of illness, but 
the accompanying mistrust in the organization seemed to negate the effects of the strategy. 
The belief that the senior managers were untrustworthy was a strong one that guided the be-
havior of the employee. 
 
Calling upon the principle of unity between all levels: 
As in the senior management group, the team leaders rarely used the legitimation 
strategy. Only one clear example identified. Due to the financial difficulties faced by the or-
ganization, senior managers and team leaders attended a retreat to brainstorm around this 
problem. One of the ideas to come out of the session was that managers would not be ex-
empt from the cutback any more than other staffs. 
“We came up with three basic principles. If indeed we’re in a situation where 
we have to deal with a shortcoming or shortfall in funds, … management 
and staff will bear the burden equally. It should have the least impact on cli-
ents. It should have the least impact on staff. That includes everybody.” 
(Team leader) 
 
By invoking a principle of unity with other staffs regarding the financial difficulties, 
the senior managers and team leaders thus tried to express a tone of personal sacrifice, and 
showed that they would not be exempt or receive special protection from the financial trou-
bles of the organization. Combined with the principle of having the least impact on the cli-
ents, the two groups aimed to increase the legitimacy of their arguments. There were no 
other examples of the legitimation strategy in the team leaders group, however. Reasons for 
this are similar to the senior management group, including their lack of past history with the 
organization and its players. 
 
Questioning the work ethic and values of others: 
The therapists provided a few more examples of this deep-level strategy. By describ-
ing the organization as valuing the needs of the Ministry of Community and Social Services, 
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rather than client or staff needs, some therapists seemed to take the position that their work 
ethic was superior to the senior managers. 
“I find this agency has a difficult time taking an ethical position and sticking 
to it. I find they’re very much concerned about how [the Ministry] perceives 
them. They want to be liked by [the Ministry]… If [the Ministry] says ‘This is 
our position’, and it’s 180 degrees from the position that they took yesterday, 
this agency would be behind them tomorrow and have no problem rational-
izing that.” (Therapist) 
 
Many of the therapists interviewed agreed the organization was overly influenced by 
the Ministry’s needs. By bringing into question the values of the organization and where 
their focus lay, the therapists in effect legitimized their arguments and brought them into the 
abstract realm of values. Some therapists legitimized their attitudes and resistance by claim-
ing that the best interests of the clients were at stake, even if the resistance contradicted the 
will of the administration. 
“I would use my magic wand to make it good here, to get our ship together 
and do what’s best for the clients that we see, and never mind about the crap 
that goes around us.” (Therapist) 
 
Many therapists also were weary of claims by the organization that it was doing 
things ‘for them’. 
“Sometimes we’ll go into big meetings and they’ll say that they try to do all 
these nice things for us, and I say bull crap on that, you’re just looking out 
for your old budget and what’s important to you. You don’t really give a hoot 
about the people below you.” (Therapist) 
 
One therapist recalled the values and philosophies that guide therapists in describing 
her reactions toward the level of conflict in the organization.  
“I find it really hard that as a group of human service providers who know an 
awful lot about systemic change in families, we never apply the theories to 
our own kind. I find that just outrageous.” (Therapist) 
 
Invoking her professional values legitimized this therapist’s actions of not participat-
ing in confrontational actions with other members of the organization. 
In essence, there is thus evidence that attempts by management to legitimize actions 
by calling on higher order explanations such as those described above often failed. Thera-
pists often brought out the question of the credibility of the managers in such cases by align-
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ing themselves philosophically with their clients. This strategy also would have the effect of 
countering attempts to use referent power and the ingratiation strategy. 
 
Not wanting to “screw things up” for management: 
The clerical group, for its part, provided a few examples of the legitimation strategy. 
All participants in this group emphasized that they would not intentionally “screw things up” 
for management, even if they disagreed with what management wanted. 
“I feel that as an employee that not only you are representing your agency, 
but you’re representing the Director in whatever capacity you’re in. I’d think 
an agency is only as good as the people working in it, and I don’t know the 
right terminology, but the people they serve. Because we are a health agency, 
to me, how we present ourselves says a lot not only for us but also for our 
Director.” (Clerical staff) 
 
“My loyalty is to the agency first. Yes, it’s to staff, because I like people and I 
like all staff, old and new alike. Whether I like it or not, I’m professional 
enough I can work with them, all staff, old and new. I’ve always said you 
don’t have to like me, and I don’t have to like you, but we’re professionals 
and we have to work together, so let’s do the best we can.” (Clerical staff) 
 
Sharing responsibility equally with all levels: 
Other examples of legitimation in the clerical group relate to invoking the shared re-
sponsibility of saving money to help the organization as a whole. The goal was explained as 
trying to encourage others to contribute to the saving, and possibly not to be singled out or 
giving the appearance of favoring the financial cuts. 
“We know that there are going to be cuts… I guess everybody has a respon-
sibility of saving, saving one way or another… So, you look around for the 
best prices. It might be nickel and dime, but at this point, if we can save five 
hundred a month on supplies, purchases, then I don’t care, it’s only five 
hundred dollars a month, but if everybody does it, then [we’ve saved 
money].” (Clerical staff) 
 
Thus, the clerical group cited loyalty to the agency and the shared responsibility of 
saving money as important in guiding their behavior during the turbulent events that oc-
curred. This may explain in part why coercion and controlling information and communica-
tions between different parts of the organization were not used as strategies and sources of 
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power. Coercive actions, for example, would contradict the value of loyalty to the organiza-
tion. Controlling information, such as withholding or leaking confidential information to 
union members also is contradictory to the allegiance the clerical staffs described to their 
employer. Despite the centrality of their role in information flow, the clerical staffs did not 
appear to engage in any strategies that would contradict their values of loyalty to the organi-
zation.  
In summary, there appeared to be limited use of legitimation through invoking sacri-
fice and doing things “for the good of the organization” in downward relationships (senior 
management Æ therapists). The low level of trust between the two groups may explain the 
infrequent references to this strategy. There did not appear to be a great deal of loyalty to the 
organization, thereby making it more difficult for higher managers to invoke this strategy. It 
appears the therapists group attempted to invalidate the strategy by clinging to issues of mis-
trust. Loyalty to an organization might be considered an afterthought in situations where 
trust is low and one’s job security is on the line. 
In upward relationships (therapists Æ senior management), therapists did invoke this 
strategy by stating that they had been loyal to the organization for many years, and that their 
intentions were “in the best interests” of the clients. In upward relationships, thus, therapists 
legitimized their resistance to organizational changes through the needs of the clients. Their 
reactions to attempts by managers to invoke loyalty seemed to revolve around issues of trust, 
particularly for therapists who had many years of experience in the organization. This also 
possibly relates to the lack of recognition by senior managers of past history and of the value 
of certain intervention programs. In other words, therapists did not place much value on 
loyalty to the organization because they needed signs that the company “cared” for them and 
was fighting for them. It would be reasonable to assume that the therapists felt they needed 
something in return for their loyalty, but that the organization was not in any position of do-
ing this, especially in times of financial cutbacks. 
 The legitimation strategy in up-down relationships (senior management Å team 
leaders Æ therapists) was used by one team leader to show he would not be spared from the 
effects of financial cutbacks, thus in some ways trying to reach out to the therapists and 
bringing himself closer to them.  
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Thus, it seems that this strategy was tied to dealing with issues or dynamics of trust 
and mistrust. The relative lack of use of this strategy also may be explained by the absence of 
altruistic feelings toward the organization. 
 
6.3.3 NEUTRALIZATION 
Neutralization is a strategy that attempts to treat one’s viewpoints and positions as 
neutral by universalizing them as positions shared by everyone or by important segments of 
society. One method identified by Frost (1987) to accomplish this is by treating one’s argu-
ments as rational and thus value-free. In this section, we will provide several examples from 
the different employee groups to compare how the strategy was used. 
The neutralization strategy revolved around three principal themes: cultural sensitiv-
ity, employee and client participation and control in the agency’s functioning, and issues 
dealing with the past.  
 
Justifying hiring practices through ethnic identity: 
As described earlier, ethnic identity was often at the forefront of conflicts within the 
organization, both historically and at the time of the study. Senior management felt that 
‘mainstream’ services did not meet the needs of cultural groups, and they justified certain 
hiring practices and job advertisements on the basis of factual clients needs. 
“When it came to hiring our first unionized Native clinician, what skills and 
functions or what skills and qualifications did we want for that position? Did 
we want the same skills and qualifications that were there for the clinicians 
on the Anglophone and Francophone [teams], or did we want something dif-
ferent if we’re saying that we have to have a different team, a different ap-
proach. The Native community has always argued that the mainstream ser-
vices don’t respond effectively to Natives, and Natives don’t access the tradi-
tional services that we have in the mainstream services. Why? The White 
man’s approach, solution or mind set does not necessarily answer the native 
approach. It doesn’t include the Native component, world vision, etc.” (Senior 
manager) 
 
The union, on the other hand, felt quite the opposite as it did not believe that lan-
guage skills were a necessary requirement to carry out the therapists’ functions or to meet the 
needs of the clients. The union president felt that the only reason that Francophone posi-
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tions were protected was that they had the backing of the French Language Services Act of 
Ontario. He argued that no such protection existed for the Native group, that the Natives 
had not won any of the legal battles on such ground, and that consequently hiring practices 
for the Francophones should not be extended to Native positions. 
To neutralize the union’s contention that special hiring practices were unwarranted, 
senior managers and the Board of Directors aligned themselves using established facts to 
prove that traditional intervention did not work with Natives. The team leaders group joined 
with senior management and described similar difficulties with the union, stating that a single 
hiring structure was not satisfactory because it would not meet Native needs. There were 
clear attempts by the team leaders to combine moral authority for control over cultural is-
sues with facts showing that traditional therapy approaches did not work. In essence, they 
intermixed value judgments with “objective” assessments that non-Native therapy would fail. 
It is noteworthy that for the therapists group, staffs were divided about their union’s 
position. While it was not the objective of this study to focus solely on the cultural dynamics 
that occurred, several dynamics around culture were noted between therapists. Some thera-
pists accepted the ethnicity arguments, but others felt that non-Natives could easily carry out 
the job functions. Experienced therapists, for example, could pick up on cultural dynamics 
and deal with them. Thus, for issues surrounding ethnicity, there was evidence that expertise, 
job experience, and factual information were used as a source of power to bolster arguments 
for both sides. 
 
Employee and consumer participation as the “right thing to do”: 
Employee and consumer participation in running the organization was a second 
theme that involved the neutralization strategy. Planning a new organization is a large task by 
any means, and the mental health centre that we studied was no exception. While the final 
organizational model had been in place for some months, there remained many heated dis-
cussions around the structure that was adopted. Senior managers, for example, felt they 
needed some degree of control over the functioning of the agency and were reluctant to 
hand over some management tasks normally assigned only to senior managers. Therapists, 
for their part, put much energy into trying to gain additional say in the organization’s deci-
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sion processes. First, the therapists brought to light that bottom-up organizational models 
were better than top-down approaches. They argued that experiences in other provincial and 
American social agencies showed that organizations could not represent their community 
effectively if community partners were not integrated into the structure. They also argued 
that citizens were not represented in the current organizational structure.  
It is reasonable to assume that when therapists invoked the neutralization strategy, by 
showing the factual benefits of community participation, they increased the level of uncer-
tainty for senior management and the Board of Directors of the agency. This included the 
possibility of less control for senior management over the operations of the agency, in-
creased risk, and the potential for outside parties to influence the direction of the organiza-
tion. The therapists group achieved this in part with the neutralization strategy by emphasiz-
ing the ‘objective’ nature of their arguments, and by rationalizing community participation 
through the experience of other human service agencies. Combined with the legitimation 
strategy, where the values of fairness and equity were brought into play, this was a strategy 
that attacked the issue from several angles. 
The team leaders, for their part, also combined the neutralization strategy with the 
legitimation strategy, but in the context of showing to staffs that their participation was de-
sired, not resisted. Because of the high levels of mistrust in the organization, senior managers 
and team leaders had some difficulty in convincing therapists that they truly needed their 
input for the financial and organizational problems that faced the agency.  
“What we were attempting to do was to consult with them as a way of devel-
oping some notions of what could be done and the financial implications … 
and to have some dialogue on it. I think, maybe in our naiveté, management 
wasn’t able to arrive at that for the reason that it was seen that it should more 
appropriately be dealt with at the negotiating committee. But I can honestly 
say, the intent was not … to whittle away at the union’s position or to at-
tempt to negotiate. It was purely out of that need to want to democratize the 
discussion, to seek consultation when possible. I guess that shows that you 
can’t always win even though your intent may be appropriate.” (Team leader) 
 
In our interviews with the therapists, it was evident that they mistrusted financial in-
formation and facts provided by senior managers. Attaching the values of consumer partici-
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pation, democracy, and ‘honest discussion’ to information and facts was an attempt to deal 
with this mistrust to increase their significance and influence. 
Also under the philosophy of staff participation was the Executive Director’s at-
tempt to approach staffs directly about the financial problems of the organization, without 
first going through the union. As shown earlier, this represented breaking his own rules 
about crossing the normal channels of communication, but it was carried out under the guise 
of cooperation, harmonization and rapprochement with the therapists and clerical groups. 
By showing the rational benefits of increasing staffs’ opportunities for input, senior manag-
ers hoped to open up the dialogue between the two groups. This action was necessary be-
cause therapists and clerical staffs had recently gained observer status on the Community 
Advisory Committees, something that the Executive Director could not oppose. By using 
rational and philosophical/moral arguments in combination, however, this allowed senior 
managers, particularly the Executive Director, to approach staffs without first dealing with 
the union. In other words, the neutralization strategy was an attempt to show that it was not 
just a personal value they held, but that it was grounded in the betterment of the organiza-
tion through increased efficiency, cooperation, and better services for the clients. 
Combining impersonal factual arguments with intentions of honesty and collabora-
tion was thus a strategy that was attempted in downward relationships with therapists. The 
long history of mistrust between therapists and senior management, however, in some ways 
negated the effects of the strategy. Senior managers and team leaders could not totally bypass 
issues of trust with this strategy. 
 
Different ways of overcoming history: 
The third major theme related to the neutralization strategy was one of dealing with 
the past. Given that all three senior managers, three of the four team leaders, and all the 
members of the Board of Directors were new to the organization, it is not surprising that 
there were contrasts between old and new ways of doing things. Senior managers and team 
leaders wanted to part with the past. This first became evident when they requested that the 
researcher avoid reviving old skeletons. Therapists, for the most part veterans of the organi-
Chapter 6 — Surface and Deep Level Strategies     243 
 
 
zation, felt that their past contributions and experiences should not be ignored. Thus, there 
were many issues around past history that created tension within the organization. 
To deal with some of these issues, the different groups in the organization invoked 
the neutralization strategy, but in different ways. Senior managers and team leaders, for ex-
ample, tried to show the efficiency of their new policies, procedures, models of intervention, 
and materials such as furniture. “New” was equated with “better”. It is reasonable to assume 
that the senior managers, Board of Directors, and team leaders felt they had to provide dif-
ferent management styles than in the past, or consequently face the same old problems that 
existed before the organizational separation. Thus, “new ways are better” implied that past 
ways were outdated and wrong. 
The therapists group, on the other hand, felt that managers should not claim that 
things were better because they had no past to compare to.  
“Upper management, often times at meetings, [assumed] that they as an 
agency were better than what was before with the hospital. They were trying 
to make themselves [better]. It is not the case at all.” (Therapist) 
 
“I didn’t like the idea that they were going to bad-mouth the other place, but 
they hadn’t been there… I say ‘No, you didn’t live that other part. No, it’s 
not perfect, but you’re far from being perfect too’.” (Therapist) 
 
Therapists also felt distant from senior managers, and they continually felt little value 
was placed on their job skills and past experience. This was particularly true of veteran staffs, 
but several newcomer therapists also expressed it. 
“How can you form an opinion on a team when you don’t know the type of 
work they do. [Senior managers] don’t know. They don’t have the right [to 
form an opinion].” (Therapist) 
 
In terms of a strategy, some therapists thus emphasized the lack of knowledge of 
senior managers with regard to front line job functions and the skills required to carry them 
out. From the perspective of many therapists, this was described as an ‘objective’ fact be-
cause they felt they could show that senior managers did not share a common history with 
them. They also emphasized that the managers had not lived through several years of uncer-
tainty. In essence, therapists embedded their own values (rejecting many attempts by manag-
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ers to include them in decision processes) through rational means (managers did not have 
sufficient knowledge of front line work to make decisions about it). 
There were no examples of the neutralization strategy from the clerical group. As for 
the other strategies, we feel that their distance from some of the organizational issues ex-
plains the absence of this strategy in their group.  
In summary, the neutralization strategy borrows elements from the reasoning strat-
egy and from information as a source of power, and tries to increase the value of one’s posi-
tion by combining value judgments with ‘objective’ facts and information. This strategy is 
obviously an attempt to appeal to the rational of other actors, but with additional emphasis 
on trying to reach into value system. In downward relationships (admin Æ union, team lead-
ers Æ union), we found that higher level persons tried to deal with issues of trust and past 
history to show it’s not just a personal value judgment or opinion, but that decisions were 
grounded in facts. Upward relationships, on the other hand, were characterized in some 
cases by arguing that job experience and training could substitute for cultural upbringing. 
There was much division among staffs for this dynamic, however, which meant that it did 
not have the widespread support in the therapist group. 
While there are similarities between the neutralization strategy and the reasoning 
strategy, there are also several differences. The two strategies are alike in that they appeal to 
the rational side of actors by calling upon facts and information, for example. The neutraliza-
tion strategy, however, goes further by integrating value statements, invoking cultural sensi-
tivity and moral authority over organizational issues. For organizational actors, enhancing 
one’s arguments with abstract values appears to have the effect of increasing uncertainty. 
When value judgments are intermixed with ‘objective’ or factual information, they are more 
difficult to discern, yet can exert considerable power. 
 
6.3.4 SOCIALIZATION 
The socialization strategy relies on mechanisms of learning and orientation to shape 
the attitudes, behaviors and interpretative schemes of some actors, to the benefit of others. 
(Frost, 1987) As for the sections above, it is useful to distinguish between the different hier-
archical levels in the organization in analyzing the strategy.  
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Using training manuals for the Board of Directors: 
In the senior management group, only one of the participants, the Executive Direc-
tor, spoke about this strategy as a conscious effort to guide and shape the behavior of others. 
The Executive Director’s efforts were aimed at three targets: the Board of Directors, team 
leaders, and therapists. For each of these targets there was a particular flavor to the socializa-
tion strategy. For the Board of Directors, for example, the Executive Director was clear 
about his concern that the Board might overstep its boundaries and try to extend its role into 
the day-to-day business of the organization. Confining the role of the Board was important 
to minimize its power, and orienting and directing its members toward a particular role was a 
way of accomplishing this. 
“We’ve given the [Board of Directors] a board and administrator publication 
which shows what the role of a board member should be versus that of the 
Executive Director. There is a board members’ ethics section at the begin-
ning of that thing which talks about things that as a board member, well, de-
cisions that you take or are made by the board as a whole, the special role 
that exists between a president and an Executive Director, all those kinds of 
things… The responsibility of the board should be on policy development, 
strategic direction setting and Executive Director evaluation and perform-
ance appraisal. But he manages what is below him, within the context of the 
policies that have been developed. If they start breaking those lines, or I start 
breaking those lines, there’s a problem… The manual tells them what is and 
what isn’t.” (Senior manager) 
 
The example above provides evidence of the socialization strategy applied in an up-
ward relationship at the highest levels of the organization. The Executive Director’s use of a 
board members’ manual allowed him to orient and shape the attitudes and behaviors of the 
board members to a certain degree, while solidifying his own points of view through the 
process. 
 
Work retreats as a way of clarifying lines of communication and  
responsibilities: 
 
In downward relationships, the Executive Director employed work retreats and con-
sciousness-raising exercises as a method of orienting his middle and senior level staffs. 
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“We did an exercise to see where we are in our organization in terms of 
problems and in terms of needs. We looked at our group management proc-
ess. We have different exercises. I tried to show at what point, in the exercise 
we had, that they were open to the input of others, at what point they 
seemed to always to be the one who was influencing to rule overall, and in-
fluence the decision we took on something. By the same token, we showed 
what the correct answers were on something and they could compare that to 
theirs.” (Senior manager) 
 
This form of orienting the staffs was described as helping people become more 
aware of how they influenced others, so that there would be more likelihood of a shared vi-
sion between them all. By describing “correct” answers, as per the training manuals, the Ex-
ecutive Director was in effect favoring his reality over others. The intent was to have an im-
pact on the lines of communication, on creating a shared vision within the organization, and 
clarifying of the roles of each member of the management team. 
 
Raising awareness of cultural identity as a means of entrenching power  
over time: 
 
Regarding the team leaders level, there were a few examples that showed that this 
strategy was accessible to their level in the organization. The team leaders were clear that is-
sues relating to the Native culture required long-term education of all staffs, including the 
upper levels of the agency. Recent agency-wide training on native cultural awareness was 
held but was described as controversial because the trainer appeared to be on a “cultural 
bandwagon”. In the eyes of the therapist staffs, these workshops backfired because they at-
tempted to “convince” rather than educate, and to give moral speeches about the rights of 
Natives and Francophones rather than to show the benefits of increased cultural tolerance. 
The team leaders felt that cultural sensitivity had to be developed, however, even if over a 
long term. Continual exposure to Native issues by increasing their presence in the organiza-
tion, and not “rocking the boat” were described as successful tactics within this strategy. The 
team leader thus employed the socialization strategy in up-down relationships, aiming her 
sights on the agency as a whole. Our informal discussions with the team leaders would lead 
us to believe that increased tolerance could only help them increase their cultural power. The 
socialization strategy was a means that, when spread over the span of several years, would 
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entrench cultural identity, making it more difficult for senior managers and the Board of Di-
rectors to direct their affairs. 
 
Focusing on clinical themes with higher authorities: 
For the therapists group, as in the team leaders group, there were few examples of 
the socialization strategy. The two examples we found related to orienting senior managers 
and the Board of Directors to the values and philosophy of certain clinical programs. Pri-
mary prevention programs, for example, did not appear to be the focus of the new admini-
stration’s intervention efforts. The therapists thus felt it important to reorient the upper lev-
els of the organization to match their experience, skills, and clinical preference, in essence, 
enhancing their expertise power. One factor that entered into play, however, is that half of 
the new organization’s members, most of them therapists, brought with them a past history 
that the new managers had great difficulty in uprooting. For therapists and clerical staffs, it is 
reasonable to assume that orientation of new staffs would focus on “bringing them to their 
side”, whereas administration focused on the newness and uniqueness of the organization 
with its new employees. 
In summary, the socialization strategy was employed by senior level persons in the 
organization to ensure that all worked toward a shared vision. As Pfeffer (1992a) points out, 
however, developing a strongly shared vision takes time and effort. This may explain why so 
much time and energy was expended over two years to train the Board of Directors. 
It is difficult to determine whether there were differences between veteran and new-
comers for the socialization strategy. It would appear at first that newcomers were the pri-
mary users of the socialization strategy because almost all of our examples come from the 
senior managers and team leaders groups. On closer examination, we find that these two 
groups occupy the highest positions in the organization. Our evidence shows that higher 
levels used socialization across all levels, whereas lower level staffs tended to keep it within 
their own level. More exploration of this is warranted. 
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6.4  SUMMARY 
 Regardless of their hierarchical position or years of employment with the organiza-
tion, the data clearly showed that all participants employed or had to deal with power strate-
gies during the organizational turbulence. All the participants were involved in power rela-
tionships, some involving minor actions, others involving outright disputes and open argu-
ments between levels. One level in particular, clerical staffs, was less involved than other lev-
els in the power plays of the organization, and this was explained by their more peripheral 
role. Nonetheless, the clerical group was fully aware of the difficulties and dynamics between 
organizational levels, and it would be misleading to believe they were immune from these 
organizational processes. 
We rarely found “pure” types of strategies. Different categories often overlapped in 
the actions and beliefs of the participants. We nonetheless presented them separately in this 
chapter to provide detailed examples of how they were used.  
We found clear distinctions between surface level and deep level strategies. Deep 
level strategies displace the responsibility from the actor to more abstract elements such as 
culture, ethnic identity, or loyalty. Several of the deep level strategies, such as neutralization, 
resembled surface level dynamics but they integrated values and beliefs, thus increasing their 
social pressure. Deep level strategies seemed to diffuse pressure away from the person in-
voking the strategy and to shift the emphasis to other issues. 
The various groups were uneven in their use of strategies depending on their hierar-
chical level within the organization. This would be explained in part by the potentially larger 
pool of resources at the administration group, which permutated to different ways of exert-
ing direct and indirect influence. Another reason relates to the different opportunities of the 
groups to exert power and the dilemmas facing them. 
Analysis of the deep level strategies brought to light strong evidence of clashing be-
liefs regarding the past and the future, something that was not always evident in the surface 
level strategies. Values linked to the past were more clearly evident in deep level strategies. 
The current chapter has described the power strategies as presented by the partici-
pants. In the next chapter, we will analyze the strategies in terms of relationships and dynam-
ics within the organization. 
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C h a p t e r   S e v e n 
 
Discussion 
 
“One of the guiding principles at the management table has been and  
continues to be let’s not make the same mistakes. At the very least,  
let’s not make the same mistakes. Let’s make new ones.” 
(Team Leader) 
“There may be a crisis that comes up, and depending on how you look at  
that crisis, you can either see it as nothing but a dark hole or you can see it  
as something with opportunities that can be used to improve things.” 
(Senior Manager) 
 
This research examined power strategy formation of employees in a mental health 
organization that went through a protracted and difficult divestment from a psychiatric hos-
pital. The central questions we addressed were: What kinds of strategies emerge when there 
is turbulent organizational change? How did the employees deal with the turbulent events? 
How are their power strategies similar or different? What relational power patterns emerged 
around the power strategies?  
When asked for three words to describe their organization, the majority of partici-
pants in this research used words such as confused, struggling, divided, suspicious, hierarchi-
cal, manipulative, and untrustworthy. While these words may have different meanings in dif-
ferent contexts, they nonetheless convey a particular impression of the changes that 
occurred. They indicate that the organizational changes were turbulent, often unpredictable, 
sometimes personalized, and that they existed in a very tense climate. Upon examination of 
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the data, we may ask what the participants have taught us about strategy formation. Our re-
search suggests that the answer might differ, depending to whom one would speak. As Kip-
nis, Schmidt and Wilkinson (1980) put it, it would seem everybody was influencing every-
body else in the organization, regardless of position or rank. 
The four groups of staffs (senior managers, team leaders, therapists, and clerical 
staffs) had some common elements between them. They all faced an organizational split 
from a well-established psychiatric hospital, shared a generally similar political environment, 
and all were mandated to work in one capacity or another towards improving the mental 
health needs of their clients. They also were interrelated through their functions and power 
relationships. On the other hand, as characterized in Chapter 2, professional organizations 
rely on the skills and knowledge of their professional staffs who have a high degree of train-
ing, specialization and autonomy in exercising their skills. The four groups of staffs differed 
considerably along this dimension, revealing patterns relating to strategies used. 
The first section of this chapter will review the findings of Chapter 6 for surface and 
deep level strategies in light of power relationships. The second part will examine the impor-
tant features of these relationships and contrast them to the theoretical approaches to strat-
egy formation discussed in Chapter 2. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the 
empirical contributions and the implications for future research. 
 
7.1 DISCUSSION OF THE SURFACE AND DEEP LEVEL STRATEGIES 
A first observation is the variability of the strategies between the groups. Depending 
on who the actors were and their position within the organization, certain strategies were 
emphasized more than others. We will examine these in the sections below in the context of 
who exercised the power strategies in each of the hierarchical groups. Power strategies will 
be examined in terms of downward, upward, down-up, and lateral relationships to examine 
the interactions between the groups.  
 
7.1.1  Downward relationships (senior managers Æ lower level staffs) 
Organizational members involved in downward power relationships (e.g., senior 
managers to therapists and clerical staffs) had the fullest range of sources of power and 
        Chapter 7 — Discussion       
 
251
 
strategies available to them, yet senior managers clearly emphasized some strategies more 
than others. They discussed at length the importance of maintaining clear boundaries be-
tween hierarchical levels to ensure consistency and clear communications. There were thus 
many references in this group to managing lines of communication. Senior managers, how-
ever, often broke their own official lines of communication by bypassing the team leaders 
and the union. They justified this as soliciting input, flattening the hierarchy, and increasing 
collaboration. Ironically, as they emphasized boundaries, the senior managers also put much 
energy into decreasing the “we-they” dynamic between senior managers and lower level 
staffs by breaking their own rules. 
Concerning sanctions as a strategy, we found no data showing use of sanctions by 
the senior managers over other staffs. The perception by therapists that senior managers had 
used sanctions was evident and very strong, particularly around breaking lines of communi-
cation, but there was no direct evidence of actual sanctions. In addition, there was absence 
of positive sanctions such as rewards. Under the tense climate, sanctions in the form of re-
wards would have been received with much mistrust. This is perhaps because “hard” tactics 
such as sanctions are generally less well perceived than softer means (Guilbault, 1984; Falbe 
and Yukl, 1992). In an environment where senior managers needed every ounce of collabo-
ration from other groups, these could have weakened other strategies such as reasoning and 
bargaining. Our data seem to support Lam’s (1997) research in the industrial literature that 
the use of demands, threats, or intimidation are often not used because they are not generally 
successful in convincing staffs to comply with policies. 
There appeared to be an overlap between lines of communication and author-
ity/legitimate power, and imposing sanctions. Authority power relies on recognition of the 
person’s authority, while lines of communication rely more on impersonal personnel policies 
and procedures as the guide to behavior. The emphasis on lines of communication acted as a 
boundary between levels. It also is evidence of how authority power was exerted, but in a 
more depersonalized sense. It may be argued that senior managers believed that breaking 
their own rules, while at the same time emphasizing that others should follow the proper 
lines of communication, would make it easier for them to obtain information, cooperation 
and assistance. In other words, “if we can’t get it from the union, let’s get it directly from the 
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therapists.” It may be hypothesized that middle managers were bypassed completely because 
the target of the change efforts was the therapists group. Aimed at the therapists group, up-
per level strategies thus took on a rational flavor at both surface and deep levels. 
Senior managers used ingratiation to show they valued the skills and qualities of the 
therapists. Senior managers also openly admitted some of their own shortcomings so as to 
show that they did not have all the solutions, were “human”, and that input from the thera-
pists was needed and valued. 
The senior managers frequently used reasoning by pointing out facts and logical ex-
planations for their points of view. This implies that senior managers felt they could use in-
formation and facts to appeal to the rational side of lower level staffs. Past events and mis-
trust of information were difficult elements for senior managers to deal with, however, and 
this negated many efforts of reasoning. Nonetheless, the resistance to information from be-
low did not discourage the senior managers to use this strategy, seemingly in the belief that 
lower level staffs would ‘come around’ to their point of view sooner or later. The evidence 
shows this strategy was likely a poor one for quick results due to the high resistance present. 
Bargaining was a strategy in which senior managers engaged, and this took on several 
forms. One was of increasing the sense of urgency by emphasizing the financial situation and 
possible effects on staffing. This relied almost entirely on information as power, and was 
used to create a very visible crisis. This provides some evidence that the more visible infor-
mation is, the more it can be manipulated into producing a crisis or urgency. How successful 
the manipulation is seems to depend heavily on the credibility attached to it. 
A second form was of opening up the consultation process to include all employees, 
thus bypassing the union. Also, by presenting several options to staffs, as opposed to a single 
option, senior managers minimized accusations they were not willing to consider alterna-
tives. There were indications that the bargaining process used by senior managers was aimed 
at splitting labor union solidarity by pitting employees against their union. Overall, the bar-
gaining strategy was weakened because lower level staffs mistrusted one of the sources of 
power it was based on, information. To paraphrase Kotter (1996), the value of the informa-
tion was reduced so that the therapists saw no tornado-like threat, which is one reason their 
sense of urgency was lower than the senior managers. 
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Managing personal involvement in the organization was one of the strategies that 
senior managers focused on by soliciting and valuing input from lower levels. In an effort to 
break down the “we-they” dynamic with lower level staffs and to counter psychological dis-
tance with therapists, senior managers and team leaders sometimes turned to a “listening 
mode” with lower levels. 
Although the two Co-ordinators often had to appeal to the Executive Director’s au-
thority to deal with issues from team leaders (who did not report to the Co-ordinators di-
rectly), the senior managers did not emphasize appeals to higher authorities. The Co-
ordinators avoided this strategy because invoking the authority of higher levels in the organi-
zation made them feel like “snitches” against lower levels. This is an example of staffs having 
a source of power and the hierarchical position to use it, but with a context that would have 
made the strategy backfire. This is strong evidence that access to, or possession of a source 
of power is not enough to use it successfully. The context for it must be right. 
As for working to rule, there was no discussion by the senior managers that they or 
other levels had engaged in this strategy. This strategy would be incompatible with the lead-
ership role of senior manager in the organization. Also, we found no evidence of coalitions 
in the senior managers group, although there were indications they tried to ensure consis-
tency between them by emphasizing lines of communications with all lower level staffs. 
Old baggage and mistrust of information were strongly tied to the avoidance of cha-
risma or appeals to altruism by senior managers because these strategies would have carried a 
negative connotation. This is probably due to the context of mistrust that would have nulli-
fied these strategies. Assertiveness as a strategy was absent, despite the high level of mistrust. 
One explanation for this is that assertiveness was not deemed compatible with reducing the 
intensity of already strained relationships. There was little senior managers would gain by 
using assertiveness with lower level staffs.  
We did not find examples that senior managers had used deceit as a strategy, al-
though this was contrary to the perception from lower level staffs that it had been used a lot. 
Accusations of deceit and manipulation of information from lower levels seemed tied to the 
past, even if none of the senior managers had been employed by, nor had links with the 
former organization. Managers of the psychiatric hospital transferred “old baggage” to the 
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new organization’s managers by attribution. The past thus became an essential element in the 
perception that deceit was used and in mistrust. 
The interviews with senior managers revealed several examples of deep level strate-
gies. It is hard not to notice that each of the senior managers placed more emphasis on ele-
ments related to deep level strategies than the team leaders, therapists, and clerical staffs. 
Several reasons may explain this. First, higher levels in organizations generally have more 
sources of power at their disposal. It is reasonable to assume that because the pool of 
sources of power is larger, the number of permutations around these sources of power is 
larger. Second, despite having a larger pool of sources of power, senior managers often were 
frustrated at the constant resistance of lower level staffs to all kinds of issues. It is reasonable 
to assume they had recourse to deep level strategies to supplement a power base weakened 
by the long and protracted period of change and turbulence. The empirical evidence in the 
present research supports this. Third, it is likely that the higher up one is in an organization, 
the more elements of turbulence one has to deal with. It also is possible that higher ups can 
initiate or worsen turbulence due to their position and sources of power. While the sample 
size of this study was too small to draw generalizations on this issue, the evidence indicates 
that senior managers made every effort to minimize turbulence. Further research in different 
organizational contexts could elucidate this. 
Higher levels of the organization, particularly senior managers, constantly focused on 
the future and on bringing in new elements to the organization. This is partly due to their 
inability to invoke the past since this was the realm of other employees who had been there 
longer than all the senior managers combined. At the risk of over-simplifying, a description 
of the beliefs of the senior managers was “out with the old, in with the new”. They focused 
on provincial trends as the desired direction to follow, presented them as inevitable, and thus 
tried to invoke a sense of destiny for the organization. In essence, these actions made it 
“natural” to move on and not to stay with the present. Naturalization was thus a strategy that 
presented organizational change as a force that was beyond anyone’s control. Senior manag-
ers were unable to invoke and manipulate the past because they did not share organizational 
history with veteran staffs. Focusing on the future was one of their means of dealing with it. 
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Legitimation as a strategy was invoked by the senior managers in the form of show-
ing concern and caring for others, and by invoking the principles of fairness and equity to 
defend their decisions. Legitimation also took the form of calling on the unity of all staffs in 
facing the difficulties of the organization, ensuring that lower level staffs knew upper levels 
would bear the brunt of the problems equally with others. Senior managers did not invoke 
loyalty to the organization as a strategy, however. This is perhaps because loyalty is implied 
from the moment one is hired by an organization. More likely, invoking loyalty as a legitima-
tion strategy would have been too transparent and would not have been viewed with much 
credibility from lower level staffs, particularly the therapists. In this sense, legitimation had 
its limits as a strategy, and this may explain its limited use by senior managers. Lack of credi-
bility and low levels of trust were factors that weakened the legitimation strategy. This paral-
lels the weak use of ingratiation and referent power. 
Neutralization was the deep level strategy that the senior managers described the 
most. As used in downward relationships, the neutralization strategy was a mix of hard facts 
to reach the rational side of employees and beliefs that culturally led services were morally 
correct (e.g., provincial legislation mandating protecting the right to culturally appropriate 
services). This made it very difficult for employees at other levels to question this issue with-
out creating internal divisions amongst the various groups and putting people into different 
camps according to their opinions. In essence, this strategy was very potent and effective in 
reducing opposition as it was used in downward relationships. 
Socialization, the last of the deep level strategies, was used in downwards relation-
ships to develop a shared vision and a common understanding of the organization’s func-
tioning. Raising the consciousness of staffs about their own styles and behaviors, and com-
paring them to “correct” answers from training manuals was one way that senior managers 
attempted to influence others using the socialization strategy. When viewed in the context of 
the consistent and deliberate focus on following formal lines of communication, one begins 
to understand how higher levels in the organization combined surface and deep level strate-
gies to inculcate in others their beliefs and attitudes about how things should be run. 
In summary, downward relationships were characterized by backing away from past 
ways of doing business and moving forward into the future. The values and beliefs of senior 
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administrators around “newer is better” and “newer means less problems” were evident in 
many of their actions (e.g., new furniture, focusing on the new lines of communication). 
These values and beliefs were rooted in avoiding past mistakes and the past in general. This 
was equally applied to newcomers and veterans of the organization because of the perceived 
shift that they would fall back to old ways of doing business. The evidence shows that em-
phasis on structural strategies (e.g., use of proper protocols, policies and procedures, lines of 
communication) seemed grounded in parting with the past. Thus, the empirical data reveal 
heavy emphasis by senior administration personnel on deep level strategies. 
When examined within the historical context of the organization presented in Chap-
ter 4, we find more evidence that relationships moved away from past ways of business and 
forward to new ways. The emphasis on lines of communication, also large doses of reason-
ing and presenting facts were ways that upper level staffs believed they could ensure consis-
tency and move toward their objective of creating an entirely new organization. It also re-
veals that senior managers tended to focus on strategies related to the structural dimensions 
of the organization as opposed to more person-oriented strategies. 
The literature on industrial organizations often cites overcoming history as an impor-
tant component of change strategies. (Kanter, Stein & Jick, 1992; Kotter, 1996) There is 
every reason to believe the same dynamic holds true for the human services sector. There 
was considerable evidence of a chasm between senior management’s mandate to start the 
organization on a new foot, and attempts by employees at other levels to hold on to the past. 
Therapists did not embrace change in the new organization, despite the difficulties they had 
with their former organization. Upon examination of the data, the new organization was de-
liberately designed from the outset to be incompatible with the old one to break with old 
patterns. There was a struggle to break with the past. 
Senior managers, who were purposefully chosen because of their newness to the or-
ganization and their distance from old issues, insisted their strategies were positive for the 
growth of the organization. Although they faced major difficulties ahead, they were con-
vinced that their choices and strategies provided a clear and consistent course for the future. 
Their strong focus on a predictable structure, such as lines of communication, indicates this. 
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Senior managers also were more likely to integrate deep level value and beliefs into strategies 
than the other groups. 
On a deeper level, senior managers ignored or devalued anything to do with the for-
mer organization while espousing everything new as desirable and better. Additionally, cul-
tural identity was woven into hiring practices, thereby increasing somewhat their margin of 
freedom in making hiring decisions and structuring the agency. Senior managers also in-
voked the values of social participation and cooperation by seeking input. On the other 
hand, strategies aimed at improving personal relationships, such as the ingratiation strategy 
and socialization could not be used because they did not have the required power bases and 
credibility. These were not successful in breaking with the past. 
The actions of senior managers of disengaging from the past are consistent with 
what Lewin (1951) calls “unfreezing” or breaking with past or entrenched patterns of doing 
business. From another angle, however, it shows that veteran therapists were actively trying 
to prevent “unfreezing” by focusing on the past. They also co-opted actors external to the 
organization and invoked deep level strategies. These included calling upon the reverse set of 
beliefs held by managers about “new is better”. Claiming a superior moral ground and ethics 
also helped the therapists to block change. The present study provides evidence that the un-
freezing process involves more than just structural change and that deep level processes are 
present.  
In the industrial literature, Kanter, Stein & Jick (1992) have found that chaos arises 
out of change that occurs too quickly or that is out of synch with a phased-in approach to 
change. We do not believe a fast pace of change was a factor in the organization we studied. 
Quite to the contrary, the change process lasted several years and participants complained 
that they never thought they would see the end of the turbulence. 
One of the most important factors for the organizational turbulence was thus con-
flict with the past. For senior managers and their Board of Directors, departing with the past 
was desirable and in some sense mandated. The sense of “Let’s start from square one” was 
very strong in some groups, but the mindsets and experiences of each of the groups differed 
greatly on this, as shown in their strategies. In essence, the new senior administrative team, 
along with its new Board of Directors, were experienced in their own right and wanted to 
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make the new organization a completely new one. Unfortunately, veteran staffs translated an 
upper management belief that “new is better” as “they don’t want us.” 
Thus, senior managers, who engaged principally in downward relationships, engaged 
in strategies that addressed structural as well as personal aspects or their power relationships, 
resulting in a mix of direct and indirect means of influence. 
 
7.1.2 Up-down relationships (senior managers Å team leaders Æ therapists 
and clerical staffs) 
 
Up-down relationships originated in the group of team leaders, who like the other 
groups, tended to focus on some strategies more than on others. Openly managing psycho-
logical involvement took the form of “staying out of the way” and not becoming a third 
party contributing to the dysfunctional dynamics between other levels. The team leaders 
avoided getting triangulated in disputes between senior management and therapists, and they 
avoided alignments with upper and lower levels. This is partly due to senior managers by-
passing them and addressing staffs directly. Despite their potentially easy access to the power 
sources fueling these strategies, the team leaders seemed to put some distance between 
themselves and the politics of the organization to avoid getting caught in the cross-fire. 
Thus, psychological distance, limiting involvement in disputes between other levels, and 
some degree of passivity towards the organization’s larger issues were part-and-parcel of 
their actions. 
Due to their position within the organization, there was evidence that team leaders 
joined in coalitions with their respective Community Advisory Committees. They often 
sought the support of their Committees (against senior management’s wishes) to modify 
clinical programs. This was often intermixed with the issue of cultural identity in the Fran-
cophone and Native units. It is reasonable to assume that the team leaders were “sand-
wiched” between senior managers and therapists, leading them to seek the support of their 
Community Advisory Committees. When they were caught between the two parties, aligning 
with this legal body often allowed them to exert power they would not ordinarily have had. 
We find it interesting that there were few references from the team leaders to manag-
ing lines of communication as a strategy. While therapists continually accused senior manag-
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ers of breaking their own rules when it came to respecting lines of communication, and 
while senior managers strongly felt it was within their purview to bypass team leaders and 
talk directly to therapists at any time, the team leaders were silent on this issue. Contrasting 
with senior managers, the team leaders were not likely to change the existing dynamics be-
cause of the strong negative overtones and the risk of being pulled into other problems. 
From an outsider’s point of view, it would seem that the team leaders were absent. When 
examining these dynamics in relation to other strategies, however, it becomes apparent the 
team leaders chose to ally with their Community Advisory Committees. It also is an indica-
tion that they were staying out of the line of fire and sought refuge in a legal and cultural en-
tity. 
Ingratiation was only lightly used in terms of listening and presenting a calm face to 
situations. Team leaders did not show evidence of actively using this strategy to avoid getting 
caught in the crossfire. Rather, their avoidance patterns seemed to take precedence. 
From the team leaders, there also were very few references to altruism, assertiveness, 
bargaining, deceit, appeals to higher authorities, reasoning, sanctions, and working to rule. 
The team leaders did not use reasoning as a strategy because in their role, they would have 
repeated the same arguments that senior managers had used. Likewise, the team leaders did 
not use reasoning with senior managers for the same reason.  
The team leaders were clearly bypassed in bargaining dynamics, or they may have 
situated themselves away from the line of fire of bargaining. Bargaining was not within their 
role, however, so this may explain the absence of discussion of this strategy from the team 
leaders. Team leaders did not discuss sanctions as a strategy that they had used either in the 
positive or negative sense. Given the tense and negatively charged dynamics between senior 
managers and team therapists, we would have expected team leaders to have to impose some 
sort of order through sanctions, but this did not occur. Rather, team leaders seemed to step 
back to avoid getting caught in the crossfire, leaving senior managers with the task of impos-
ing sanctions. As far as working to rule, it is reasonable to assume that the team leaders had 
to deal with these dynamics from the therapists group, but there was no evidence they en-
gaged in these strategies. Doing so would have defeated their goal of managing and stabiliz-
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ing front-line dynamics, and it would have given the appearance of aligning with lower level 
staffs.  
In essence, the most prominent strategy engaged in by the team leaders was one of 
avoiding tense organizational dynamics, thus avoiding the crossfire between upper and lower 
levels. The evidence towards this is striking and was observed as non-involvement in many 
of the other strategies. Their own words of feeling “sandwiched” describes this well. If they 
favored the senior management side, the therapists would mistrust them. If they sided with 
the therapists, this would mean that upper levels would only have more problems and dy-
namics to deal with. Caught “between a rock and a hard place”, the team leaders chose to 
stay out of the line of fire and to avoid being triangulated or brought into the battlefield. A 
long history of mistrust between other levels seemed to be tied to this strategy. 
Team leaders were relatively “absent” in the dynamics of the surface level strategies 
when compared to senior managers and therapists. They did not discuss surface level strate-
gies to any great length, and participants at other levels did not deal very much with team 
leaders in their discussions. Examination of the data shows a bit more involvement of the 
team leaders in the deep level strategies, however. 
For deep level strategies, references to naturalization in up-down relationships re-
volved principally around culture as a source of power. Team leaders defended culturally led 
services by describing them as natural and inevitable trends in human services. This offered 
some protection for their units during the organizational turbulence, particularly for the 
Francophone and Native clinics. Any cutbacks in funding in their units would be perceived 
as going against inevitable trends, and this would immediately involve the Community Advi-
sory Committees and community pressure groups. We believe that the possibility of getting 
caught in the cross-fire between other levels pushed team leaders to seek the backing of ex-
ternal members, such as the Community Advisory Committees or other persons with clout 
in the community such as school board representatives who themselves are divided along 
cultural lines. 
The legitimation strategy was not discussed much in terms of up-down relationships. 
One example used the belief that no employee, regardless of their level in the organization, 
should be exempt from bearing the problems of the organization. In essence, this strategy 
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was used to reach out to lower level staffs while not aligning necessarily with higher level 
staffs. It thus served to minimize accusations from therapists and clerical staffs that senior 
managers were protecting them. Other examples were few and far between, however. 
The neutralization strategy was the most frequently used deep level strategy among 
all groups, including those in up-down relationships. In the examples provided by the team 
leaders, this strategy borrowed from the reasoning strategy in an attempt to appeal to the 
rational side of others (e.g., showing the ineffectiveness of the “white man’s” approach to 
Native children’s services) while adding moral authority for control of culture. “Objective” 
facts were used to veil value judgments to emphasize their points of view. In addition, by 
openly valuing staff participation and input, democracy, and honesty, the team leaders carved 
a position for themselves as the champions of participation while avoiding the crossfire be-
tween other levels. This was because relationships between higher and lower levels were very 
intense. This strategy was infrequently used, however, leading us to believe that they used 
psychological distance as a primary strategy leading their actions. 
The relative absence of examples of neutralization as a strategy to deal with past his-
tory is noteworthy in this group. Being caught between a higher level that emphasized new-
ness and lower level staffs emphasizing “old baggage”, team leaders took a side position to 
remain neutral and to avoid any cross-fire. Trying to veil value judgments within a reasoning 
strategy between two such extremes would have been very difficult and too transparent. As 
such, the non-use of this strategy may be considered a strategy in itself. 
Team leaders were particularly sensitive to the cultural issues of the organization, and 
they employed the socialization strategy through agency-wide training. They also involved 
themselves in long-term training and cultural awareness changes by gently advocating the 
benefits of increased cultural tolerance, hoping this would have a spillover effect on others. 
A carefully chosen mix of reasoning and value judgments about cultural differences 
was an important strategy for team leaders, although generally in lesser amounts than the 
senior managers. From the description the team leaders gave of the organizational dynamics, 
it is reasonable to assume that they were fighting any attempts at triangulation or bringing 
them into the fray. This was partly due to the structure of the new organization, but their 
non-involvement in the crossfire between other levels was too evident for simple structure 
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to explain. With the strong control and involvement in the organization by upper levels, 
team leaders were in effect displaced from some of their responsibilities. It is reasonable to 
assume that team leaders felt disempowered over time, leading them to avoid the crossfire 
between levels, and leading them to seek other sources of power such as cultural alignments 
with their Community Advisory Committees. Their absence in the interactions between 
other levels, despite their centrality in the organization, thus may have been a deliberate one.  
While there were not numerous examples in the data, the team leaders seemed to fo-
cus on cultural issues when they discussed future trends, clinical practice, and training. The 
team leaders may have been refusing to play their superiors’ game through passive resistance. 
They re-empowered themselves by aligning with the Community Advisory Committees 
through surface (coalitions) and deep level strategies related to cultural identity. In some 
ways, this prevented them from becoming entangled in the poor interactions between upper 
and lower levels. Given the strength of the tensions in the organization, active involvement 
in those interactions would have been counter-productive. 
In other research on a more social-psychological level, Oshry (1991) examined inter-
actions among “tops”, “bottoms”, and “middles” of industrial organizations. He found that 
dynamics surrounding middle managers could lead them from being normally confident and 
competent people to “ineffective and self-doubting wrecks”. Oshry suggests, among other 
things, that middle managers should integrate with other middle managers to break out of 
conflict and paralysis. They also should adopt the “top” roles when required, and the “bot-
tom” roles when needed. Oshry calls this “appreciating the differences” by acknowledging 
the characteristics of upper and lower levels. 
We did not find any of the dynamics described by Oshry in terms of adopting top or 
bottom roles, nor did we find evidence of the team leaders aligning between themselves. The 
team leaders simply carried out their tasks and went along with their superiors’ demands 
when required. Their focus was on avoiding becoming a third party contributing to dysfunc-
tion between other levels, aligning with external sources of power, and invoking cultural 
identity to set boundaries between themselves and senior managers. Further research into 
the dynamics of middle managers is warranted, particularly in terms of deep level power. 
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7.1.3  Upward relationships (therapists and clerical staffs Æ team leaders 
and senior managers) 
 
Upward relationships of the participants were characterized by dynamics related to 
crossing formal lines of communication. While we found few examples of the therapists 
crossing lines themselves, their perceptions that senior managers constantly broke their own 
rules around this issue led them to considerable disengagement in the organization. Psycho-
logical distance, in the form of ignoring senior management’s attempts at collaboration, was 
a key dynamic tied to management’s attempts to cross lines of communication. As the thera-
pists described it, disengagement also was a result of feeling misunderstood. They felt senior 
managers and team leaders had no appreciation for their past work experience and expertise.  
Some therapists used assertiveness in attempts to redirect the work of team leaders 
and senior managers. Assertiveness was used to intensify upward relationships between 
therapists and senior managers, and it counteracted attempts by management to stabilize and 
diffuse situations. It was one of the factors that drove senior managers out of their “comfort 
zones” and required further actions on their part. 
Coalitions were discussed at length by the therapists, both in terms of union solidar-
ity and in terms of ethnic identity in the Francophone unit. We also saw evidence of co-
optation of external sources of influence. The group of therapists made many more refer-
ences to coalitions than any other group. It is interesting that there was no evidence of coali-
tions with the team leaders. As mentioned before, this may be explained by the strong nega-
tive interactions between upper and lower levels, enough to reduce the effectiveness of any 
possible coalitions with the team leaders. Added to this was the relative absence of team 
leaders concerning any buffering effects between therapists and senior managers. It is prob-
able that the team leaders would have been even more sandwiched than they were. 
Bargaining was an important strategy for the therapists at the onset of the new or-
ganization, particularly for protecting existing salaries and working conditions. Several thera-
pists, particularly those closely tied to the union, were outraged when traditional labor union 
bargaining was bypassed and apparently transformed into “staff consultations” by senior 
management, thereby reducing the pressure that could be exerted by bargaining.  
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It is noted that there are ties between the bargaining and coalition strategies. Bargain-
ing as a unit required the support of group members, which lagged at different times. The 
union did not always have full support of its members, therefore lowering the potential ef-
fect that bargaining could have had. 
Therapists had little recourse to working-to-rule and sanctions. Work slowdowns 
could have intensified the pressure on higher levels of the organization and consequently 
increased uncertainty, but therapists explained they had little precedent to carry out such ac-
tions, and they did not have the energy. They stated that working their regular hours, and not 
withholding regular service was their focus. Working to rule might have had a strong back-
lash against the therapists given that they did not want to involve clients in their battles. 
Also, strategies such as sanctions required sources of power that may not have been available 
to therapists. They nonetheless discussed at length their perceptions that sanctions would be 
used on them for any actions deemed inappropriate by management. 
This group of staffs used ingratiation infrequently. Since most had ‘old baggage’ they 
carried into the new organization, they felt this strategy was a waste of time. Veterans might 
have perceived actions by newer staffs along these lines as brown-nosing. 
Reasoning also was a strategy for which there were few examples in the data in up-
wards relationships. (Most references to this strategy came from the senior management 
group). One explanation is that due to the highly strained relationship between senior man-
agement and therapists, the latter felt that trying to use facts to inform and to influence was 
to no avail. Therapists placed little value on information and facts provided by the admini-
stration, thereby muting its effect as a power source and lowering the possibility of its ma-
nipulation in a strategy. 
Appeals to higher authorities saw limited use by the therapists because of the heavy 
emphasis on following formal lines of communication. They nonetheless bypassed these 
lines to discuss issues with the two Co-ordinators on several occasions, and this was cloaked 
in their participation on committees where they knew the Coordinators would be present. 
The new presence of therapists on the Community Advisory Committees, however, could 
possibly reflect this strategy gaining importance. Because of the early timing of this study we 
were not able to investigate this further. 
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Only the therapists group mentioned deceit as a strategy that was employed, but not 
for an upward relationship. This was used internally, within the therapists group, to clarify 
issues with the union. This strategy was not employed against other groups. It is noteworthy, 
however, that there was strong emphasis by the therapists group that deceit had been used 
against them in terms of misleading and incomplete information. 
Not surprisingly, the therapists group did not use altruism. It would have been diffi-
cult for this group to invoke altruism or have any credibility attached to it given the conflict 
in the organization. There were no indications, however, that employees put in less than a 
full day’s work, although there was little motivation to do overtime. 
Clerical staffs also were involved in upward relationships. Compared to the thera-
pists, team leaders and senior managers, the clerical group was relatively absent in all the sur-
face level strategies, however. They did not describe themselves as directly involved in the 
power plays of the organization. This does not imply they had no stake in the events that 
occurred nor that they were powerless, but that their role was more a peripheral one when 
one examines the organization as a whole. Battles in the organization traditionally did not 
involve clerical staffs.  
In contrast to downward relationships, upward strategies seemed focused on keeping 
the past alive. Discussions around crossing formal lines of communication, maintaining a 
low involvement in the new plans of the organization, and some bargaining to maintain ex-
isting working conditions were the predominant dynamics. Lower level staffs, particularly 
those affected the most by the change strategies from above, seemed more likely to describe 
the changes as turbulent compared with other groups. 
Therapists came up with ways to minimize the potency of the naturalization strategy 
as used by the senior managers. Therapists created dilemmas for the higher levels by invok-
ing similar strategies, but with a different set of beliefs. While higher levels proposed future 
trends as inevitable, lower levels held on to the past by valuing old ways of doing things. 
With statements such as “We have always done it this way … why change now?”, therapists 
introduced the reverse set of beliefs being promoted by higher levels.  
Therapists also felt that is was only “natural” for them to mistrust managers and in-
formation, and they used their past history as justification for this. A sense of suspiciousness 
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and careful regard for anything new was part of the belief system of therapists, and this was 
partly due to senior management’s discounting their past skills and experience. Veterans also 
relayed this belief to newcomers to convey the message that they should always read between 
the lines of what managers in general say. In essence, the way the belief was communicated 
was through a message that historically, information and judgments from above could not 
possibly be relevant to lower level staffs. 
An examination of upward relationships provided several examples of the legitima-
tion strategy, principally by questioning the ethics of senior managers. Claims by therapists 
that the best interests of the clients were at stake under the new management, and that senior 
managers were more concerned by budgets than by true client needs, were frequently em-
phasized. Invoking superior professional values and ethics was a key element that helped 
legitimize their resistance and push upper level staffs out of their comfort zones.  
Contrary to the therapists group, the clerical staffs avoided pushing the buttons of 
their bosses and were unwilling to engage in such actions. Their loyalty to the goals of the 
organization was emphasized.  This does not imply that they always agreed with upper man-
agement’s decisions, but that they would not call upon their potential sources of power to 
delay or block them. 
 The neutralization strategy was the most frequently discussed deep level strategy. 
Expertise and information as sources of power were often used to make viewpoints appear 
more widely accepted or universal than they actually were. This certainly made decision mak-
ing at higher levels more difficult because one of the implications is that it is unwise to 
counter the opinions of large groups of expert professionals. Client and employee participa-
tion in decisions, for example, was a widely held belief that was often invoked by the thera-
pists to gain access to the Community Advisory Committees. When combined with the le-
gitimation strategy, where loyalty, fairness and equity came into play, the zones of 
uncertainty thus created were undoubtedly difficult to deal with and heightened the intensity 
of the turbulence. 
 The neutralization strategy also was called upon to deal with the belief by manage-
ment that “new is better”. The therapists countered by claiming that senior managers were 
all new and that they could not possibly relate to past events in a meaningful way. Past his-
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tory, it seems, was the sole territory of the therapists because none of the senior managers 
could stake any claim to it. In essence, it was difficult for senior managers to appeal to the 
rational side of therapists when the latter continually brought forth the issue that senior 
managers did not value the skills and experiences they had gained at the former organization. 
Socialization is the fourth of the deep level strategies. A rare example involving sen-
ior managers in an upward relationship revealed their attempts to shape the attitudes of 
board members through carefully planned education about roles, and responsibilities and 
boundaries. Veiled through the use of “expert” manuals and training programs chosen by 
senior managers, the latter would ultimately develop a larger margin of freedom than if 
board members involved themselves more in the business of the organization. 
As for other types of upward relationships, therapists worked actively at educating 
senior managers to the values behind certain types of intervention programs such as preven-
tion. They sought to show that such programs were not just a combination of techniques but 
also that they were based on a variety of philosophies and schools of thought. The hidden 
pressure and implication is that to doubt the value of certain intervention programs would 
be like questioning “motherhood and apple pie”. In effect, this served to increase the margin 
of freedom of those employees in special intervention programs. 
 
7.1.4  Lateral relationships (e.g., therapist Æ therapist) 
 Lateral power strategies were more difficult to identify than other types because 
there were few examples provided by the participants. This is partly due to the intensity of 
relationships between upper and lower levels, such as between the therapists and senior man-
agers, as opposed to within levels. A few examples did provide a glimpse into the formation 
of lateral strategies, however. The therapists formed coalitions around job security and fi-
nancial issues, and exerted pressure as a group on their union representatives to speak up for 
their issues. In this sense, peers exerted pressure within their own level. On the other hand, 
senior managers did not discuss coalitions between themselves as a way to counter the 
strategies of others. This is perhaps because of their small number. Team leaders and clerical 
staffs did not discuss coalitions in lateral terms. 
        Chapter 7 — Discussion       
 
268
 
Bargaining and managing lines of communication were not strategies that were high-
lighted in lateral relationships. By definition, these occur between levels rather than within 
them. 
While there were few examples of deceit as a strategy at any level, deceit was none-
theless used laterally within the therapists group to force some clarifications of issues with 
the union. This strategy was not employed against other groups.  
Ingratiation was used within the senior managers group, combined with reasoning, to 
attempt to convince other senior managers of certain points of view. Our data did not pro-
vide further examples of ingratiation in the context of lateral dynamics, however. 
There were no indications of altruism or assertiveness as strategies in lateral dynam-
ics at any level. While therapists were not always pleased with the activities of their union, for 
example, they gave no indication of using this strategy within their own group. Also, reason-
ing strategies were noticeably absent. It is reasonable to assume that members discussed dif-
ferent alternatives with other members of their group before discussing them with other lev-
els, and trying to appeal to the sense of reason, but we found no examples of this. This is 
partly due to the fact that participants in the research were more inclined to discuss dynamics 
between levels than within them. Appeals to higher authorities and working to rule, for their 
part as strategies, were absent. By definition, this strategy would not appear in lateral rela-
tionships. 
Managing psychological distance was not a strategy employed in lateral relationships. 
Its focus was entirely between levels instead of within them. The data also did not reveal that 
sanctions were used laterally or within groups. While it is reasonable to assume that some 
pressure was put on members within groups to maintain some degree of solidarity, especially 
within the therapists group, there were no indications that negative or positive sanctions had 
been employed to create or maintain this. There is no doubt pressure to conform within a 
group was present, however. 
Lateral relationships in deep level strategies were more difficult to analyze because 
there were few examples observed. Naturalization was not a strategy that was noted in lateral 
dynamics, probably because these strategies were aimed at higher levels. When examined in 
context with the socialization strategy, however, we noted that therapists sought to show 
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other therapists that it was only natural to mistrust management, because “managers are not 
to be trusted.” Likewise, neutralization was not a dynamic noted within groups. This is 
probably due to members within groups sharing common points of view and having a com-
mon enemy at another level. It may be that these strategies tend to be aimed outside one’s 
own group during turbulent change, at least from the findings of our research. 
There also were no clear examples of the socialization strategy in the data for lateral 
relationships. While there were no direct examples, it is reasonable to assume that staffs, par-
ticularly therapists who represented the largest group, continually emphasized between 
themselves the belief that anything to do with management was not to be trusted. The belief 
system around the competencies of the senior managers, and their inability to relate to and 
understand past events, was not verbalized between members but was evident between the 
lines in the interviews. It is also reasonable to assume that there was some form of hidden 
peer pressure to stick together against the senior managers, in some ways coalescing around 
a common enemy.  
Finally, legitimation, which invokes higher order explanations such as loyalty, was 
not a dynamic referred to frequently in lateral relationships, but there were a few examples. 
Clerical staffs, for example, emphasized the importance within their own group and among 
other non-management staffs that it was everybody’s responsibility to lower expenses. Cleri-
cal staffs also were vocal about their values of ensuring services to clients by “not screwing 
up intentionally”, even if they did not agree with the decisions of their superiors. 
In essence, except for the appearance of some minor coalitions of some therapists 
against others, there were few examples of lateral strategy formation. This is explained in 
part by the intense dynamics between levels, not within them.  
 
7.1.5  Comparisons between newcomers and veteran staffs 
 Comparisons between newcomers and veteran staffs revealed differences in the way 
strategies were used. While caution is called for due to the small number of participants in 
this study, we nonetheless observed that overcoming history was a key issue with veteran 
staffs. Veterans often felt that their past work experiences in the organization were totally 
ignored in favor of starting fresh. This was one of the elements behind their passivity and 
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managing psychological involvement in the organization. Another factor was the non-
recognition of work experience and skills with the former organization. Compared to the 
veterans group, newcomers did not have a sense of history about the organization, making it 
more difficult to invoke this strategy in a meaningful way. There was, however, a contagion 
effect from veterans to newcomers leading to psychological disengagement. 
 For the ingratiation strategy, we found some differences between veterans and new-
comers. Veterans particularly disqualified ingratiation by ignoring it when it was presented as 
jokes, and so it is reasonable to assume that it would have had little value in terms of a strat-
egy for them. A few newcomers (a senior manager and a team leader) used this strategy as a 
personal approach with others, being less business-like, being “kind, open and honest”, and 
presenting a calm face to situations. This was limited in its effectiveness, however. The tur-
bulent context almost nullified many attempts at ingratiation. Past history, old baggage, and 
mistrust are factors that negated this strategy, along with the very infrequent use of rewards. 
Past investment in the history of the organization seemed to lead staffs away from this strat-
egy, as well as the negative connotation that appealing to higher authorities would have in 
the eyes of colleagues.  
The reasoning strategy did not appear to be used differently between newcomers and 
veterans. Questions of mistrust of information and the low value placed on the accuracy of 
information seemed to be tied to the low use of the reasoning strategy. What we know is that 
pushing up the urgency level in the organization did not increase pressure on the veteran 
staffs enough because information presented to them was disqualified. It was difficult to cre-
ate a “crisis” using information. Unfortunately, most of the literature focuses on personality 
characteristics or factors such as types of inspirational appeals rather than on length of em-
ployment. Further research along these lines would elucidate the role of length of employ-
ment in overcoming past history. 
 Concerning assertiveness as a strategy, veterans and newcomers both put fairly even 
emphasis on this strategy. There did not appear to be differences in the way they imple-
mented it (e.g. voicing their concerns loudly, refusing to do something, and avoiding asser-
tiveness). 
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 There were some distinctions between newcomers and veteran staffs on the sanc-
tions strategy, although the examples we found were entirely perceived sanctions, not sanc-
tions that members had imposed. Veterans had more history and more examples to provide 
than newcomers did. Because there was only one example from the newcomers group, fur-
ther comparisons are difficult. It is noteworthy, however, that more veterans discussed sanc-
tions than newcomers did. 
Newer staffs seemed to relate differently to the bargaining strategy than veteran 
staffs. The sense of urgency of changes was higher for newer staffs, but this occurred more 
in the senior managers than other groups. It is therefore difficult to determine if newness or 
organizational position, or both combined, were important factors. Veteran staffs seemed 
less willing to give up what they had gained when compared to newer staffs. Holding on to 
the past was one way of stifling management’s bargaining efforts. 
Related to the bargaining strategy are coalitions, and some differences were noted be-
tween newcomers and veterans. Staffs who had been with the organization longer tended to 
be more “battle hardened” and felt the need to present a unified force against higher levels. 
They also were more ready to initiate coalitions because they had worked together for a 
longer time. While newcomers also felt coalitions were important, their sense of urgency 
around this dynamic was not quite as strong, as shown by their lesser involvement in issues 
related to past history. The physical separation of the organization into clinics across the 
community also was a factor that prevented newer staffs from forming coalitions because 
they did not know other staffs across the organization well enough.  
Still in the coalition strategy, veterans clearly had a strong sense of the past and did 
not want to repeat the cultural disputes that had occurred at their former place of employ-
ment. In essence, coalitions were influenced somewhat by cultural identity as a source of 
power. Veterans were more willing to co-opt members external to the organization because 
of their extensive knowledge of external actors and the ways to tie them into the existing sys-
tem. 
Working to rule seemed to highlight a few differences between veterans and new-
comers. While the number of references to this strategy was low, it nonetheless was apparent 
that newer staffs were more prepared to take risks than veterans were. Veteran staffs often 
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related their non-use of this strategy to perceived threats of sanctions from higher levels. 
Overall, however, this was not a strategy the participants discussed at any great length. 
There did not appear to be any differences between veterans and newcomers in ap-
peals to higher authorities. This was due to the focus on following prescribed lines of com-
munication, and the negative connotation that talking about organizational issues with 
higher-ups would have. There also were no differences between the groups for the altruism 
strategy. It is reasonable to assume that the absence of altruistic acts was related to the psy-
chological distance strategy, where there was a contagion effect on the newer staffs.  
Veterans and newcomers did not appear to use deceit as a clandestine strategy differ-
ently, although the perception and accusations that deceit had been used were much more 
frequent and intense in the veterans group. It would be reasonable to expect veteran staffs to 
take on more risk-taking behavior due to their higher job security in the organization, but we 
found no evidence of this. It is likely that clandestine strategies between levels would have 
only made a bad situation worse and that staffs resorted to strategies exerting different types 
of social pressure, such as psychological distance. Use of threats and deceit were not com-
mon in any of the groups.  
Concerning managing lines of communication, newcomers were more vocal than 
veterans about this strategy. This probably reflects the fact that it is the senior managers, all 
newcomers, who spoke with the most emphasis about this, compared to all other groups.  
In essence, veterans were more active in managing psychological distance than new-
comers, and this is explained in large part by their high investment of time and energy over 
the years in the organization. There was no evidence of “new camp versus old camp” dy-
namics. 
The data in the present research for all surface level strategies confirm findings in the 
industrial literature that different groups of people use strategies differently (e.g., Kipnis, 
Schmidt & Wilkinson, 1980; Mintzberg, 1989). This is partly because they wield different 
sources of power, but also to factors such as past history and low levels of trust. We found 
that higher level members of the organization focused on making events more predictable 
(or less unpredictable) by focusing on proper lines of communication and structure ele-
ments. They also focused heavily on burying the past by rationalizing the benefits of new 
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ways of functioning, and by introducing new policies and procedures, and material things 
such as furniture. The more that lower level staffs resisted, the more that reasoning occurred 
without the intended success. This is concurrent with studies in the industrial literature that 
show that reasoning tends to be used consistently throughout turbulence, even when resis-
tance is high, because of perceptions that is more acceptable as an action by others. (Yukl, 
Kim, and Falbe, 1996) Information as a potential source of power was made less relevant 
because of strong mistrust of data submitted by senior levels. 
Team leaders (middle managers) were characterized by their non-involvement in the 
dynamics of the organization. Their central position in the structure of the organization did 
not translate into being central in its dynamics. Their alignments were more external to the 
immediate organization than they were internal, such as with their Community Advisory 
Committees. Access to external influencers and cultural elements were relevant in protecting 
them from the crossfire between senior managers and therapists. Past history and trust were 
not factors that strongly influenced the strategies of middle managers because they avoided 
becoming triangulated or dragged into dynamics between other levels. 
Dynamics in the therapists group, on the other hand, showed they consistently coun-
tered strategies of the senior managers. Initial hopes for positive change and collaboration 
were quickly replaced by a focus on the past, past ways of doing business, and strong mis-
trust of information. Instead of dealing with structural issues, the therapists focused on ig-
noring higher levels through managing psychological distance and coalitions through exter-
nal co-optation. This in many ways paralyzed senior managers’ attempts to rationalize their 
points of view through the sharing of information. It seems their strategies were opposites to 
those of senior managers. Therapists countered reasoning and ingratiation on the part of 
senior managers by non-interest and managing psychological involvement. 
Clerical staffs, for their part, were noticeably absent in all the dynamics, probably be-
cause of their peripheral role. They did not make use of sources of power potentially avail-
able to them (e.g., flow of information), and this was due to the strength of negative dynam-
ics between the therapists and the senior managers and their non-alignment with other 
groups. 
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Strategies in all levels seemed intimately tied to the level of mistrust of information, 
which in turn was tied to non-recognition of past history. Mistrust directly affected sources 
of power such as information. Also, therapists countered the sense of urgency created by 
senior managers by recalling the past. The sense of crisis that higher levels tried to create to 
move things along did not succeed in creating strong zones of uncertainty for other levels. 
In our view, the strategies employed by the staffs in the present research parallel 
those described in the industrial literature in terms of power. Their application specifically to 
the mental health setting showed that factors such as past history and levels of trust are 
tightly woven in the strategies. Our analysis adds managing psychological distance as an im-
portant strategy because of its strong presence and the frequent references to it by the par-
ticipants. Its effects to counter the power and strategies of higher levels in the organization 
were noteworthy.  
All veterans and newcomers were affected and involved in deep level power strate-
gies, sometimes in similar ways, sometimes in different ways. Comparisons between the 
groups must be made carefully, however, because the groups were not all matched in terms 
of years of experience with the organization. Higher level staffs were all new, whereas about 
half of the therapists were veteran staffs. The two groups were each heterogeneous. 
Newcomers did not invoke the naturalization strategy in terms of past trends or ways 
of doing business. This is explained by their lack of connection with the past organization, 
when compared to veterans and as shown by the difficulties senior managers had in connect-
ing with veterans. Questions of mistrust also were not as important as for the veterans. Be-
lief systems seemed influenced by the fact that higher levels (all newcomers) did not value 
past experience and skills. In essence, this gave the message that success in the new organiza-
tion depended on throwing out everything to do with the past and starting afresh. Newcom-
ers at all levels did invoke cultural arguments, however, when emphasizing the inevitable 
recognition of culturally appropriate services.  
We did not find any significant differences between newcomers and veterans for the 
legitimation strategy. Legitimation was not necessarily tied to past history and thus was avail-
able as a strategy to all employees, regardless of the level or years of experience in the or-
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ganization. Thus, the values and beliefs around issues of loyalty, equity and fairness were not 
necessarily used differently because of years of experience with the organization. 
The neutralization strategy, on the other hand, did highlight differences between vet-
eran staffs and newcomers. As discussed earlier, all senior managers, most of the team lead-
ers, and all members of the Board of Directors were new to the organization. A strongly 
held value of this group was that they had to part with things of the past and start off on a 
new foot. Veterans, on the other hand, did not want their past experiences and knowledge to 
be ignored. Newer senior staffs equated new structures, policies and procedures, models of 
intervention, and even new furniture, with “better”. Veterans on the other hand, principally 
in the therapists group, reasoned that managers did not have to discard the past to make the 
new organization an effective one. Thus, there was a clash of the old with the new. This was 
not generalized across all veterans and newcomers, however. Some members in the thera-
pists group, for example, were often neutral because of their lack of connection with the 
past. Further analysis of the dynamics between veterans and newcomers in this strategy must 
be interpreted cautiously due to the heterogeneous nature and small size of each group. 
Socialization is the final deep level strategy that we examined. Veteran staffs were 
clearly aware that newcomers were confused by a long history of tense dynamics and were 
looking for clear directions as to the future of the organization. Persons employed by the 
psychiatric hospital before the divestment always felt it was necessary to read between the 
lines, and they ensured this message was transmitted to new employees. There were unspo-
ken rules that managers and information they used were not to be trusted, and this was evi-
dent when senior managers were in their presence. There was thus some form of transmis-
sion of beliefs through socialization, which in some ways resulted in a shared vision between 
therapists. We did note that the intensity of beliefs around the past was stronger for the vet-
erans group, whose belief system was directly tied to their experiences with the former or-
ganization. Newcomers, who did not share the same sense of history, seemed less focused 
on holding on to the past although they sometimes piggybacked their opinions on those of 
veteran staffs. This was noticed particularly in the therapists group. Again, we emphasize that 
it is difficult to compare veterans and newcomers as groups because each included a variety 
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of positions within the organization. Further research with a larger number of participants 
could shed more light on this. 
In summary, there were differences between veterans and newcomers in the use of 
strategies with newcomers focusing more on strategies evoking positive emotions while vet-
erans seemed to avoid or not use them. A principal factor seemed to be the past and percep-
tions of lack of recognition of years of work experience and skills of the therapists. Our con-
clusions are tempered because the newcomers formed the entire administration group, 
however. Senior management’s (all newcomers) emphasis on structural elements leads us to 
postulate they were attempting to decrease uncertainty through a combination of deep and 
surface level strategies relating to structure, rationalization and cloaking their beliefs in facts, 
whether conscious of it or not at the time. This is in contrast to the veterans, who continu-
ally recalled their past roots as a means of decreasing uncertainty and of stifling change. We 
found that veterans tend to see events as much more turbulent because of their longer in-
volvement with the history of the organization. 
 
7.2  THE FINDINGS IN LIGHT OF EXISTING THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVES OF STRATEGY FORMATION 
 
In Chapter 2, which focused on the theoretical underpinnings of strategy formation, 
we reviewed many perspectives for analyzing strategies and power. In keeping with its inter-
disciplinary nature, this dissertation avoided focusing on a single perspective, and it put the 
focus on themes emerging from the data.  
Chapter 5 examined the sources of power emanating from the research interviews. 
Chapter 6 detailed each of the power strategies at both the surface and deep levels. Recalling 
the different theoretical perspectives in Chapter 2, several different approaches to the study 
of power were presented. We will revisit these briefly and examine how the data relate to the 
existing literature.  
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7.2.1 The Classical Perspective 
The Classical approach emphasizes the rational and analytical point of view. As such, 
strategies are described as predictable, planned, and rational actions (Meyerson & Banfield, 
1955; Ansoff, 1965; Andrews, 1971; Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Channon, 1978; Porter, 1980 
among others). The empirical data reviewed in this study only weakly support this in that the 
transition from psychiatric hospital to the new community organization was a deliberate 
event planned around certain actions that were irrevocable. The classical perspective fails on 
several fronts, however. First, the empirical evidence presented here shows that strategies are 
not always planned, but sometimes emergent and sometimes spontaneous. Senior managers’ 
willingness to bring in new computer desks, for example, was thwarted by a belief by thera-
pists that this would lead to job changes in the future. Senior managers consequently had to 
shift to deep level strategies (e.g., naturalization) to show these changes were inevitable. One 
could say senior managers from the beginning did not plan this outcome despite much prior 
analysis. Another example was the union’s strong resistance to modified hiring practices for 
Natives and Francophones. This resistance built up over time and consequently senior man-
agers adopted a different set of strategies to deal with it. Thus, the present research does not 
support the concept that all strategies can be or are scientifically planned from the outset. 
The classical perspective of strategy formation is inadequate for explaining such dynamics 
because it assumes actors have full knowledge of all facts and have completed a thorough 
analysis of all possible alternatives and obstacles before a strategy is implemented.  
The classical perspective does not account for power dynamics that are relational 
rather than mechanical. Some strategies, particularly the deep level ones, were deeply rooted 
in the organization’s functioning and belief systems of its members. Senior managers held 
the belief that history could be overcome by avoiding it altogether and by valuing newness 
and new skills and programs. Quite the opposite was true for the lower level staffs. Thus, 
aspects of cultural identity are ignored. The classical perspective does not account for the 
threat to union solidarity and splitting of the union along cultural lines.  
In addition, one might assume that under the classical approach the more knowledge 
one has about a situation, the more successful one’s strategies might be. Following this logic, 
we would assume that the senior managers had the largest view of the organization, pos-
        Chapter 7 — Discussion       
 
278
 
sessed more information than everyone else, and consequently had more sources of power 
to pull from and a larger pool of strategies. Unfortunately, this logic is weak when we exam-
ine the amount of pressure exerted by the lower groups, and the high amount of resistance 
that emerged. According to the classical perspective, resistance would have been easier to 
deal with, or in the extreme, non-existent because senior managers would have foreseen the 
events and planned accordingly.  
As noted in Chapter 2, the organization studied in this research is a professional or-
ganization that is not suited for the “one best way” of planning for change. According to 
Mintzberg (1994b) much of the literature still relies on 
“conventional assumptions of planning, namely strategies that should ema-
nate from the top of the organization full-blown, that goals can be clearly 
stated, that the central formulation of strategies must be followed by their 
pervasive implementation, that the workers (in this case professors, teachers, 
and doctors, etc.) will (or must) respond to these centrally composed strate-
gies, and so on.” (pp. 404-405) 
 
The evidence reported in this research supports Mintzberg’s assumptions that such 
concepts are outdated and cannot be applied readily to professional organizations. Others 
put this more bluntly. “I see planning as an expanding bureaucracy, of very little assistance to 
me but capable of creating several structures of bullshit that I have to cope with.” (in Mintz-
berg, 1994b, p. 405) 
The professional organization studied here showed disparate units, each with its own 
needs, problems, and issues. The Francophone therapists, for example, were sometimes at 
odds with the other groups in terms of wanting and “exerting” a separate cultural identity. 
The same held true for the Native group, which sought different hiring practices suited to its 
needs.  
In essence, the data in this study support the positions by several others (Pettigrew, 
1985; Dufour, 1991; Mintzberg, 1994b, among others) that the classical approach falls short 
of bringing a full understanding of strategy formation processes, particularly in unpredictable 
or turbulent environments. Basing one’s decisions entirely on formalized planning or strat-
egy-making makes little sense in an environment that is uncertain and turbulent. This would 
require information processing abilities that individuals cannot possibly achieve themselves. 
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7.2.2 The Behavioral Perspective 
The tenets of the behavioral approaches hold that strategy formation is less rational 
and planned than the classical approach. Strategies are limited or bounded because the actors 
cannot possibly possess, process and understand all information and facts (Simon, 1955; 
March & Simon, 1958). They tend to base their strategies on the best assessment they can 
make with what is available. Dealing with resistance to change is a key facet based on atti-
tudes and personal psychological change. Personality traits strongly influence the actions of 
persons. 
The data in this study revealed much resistance to change from the therapists group 
as addressed in the behavioral literature. Examination of personality traits, individual motiva-
tion, and commitment offer some insights into why the groups behaved as they did. Job se-
curity, initially high expectations for better working conditions, perceptions of non-interest 
by the psychiatric hospital to protect the workers during the transition and the desire for 
recognition of cultural identity are all examples of this.  
As with the classical approach above, professional, cultural and political overtones 
that colored strategies at all levels of the organization are not fully accounted for, however. 
Rather than being fully predictable, the strategies seemed sometimes disparate or frag-
mented. They formed a whole made up of different individual and collective actions. Thus, 
recalling theories presented in Chapter 2, perspectives such as the “garbage can” model of 
strategy formation (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972) do not hold up. The garbage can model, 
for example, assumes that decisions are often non-purposeful and random. The data do not 
support this notion because the four groups of staffs studied were often planned and pur-
poseful in their actions, even if at times this was in an “emergent” way. Each of the twelve 
surface and four deep level strategies showed purpose in trying to facilitate or conversely to 
block change from different perspectives. Senior managers, for example, broke their own 
communications guidelines in a purposeful attempt to approach staffs under the name of 
collaboration and seeking input. Such actions, while not necessarily planned in a formalized 
way, show premeditated actions on their part rather than random non-purposeful events. 
Creating a sense of urgency using financial data, and the subsequent increase in resistance by 
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therapists, show spill-over of one strategy onto another that some behavioral theories cannot 
explain. Inflicting damage to union solidarity by bypassing the union around possible layoffs 
is another example of non-random actions in a stream of actions and events. 
The Organizational Development approach, for its part, holds that attitudes, inter-
personal relations and organizational climate are keys to successful strategies. The evidence 
presented here contrasts with the findings of this approach in that many attempts using or-
ganizational development had been made by senior managers to improve and open up chan-
nels of communication, and to increase staff participation. They were without success. The 
turbulent context of the organization prevented many of the actions of senior managers 
from having the desired effect. In addition, the behavioral camp of theories generally ignores 
any issues of a political context such as team leaders aligning politically with their community 
advisory committees, which was to the possible detriment of aligning with senior managers. 
The data in this research provide little support for Hedberg and Jonsson’s (1978) dis-
continuous perspective. The concept that strategies are discontinuous during turbulence and 
that a shared cognitive and emotional framework does not exist until the turbulence ceases, 
is an interesting concept that has some merits in the short run. As an example, senior man-
agers assumed that therapists would willingly accept new furniture designed to accommodate 
computers in each office. They did not take into consideration that therapist resistance was 
motivated by fears about job security, however. When senior managers sought input from 
therapists around office paint and the color of carpets they wanted installed, there existed 
high amounts of resistance despite assumptions this would lower resistance. This can be ex-
plained in part by a lack of shared cognitive framework and would explain stressors between 
levels and attempts to increase predictability/decrease uncertainty.  
In an organization that endures protracted or long-term turbulence, however, it is 
difficult to understand how an organization can fill its mandate and continue functioning, 
despite turbulence, without some kind of shared cognitive and emotional framework. In the 
present research, members at all levels of the organization shared a common goal of helping 
children and families in distress and ensured the services were provided to those in need. 
Even if the emotional framework was negative at many times, staffs nonetheless related in 
their strategies around a shared emotional and cognitive framework. 
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In addition, the behavioral perspective clearly shows a bias towards management’s 
role in reducing resistance and creating conditions that inhibit turbulence. The present re-
search shows evidence that this concept is self-limiting, as are theories that focus only on 
personality traits. Examining elements that drive organizational members into and out of 
their comfort zones is helpful, but the data presented here show there are more factors in-
volved. Power is everywhere in organizations, not only at the top. The behavioral theories 
are not entirely without merit, however. Dealing with resistance is an activity in which or-
ganizations spend a great deal of time. An enhanced perspective including politics and cul-
ture would increase the applicability of this perspective since it already deals with group dy-
namics. 
 
7.2.3 The Contingency Perspective 
This approach holds that power is the joint result of the extent to which actors can 
cope with uncertainties that are critical to the organization, and the degree to which such 
coping capacity is unique or non-substitutable. The routinization of processes reduces the 
amount of uncertainty present in the task or process, and thus the opportunity for coping 
with uncertainty. The reduction of uncertainty, and therefore the reduction in the complexity 
of the tasks and the skills required to do the tasks, for example, makes performing a job 
more replaceable. The combination of these two factors suggests that those performing 
more routine tasks have less power.  
The present research does not dispute these facts but we found no evidence that 
more replaceable jobs automatically had “less” power. While clerical functions in the organi-
zation were more routine that those of the therapists, for example, the clerical staffs none-
theless were gatekeepers of information. The fact they did not manipulate this power against 
others did not mean they had no access to it or that they were powerless. Rather, it means 
the clerical staffs made conscious choices about which strategies they invoked or didn’t in-
voke. Thus, while the contingency approach stresses environmental variables and how 
members fit in terms of scarcity and criticality, it tends to minimize the importance of inter-
nal dynamics. 
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Additionally, the contingency perspective emphasizes the environment as having a 
strong impact on the organization’s structure and functioning. While the Community Advi-
sory Committees in the present research could be seen as shaping the strategies of members 
as filters of community pressure, we find little explanation for other dynamics. The contin-
gency view comes short in explaining why the union did not engage in labor union slow-
downs or work stoppages as strategies nor held the threat of strikes over the head of man-
agement. The evidence uncovered shows quite the contrary by the relative absence of these 
actions, despite their potential for severely disrupting the organization. Contingency does not 
explicate well enough the relative quietness of all groups around the work stoppages issue, 
among others. 
In essence, attempts to explain organizational processes through their environment 
are not enough to explain strategy formation. It is difficult to find explanations for all micro-
level strategies and actions by looking only at contingencies or limits outside the organiza-
tion. These factors are too impersonal. What determines how an organization acts or reacts 
to change is not the external environment, but the willingness of individuals to change their 
ways of working or ways of thinking about the organization. (Mills & Murgatroyd, 1991) 
Applicability of such concepts to professional organizations such as the one here is thus 
problematic, as others have found (Séguin & Chanlat, 1983). 
 
7.2.4 The Cultural Influence Perspective 
 In the cultural influence perspective, there is a different focus for explaining strategy 
formation. As defined by Schein (1996) for industrial organizations, culture is a shared, 
taken-for-granted implicit assumption that a group holds and that determines how it per-
ceives, thinks about and reacts to its various environments. There was considerable evidence 
of shared history between veteran staffs through sharing events, interactions, and experi-
ences. Their shared history helped them coalesce against management’s emphasis on new-
ness. Senior managers, for their part, contrasted this with a shared set of understandings 
around the importance of newness, a fresh start, and parting with older, “less desirable” ways 
of doing business. Confirming Schein’s (1990) findings, the present study found that higher 
levels tended to articulate new sets of beliefs for the new organization to launch their change 
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efforts. This is consistent with the industrial literature on organizational change. (Kotter, 
1996) 
 Some of the recent literature on organizational culture helps highlight power dynam-
ics in the present organization. Kotter (1996), for example, explains that changes to habits 
take time and usually come at the end of a transformation process. In addition, new ap-
proaches usually sink into a culture only after it is clear that they work and that they are bet-
ter than the old approaches. Applying this to the present research helps put some of the 
pieces in perspective. The empirical data presented show that senior managers had the high-
est emphasis on reasoning and facts, along with neutralization at the deep level. Taken in the 
organizational culture context, it is clear managers made continual efforts at surface and deep 
levels to convey how the new organization and its functioning would be superior to the old. 
 Comparing with Schein’s (1990) descriptions of organizational change, we found 
evidence of only some of the strategies that he has identified in other research in the indus-
trial field. Highlighting threats to the organization through making financial difficulties pub-
lic was one way the senior managers attempted to make change desirable. Appointing new 
persons to each senior manager and team leader positions was another way to make a state-
ment about starting afresh. 
 We found little evidence of seduction, coercion or creating visible scandals as means 
of discrediting sacred cows or old ways of doing business. The context of the organization 
and Schein’s tendency to focus on the industrial rather than the public sector organizations 
may explain some of these differences.  
 Lesser emphasis for other groups on deep level strategies is explained, at least in part, 
by the more important role and mandate of senior managers to bring about change. It would 
appear those trying to bring about changes (senior managers) had to exert influence in more 
dimensions, including at the cultural level. 
 In terms of how culture is embedded in strategies, it would appear that one can get 
good indications of this by observing how staffs reacted to critical events. As an example, a 
more emotionally charged atmosphere emerged as therapists found out their past skills and 
experience were not openly valued by senior managers or even by the team leaders. The 
message to lower level staffs, particularly the therapists, was clear: “out with the old, in with 
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the new”. The shift to the neutralization strategy by embedding facts into one’s point of view 
was highlighted in the data presented earlier. This may explain why senior managers empha-
sized neutralization more than the other groups. 
 The use of socialization by senior managers provides further evidence in support of 
Schein’s (1990; Jones, 1986; Feldman, 1988) notions of organizational culture. In trying to 
create a new culture and identity for the new community mental health centre, the govern-
ment Steering Committee seemed to have purposefully hired new senior managers who did 
not know the old ropes, thus making it easier to steer new members to the “correct” set of 
beliefs using socialization. 
 The cultural influence perspective also helps understand reasons why resistance to 
change was so high. First, by devaluing past experience and making no commitment to the 
stability of current intervention programs, senior managers unwittingly created resistance 
from the start. Not having the active support of the team leaders, they were left to try to in-
still new practices for a new organization, but in a context where there was much past bag-
gage. This was emphasized from the outset when the government Steering Committee hired 
a completely new management team (to the exclusion of former managers and team leaders), 
placed them at a separate location, and encouraged little contact between the management 
and staffs before the transition. The message was clear: “let’s start from scratch”. As Kotter 
(1996) suggests, perhaps they should have recognized and dealt with (rather than try to 
eliminate completely) the old practices: “The challenge is to graft the new practices onto the 
old roots while killing off the inconsistent pieces.” (p. 151) The cultural influence perspective 
helps understand that the senior managers unfortunately tried to kill off all the old roots and 
start from a completely new base. 
 The second dimension of the cultural influence perspective examines cultural identity 
rather than organizational culture. We have provided several examples of how the Native 
and Francophone groups in the present study manipulated cultural identity into a source of 
power and into their strategies. We found no evidence that the process for invoking the 
power was different between the groups, however. Both used their respective Community 
Advisory Committees as allies or in coalitions, and both invoked some degree of moral 
autonomy by staking their position in the source of expertise that cultural identity provides. 
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We noted no significant differences between the Anglophone, Francophone, and 
Native cultural groups in terms of top-down versus bottom-up approaches, possibly because 
they all worked for the same organization, under a single mandate, in the same community. 
Some degree of assimilation between the groups could be expected. This contrasts with 
Faucheux (1978) who finds style differences in the way strategies are used. The differences 
are probably due to the different context of the present study. We did not find that the dif-
ferent cultural groups handled conflict differently, although a larger sample in further re-
search may shed more light on the subject. 
Other more recent research examined similar issues and has provided some under-
standing of the importance of culture. Frese et al. (1996), for example, found that East Ger-
man workers had lower personal motivation in organizations than West Germans because of 
traditionally lower complexity and control in their own jobs. Application of these findings to 
the present study is problematic, however, due to the different sampling, organizational re-
search contexts, and political and national contexts. We also did not study motivation per say 
in the present study. Research of this type merits a full study of its own. 
Contributions such as Schein’s (1990, 1996) from the cultural influence perspective 
are notable because they support the concept of deep level strategies. Socialization of new 
members, for example, aims to steer members to a “right” set of assumptions, thus perpetu-
ating their culture and ideas. The present research shows that clashes of values or beliefs are 
indications of possible conflict. If the values are shared, organizational functioning is 
smoother. If there are differences between groups as evidenced in their deep level strategies, 
there is evidence of problems. 
Additionally, we fully support Schein’s (1996) call for more interdisciplinary ap-
proaches to the study of organizational culture and its impact on organizations. 
“I think it is a difficult process, and our theories are weak because we have 
not practiced it enough. Particularly in relation to culture, when I see my col-
leagues inventing questionnaires to “measure” culture, I feel that they are 
simply not seeing what is there, and this is particularly dangerous when one is 
dealing with a social force that is invisible yet very powerful. … We could 
learn from spending more time in with colleagues from related but different 
disciplines. It is comforting for the social psychologist trained in question-
naire or laboratory methods to spend time with colleagues who have the 
same training, but it might be more productive for that psychologist to go in 
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to the field with an ethnographer or become a participant observer in a real 
organization.” (p. 239) 
 
7.2.5 The Multidimensional Perspective 
 The multidimensional and the power relations and games perspectives are the re-
maining two categories of approaches to strategy formation that we will examine. 
 The multidimensional theories encompass several different approaches, each with its 
own particular focus. Data from the present research support only some of those ap-
proaches. The evidence presented, for example, does not fully support Hax’s (1990) asser-
tion that uncovering the major milestones or steps an organization has taken in the past will 
indicate the organization’s future direction. While examining the history of the organization 
has certainly been beneficial in providing contextual information, we find that the turbulent 
and unpredictable dynamics observed prevent tracing the future path of the organization. 
The only thing we can accurately predict is that turbulence can engender more turbulence. 
Hax’s concepts also are problematic because they are geared more for the profit sector 
where uncertainty is low. Application to non-profit organizations is limited. 
 Support for Pettigrew’s (1978, 1992) and Waema & Walsham’s (1990) notions 
around strategy formation is much stronger. The concept of identifiable and more discrete 
elements behind strategies seems to be a precursor for the surface and deep level strategies 
we uncovered. More importantly, however, the evidence supports Pettigrew’s assertion that 
through time, organizational members will face dilemmas that require them to make choices. 
We observed, for example, that when new problems arose or dilemmas were created by 
therapists (e.g., refusing to sign a performance appraisal), this created a new set of dilemmas 
and forced choices at other levels of the organization. It also required members to call upon 
other resources to deal with them (e.g., the team leader having to try a personal approach, 
then telling the staffs to sign the performance appraisal in an assertive tone). As we have 
shown, these choices are influenced by a series of factors including culture, internal and ex-
ternal politics and structure, past history, and psychological perceptions, among others. 
 In terms of turbulent environments, it appears that Pettigrew’s formulation provides 
a strong basis for analysis of the opposition of past and future that we observed. It ensures 
that historical and political contexts remain at the forefront, and it is compatible with the 
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notion of emergent theories. Pettigrew’s approach should be expanded somewhat to allow 
more precise guides for studying how values and cultural identity infiltrate strategies, how-
ever. 
 Having used Pettigrew as a launching point for his research, Dufour’s (1991) exami-
nation of implementation issues in closing maternity units has some relevance to the findings 
in the current study. The focus of the present research did not include as large an analysis of 
the external political context, however, and Dufour’s focus was more on the strategies that 
higher levels of the organization used for implementing unit closures.  
 The three principal groups of factors affecting implementation that Dufour identifies 
provide limited tools for analysis in the present study. The nature of the locale (e.g., geogra-
phy and socioeconomic variables, and the rate and pace of change), and the quality of the 
change proposals seemed less important in the present research than in Dufour’s study. The 
leadership strategies that Dufour identifies, however, have more application and our findings 
support them. Our findings parallel Dufour’s legitimating strategies (e.g., influencing how 
others feel about change; strategically reducing service levels before a closure), enforcing 
strategies (e.g., using legal authority), and bargaining/negotiating strategies (e.g., reducing 
expectations even if at the expense of the original intentions). We cannot compare the em-
phasis placed by different hierarchical levels and between newcomers/veterans, however, 
because this was not Dufour’s focus. He does not provide discussion of the different levels 
of the organization. 
 We cannot compare the current research with the option lens model either. (Bow-
man & Hurry, 1993) The evidence supports the proposal that organizational members some-
times use mixes of rationality and “gut feeling” because planned strategies often fail in turbu-
lent environments. It also supports the idea that they keep their options open. The option 
lens model is weak in explaining dynamics at a deeper level, however, with the absence of 
any discussion of values, beliefs and culture. The findings of the current study are more 
complex than what Bowman and Hurry propose.  
 In essence, several theories in the multidimensional perspective provide little light on 
the current findings, while others such as Pettigrew’s and Dufour’s contextualist model ap-
pear to offer tools that can be useful for examining surface and deeper level strategies to 
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some degree. The focus on upper management levels for most of the theories leaves little 
room for comparison with the present findings, however. Examining the actions and pat-
terns of strategies of lower level staffs would be useful. 
 
7.2.6 The Power Relations and Games Perspective 
 The final perspective or group of theories reviewed in Chapter 2 is the power games 
and relations perspective. This approach puts the focus on interactional dynamics in organi-
zations and examining conflict between organizational members, who each work within 
and/or outside the organization to change it. The strategies examined in the present research 
clearly show individual and collective attempts to control, or to lessen/prevent control by 
others. 
 Although its focus is on interaction between organizational members, the literature 
comprising this perspective is quite varied, and our examination has benefited by borrowing 
key elements from each and applying them. As the evidence shows, strategy formation is not 
something only for managers. We found uncontestable proof that other levels in an organi-
zation engaged power sources and strategies, thus supporting the literature in the power rela-
tions and games approach. 
 The evidence also clearly shows that the strategies used at all levels lead to a consid-
erably bumpy road for senior managers, particularly when it is their function and mandate to 
introduce and implement change. 
 Perhaps because of the small size of the professional organization we studied, we 
found little evidence that indicates the strategies would revolve around the basic mandate of 
the organization, nor that the professional staffs had an overarching discretion and power. 
(Mintzberg, 1989) While the therapists exerted professional discretion when with clients, 
they did not wield it in any threats against other groups. Instead we noted that it was the 
non-professional group, the senior managers, who used expertise as a power source to waive 
usual hiring practices for Native staffs and to hold those positions for persons having a 
strong Native background. Contrasting with Mintzberg, the present research found that the 
cloak of professionalism was used against the very staffs who normally would use it. 
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 The data support Crozier & Friedberg’s concepts that organizational members are 
active rather than passive in creating the reality they inhabit. Even if at first glance it appears 
that the team leaders and clerical staffs were passive through their absence of strategies, for 
example, we conclude that these were conscious choices to engage or not engage whatever 
sources of power were accessible to them. The “absence” of the team leaders between senior 
managers and therapists means they may not have had the power sources to act as a buffer 
between them, or that they actively chose not to get involved. 
 The notion of sources of uncertainty also receives much support from the present 
study. By definition, the presence of turbulence and unpredictability at all levels of the or-
ganization, as described in Chapter 4, led members to create dilemmas for others in the or-
ganization (e.g., purposefully not collaborate with change efforts that higher ups tried to im-
plement). The crossing of lines of communication is another example, where senior 
managers attempted to reduce uncertainty by bypassing/removing the union blockages and 
dealing directly with the therapists. In this light, creating uncertainty represented an oppor-
tunity. An implication is that the formal structure of an organization does not necessarily 
reflect the true nature of its functioning. 
 We have little data from Crozier’s & Friedberg’s research that can be compared di-
rectly with the present research. While Crozier & Friedberg discuss working to rule, doctor-
ing information, disrupting operations and using the cloak of expertise as actions used to 
create or prevent change, we found much less emphasis on these strategies. Rather, psycho-
logical non-involvement, reasoning and managing lines of communication appeared to be 
the focus. This may be the result of differences between the research contexts, however. 
Crozier & Friedberg’s French bureaucracies were much larger and presented different his-
torical, structural, cultural and environmental conditions. As the evidence shows, the inclu-
sion of underlying values and beliefs is important for drawing out less visible or hidden dy-
namics, something the two authors do not account for. 
 The research on coalitions reviewed in Chapter 2 sees some application to the cur-
rent study because we observed many dynamics related to coalitions. While we did not study 
the stages of coalition formation per say, the data weakly support Summers’ (1986) findings 
that coalitions and like groupings form around critical events, particularly when there were 
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threats to job security and to cultural integrity of the satellite clinics. There was very little 
evidence of coalitions from senior managers with external sources. Instead, the data showed 
that team leaders and therapists were actively invoking cultural rights and co-opting persons 
external to the immediate organization’s staffs. Garguilo’s (1993) proposals around the types 
of co-optation are very useful in this regard. Application of those proposals from the indus-
trial sector to the human services sectors is thus possible and was fruitful to the present re-
search. 
The present research has found that clashes of values, beliefs, and cultural identity 
between levels indicate serious organizational problems. This parallels work in the field of 
family therapy (Selvini-Palazzoli et al., 1984; Imber-Black, 1988; Mills & Murgatroyd, 1991, 
among others) that identifies visible external behaviors (e.g., conflict between senior manag-
ers and therapists) as symptoms of deeper issues in a system (e.g., clashes of values around 
past history). The model goes to the root of the problem by examining the boundaries that 
mark the groups, cohesion or disengagement between members, repeated patterns of behav-
ior that reveal how the group functions, and value differences, contrasts, and similarities be-
tween its members. While it was beyond the scope of this study to measure the entire appli-
cability of such a model over large samples and multiple contexts, the basic concepts 
certainly have had value in the present study and provide fuel for further research along 
these lines in organizations. Empirical data in the present research appear to provide strong 
support for the concepts although they originate in a different field and focus on different 
types of systems. 
The proposals on which the present research mostly bases its foundation are those 
brought forward by Frost (1987), who attempts to bring several of the above dimensions 
together. Assumptions leading Frost’s model include viewing organizations as significantly 
influenced by the exercise of power by their members.  The high amounts of energy and 
time that we observed staffs putting into power issues provides proof that power is an inte-
gral part of human service organizations. We also provided evidence that all levels are in-
volved. This is not to say that every human service organization is involved in the same way, 
but that power comes through the organization in one way or another. 
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A second assumption is that power exists on surface and deeper levels. As the evi-
dence shows, there were nearly one thousand references to surface and deep level strategies 
spread across the four hierarchical groups. The uneven distribution of the strategies across 
the groups is partly a reflection of differing access to sources of power that are irreplaceable 
(e.g., Native therapists cannot be replaced easily) and the differing opportunities to use them. 
The sources of power are central to the work of the mental health centre (e.g., the mental 
health centre cannot function without professional therapists), and are pervasive because 
they influence every part and every level in the organization. The sources of power we iden-
tified also may have an immediate impact on the organization (e.g., if a secretary purposefully 
delays calling the maintenance man to fix the heating, the impact will be felt quickly across 
the building). It may be argued that not all sources of power have an immediate impact, 
however. Particularly for the senior manager’s group, the data showed that manipulation of 
power sources (e.g., cultural identity) into deep level strategies may take time to have an ef-
fect (e.g., socialization of new board members is a gradual process). 
While the present research was qualitative in nature, cautious comparisons with 
quantitative research around the use of power did not show many matches. Frost’s compila-
tion shows, for example, that upper level staffs (downward relationships) tend to use asser-
tiveness and sanctions to a high degree and moderate use of ingratiation, bargaining and ap-
peals to higher authorities. The present findings contrast with those studies in that the 
strategies exerting high amounts of social pressure received less relative emphasis. This per-
haps is due to risk aversion where staffs at all levels preferred not to rock the boat. The up-
per level also tended to appeal to the rational side of staffs while manipulating structure 
(lines of communication). 
These differences can be attributed at least in part to the turbulent context in which 
the present study was carried out. Other researchers (Kipnis, Schmidt & Wilkinson, 1980; 
Yukl & Falbe, 1990; Falbe & Yukl, 1992; Guerin, 1995; Gordon, 1996) focused on industrial 
contexts that did not necessarily involve strong negative relationships. It is plausible that 
when relational environments are heavily charged, senior managers do not use heavy-handed 
strategies because this would only create more negativity. Deep level neutralization in par-
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ticular is a “smoother” intervention strategy and it is less likely to provoke additional open 
conflict.  
It is quite probable that staffs were aware of the impact of the different types of 
strategies available to them. The use of authority as a power source, for example, does not 
incur the costs associated with coercion, deceit, or assertiveness, which are detrimental to 
relational growth. The costs would possibly include having to back down or to use rewards 
to gain the other party’s collaboration. Oftentimes, the relationship is beyond “repair”, thus 
crippling sources of power such as charisma. 
Similar inferences can be made for upward relationships. Findings from the literature 
on organizations and on social psychology (Roloff, 1976; Kipnis, Schmidt & Wilkinson, 
1980; Wayne, Liden and Graff, 1997) reveal in a mix of laboratory and limited field trials that 
upward relationships often involve use of reasoning, ingratiation and coalitions. The present 
data do not support the presence of ingratiation in upward relationships due to the turbulent 
context. The transparency and the perception of ulterior motives of such attempts would 
perhaps be a factor in their non-use. The presence of coalitions, however, was clearly noted, 
particularly around union issues and co-opting external participants. 
The literature is less clear around strategies of middle managers, on the other hand. 
Comparisons with our findings are thus not possible. The relative absence of lateral strate-
gies in our data also makes comparisons difficult. 
The evidence shows that the higher a person is on the hierarchy, the more potential 
sources of power and strategies there are. The analysis shows, however, that this potential 
does not always transform into actual power strategies. Senior managers had the option to 
use assertiveness and coerciveness, for example, but they put these strategies aside in favor 
of less negative strategies.   
A weakness in comparing the present results with the industrial literature is that the 
latter’s sampling often is done under artificial or contrived conditions using self-report ques-
tionnaires rather than actual human service organizations. Further research along the lines of 
the present study would shed more light and a basis for comparisons. 
 Through the power relations and games perspective, the present research has high-
lighted that persons with longer years of experience in an organization may tend to describe 
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events as more turbulent due to the higher investment in the organization. In addition, 
higher-ups are more susceptible to bear the responsibility for change and thus the blame for 
turbulence. Lower level staffs seem more engaged in resisting change. While this is due to 
the roles and responsibilities of each group, it implies that members involved in downward 
relationships need to resort to more different types of strategies. In addition, implementing 
change would seem to require more strategies than resisting change. The role of higher ups 
is to keep the turbulence down, thereby leading to less use of negative strategies. The heavier 
emphasis of upper levels in deep level strategies, which involve less negative dynamics, is an 
indication of this. 
  In summary, the data presented here provide support to the power relations and 
games approach. It has provided tools to draw attention to the inconsistencies and contra-
dictions in the organization and power issues within the organization. These inconsistencies 
can be a major source of organizational conflict and tension. (Mills & Murgatroyd, 1991) 
The model has its limits, however. It is inconceivable that it can be used to study all organi-
zations in all contexts. It also cannot account for all possible actions of organizational mem-
bers because such research is time consuming and difficult to carry out. The focus seems to 
be on internal processes more than on environmental relationships. A full analysis of every 
conceivable external relationship would require huge resources and a wide-ranging knowl-
edge of the organization studied. Having mentioned these limits, however, no model can be 
everything to every situation, and the power relations and games perspective provides excel-
lent tools for “digging” into observable and more discrete power dynamics as described by 
the participants. It also keeps “alive” the rich stories of the participants. The power games 
and relations perspective seems to provide the most complete view of strategy processes of 
the multiple theoretical perspectives that were reviewed. 
 
7.2.7 Concluding Summary  
 Through this study, we identified several elements that are involved in power dynam-
ics or strategies, including the availability of resources and information, the ability to deal 
with uncertainty, and the importance of including deep level analysis. Staffs at all levels used 
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strategies to influence the outcome of decisions. Strategies are thus vehicles through which 
we can observe members of an organization exert power.  
We recognize that the theoretical approaches discussed above are not necessarily mu-
tually exclusive and that there is some overlap between them. There is at least some truth in 
many of the perspectives. The argument that one perspective might be “better” than another 
is less important when one takes on an interdisciplinary view. It would not be difficult to 
find examples that don’t “fit” in some of the perspectives. Nonetheless, the literature on 
power has evolved in different schools of thought and is divided accordingly. The key is to 
find a perspective that examines actions of organizational members from several angles and 
dimensions. Examining surface and deep levels or organizational strategies is a step in this 
direction. 
 Several elements are linked to how power manifests itself. This research has pro-
vided evidence that having access to a source of power does not guarantee one can manipu-
late it into a strategy. Theoretically, upper level staffs in organizations have access to the 
largest pool of sources of power and opportunities to work on visible problems that are im-
portant to the organization’s functioning. Our research showed that this is not always the 
case, however, especially when cultural identity issues are brought into play. Senior managers 
often found it difficult to deal with these issues because of the abstract nature of such deep 
level dynamics. 
 Another factor we examined was newcomer versus veteran status in the organization. 
Those who tried to break radically with the past engendered a feeling in veteran members 
that their skills and experience were not wanted. Feelings of exclusion were a strong dynamic 
that shaped many attitudes and beliefs of veterans, particularly those around the credibility of 
change plans drawn up by newcomers. Differences in strategy formation were not as evident 
when examining length of employment (newcomers versus veterans) as compared with hier-
archical level in the organization, however. 
 In addition, the perception that a strategy was used appeared as powerful as if the 
strategy actually had been used. The perception that senior managers and team leaders had 
used sanctions despite no evidence to this effect is a good example. 
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 The long or protracted change period that had begun several years before was an-
other important element. Under such conditions, creating a sense of urgency often is de-
scribed in the industrial literature as crucial to implementing change. (Kanter, Stein & Jick, 
1992; Kotter, 1996). In an attempt to create a sense of urgency to rally people behind the 
changes, senior managers deliberately shared information with all employees and tried to 
convince them this was a turning point. The mindset that existed in other staffs, however, 
gave little credibility to this process, and issues around information and crossing lines of 
communication came to a head. Deep level strategies from management, designed to put a 
more constraining influence than surface level strategies alone, were not able to change the 
crisis into a potential opportunity for change. In essence, deep level strategies aimed at ad-
dressing the emotional and value systems of therapists did not have much impact because of 
insufficient power bases. The turbulent context seems to make it more difficult to use the 
personal relationship as power (e.g., ingratiation), particularly between hierarchical levels of 
an organization. 
 With all the tense power relations between upper and lower levels, one has to won-
der about the role of the team leaders or middle managers. With a small number of partici-
pants, it is difficult to draw conclusions, but we may hypothesize that their “quiet” position 
on the sides was a strategy that would help them quietly anchor their power in the Commu-
nity Advisory Committees. The belief that “make no noise and they’ll ignore us” could be 
behind this. 
 The study of strategies in this organization brought to light an important paradox. 
On one hand, it would seem that veteran staffs, who were from the “inside” of the organiza-
tion and were familiar and tired with its old issues and problems, would help lead the transi-
tion. Ironically, the same staffs who had integrated past orientations and ways of functioning 
were among the most active in blocking change. Their strategies focused on issues of man-
agers not recognizing the past. 
 This leads us to question the choice of a completely new management team to lead 
the divestment of a department of an established institution, to head up the new organiza-
tion, and to design and implement the transition of staffs. We may speak of a clash of vi-
sions, the two views being incompatible with one another. The new managers held a vision 
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of a completely new organization, one with new roots, one of excitement for the future that 
would do things differently and that would not repeat past mistakes. This compared to vet-
eran staffs who were going to be transferred to the new organization but who had well-
established roots at the psychiatric hospital. In our view, having analyzed the facts at surface 
and deep levels, it may have been erroneous to design a new organization as if the old one 
had never existed and to make everything “new”. Veteran staffs simply were not given the 
opportunity to graft new ideas onto anything. What they had was devalued and new manag-
ers made attempts to remove it from play entirely. 
 The model of analysis that we employed to study power strategies within the organi-
zation provided several insights into its functioning. First, the model helped examine the use 
of power within an organization undergoing protracted turbulent change. It provided struc-
ture to the analysis of the complex dynamics that occurred by examining power relationships 
from several angles. The model attended well to the actions of the organization’s members 
and shed light on how they dealt with contingencies and uncertainty that they or others had 
created. We also highlighted the historical evolution of the organizational power games and 
how the belief systems that built up before and during the turbulence were involved. 
 The model also provided some insights into how organizational actors manipulate 
power sources into power in action. Power is complex and not always easy to discern, and 
the framework of surface and deep level strategies provides at least some understanding of 
the factors related to strategy formation and keeps the richness of the data at the forefront. 
 The model also revealed differences between groups in the way they used the twelve 
surface and four deep level strategies. Those who did not share history with the former or-
ganization, for example, could not invoke deep level strategies in the same way as those who 
had worked there for many years, regardless of hierarchical position. This was particularly 
evident when comparing the managers and therapists. In essence, the strategic actions of the 
participants can be related to surface and deep level power structures. 
 Additionally, upon review of the evidence, we would argue against Mintzberg’s 
(1989) categorization of power strategies as legitimate and illegitimate. The term illegitimate 
implies a pejorative or devious view of power strategies. Power is not necessarily deviant and 
it may contribute to positive and successful organizational change, innovation, and allow dif-
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ferences of opinion to emerge. In essence, organizations may survive because of power strate-
gies, not despite them. Unfortunately, the focus on positive strategies seems to be forgotten 
during turbulent times.  
 A final note on strategies. We explained in Chapter 2 the difference between strate-
gies and tactics. As Mintzberg (1994b) puts it, strategies refer to important things, tactics to 
details. The fact that the data provided evidence of emergent strategies means that some-
times actions resemble mere individual tactics, but that in the end they often emerge as 
strategies. It is thus important not to prematurely categorize actions as simple tactics, and 
that the deciding factors are their timing and their context. 
 
7.3  EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND ISSUES 
ARISING FROM THE RESEARCH 
 
7.3.1 Qualitative analysis in the mental health sector  
This research has provided a detailed accounting of the power strategies used by 
staffs in a mental health centre undergoing turbulent change. Most studies have been carried 
out in the industrial sector. In addition, they have tended to limit themselves to cataloguing 
strategies in statistical ways that minimize contextual information. (Kipnis, Schmidt and Wil-
kinson, 1980; Yukl and Falbe, 1992; Gerin, 1995; Gordon, 1996) By adopting a qualitative 
approach, the present research has gone a step beyond to provide micro-level context for 
each of the strategies within the larger organizational context. 
The present study reviewed the literature from several disciplines and fields of study 
and grouped them into six different perspectives according to the angles from which they 
view strategy formation.  
This research studied nearly six hundred references to sources of power and one 
thousand references to power strategies. We grouped the sources of power into nine catego-
ries. The power strategies, for their part, were grouped into twelve types of surface level 
strategies and four deep level strategies. Each strategy was then compared in the way that 
different levels of the organization had used them. Senior managers, team leaders, therapists 
and clerical staffs were compared, as well as the dimension of newcomer and veteran status. 
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Through these data, we found there are no simple rules or single perspective for studying 
strategy formation. 
A contribution of this study was to provide evidence for cultural identity as a source 
of power because of its strong presence and use by the participants, something not included 
in prior research on power in the organizational context. The pervasiveness of the evidence 
suggests that cultural identity should be added to the basic sources identified in the literature. 
This study has collected extensive and detailed information about strategy formation 
at the micro level in a human service organization. Such studies are not common, especially 
in the context of community mental health centres undergoing turbulent change. While sev-
eral mental health centres have divested from psychiatric hospitals in Ontario over the past 
twenty years, few other studies to our knowledge have addressed micro level dynamics in 
such detail. The present data identifies clashes in values and beliefs as possible indicators of 
organizational problem spots. 
 
7.3.2 Application of the industrial literature to the non-profit context 
 Organizations everywhere face difficult change. Financial constraints, organizational 
restructuring of the social and health services, and new social mandates are creating huge 
pressures on organizations to change. To paraphrase Kotter (1996), even successful change 
efforts can be messy and full of surprises. Persons interested in navigating these organiza-
tional changes successfully will need to understand the nature of the micro-level processes 
that accompany change so that they can deal with them. 
 At the outset of this research, we highlighted the major differences between indus-
trial and non-profit organizations. We reaffirm that there are distinctions between the two. 
While industrial organizations often must be sensitive to cultural needs, they do so because 
of market forces, not necessarily because it is their social mandate. Publicly funded human 
service organizations do not have this luxury, at least in the Canadian context. Elements such 
as culturally appropriate social services are commonly built into the mandate of human ser-
vice organizations because of government decree. We feel, however, that the industrial litera-
ture is a valid starting point for studying human service organizations in a turbulent context 
as long as it is adapted contextually. Our comparison of the findings with existing theory 
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provide evidence of the applicability of some concepts from the industrial sector, such as 
behavioral elements related to resistance and the impact of culture on strategies. 
 
7.3.3 Focus on multiple levels of the organization 
 This research took a wide view of organizations, in contrast with the traditional top-
down view that permeates the literature. We examined power relationships in downward, 
upward, up-down, and lateral directions and provided detailed examples of how these take 
shape. We shifted the emphasis away from management-only to a relational one that includes 
other levels of the organization. We confirmed that employees at all levels of the organiza-
tion were involved in strategy making and that this was not the purview of senior managers 
alone. An obvious implication of this study is that strategy processes matter. 
Some members of the organization, particularly senior managers and therapists were 
more active in strategies than the team leaders and the clerical group, but the latter showed 
some signs of consciously removing themselves from the line of fire. Some groups were 
more involved than others, particularly the therapist and veteran staffs, but none were im-
mune from its effects. We also made comparisons between veteran and newcomer staffs that 
brought to light additional dynamics, especially those relating to past history and recognition 
of expertise and experience. 
The historical investigation we carried out, along with the identification of values and 
beliefs at all levels of the organization provided information on the conflicts permeating the 
organization. In essence, it was important to examine cultural issues at all levels of the men-
tal health centre, not only at the top. 
We challenge the notion that the study of strategy formation is for top management 
only. Our data strongly suggest that a complete picture of an organization’s functioning re-
quires examining multiple hierarchical levels. In essence, when examined in the context of 
turbulence and uncertainty, the study of surface and deep power processes provides infor-
mation and understanding about the relations between individuals at different hierarchical 
positions and their relation to the history of the organization. This research suggests the use-
fulness of comparative analyses across layers within an organization. 
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7.3.4 Adaptation of computer software for analysis of the data 
 A less obvious but nonetheless important contribution of this research was leading a 
reprogramming of the AQUAD (Analysis of Qualitative Data) software package with the 
originator of the software, Dr. Gunter L. Huber. Initially the software produced long print-
outs of codes and line numbers that had no attached context. This made it difficult to give 
meaning to them without sifting deeply through the transcripts, a very tedious process. After 
making several recommendations to the programmer to modify the software, and having 
tested multiple versions of it with him, we were able to add contextual comments to the 
codes that we used. These comments were now much longer than the four or five words 
permitted under the original software. Through the reprogramming of the software, qualita-
tive researchers using AQUAD may now have contextual information appear next to the 
codes on screen and in their printouts. We are thankful to Dr. Huber for his collaboration 
on this. 
 
7.3.5 Support for an interdisciplinary approach for the study of power issues 
 This research affirms the importance of an interdisciplinary approach to the study of 
power dynamics. Strategy formation is a dynamic process involving many sources of infor-
mation and angles of study. Rather than a static view, strategy formation takes place within 
organizations. Individuals do not function as disconnected people. They are members of sys-
tems within the organization, systems that have important effects on their strategies. 
Starting with a literature review, then contrasting it generally to our findings, this re-
search has confirmed the need to move away from the classical approach to strategy forma-
tion that relied heavily on the disciplines of economics, mathematics and statistics. Given the 
complexity of human service organizations and the high rate of change in them, particularly 
because of recent government pullbacks, it is imperative that the study of strategy formation 
takes into account the relevant aspects of many disciplines. To paraphrase Harrison (1981), 
different interdisciplinary approaches to power strategy formation represent particular seg-
ments of the real world at a given time and place, and under varying conditions. The review 
of these approaches in Chapter 2 reveals that a large number of variables may come into 
play. Because these have varying degrees of complexity, it is impossible to understand them 
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all and their scope. Thus, certain variables were chosen to study power in this research to 
understand the functioning of an organization undergoing turbulent change. The power rela-
tions and games perspective epitomizes the interdisciplinary aspects of strategy formation 
even without the other perspectives. In addition, this perspective reinforces the role of all 
members of the organization, not only top management, thus giving a systems view of the 
organization’s functioning. 
 This study has taken into account, with varying emphasis, processes involving psycho-
logical and behavioral processes (such as the team leaders’ tendency for disengagement to avoid 
getting entangled in uncertainty as a psychological force, and perceptions of therapists of 
having been the object of sanctions despite evidence to the contrary), sociological and social-
psychological processes relating to alignments and coalition formation and other group interac-
tions, personal value systems as evidenced in deep level strategies impacting reflecting cultural 
identity in Francophone and Native issues, environmental issues reflecting the political context 
of community pressure groups leading to the organization’s divestment from the psychiatric 
hospital in the first place, and political forces that constrained senior managers to move for-
ward with certain hiring practices despite strong resistance from the union, to name only a 
few examples. The empirical evidence supports the notion that none of these elements alone 
explains strategy formation, and that a review of all other components is essential before 
drawing any conclusions. 
 
        Chapter 7 — Discussion       
 
302
 
7.3.6 Considerations and implications for further research in the human ser-
vices 
 Although for practical reasons, the present study had to draw the line somewhere in 
terms of focus, there are several implications for practice and for future research. First, we 
recognize that knowledge about dysfunctional interactions, obstacles to change, and the 
process of change itself can be used to intervene in organizations. Knowledge of these ele-
ments can help us determine what steps we should take to redress the organization to a 
proper course. Studying surface and deep level actions of staffs in an organization allows 
leaders, regular staffs, researchers and consultants to examine power configurations that en-
able organizations to function more effectively, or conversely, why change efforts fail. 
 The growth and proliferation of “organizational consultants” and “strategy consult-
ants” over the past years say something significant about the difficulties these organizations 
have in overcoming historical issues and moving through turbulent times. Organizational 
change consultants should study not only the structure of organizations, but also carry out 
in-depth interviews with staffs at all levels to find out “where they are at”. As the evidence in 
the present research suggests, a debriefing process might be a useful tool for those undergo-
ing turbulent organizational change. Employees need to make sense of what is going on be-
cause events are often emotionally charged and carry lots of “baggage”.  Applied research in 
these areas would be useful. 
 In essence, it is unlikely that the study of politics in organizations has reached the 
saturation point, and it should continue as an area of theoretical study. Complexities of hu-
man service organizations, and the economic constraints that they face in light of funding 
cutbacks, make for a fertile field of theoretical study. Environmental factors, such as chang-
ing governmental mandates in the human services, make this type of study purposeful. 
 The findings suggest several directions for further research. First, there is value in 
pursuing the study of coalitions at a micro level and focusing on the integration of cultural 
values. While there has been some research in experimental settings (Summers, 1986) the 
natural environment provides contexts that other settings do not.  
Also, further studies of co-optation as a form of coalitions in the human services 
would shed light on how outside parties are brought into conflict situations. How these par-
        Chapter 7 — Discussion       
 
303
 
ties avoid or do not avoid being co-opted would be interesting as well. As discovered in the 
present research, however, such studies are very time consuming, even if observing a small 
number of participants.  
 It would be fruitful to study a larger number of mental health organizations to see if 
any additional patterns emerge in terms of strategy formation at surface and deep levels. A 
focus across several levels of the organizations would minimize the top-down focus that tra-
ditionally exists. Revisiting some of the more recent research on strategy formation that has 
focused on statistical methods and applying a qualitative examination would bring further 
contextual information to those studies. The research methods and model used in the pre-
sent research, although carried out on a smaller scale than the quantitative studies, could act 
as a starting point. Formulating those studies would probably require conducting case study 
research to disentangle the many elements tied into strategy formation. 
As shown in the present research, understanding the historical context of an organi-
zation is essential to understanding its current dynamics, particularly for deep level dynamics. 
Recalling Schein’s (1996) comments, development of analytical techniques that consider 
these issues is essential. 
 Although our findings are exploratory, it would be fruitful to draw comparisons with 
strategy formation in less turbulent human service organizations. Other human service or-
ganizations should be examined in terms of the use of both surface and deep level power 
strategies. We have identified strategy formation in a professional bureaucracy, which Mintz-
berg (1989) characterizes by a participatory and democratic functioning from professionals. 
Other less professionally oriented organizations, such as volunteer agencies, may provide 
further data into strategy formation in the human services. Observations across different 
levels of the organizations would provide excellent information about strategic behavior. 
 Further research that identifies and assesses the effectiveness of specific strategies in 
various kinds of human service settings is needed. Additionally, following on Dufour’s work, 
it would be interesting to compare if some strategies are not successful in the short-term but 
eventually become productive to those who initiated them. The mix and flow of different 
types of strategies would provide valuable information on combinations of strategies that are 
productive under certain conditions but not others. 
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 Organizational dynamics can sometimes become extremely painful and stressful to 
its member. In extreme cases, it can go out of control, as in cases where organizations are 
shut down because they can no longer meet their mandate and are rife with conflict. Other 
examples include firing entire senior management teams, and full boards of directors resign-
ing. Understanding what leads to these conditions and what might be done about them is an 
interesting area for more research. These situations may produce opportunities for new 
strategies not yet identified. Studying new games in deep organizational structures, and the 
way they shift between levels, also is a promising area for future research. 
 We have noted the relative absence of clerical staffs in the dynamics. Further re-
search could help determine if this is an active or passive strategy. Unfortunately, our sample 
size was small. The number of power sources and strategies used by this group was small as 
well, making conclusions difficult. Larger samples in the human services sector would be 
helpful in this regard. 
 In terms of practical organizational interventions, researchers should examine de-
briefing of staffs. The protracted and difficult interactions we observed between staffs pro-
vide proof that even mental health workers are not immune from stresses and conflict, and 
that they may need some form of closure to the turbulence. Research examining issues 
around types of debriefing for each level of hierarchy, conditions for initiating debriefing 
processes during and/or after turbulent change, and the short- and long-term effects of such 
are but some of the questions for further research. 
 Concerning research methods, difficulties are inherent in studying deep level strate-
gies due to their often discrete nature in organizations. Refined techniques for shedding light 
on these and putting them in the context of a historical analysis of organizations would be 
welcome.  
 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
 As seen through the eyes of the participants in this research, power dynamics are not 
just a concern for senior managers. Power affects persons at all levels of human service or-
ganizations, although in different ways. Thinking systemically, everybody in the organization 
affects everybody else. Change strategies require that employees exit their comfort zones and 
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go into unknown directions, regardless of their hierarchical position in the organization. The 
study of organizational processes at all levels provides a much better picture of power issues 
and dynamics than studying from a top-down perspective alone as the literature has tended 
to do. 
The complexity of power relationships in organizations stresses the importance of 
studying the less visible or less tangible aspects of power. This highlights the shortcomings 
of research that focuses primarily on top-down decision-making. The implications of what 
goes on must be understood through an analysis of less immediately visible aspects of 
power, which are studied through surface and deep level strategies. 
 While the data presented in this research highlighted serious organizational prob-
lems, we are nonetheless hopeful for its recovery. To paraphrase Friedberg (1993), if the data 
presented in this research allow the organization’s members to understand their system bet-
ter, or at least to understand their own actions within the larger context, it perhaps also can 
allow them to re-examine their points of view about their organization, its constraints and its 
opportunities. We hope this will provoke positive changes in the organization in the end.  
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APPENDIX A 
Before each interview, we asked the participants to sign the following consent for tape 
recording. None of the participants refused to sign the consent form although one person did 
not want to be tape-recorded. The consent form for that person was modified to read "Consent 
for use of interview materials". 
 
CONSENT FOR TAPE RECORDING 
 
 
I, _____________________________, consent to the tape recording of 
interviews by Daniel Côté, Ph.D. candidate at the University of Montreal, and to the use 
of such material for research purposes and publications related to this research. 
 
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be 
identified with me will remain confidential and will be disclosed only with my 
permission.  I understand that this research is bound by the research guidelines of the 
University of Montreal and by the Code of Ethics of the Ontario College of Certified 
Social Workers. 
 
 
 
CONSENTEMENT A L'ENREGISTREMENT  
 
 
Je, _________________________ , consens à l'enregistrement d'entrevues par 
Daniel Côté, candidat au Ph.D. à l'Université de Montréal, et à l'utilisation de ce matériel 
pour des fins de recherche et de publication. 
 
Toute information obtenue dans cette recherche et qui pourrait m'identifier 
demeurera confidentielle et ne sera divulguée qu'avec mon consentement.  Cette 
recherche est régie par les lois de l'Université de Montréal concernant la recherche, ainsi 
que par le Code de déontologie du Collège des travailleurs sociaux agréés de l'Ontario. 
 
 
 
_________________________  _______________________ 
Participant’s signature   Date 
 
 
__________________________ 
Daniel Côté, M.Sc., C.S.W. 
Certified Social Worker 
Researcher / Chercheur 
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APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
The interviews were semi-structured. While the researcher took an active role in the 
interviews by often prompting and asking questions, there remained room for the 
interviewees to expand on topics they felt were important to the research. This allowed for 
greater exploration of the topic as per the perceptions of each participant. 
There was a general format for the interviews. This format was drawn up from the 
researcher’s own experiences with organisations, reviews of documentary materials, other 
doctoral dissertations (e.g., Dufour, 1991), and informal discussions with staff between 1990 
and 1992. The interviews lasted on average 1½ hours. The topics covered were broadly 
grouped into three categories: events leading to the turbulent changes, personal and 
organisational problems brought about by the organisational changes, relationships 
concerning actions and strategies to deal with the organisational changes. 
Examples of the interview questions are grouped below according to general area. 
Some themes overlap in several categories. Not all questions were asked of each participant 
except for the opening question below. 
• Opening/start-up question for all interviews: 
 
If you were to describe your organisation in a few words, what three words would 
you use? 
 
• Questions related to the history of the organisation: 
 
What events led to the split of your organisation from the psychiatric hospital? 
What events do you see presently as turbulent?  
Which events were critical? 
What kind of rumours circulated at the time? 
What kind of opposition was there to the divestment from the hospital? 
 
• Questions related to job functions: 
How long have you been working for the present organisation? With the former 
psychiatric hospital? 
What does your work consist of? What are your job title and functions? 
What, if any, changes have occurred in your job since you have been with the 
organisation? 
What aspects of your job are the easiest? The most difficult? 
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• Questions related to relationships within the organisation: 
 
Who supervises you?  To whom do you report? 
What are your links with the other satellites? 
Through whom do you go when you want to communicate with other workers in the 
other satellite clinics? 
What is it like to work here? 
Describe the relations between administration, middle managers and front-line staff. 
Who makes decisions in your unit?  ...in the organisation? 
What problems do you encounter in your work? 
 
• Questions related to turbulence: 
 
What is your definition of turbulence? 
What are some examples of the turbulence that you experienced? 
Who was involved in the turbulent events? 
What did people do / what strategies did they use to counter the turbulence? 
 
• Questions related to relationships with outside organisations: 
 
What relationships does your organisation have with the provincial government? 
What government policies / events had an impact on your organisation? 
How did provincial financing play in the turbulence you have experienced? 
Are there any other local organisations involved in these difficulties? 
How are professional associations involved? 
 
• Questions related to taking action on something: 
 
What major problems do you encounter in your work? 
What / who triggered the problems? What was the turning point where they could 
not be ignored anymore? 
How long did the problems last? 
Who was involved? 
How did staff react to the problems? 
How were the events handled? What actions / decisions did you take? What actions 
or decisions do you perceive others took? 
What did you think about those decisions? 
How did you get involved? What support / opposition did you offer? 
Who agreed / did not agree? 
How did you get support for your actions / decisions? Who did you involve? 
How were the decisions presented to you? 
Was there any consultation about the decisions that were taken?  
Did the decisions resolve the problems?  ... make them worse? 
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What goals do you have in this organisation for the next six months? How would 
you achieve them? 
In your opinion, how could you improve the agency?  How would you go about this? 
If you had a magic wand that you could use on this organisation, how would you use 
it? 
 
